Can you cite your source? — Leontiskos

Sorry, it was referenced in an earlier comment. It’s from https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-problem/ quoting M.G.F. Martin’s defence of naive realist disjunctivism. It’s how to define the difference between a veridical experience and a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination.

I'm not sure I understand you. What is different, Nature versus Mind or science vs a Nature/Mind distinction? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I tend to think of science, at a minimum, as what science textbooks say.

The science textbooks I am familiar with never talk of properties in the abstract like philosophy talks of properties.

As a for instance: there are chemical properties of salt, but these are not the same as "properties of objects" -- it doesn't approach the universality that metaphysics requires because it's mostly a mixture of thorough bookkeeping with attention to detail, but (since it's just done by us) not universal, or even looking for universal relationships.

Metaphysics looks for universal relationships in reality, or at least discusses reality, and as such no matter what metaphysical belief you hold you have to accommodate the science to be credible, at least in our world. If your metaphysics contradicts understood science, it's a hard road to go to justify why anyone ought to believe it.

But if that's so: it seems science and metaphysics must be different from one another, even though I'm uncertain about the universal relationship that makes science differ from metaphysics.

:up: likewise

See A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour and primitivism. Plenty of people thought – and probably still do, particularly if they are not taught science – that fire engines are red in the dark and that the presence of light simply "reveals" that colour. — Michael

It depends on what is meant by "are read". Obviously they cannot appear red in the dark. In any case even if, for the sake of argument, you assume there is a fact of the matter there, if you want to say that science, which is necessarily based on perception, shows us that fire engines are not red in the dark, then you are claiming that science, and by implication, perception shows us how things are, which is counter to your stated position.

What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin

It seems odd to speak of simple organisms making inferences, conscious or otherwise, since the term usually applies to the deliverances of rational thought. I don't deny that so-called "higher organisms", cognitively complex organisms, including humans, can make inferences, but I don't see perceptions of anything in the environment as inferences, rather those perceptions are what inferences might be based upon.

What seems confused to me is this strange instance that seeing is this primordial thing, resistant to all analysis, such that "I think we see what the objects are" is somehow remotely adequate. Never mind what we actually understand about perception, that is

scientism
— Leontiskos — hypericin

We see objects as they are able to appear to us given their and our natures. The science of perception has shown us that naive realism does not take into account the relational character of perception. If those relations are as real as the percipients and the things perceived, then why should we speak in terms of indirectness or distortion?

Perhaps you could explain how to properly interpret the parts in bold.

Under any ordinary reading, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" the photo. The photo is just a photosensitive surface that has chemically reacted to light.

And by the same token, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience is just a mental phenomenon elicited in response to signals sent by the body's sense receptors.

So given the above account of direct/naive realism, direct/naive realism is false. — Michael

Then maybe I'm not a naive realist, but that's not required to be a direct realist.

Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P.

My position is this:

A direct perception is: P (including R) of an O.

An indirect perception is: P of an R of an O.

I think we may be saying the same thing but in different ways.

Your position is this:

A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.

An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O.

We both appear to agree that the correct characterisation of a perception is: P (including R) of an O, but you call this indirect whereas I call it direct.

Since I consider this "correct characterisation" to be a direct perception, I accuse your side of taking a homunculus view of directly perceiving representations (of objects). Since you consider this "correct characterisation" to be an indirect perception, you accuse my side of identifying perceptions with their objects.

I favour my direct realist view because P (excluding R) of an O isn't a perception at all.

Nicely set out!

Thanks :blush:

Pretty much. As I put, a ways back,

If they say I am not seeing my hand, but a "mental image of my hand" or some such, my reply is that, the "mental image", so far as it makes any sense, is me seeing my hand. — Banno

Is there anything left to say on this forum that you haven't already said Banno? :razz:

Of course not. But they won't listen... :smirk:

Seems you and I are largely in agreement on direct perception, which did not really surprise me.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

I've done that to help make it clear what I'm asking. So, I'd like to read your answer to the question above. There's also more you wrote a few days back that I'm working on addressing.

:wink:

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green"... — RussellA

That requires knowing how to use the word "green" to pick out green things. Knowing how to use the word "green" requires knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of tasting something bitter"...

Paying attention to bitterness does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of an acrid smell"...

Paying attention to an acrid smell does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of a sharp pain"...

