In the Miso Soup - Ryu Murikami

Had to stop Perdido at about page 300 or so, I really liked the writing style and the city descriptions (this latter up to a point), but I found it became somewhat of a slog, in that he'll tell bits of the story, then spend pages on the city again and again, making it uneven.

Definitely will try it again sometime in the future, but, I wasn't really feeling it at the moment, especially towards the last 100 or so pages of my reading.

Some things don't have explanations though we seek them so, desperately wanting answers to every "why" we pose. But for every moment of fortune or misery experienced, the universe itself, does not care for our concerns or tribulations.

But there is far more to this than cosmic conspiracy- for we are part of the universe and we do care about ourselves and other beings. A very small, but nonetheless instructive example is the very fact that you encounter people here - complete strangers - having sympathy for you and offering the best advice they can give, in so far as experience has taught them so.

So a slight shift in perspective may be the first step in the re-imagination of the scope of the problem, from an uncaring universe, to caring people. Streaks of luck, ranging from the lowest misery to the highest ecstasy cannot continue indefinitely, the only true constant is change, in which case, all I can say is, I am sorry for the moment you are going through, and I hope better times will come, which cannot help but happen.

Not particularly much to say. Desmond Clarke, who has written a very thoughtful interpretation of Descartes, says that:

"Descartes is, at best confused about what substances are. Secondly. he consistently argues that we have no independent knowledge of substances apart from knowing their properties."

Sorry, I missed this reply somehow. I think it's a bit more complex than that, I mean there is no doubt that being a religious fanatic can be very problematic and even dangerous, we have plenty of examples throughout history that exemplifies this side of religion.

On the other hand, I don't agree about "synthetic" or "fake" experiences. I don't think they are this and would have trouble imagining what a "fake experience" could be. You can say, afterwards, that your judgement about an experience was mistaken, the experience itself wasn't false.

And there's a lot of variety too, you are right that some Christians go overboard when they start speaking in tongues. But there's also plenty of people who have a religious experience that don't do extreme things.

So it's a bit too broad-brush to say that all of this is fake or illusory, as I see it anyway.

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection. — Fooloso4

The will argument is somewhat strange, especially when he says that the scope of the will is larger than the scope of the intellect. Since he allows for degrees of perfection, there are aspects in which we could be more perfect.

I had in mind the following quote, near the end of the Fourth Meditation:

"And I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural light which God gave me is no greater that it is; for it is in the nature of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and it is the nature of a created intellect to be finite."

Continuing in this line, a bit further down, in which Descartes speaks of the will, as you have quoted, he also says:

"... but it is undoubtedly an imperfection in me to misuse my freedom and make judgements about matters which I do not fully understand. I can see, however, that God could have easily brought about it that without losing my freedom, and despite the limitations in my knowledge, I should nevertheless never make a mistake."

He proceeds to say that he could see how it might be more perfect that we live in this world than one in which we never make an error and then:

"And I have no right to complain that the role God wished me to undertake is not... the most perfect of all."

According to the argument it is not simply knowledge that God exists, but the claim that God would not deceive us that guarantees that clear and distinct ideas can't be wrong. — Fooloso4

Thanks for precision, that's correct, he does say that. But that specific part of the argument doesn't seem to me to have aged very well.

At bottom is a reliance on reason. For even his claims about God depends on reason. Further, he has established that even if God is a deceiver, his Archimedean point, his knowledge that he exists, established by reason, is fixed. — Fooloso4

Yes, I agree. The thing is I don't see reason as being "transparent", that is, I can't get to the bottom of reasons in a way that I feel no problems in "seeing", this is as simple and as foundational as any reason can get, there's just so much in every judgment and proposition that are assumed.

:100:

Yeah, just like opium, it makes them feel good, but it could shut down options that they would otherwise pursue, maybe getting into political activism or something along those lines, because why bother? We are going to a better place, etc.

The promise is that of a better life in the afterlife, with no suffering, joy, bliss and happiness. It's especially prevalent in people who are very poor - I live in the Dominican Republic, I think the only country which has a bible in the shield of the flag - and whose loved ones have died, or have committed crimes - there's murders here all the time, every day, quite dangerous, nowhere near the levels of Haiti, but that's a bad comparison, cause Haiti is the worst country in the hemisphere in terms of poverty and life expectancy, but it's not a picnic here.

