Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, — Michael

I think that there are better options...

I think that there are better options... — creativesoul

Either naive realism is true or naive realism is false. It's a simple dichotomy.

The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

I think that that is a bewitchment of the mind by virtue of language use. It also shows the limitation of logic.

Validity alone does not warrant belief.

Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism,
— Michael

I think that there are better options... — creativesoul

Either naive realism is true or naive realism is false. It's a simple dichotomy. — Michael

I meant better options for rejecting naive realism than just indirect realism(indirect perception) of the kind you're arguing for/from.

There are more choices than just the kind of indirect realism that presupposes all components/constituents of all experience are located in the brain and the kind of direct perception that holds colors are mind independent properties of distal objects.

I meant better options than just indirect realism(indirect perception) as compared/contrasted to naive realism. There are more choices than just indirect realism that presuppose all components of all experience is/are located in the brain. — creativesoul

This is where I think there's confusion.

Naive realists claim that distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claim that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Either distal objects are constituents of experience or distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Therefore, either naive realists are correct or indirect realists are correct.

What third option is there?

I'm going to quote from Naïve Realism:

Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use. As understood today, the naïve realist claims that, when we successfully see a tomato, that tomato is literally a constituent of that experience, such that an experience of that fundamental kind could not have occurred in the absence of that object. As naïve realism, thus understood, sees perception as fundamentally involving a relation between subjects and their environments, the position is also sometimes known as “relationalism” in the contemporary literature. Typically, today’s naïve realist will also claim that the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. On such a view, the redness that I am aware of when I look at a ripe tomato is a matter of my experience acquainting me with the tomato’s color: the redness that I am aware of in this experience just is the redness of the tomato. As such a view appears to commit its proponent to a version of claim (3) above—that for one to see an object to have a feature, the object must actually have that feature—the inheritance of the name “naïve” realism seems appropriate. As for whether there can be naïve realist theories of senses other than vision, this is an issue that awaits a more detailed exploration.

The key parts are in bold.

Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense."

Those who call themselves non-naive direct realists seem to want to accept the first part but reject the second part, but I can't make sense of the first part except as the second part.

So the relevant considerations are whether or not these are true:

1. Everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence
2. The conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense
3. These objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have

If (1) is true and (2) true then direct realism is true (and (3) is true).
If (1) is true and (2) is false then indirect realism is true (even if (3) is true).

I think the scientific evidence supports the claim that (1) is true and that (2) and (3) are false. Therefore, I think the scientific evidence supports indirect realism.

There's more to it than whether or not distal objects are constituents of experience. But, as you imply, either that is the case or it is not the case.

Unless sometimes it is not, after it has been. (Hallucinations)

If our notion of experience leads us to say that we see cows, but cows are not constituents of seeing cows, then that alone warrants a careful reconsideration of the notion of experience we're working with.

Crossposted. I'll address the quote soon.

I mentioned before that direct realism was Aristotelian. It said that our minds directly contact the forms in the things around us. Indirect realism was a rejection of that kind of idealism.

Ironically, some in this discussion see indirect realism as a haunted scenario and reject it in favor of some kind of behaviorism in which perception plays a dubious role.

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael

You may be interested in listening to Searle's lectures on philosophy of mind. It's an entire course available for free on youtube. He has an interesting take on this subject matter that you may find appealing. You could start around lecture 8 to avoid the groundwork setting out the history/exegesis of the topic prior to him getting into his own view on it.

Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense."

Those who call themselves non-naive direct realists seem to want to accept the first part but reject the second part, but I can't make sense of the first part except as the second part.

So the relevant considerations are whether or not these are true:

1. Everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence
2. The conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense
3. These objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have

If (1) is true and (2) true then direct realism is true (and (3) is true).
If (1) is true and (2) is false then indirect realism is true (even if (3) is true).

I think the scientific evidence supports the claim that (1) is true and that (2) and (3) are false. Therefore, I think the scientific evidence supports indirect realism. — Michael

I personally would reject 3, for it overstates the case. Some, not all. I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked.

P.S.

Strictly speaking I would reject 1 as well, but for the sake of this argument, I'll let the attribution of "mind independent" to cadillacs stand, although they are not. It's the difference between an object's emergence and/or persistence as compared/contrasted with/to "existence". Cadillacs may persist for some time in a mind independent fashion, after they emerge in a mind dependent one. They do not persist until after they emerge, so...

I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked. — creativesoul

The important part is this: “… where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense.”

Distal objects like cows are causally responsible for the activity in my visual cortex, and so the resulting visual experience, but they are not constituents of that resulting visual experience.

To claim that distal objects are constituents of visual experience is to assert an unscientific account of visual experience.

I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked.
— creativesoul

The important part is this: “… where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense.”

Distal objects like cows are causally responsible for the activity in my visual cortex, and so the resulting experience, but they are not constituents of that resulting experience. — Michael

Right, for you, according to the framework you're employing, that's the important part, but science has nothing to say specifically about the notion of "experience" one employs.

For example, some hold that all experience can be reduced to the physical, in the head, or something similar. Consistency/coherency alone demands that all components/constituents within experience must also boil down to the physical, in the head, etc. That seems to be what you're arguing for/from.

Others claim that experience is entirely subjective, in the head, but cannot be reduced to the physical. They claim that experience has a qualitative nature to it, that there is something it is like to be an experiencing creature.

Others claim that experience is an ongoing process, consisting of all sorts of things, some in the head, some not. Consistency/coherency alone demands that not all components of experience are located in the head.