Paying attention to a sharp pain does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of hearing a grating noise"...

Paying attention to a grating noise does not require knowing how to use language.



One of those things above is not like the other.

...Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing.

That only follows from the outlier above.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.

Drop everything after the term "sight", and I would concur that that follows from what preceded it.

I wrote that I can never know what someone else is thinking. However, sometimes I can guess. Though, I can never know whether my guess is correct or not. — RussellA

You need not know that your belief is true in that case in order for it to be so.

You look at the world. Do you see a mkondo?

You obviously cannot know whether you are seeing a mkondo or not until you know the meaning of "mkondo".

IE, you have to know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" before knowing whether you can see trees lining the banks. — RussellA

That's not right though. I'm talking about seeing trees and your talking about knowing about that.


A capable creature need not know that they're seeing a Cypress tree in order to see one.

I need not know what "trees lining the banks" means in order to see trees lining the banks. If that were the case, and we took it to the extreme, language less animals could not see Cypress trees, whether that be lining the banks or otherwise. Further, I suppose it would follow from what you claim that they could not see anything at all.

You can only know that you are looking a a mkondo in the world if you already know the meaning of "mkondo". It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "mkondo" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this mkondo wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon the elementary particles and elementary forces that do exist in space-time.

So what are we perceiving?

On the one hand we are perceiving a set of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, meaning that we are directly perceiving the world as it is, and on the other hand we are also perceiving a mental concept, meaning that we are also indirectly perceiving the world as we think it is.

Perception needs both aspects, something in the world and something in the mind. — RussellA

I think your use of "perception" is stretched beyond sense ability. We do not perceive mental concepts. This does mark at least one of the aforementioned significant differences between our views.

In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is. — RussellA

Weird that you're claiming to look at a world independent of humans and in doing so claim to be abke to directly see that which is imperceptible to the naked eye. Weird indeed.

That looks like special pleading for elementary particles. What makes them different from Cypress trees? We name them both. Both exist long prior to our awareness of them.

We can see the trees though. So, if either of the two is under suspicion of whether or not it is dependent upon us, it would certainly seem that the tree was safer from that charge.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.
— creativesoul

Exactly, it is a question of linguistics. — RussellA

Not what I said. I'm making the point that to see the green apple as "a green apple" requires language use, whereas seeing the green apple does not.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate. — Michael

I'm curious if you'd show me how I'm equivocating.

there is ample evidence of perception and thinking being entangled. — wonderer1

I think that the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around. Seeing a green apple as a green apple is both perception(seeing the green apple) and thinking(seeing the green apple as a green apple).

Some language less creatures can see green apples but cannot see green apples as green apples.

Good. I was going to lump you with Michael, so I'm glad you agree. — Leontiskos

Wait, what am I supposed to be agreeing with? I suspect that I ought to be lumped.

<Machines make inferences from sense data; humans are like machines; therefore humans make inferences from sense data> — Leontiskos

Really? There was a time when inference was the exclusive provenance of humans. Have the tables turned to the point where to suggest humans infer as well is to inappropriately conflate them with computers? I don't think so. Humans are still the predominant inferrers, computers only do so with titanic difficulty, and have only lately started to catch up. It is no accident that the ai revolution started almost a century after computers.

Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position? — Leontiskos

That it is the position prior to actually thinking about the subject, I agree. But this absolves you of no burden.

Well, if you plop a child down in front of a Disney movie, do they require special skills of interpretation and inference to enter into the story? — Leontiskos

Absolutely.

A word is a sound, and so without the sound there is no word, but it does not follow that (conscious) interpretation or inference is occurring. It is the same, I say, for images and other sensory inputs. — Leontiskos

We are indeed not aware of the bulk of the inference and interpretation we do. But that doesn't mean it's not happening.

Okay, and so it is not a window, but is instead a set of data that, if interpreted correctly, can lead to knowledge of the real? — Leontiskos

Yes I think that's right.

Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position? — Leontiskos

That it is the position prior to actually thinking about the subject, I agree. — hypericin

What it means is that you are the one required to give a clear argument for your position, and I do not believe you have done so. If we were to do this topic justice then this is what you would need to do. Many seem to be underestimating the intuitive weight of direct realism.

I have been reading Nagel's The Last Word with J, and that whole book is about the sort of problems that plague the accounts of indirect realism in this thread (but also in your moral theory). Nagel will go after Kant as the king of that tradition, but the accounts in this thread fall well short of Kantian epistemology.