As for your other answer, I do not know. And have asked myself such questions. I can only assume that the biological drive to survive is so strong, that it overrides such thoughts and actions.

Again, I don't believe in any of this, and we have lots of evidence for all the bad things religions have done, but it has plenty of value for believers.

I mean, I've seen many people hang on to life due to a belief that there will be a better life after this one.

It's not true of course, nor does it resonate with me in any way. But my experience just shows me that for some people it does work, like nature does to you, and to me, to some extent.

It actually does. The Japanese, some of the most modern-stressed people in the world, prescribe forest therapy for burnout, grief, recovery from illness. — Vera Mont

I don't think we disagree on the large picture, but we seem to differ on the scope of the solution. That's right, Japan has the highest, if not one of the highest, suicide rates in the world. And nature can provide much needed help and relief.

What I am saying, is that it may provide a complete relief for some - for some period of time anyway - maybe for most. But what I'm adding, is that even if those people get relief from nature, it is not enough to ward off suicide, or waves of meaninglessness or depression for many.

It's a fantastic help, but not a total one, for man's conditions. For nature is beautiful and also lethal.

As do the gods, whose followers cause most of this suffering. The cruelties of humans to one another compensated-for by clinging to gods made in the image of men. As for natural disaster, I find it more spiritually and rationally acceptable that bad things just happen in an unreasoning, amoral universe than that a god causes them to happen as punishment for something a distant ancestor may or may not have done. May that's just me.... — Vera Mont

I don't disagree that it is easier to handle in this way for us, which doesn't make it easy.

I've seen cases of people who live near, often in nature, for all effects and purposes, that live pretty harsh lives, they have no income, no healthcare, no way to feel meaningful in life, because they have virtually no opportunity to get out of poverty and telling them you have mountains and rivers and hills, isn't going to help much.

I very much think it's circumstance dependent.

Is that a spiritual yearning, though, or an intellectual desire to make sense of things? — Vera Mont

I kind of take existence and the world to be a kind of (secular) miracle, so in this specific case, I cannot disentangle them. Most people would consider it an intellectual desire, but for me, it goes a bit beyond that.

You don't need to tell me about it, I very much agree with that.

But just because it may satisfy me or you, doesn't mean it will work equally well with everyone, for some it doesn't cut it.

I mean, sure mountains, beaches, jungles, the night sky, are all wonderful, but if one's child dies from starvation or one's whole family was killed, then these things have more limited utility.

I still feel the inclination to some philosophical framework, it does provide me with the "religious" equivalent, and is very interesting, at least to me.

But sure, nature can be great, on occasion.

I agree.

Ok.

:up:

And that quote is by itself perfectly sensible, not everybody has a constitution to think that all there is, is this universe here, following some laws and blind chance let us to be here. I mean, there's a lot we do not know, so I suspect even this scientistic version is bound to be missing crucial information.

Is this life enough? I don't think we can seriously say that to the face of many, many people who live in the most miserable and wretched conditions we can imagine. Because it isn't - or shouldn't be at least.

For others more fortunate, we can agree with Descartes and say:

"I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural light which God gave me is no greater than it is... I have reason to give thanks to him who has never owed me anything for the great bounty that he has shown me, rather than thinking myself deprived or robbed of any gifts he did not bestow." (Italics mine)

Of course, non-religious people would call this "nature", not God. But it's a valid perspective.

Even with this, some people won't be satisfied, and that's OK too.

Interesting OP. There's some merit to the idea that a good deal of talk about consciousness is often empty.

And frankly, I suspect that one of the issues is that, at least on our own human case, we are confusing self-consciousness thinking that I am thinking, or experiencing that I am experiencing, such that I can tell you "I am seeing a blue car racing toward us", is perfectly understandable and common, with consciousness, which would "just" be experiencing.

To be conscious is to be aware that I am reading these letters right now, or that I move my eyes, I'll see a light, but removing the propositional form.

