They say only that it seems that way — Luke
or that our perceptions are shaped by those objects. — Luke
None of these quotes state or even suggest that the naive realism position is that their perceptions have the same physical constituents as the perceived object. — Luke
It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.
Naive realists claim that it is the distal objects themselves, not mental representations, that are the constituents of experience.
Experience is an act where the “distal objects” that we experience are acted upon in a certain way. — NOS4A2
Disjunctivists and their opponents agree that veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations have something in common, in so far as they agree that such mental events should be grouped together as being perceptual experiences. They also agree that there are differences to be marked between them, hence the different labels for them. However, they disagree when it comes to specifying what these commonalities and differences consist in.
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Some disjunctivists claim that veridical perceptions have a phenomenal character that hallucinations cannot possess. For example, according to one version of naïve realism (what we might call ‘naïve realism about phenomenal character’), when one veridically perceives the world, the mind-independent items perceived, such as tables and trees and the properties they manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine its phenomenal character.
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The disjunctivist may insist that in a case of genuine perception, even if the objects of perception are distal causes of the subject’s experience, they are also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it. So the occurrence of the relevant brain processes won’t be sufficient to produce the kind of mental event involved in perception, unless further non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of that kind of mental effect also obtain.
This isn't what naive or indirect realists mean by "experience". They are referring to a particular kind of mental state with phenomenal character. These are, we now know, what occur when the appropriate areas of the brain are active, e.g. the visual and auditory cortexes.
or else we’d be able to describe with some degree of accuracy what is actually going on in there. — NOS4A2
A perfect example of the difficulties with language: to impute dualism to actuality is metaphysically disastrous, re: whatever is just is, Aristotle’s A = A, but when actuality is qualified by “mind-independent”, a dualism is automatically given.
An overly-critical analyst might even go so far as to assert there is no such thing as “actuality” without an intelligence affected by it, the repercussion being non-dualism is impossible, from which follows A = whatever I think it is. — Mww
Respectfully, I submit that our intelligence is dualist in its logical structure, and language merely represents the expression of its employment, so our mindsets are at least that far apart. — Mww
Anyway….historically we’ve noticed between us the pitfalls of OLP, so in that respect, we’re not that far apart. — Mww
The definitive footnote: it can only be said what is seen is the shoe iff there is already extant experience of that particular distal object... — Mww
….we never see shoes. — Banno
To clarify, when you say that, according to naive realism, perceptions and perceived distal objects have the same physical constituents, do you take this to mean that perceptions and the perceived distal objects are identical? — Luke
So, distal objects are literal component parts of conscious experience; in the same sense, perhaps, that the red paint is a literal component part of a painting — Michael
...our perceptions are shaped by those objects. — Luke
To clarify, when you say that, according to naive realism, perceptions and perceived distal objects have the same physical constituents, do you take this to mean that perceptions and the perceived distal objects are identical?
— Luke
You'll have to ask naive realists for specifics of what they mean — Michael
This is the very point I am making. Non-naive direct realism is indirect realism given that they both accept that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience — Michael
I can only quote what they say — Michael
which is that the relation between conscious experience and distal objects is more than just causal and is non-representational, using the term "constituent", which means "being a part". — Michael
Are you quoting naive realists, though? — Luke
Naïve realism is the view that the conscious character of experience in genuine cases of perception is constituted, at least in part, by non-representational perceptual relations between subjects and aspects of the mind-independent world. — French and Phillips 2020
[N]aïve realists hold that ... [t]he conscious visual experience you have of the oak has that very tree as a literal part. — French and Phillips 2023
See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body. — Apustimelogist
It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.
[N]aïve realists hold that ... [t]he conscious visual experience you have of the oak has that very tree as a literal part. — French and Phillips 2023
when we describe what's going on when we dream and hallucinate we're describing what's happening to/in us and not what's happening elsewhere in the world. The indirect realist simply argues that the same can be true of veridical experience because veridical experience, hallucinations, and dreams are all of a common kind – mental states with phenomenal character – that differ only in their cause (which is not to say that we can't also talk about their cause). — Michael
Distal objects do both, cause and become and/or 'act' as necessary elemental constituents of veridical experience. — creativesoul
Conscious experience occurs in the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, — Michael
...therefore distal objects are not constituents of conscious experience.
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