The nutshell problem with universal relativism is something like, <If someone is universally deceived, then they could never know that they are deceived, for they would have no fixed point of non-deception with which to compare the deception>. Now I realize that you have attempted to object to my idea of "accuracy or reliability" as the distinguishing mark between direct and indirect realism, but , who has done some good work of disambiguation, is less reticent about this.

The idea is that there is some alternative vantage point which is more fundamental than phenomenal experience, and which makes inferences based on the phenomenal experience. Of course there are ways in which reason can (and does) correct for perceptual distortions, but I don't find the schizophrenic separation that accompanies indirect realism tenable. — Leontiskos

Now as I have noted, the interesting thing about this thread is that the indirect realists wish to focus on perception rather than knowledge or phenomenal experience. Both @hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism, and if the point is only that, "Sometimes our perceptions are mistaken in knowing what is real, but reason can step in and correct course, thus providing us with 'indirect' knowledge of the real," then I don't really disagree. This would not be an insuperable universal relativizing, but only a superable local relativizing. Such a position opposes naive realism but not direct realism.

My guess is that you are more indebted to Scientism than Kantianism. You think that science provides us with access to the real, and that it is the preeminent way to gain knowledge of the real. "Sense data is unreliable, therefore in order to gain knowledge of the real we must have recourse to science." The idea is that the local unreliability of the senses can be remedied by science. Correct? I think this view is confused in a culturally understandable way, but it is a far cry from the lineage of skeptical thought inaugurated by David Hume. If you are only making these more mild claims then we may be talking past one another.*

We are indeed not aware of the bulk of the inference and interpretation we do. But that doesn't mean it's not happening. — hypericin

But what reason do we have to believe that it is happening? Again, positive arguments must be brought forward.

(Many have rightly balked at this highly metaphorical usage of the word "inference," but I believe that word may be more Michael's than yours.)

* Still, I think my post <here> ought to have cleared up such misunderstandings.

You tend to do these oblique attacks instead of swapping argument for argument. I'd rather you set out why indirect realism is necessarily dualist (property dualism? substance dualism?) rather than imply it as a concern. Maybe it's just a difference in style.

Sorry, I don't mean to be oblique. It's that I think accusations of dualism really depend heavily on the exact formulation involved, so I don't want to be overly direct because I don't think it's always an issue.

The issue of dualism comes in when mind appears to take on a role that is sui generis and unique vis-á-vis how it interacts with the rest of the world. This is a tricky area because, barring panpsychism, mind is clearly unique in some respects.

It comes down to what makes experience indirect, what makes the relationship between people and lemons vis-á-vis seeing yellow different from the relationship between people's breathing and air vis-á-vis oxygenating blood. If that difference just is that one is phenomenal, and that a relations involving phenomenal experience is what makes it indirect, then that looks a lot like mind having its own sorts of sui generis causal relations, essentially being a different substance from other entities, etc.

Because appeals to the complexity of the interaction don't seem to be enough. The process through which pregnancy occurs is extremely complex and mediated through many different pathways, but no one says "sexual intercourse has an indirect relationship with pregnancy," or "sperm have an indirect relationship with pregnancy." Or "sunlight has an indirect relationship with photosynthesis."

Just in normal usage, a common indirect relationship would be something like drinking alcohol and pregnancy. The two don't necessarily go together, but ingesting alcohol leads to more risk taking behavior. Sex and pregnancy as an "indirect" relationship?

Without a way to specify the "indirectness" it seems to reduce to "being phenomenal is indirect because phenomenal awareness is a special type of relation," which is where a sort of dualism seems to come in, along with begging the question.



See above. I don't see how "science says" one thing or another here. If the relationship between sex and pregnancy, light and photosynthesis, breathing and oxygenated blood, the sensation of deciding to make a voluntary movement and movement, etc. are all direct, despite complex intermediaries, what makes perception different? Or maybe those are all also indirect relationships?

Do we experience our own thoughts directly or indirectly? It would seem it would have to be indirectly if the argument is that complex intermediaries make a relationship indirect.



Science and metaphysics are different from one another, but they bleed over into one another all the time. The first time I heard of "emergent properties" was in a molecular biology class, not a philosophy lecture. Metaphysics and ontology tend to touch science on the theory side.