We alter between these two meanings and find it difficult to imagine that we don't have a clue what it would be like to be a bat, in part because bats don't appear to show self-awareness. We do.

And also, another issue is that we still persist with this nagging idea of "dead and stupid matter", that that thing out there which makes our rocks and rivers, can't possibly think, no matter how it is configured.

But modern physics makes it evident that matter is not this way, it's not this block of concrete stuff, it's much more sophisticated than these notions. Still, seeing matter in this way shouldn't cause us to believe that matter so-organized must think, but at the same time, we should also stop short of concluding that matter cannot think.

The latter view is extremely less likely, but, should be noted anyway.

I mean, it kind of depends on the kind of atheism one is listening to or supports. For instance, Bertrand Russell, on the whole, seems much more levelheaded than, Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens.

This is partly explained by the time periods they grew up in, as well as personal temperament. The argument you list here is quite an accurate description of a vulgar kind of atheism, which needn't be the only variety one pays attention to.

In my own case, getting rid of religion was quite freeing, it just didn't make much sense to me and the questions I asked were never answered, or answered very poorly. So that sense of liberation can certainly cause some to think that others would feel the same if they had the same experience, which needn't follow.

Of course, once you realize that for some, a belief in some kind of God sustains them through very brutal circumstances, to condemn that is to be a jerk.

One major issue is that there is nothing like a "spiritual equivalent" in science, and this is a need people tend to have, as temporal, fragile, self-conscious beings. Until some kind of rational belief system(s) is developed, these issues will remain in some fashion.

There's a lot there and very careful notes taken, it is much appreciated, I am about to begin the 6th Meditation, but your posts deserve some comments.

I think most of your reading is on the right track, since I am no expert, but keep in mind that even after he has completed and developed this method, he says, roughly paraphrasing, that this method is as good as my reason can take me, because I cannot comprehend an infinite being, I only know that He exists and this guarantees that clear and distinct ideas gotten through this method, can't be wrong.

So, I would prefer to say that he strives for certainty, as far as human understanding goes, though some things we can't comprehend, we being finite creatures.

In modern terms, I suppose we'd say that some would like to find a certain indubitable starting point from which we can see that the foundation of our thinking as being completely seen through, a bit like seeing that 2+2=4, so a Cartesian project, without God and formulated differently.

But by now we know this is not possible, it's asking for way too much.

"Self" talk is very hard, and we would have to examine if those options you listed make sense, say of halving two selves. I think there is a sense in which Descartes "choppy" argument is rather reasonable, in that for me it feels as if the self and my feelings of it, fluctuate in intensity and intelligibility.

You can and you can also pick up the table with cup on top of it or you can pick the table apart, say by breaking one of its legs. Or you can sit on the table and use it as a chair, say someone who has never seen a table, might use it that way.

I found that substance dualism, likewise, fails to explain reality as well as analytical idealism because of the hard problem of interaction. — Bob Ross

It does - it feels intuitive, but it leaves many questions open, which need not even arise.

Firstly, objects in general, under analytical idealism, are not disassociated complexes: only other conscious beings are. The cup I am holding exists only nominally distinctly from the chair I am sitting on: they both do not have distinct boundaries like disassociated minds. — Bob Ross

If objects are not disassociated complexes, then that's much more sensible. And yes, these objects don't have a natural separation point in which we can say this is a cup and this other thing is a table, on which the cup rests on, there's no reason why we can't take both things to be a single object.

Secondly, I agree with you that DID is still a very newly researched psychological disorder, and that is why Kastrup notes it as a working hypothesis to solve to soft problem of decomposition. — Bob Ross

It's the eternal problem of the one and the many. Are we ourselves in reality separate beings or are we one being, that perceives itself as many? The latter option is not so trivial to get rid of...

Still basing a large part of one's philosophy on DID is risky and one should be cautious in relying on it too much. Maybe when more is learned, it could be sensible to use, or it could end up being a false avenue.

I may have already participated, if not I'd add:

Why not monism? What we seek is to try and understand how everything fits together, what is it about the world that allows so much variety, if the base constituents are simple, as they seem to be?