The history of the topic tends to work from/employ the subjective/objective dichotomy recently employing a basic materialist/physicalist approach. Searle argued against computationalism/functionalism. Nagel argued that the materialist/physicalist/reductionist approaches fail to explain the subjective nature of 'what it's like to be' an experiencing creature. Chalmers granted Nagel's argument and claimed that a purely reductive physicalist approach leaves out the subjective nature of qualia within all experience. Dennett wanted to eliminate the subjective 'what it's like' and the qualitative parts of experience by virtue of offering materialist/physicalist explanations in addition to showing the inherent issues with qualia.

I, for one, when it comes to the nature of experience, reject objective/subjective, mental/physical, and internal/external dichotomous approaches, because none of them are capable of properly accounting of things that consist of both, and are thus neither one nor the other.

What concerns us is the "conscious 'phenomenal' character of ... experience". I would say that the evidence strongly suggests that the conscious 'phenomenal' character of experience is either reducible to brain activity or supervenes upon it, neither of which allow for distal objects and their properties to be constituents. The connection between the two is merely causal.

I think I understand your position.

I suppose each position can be viewed as degrees of realism. If I am to use the aforementioned phrases (as it is, in itself), you think you perceive the world as it somewhat is, or as it sometimes is, whereas the indirect realist thinks he perceives the world as it isn’t.

What scientific account of the conscious 'phenomenal' character of experience allows for distal objects and their properties to be constituents? — Michael

The "phenomenal" approach presupposes a difference between reality and appearances thereof. So, that's of no help here.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids seeing things that are not in the brain?

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids seeing things that are not in the brain? — creativesoul

I don't know what you mean by "seeing things".

All I am saying is that visual experiences occur when there is appropriate activity in the visual cortex, that distal objects are often causally responsible for these visual experiences, and that these distal objects are not constituents of these visual experiences – and I think the science of perception supports this view.

I don't know what you mean by "seeing things". — Michael

If the cow is in the field, then it is not in the brain. If we see the cow, then we see things that are not in the brain. The cow is one of the things we see.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids us from seeing cows in fields?

If the cow is in the field, then it is not in the brain. If we see the cow, then we see things that are not in the brain. The cow is one of the things we see.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids us from seeing cows in fields? — creativesoul

As I have said before, I accept that we see cows.

But this has nothing to do with the dispute between naive and indirect realists. The dispute between naive and indirect realists concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of the phenomenal character of conscious experience. Naive realists claim that they are and indirect realists claim that they're not. I think the science supports the claim that they're not.

I don't want to keep repeating myself.

...this has nothing to do with the dispute between naive and indirect realists. — Michael

Sigh...

Yeah, other options should be that way, ought they not?

You asked for other options, and yet complain when they avoid the rabbit holes. Have fun, I've got a vanity to paint.

It's not in my brain. It's wildflower blue coloured paint, and that's not in my brain either. It's in the can. There are machines that can give an exact color match. You give it a sample, and it spits out a formula to exactly match that sample.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine.

Have fun.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine. — creativesoul

It's not odd at all. We build it to measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

This doesn't entail naive colour realism.

This is all just hand-waving and insinuation. When you present an actual argument I'll address it. — Janus

The wildest of ironies.
My (quite direct and detailed) argument is that hand waving is all that “your side” has in this conflict. Which is why clearing up the language is such an unreasonably effective riposte. This has been illustrated. And is now clearly instantiated here in this exchange.

“I’ll leave you to it”.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine. — creativesoul

The absolute epitome of trying to ignore the issue

What does our biological machinery do then, if not directly connect us to the world? Sometimes the causal chain is longer than others, but it is a direct link between the creature and the world nonetheless.

Biological machinery interacts physically with distal objects.

The indirect realist uses knowledge of how biological machinery works as ground to deny that we directly perceive distal objects. If we adhere strictly to the preferred framing of folk like Michael and perhaps yourself(?), we would have to deny any and all physical contact between cows and eyes. If we extend that criterion to other senses, we would be forced to say that physically forcing our face into a pudding pie and withdrawing it would not count as directly perceiving the pie. Even if and when our eyes were/are open. — creativesoul

This is a standard-sidestep that ignores, once again, the crux of the problem. I have bolded the absolute incoherent of this position. The bolded answers all of your incredulity quite well, I think.

I understand that there's a distinction without a difference here - A hand touching a cow is obviously direct (setting aside the weird physical nature of touch actually consisting in repelling forces). Our experience of it cannot be, on any account, direct. I beginning to lose patience with the move trying to be made here that because our body directly interacts with objects (in this one avenue of sense, anyway) that somehow our mind is doing the same thing. This is patently untrue, and at this stage it seems the burden is on the direct realist to explain how this is hte case.

There's a Hard Problem of Consciousness Solver badge in it for you ;)

See what happens when one irrelevant comment is made? It becomes the focus. Easy to avoid the difficulty that way, I suppose.

:brow:

The absolute epitome of trying to ignore the issue — AmadeusD

I strongly suspect you and I have different opinions on what the issue is.

If impressing one's own face into a custard pie does not count as directly perceiving the pie, then nothing will and one's framework falls apart if it is of the materialist/physicalist variety. One issue is the failure of Michael's framework to be able to conclude/admit that the custard pie is a constituent of such an experience.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine.
— creativesoul

It's not odd at all. We build it to measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

This doesn't entail naive colour realism. — Michael

To be expected from another option.

Says the guy who has spent weeks asserting that direct realism is false because it denies indirect realism.

Says the guy who has spent weeks asserting that direct realism is false because it denies indirect realism. — Banno

I haven't said that. I've said that the science of perception supports indirect realism and not naive realism.