So, any book on quantum foundations is going to discuss metaphysical ideas. Any discussion of "what is a species and how do we define it," gets into the same sort of territory. "What is complexity?" and "what is information?" or "is there biological information?" are not uncommon questions for journal articles to focus on. Debates over methods, frequentism in particular, are another area of overlap. This isn't the bread and butter of 101 classes — although in Bio 101 we were asked to write an essay on "what life is?" and consider if viruses or prions were alive, a philosophical question — but it's also not absent from scientific considerations either.

The two seem related in that both inform one another. Physicists have informed opinions re the question of substance versus process based metaphysics for example, or mereological nihilism — i.e., "is the world a collection of things with properties or one thing/process?"

Both hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism — Leontiskos

What is the difference between naive and non-naive direct realism?

Taking my earlier comment, the naive view is that:

1. Something is an object of perception iff it is a constituent of experience
2. Distal objects are constituents of experience
3. Therefore, distal objects are objects of perception

The indirect realist accepts (1) but rejects (2). Instead their view is that:

1. Something is an object of perception iff it is a constituent of experience
4. Sense data is the constituent of experience
5. Therefore, sense data is the object of perception

Assuming the non-naive direct realist rejects (2) and (5), it must be that they reject (1) and/or (4).

If they reject (4) but accept (1) then something other than sense data and distal objects is the object of perception. This wouldn’t be direct realism but a different kind of indirect realism.

If they reject (1) but accept (4) then, at the very least, they accept the existence of sense data. They must then provide an alternative to (1) to explain what it takes for something that isn’t a constituent of experience to nonetheless be an object of perception.

If they reject both (1) and (4) then, again, they must provide an alternative to (1), but also an alternative to (4) to explain which things are the constituents of experience.

But my own take is that being a constituent of experience is the only meaningful account of “directness”, and so if (2) is false then experience of distal objects is not direct, even if they are the objects of perception. In other words, if (1) is false then “we experience X directly iff X is the object of perception” is false, and so non-naive “direct” realism isn’t direct realism at all.

“Directness” is intended to resolve the epistemological problem of perception such that if perception is direct then there is no problem, but if (2) is false then the common kind claim is true and disjunctivism is false, the epistemological problem of perception remains, and so perception isn’t direct.

If "direct knowledge" is aphenomenal knowledge, it wouldn't seem to make sense as a concept. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There can be different types of phenomenal knowledge. For example, "what" it is like to experience pain, "that" Mars is 225 million km from Earth, "how" to ride a bicycle, etc.

We can think of our interaction with the world as two distinct stages, first perception, ie, knowledge "what", and second reasoning about these perceptions, ie, knowledge "that".

To my understanding the vast majority of Direct Realists are Semantic Direct Realists rather than Phenomenological Direct Realists, as Phenomenological Direct Realism would be very difficult to justify.
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So, humoncular regress concerns aside, — Count Timothy von Icarus

The homuncular argument is a straw-man argument deliberately conflating perception with reason. The Indirect Realist believes that we directly perceive a hand, then considers the philosophical question as to whether what we perceive is the hand itself or an image of the hand. The Direct Realist also believes that we directly perceive a hand, but then ignores any philosophical questioning in favour of the language of the "ordinary man".
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If brains and sense organs perceive, and they are part of the world, wherein lies the separation that makes the relationship between brains and the world indirect? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even though the brain is part of the world, there is a distinct boundary between the brain and the world outside the brain. The brain only "knows" about the world outside the brain because of the information that passes through this boundary, ie, the five senses, and these five senses are the intermediary between the brain and the world outside the brain.

If outside the brain is a wavelength of 500nm, and inside the brain is the perception of green, even though the chain of events from outside to inside is direct, it does not of necessity follow that there is a direct relationship between what is on the outside and what is on the inside, and by linguistic convection, if the relationship is not direct then it must be indirect.
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If knowledge only exists phenomenally, calling phenomenal knowledge indirect would be like saying we only experience indirect pain, — Count Timothy von Icarus

STAGE ONE - PERCEPTION

The words direct and indirect are superfluous, so stage one doesn't distinguish Indirect and Direct Realism.

For example, suppose I perceive pain. I then have the phenomenal knowledge of "what" it is like to perceive pain. I agree that if I know pain, the word "directly" as in "I directly know pain" is redundant.