You can choose to accept pluralism, like William James and simply marvel at the multifaceted aspects of the world - this is valuable and instructive especially in terms of aesthetic appreciation. But it won't get you far, it seems to me to stop the search for underlying principles.

And who knows, the actual monism that exists in the world may be quite different from the idea we commonly get from monism in intuiting only a single thing, like a metaphysical big bang type substance. It could be very different from such notions.

With a sample of less than one, I can't say. I do like the writing and the visuals and the plot, no problems so far. Maybe it will get worse down the line, but it might be worth a shot.

I've come to believe that the term metaphysics itself is the problem.

Inasmuch as metaphysics purports to examine the nature of being, and being necessarily exists, then the subject-matter of metaphysics is incontestably real. In which case metaphysics is not different in kind from science, but only degree. Metaphysics must be an attempt to conceptualize the nature of reality insofar as that is not yet well-captured by science. Which certainly covers a lot of ground. However the notion of metaphysics as somehow distinct or separate from physics is misleading, a strawman. — Pantagruel

I think that's right and that's what I've more or less concluded after looking at the topic rather carefully for 4 years and still to this day. I also agree that metaphysics is "real" and is related to the nature of being.

I do not think it follows that metaphysics must be connected to physics, but it is helpful to the framework if what you conclude from a system of metaphysics does not contradict physics, otherwise your system is bad.

Two further comments:

1) I believe that we have restricted the scope of or knowledge to such a degree, that what was thought to be "capturable" by human thought turned out to be less than we expected: Descartes, Leibniz, etc. We know much less that they aimed for.

2) Yes, there is merit in the idea that it can be thought of as an attempt to conceptualize reality "ahead of physics", in a way. Which is why I believe the notion of "things in itself", for instance, or maybe idea of the ground of the given in experience are ideal candidates for modern metaphysics, more so the former idea.

The problem is that it seems to me we can only speak on these things on an "as if" basis, or negatively, as it were, saying what it can't be. Going beyond this would be going beyond what we can know in principle.

So, mostly agree, with minor reservations.

For novels, I prefer paperback (or hardcopy). I am close to halfway through but am reading quite slowly. Normally (with less distractions), I would have finished by now.

Yes, I agree, he writes very, very well and is quite vivid in his descriptions. Better writers? It's a matter of taste. David Foster Wallace, especially in his non-fiction is wonderful too, Jim Gauer has enviable style, a few others too, but Miéville is up there.

I would assume that the problem of evil does not arise for naturalists, not because of natural selection, but because ethics does not fall within naturalistic enquiry.

Good and evil are modes which we use to interpret the things that happen in the world, the world does not care either way.

Those who claim that a Great Being created everything and, crucially, this Great Being is All Good, do necessarily introduce the problem of evil into this worldview. Drop the "All Good" requirement, and evil is not a peculiarly puzzling problem, any more than good is.

I do agree that natural selection isn't particularly enlightening in this area, another "just so" story.

While leftists, of which I consider myself quite sympathetic, will, correctly point out that corporations are extremely dangerous too, I do think the OP has some merit.

As far as I can see, state religion by way of blind nationalism, is surely among the highest dangers we face as a species, just like the we have the right in the US praising red, white and blue, so too will Russian nationalists support Russia and Israeli nationalists support Israel, and "belief in country", whatever that could possibly mean, is strong enough to bring down the world in nuclear apocalypse.

All the worse because the idea of "supporting a country", whatever the country is, is one of the most nebulous ideas I can think of, it barely has a coherent meaning.

That's the one issue which I have a problem with his account: colors and senses are called by him (and Leibniz too, I would add) "obscure", presumably because he can't find the whatever is composite of certain, or maybe all colors. Maybe Leibniz had light or paint in mind, but he was arguing that green was mixture of yellow and blue, something like that.

Irrespective of that, it seems to me the colors, specifically (though sound too) are amongst the clearest aspects of conscious experience I can think of.

So that part of his account is confusing because color experience is manifestly evident, so the account looks incomplete.

It's unclear how to proceed with this passage, due to the differences in the aims of his project back then and what we know now.

I think what he has in mind simply the notion that when we perceive something in a manner in which we cannot say we obstructed by anything, say, bad vision or a confused understanding, we should take the experienced thing as true. It's complicated a bit by the fact that he mentions that things like colors are "obscurely" understood, which I believe he states in the Third Meditation, but we can set this aside for now.

My own impression is that when we do see things clearly, say a chair or a tree, we simply see clearly and distinctly, but I'm not confident it makes sense to say that the experience is either true or false, I hesitate here between thinking such judgments are true, or that truth doesn't arise.

I agree with him on the innateness claim, as I just don't see an alternative, unless we attribute cognition to the world. As for practices, activities and so forth, fine, so long as it is recognized that whatever these things are, and however they may vary, they are still innate to us as human beings, in other words it's within the range of what human beings do, necessarily.

That those of us who think it was the West's fault for Russian aggression must agree or like Putin or his government, it doesn't follow at all.

I don't recall anyone here say that they wanted the USSR back, so I don't know why you're bringing it up.

And who here likes it? Does anybody like invasions or war? Maybe, perhaps, some elements in the military, they are the hammer after all and everything looks like a nail, as the saying goes.

War is a disgusting indictment of barbarism in the 21st century, of which we have not learned enough, given how many there are.

But to suggest that those who disagree with your perspective like Russia or Putin, is misleading at best.

Fair enough, I think most of your clarifications are quite good.

We can put aside the "more reflexive" comments for some other time.

You learn (even if simply following others’ lead) how to “point”, how to “see”, how to “perceive”, as you learn how to apologize, thank, and promise, all together as the habits that Descartes is trying to pick apart, because we can reflect on our behavior and uncover the conditions and criteria that make up our practices. — Antony Nickles

In part, sure, we can do this, but it's an open question as to how far we can get by doing this, it doesn't sound reasonable or realistic to expect that by analyzing and reflecting on our "practices", we can do so with all of them.

Descartes, while being quite lucid, intelligent and thoughtful, at the same time though that human reason reached (or could reach) much further than what we'd say today. In this sense, him and Leibniz, for instance, seemed to indicate that we could know almost everything if we just follow the right method and continue developing the (then new) sciences.

This is important for the context of his claims.

I’m using “ordinary” in its sense of: not special, not as: unexamined; it is in contrast to creating clarity by abstraction from any context or regular criteria and requiring only the certainty of logic or science. But we are just as capable of precision and rigorous analysis of our ordinary criteria as a “philosophical” perspective. The wish for philosophy to have science-like conclusions is to cover for, or hide from, our messy, vulgar lives and so sets aside “people” and creates the metaphysical, whether it’s the mind or “advanced brain processes”. Descartes is actually saying that our first impression from our senses, say vision, is not as clear as when we uncover the criteria and conditions for, say, the activity of seeing—the inferences we make, the reasons that matter to us for doing it. — Antony Nickles

That's correct, we can have precise and rigorous analysis of "ordinary" perception and we often judge people's sanity or sobriety on this basis. Nevertheless, I don't take it to be a case that cover for our "vulgar lives" we try to infuse our ordinary perceptions with science, rather, the scientific or philosophical perspective (there was no difference back then between these terms, which is worth keeping in mind) is more reflexive and considerate than ordinary perception, we are puzzled by why certain objects look as they do under certain conditions, or why apples fall instead of going to the moon, etc.

In ordinary life, we are usually not bothered or puzzled by these things much.

It's a bit nebulous to me if that is what Descartes is intending to say, but that can be put aside.

I am claiming that—although it seems natural to assume—perceiving here is not a natural ability or brain function, but an activity like pointing, or negotiating (which is a critical differentiation, not terminological), and that “perception” is seeing what something “consists” of, it’s conditions and criteria, as Descartes did with the wax. — Antony Nickles

Sure, you can say perceiving is an activity, like pointing, I'd only add that we naturally take perception to be passive, no effort goes into in, unlike pointing, though we know that a tremendous amount of stuff is going on behind the most trivial acts of perception.