STAGE TWO - REASONING ABOUT THESE PERCEPTIONS

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that there is a direct causal chain from something in the world to our perception of this something in the world. So this doesn't distinguish Indirect from Direct Realism.

I assume that both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that given an existing knowledge base we can then reason from our perception and infer what has caused such perception. For example, when looking up at the night sky, and having some astronomical knowledge, when seeing a red dot we can reason that the cause of the red dot was in fact the planet Mars. Therefore this doesn't distinguish the Indirect from Direct Realist

IE, given an existing knowledge base and using reasoning we can infer the cause of our perceptions.

The question then becomes, which is more grammatical, as the Indirect Realist would say ""we have indirect knowledge of the cause of our perception" or as the Direct Realist would say "we have direct knowledge of the cause of our perception".

My belief is that to say that inferred knowledge is direct knowledge is ungrammatical.

For example, suppose I am in a closed room and hear a knocking on the wall. From my prior knowledge base of rooms and people, and using my reason, I may infer that the cause of the noise was in fact a person in the next room. Because my belief that the cause was someone in the next room is only an inference, I cannot say that I have any direct knowledge that there is a person next door.

Similarly, suppose I look at the night sky and see a red dot. From my prior knowledge of astronomy, and using my reason, I may infer that the cause of my perception was the planet Mars. Because my belief that the cause was the planet Mars is only an inference, I cannot say that I have any direct knowledge that the cause was the planet Mars.

In summary, it is ungrammatical to say that inferred knowledge is direct knowledge as the Direct Realists propose.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?..............I'd like to read your answer to the question above — creativesoul

I agree that the proposition in language "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are in the world Cypress trees lining the banks.

However, the question is, where exactly is this world. Does this world exist in the mind or outside the mind. It is interesting that Wittgenstein was always very careful never to give his opinion.
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Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right. — creativesoul

I could say "I perceive the colour green" or "I am conscious of the colour green". These mean the same thing, on the assumption that perceiving requires consciousness, in that I can only perceive something when conscious.

When I say "I am conscious that I perceive the colour green", this means that I am saying that my statement "I perceive the colour green" is a true statement in the event the listener thought I was uncertain about what I saw.
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You need not know that your belief is true in that case in order for it to be so. — creativesoul

When looking at the same object, I may perceive the colour green and the other person may perceive the colour blue. I can never know what colour they are perceiving, not being telepathic. However, if the other person is perceiving the colour blue, then one of us is not seeing the object as it really is.
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A capable creature need not know that they're seeing a Cypress tree in order to see one......................I'm making the point that to see the green apple as "a green apple" requires language use, whereas seeing the green apple does not. — creativesoul

This goes back to my diagram. Because the observer sees an X, does that mean there is an X, or are they imposing their private concept of an X onto what they see.
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We do not perceive mental concepts. — creativesoul

We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept.
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That looks like special pleading for elementary particles. What makes them different from Cypress trees? — creativesoul

As discussed within Ontic Structural Realism, elementary particles are primitive whereas trees are not.

in agreement on direct perception — creativesoul

Absurd to deny, I should think, and thereby easily dismissed.

Now, whatever shall we do with realism?

We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept. — RussellA

I think adverbialism provides a better account of what I think you're getting at. It's not that when we see a tree we see a concept but that when we see a tree we are "seeing treely", which is a mental state. The grammatical distinction between the verb "seeing" and the noun "a tree" doesn't accurately represent the facts about perception. Rather, "seeing a tree" is more properly understood as a verb and an adverb.

So, humoncular regress concerns aside, I think there is a more general concern that the "indirect" term is smuggling dualism in.

Absolutely, and idealism in general. Maybe it is inappropriate to question motives, but the question-begging character of each entity, substance, and space, warrants it, in my opinion. Why posit this stuff, really?

We’ve read of various mental areas—the mind, experience (phenomenal, conscious), consciousness—in which reside a menagerie of entities and substances —qualia, sense-data, representations, images etc.—but in the end we’re left with a series of nouns without any referent.

But whenever we look where these places and things are purported to exist, whether through operation or dissection or imaging, we can never find them and examine them.

These are (in my opinion) the biological accounts of a being who cannot even see his own ears, let alone the vast majority of his body. It’s the philosophy of searching inward while forever looking out, the account of a being who sees what is occurring behind the eyes rather than what is in front of them. So I think the label “naive” is misplaced.