The brain allows for vision, which gives us information; but we are trained (or pick up how) to identify objects ( say, apart from identifying colors)—to use criteria to judge a goldfinch from a robin, a rock from a turtle. Think of making an error in identifying an object; now did you judge wrong, or did your “brain” make a mistake? And what really is it to “identify things”? We don’t always identify things. We don’t need to. So there are certain conditions, contexts, where we only can be “identifying things”. Looking for the right cereal box? Trying to determine the genus of a new species? Do I take an apple as an apple? Every time? — Antony Nickles

Ah well, here I believe it is a mistake to put it in terms of "training", unless you extend training to include a teenager being "trained" to go through puberty.

In ordinary conversation I'd say, "I made a mistake.", naturally the brain plays a crucial role here, but I wouldn't usually say "my brain made a mistake".

Sure, we frequently overlook, or generalize or we aren't even attentive. I don't think I've said that we are always judging objects, nor do I see Descartes arguing for this either, on the contrary...

I thought of you when I quoted it. You had mentioned it before but couldn't remember where you read it — Fooloso4

Yes and many thanks for that. It really is an important topic, that is sometimes made fun of or more precisely ignored, these are the very ideas that should be developed in modern times, they're extremely valuable, imo.

What would someone who had never seen a lamp see? In the old Yankee Magazine they would post a picture in each issue of some old object someone found. The question was, "what is it?" Which meant, what was its purpose, what was it used for. Of course, someone who did not know the answer might use it for some other purpose. What they see, I would argue, is not something other than what they did with it. — Fooloso4

Sure, the use of a thing very much plays a crucial role to our understanding of it. If the lamp is off, they could take to be a piece of art, perhaps, or a weapon or maybe even a paperweight. If the light is on, then I think the options narrow down a bit, but I can imagine they could think of it analogous to a big flashlight, or a fire stick, etc.

But in these examples, it is quite apparent how judgment plays a role, such that if we stayed with perception, we'd not be able to discern much, if anything.

Thanks for posting the line about hats and coats which is a crucially important topic, which I am particularly interested in, because it is much understudied and I think it's exactly right.

As to how the actual Optics pertains to these - I can't comment much, I have to read them. If I had to guess, when we just look at something, what we literally see with our eyes are colours and shapes and distances, but we do not judge what we see with our eyes, but with our minds: this the shape I am currently looking at, which is grey, elongated and thin, is actually a flexible lamp.

Below it, what I see it an irregular sized object, with some orange, black and white. When I judge what it is, it's a book with deckle edge pages, which accounts for its irregular shape.

I could argue that my merely seeing with my eyes, is clear, as nothing is obstructing my vision, but it is not distinct until I judge what my eyes are seeing. I believe some account along these lines, is what Descartes might argue, in relation to Optics.

I'll get back to you on that if I learn anything new in the secondary literature.

But if there is the possibility that Descartes’ terms need not necessarily be read as metaphysical, then isn’t that the imposition of a framework (even by Descartes), and in the face of textual evidence of an alternative? — Antony Nickles

You can attempt to do an epistemological take, without the metaphysics and argue, that in "vulgar" (or ordinary) life, many of these objects are confused and unclear, but when we go into a scientific/philosophical perspective, our ideas of these objects become clearer and more distinct.

as an activity apart from the brain’s sensory vision—this as a ball of wax by the ordinary criteria we judge “makes up” or matter to us about a ball of wax, or a thing to throw at someone, or an adhesive for a poster to a wall, etc. and not “perception” as a mental process like vision or requiring “mind” to be an object, rather than our (and our shared) means of judgment and identification. — Antony Nickles

This would be terminological and not too controversial, this can be called an "activity", without much trouble.

Yes, the mind being an object can be problematic, because despite Descartes heroic attempts to clarify what a mind is, we, to this day, aren't sure what it consists of. But I'd only point out that without a mind, perception alone amounts for very little.

So, there is a sense in which the mind/brain is the organ we use to judge and identify things, while adding the qualifier that it is people that judge and think, and not minds, which doesn't change the main point, but is worth mentioning.

But he is realizing that our ordinary criteria for judgment are enough without metaphysical abstraction, thus that we can conclude these are people from only hats and coats. — Antony Nickles

The metaphysics can get into the way and distract the extremely valuable point he is making. Again, giving an epistemological reading of his account can be fruitful, and we can think about not two different aspects in the world, but different aspects within which we divide the world.

One aspect being the less reflective ordinary life, the other being the scientific/philosophical one, the latter being the domain in which we notice that what we are literally seeing are hats and coats and not people.

I think it's important to note, as I have been reading a few decent secondary sources on the matter, that Descartes gets his "clear and distinct ideas" from his work in optics, in which he attempts to explain how stimuli relate to the eye and the brain, which was quite fantastic for the time he wrote it.

Sometimes we can't see things clearly, maybe there's dust or fog, sometimes we can see well but we can't judge the object well, because we are sleepy of confused.

Keeping this in mind, that he is thinking of his scientific works adds valuable context to what he's arguing for in the Meditations.

And as a side note, his comments in the Second and Third Meditations on out "common notions" in simply superb. He already made Sellar's "manifest image", "scientific image", 400 years prior to Sellars, really impressive reasoning.

I like Kastrup and I think he says interesting things, but he is knocking on an open door. First of all, very few people actually believe in "materialism" meaning, that very few people think that all we are bits of matter that can be reduced to tiny particles and that emotions are just chemicals.

They can say that, but if a loved one dies, we can ask them why they are crying over chemicals, and we'll see how much they really believe in this stuff.

Secondly, actual intelligible materialism, that is when materialism actually had a distinct meaning, was back in the time of Descartes up to Newton, that materialism postulated that the universe was a grand machine, like a master clock, made by the best imaginable artisan, God.

But mental properties couldn't be explained by these mechanical properties, ergo dualism. But then Newton came along and showed that the world does not follow our notion of machines, and intelligible, defensible "materialism" collapsed, as Newton himself expressed, in his famous "It is inconceivable..." quote.

Lastly, we know so little about personal identity and how it actually works, that it just makes no sense to say objects in the universe are "disassociated complexes" of a universal mind.

If we don't have a clear notion of identity conditions for ourselves (see the gender debate, or DID personality disorder, which Kastrup frequently cites, the latter which is extremely difficult to manage, and not well understood at all), what sense does it make to say that objects in the universe are disassociated?

It's an interesting perspective, but it's missing extremely important historical elements which render this kind of idealism incoherent.

What it means is that, out of 8 billion or so people in the world, several could survive, maybe millions, or more, or less, who knows.

Nuclear War would be worse, given the radiation and the sheer force, so it's unlikely more of them would live than given extremely dire climate change scenarios, but we are splitting hairs, in terms of the amount of people who may survive or not.

It's not about being alarmist or not alarmist, it's pretty darn bad, which is why the links I provided, contribute to such damning conclusions, that we are in very deep shit.

You react to people as you think you should, I'll do likewise.

It could, but it alone would be insufficient for all human beings on Earth to die.

Another issue would be nuclear war, that would end everything.

It's not good, nor am I minimizing it, but just stating what I believe would be most likely. The collapse of cities and states is pretty bad...

Not the end of the species, but the end of organized human societies yes. It's an important distinction.

People won't be able to live in Florida or Saudi Arabia, water scarcity is and will become massive issues, lots of migration, etc.

We won't all die, but it won't resemble much what we have now, relatively safe cities, food readily available, being able to go outside for too long in certain areas, etc.

So it is pretty bad, though not literally the end.

Not meaningless, it signals that we are going above predicted deviations.

It may not formally lead to the conclusion that we already have exceeded the 2030 deadline goals, but it's certainly a statement announcing that this is likely to happen.

The McKibben article should also cause concern. It's hotter than predicted in addition to having El Nino, so that's worse.

I can see it clearly here where I live, the Dominican Republic, the amounts of seaweed we are getting from the bottom of the ocean off the coasts of Africa is insane, causing as much as an 80% drop in tourism, depleting oxygen and harming peoples health.

It's just awful.

Yes, and we can't predict, a-priori, how bad it will be on top of the already burning ocean, so it's a kind of Russian roulette.

Yes, that's rather sensible, however bad it seems now, very soon, it's going to be significantly worse than predicted, because every new study is confirming this, including this one by McKibben:

https://billmckibben.substack.com/p/maybe-we-should-have-called-this