1. Something is an object of perception iff it is a constituent of experience — Michael

I think the problem is that you are constantly building your own conclusions into your premises. For example, one of the cruxes of this whole debate is the question, "What is experience?," and yet you are just taking for granted an understanding of experience that presupposes your own conclusions. For example, see my post <here>.

What is the difference between naive and non-naive direct realism? — Michael

Here are two concrete examples where the two of you advert to naive forms of direct realism:

I'm afraid I still only have one clear answer: for perception to be "direct", naïve realism should be true. The features of our perceptions must be present in reality, so that barns really look red, and violins sound as they do, independently of an observer. — hypericin

At the very least we can apply modus tollens and simply say that if phenomenal experience is not reliable then these direct realists are wrong, even without having to ask what they actually mean by "direct presentation". — Michael

For example, if direct realism is thought to entail that when you place a paddle in the water it becomes bent, and when you remove it from the water it becomes straight, then according to that definition we can all call ourselves "indirect realists." We all accept that the shape of the paddle does not change, and that reason corrects for the illusion that the eyes see.

“Directness” is intended to resolve the epistemological problem of perception such that if perception is direct then there is no problem, but if (2) is false then the common kind claim is true and disjunctivism is false, the epistemological problem of perception remains, and so perception isn’t direct. — Michael

Does the bent paddle or Hume's claims about perspective prove the same point? "If the paddle isn't bent then perception isn't direct"? Are you trying to say any more than that?

These laborious discussions seem to terminate with a retreat into these sorts of quasi-vacuous positions.

It's not that when we perceive a tree we perceive a concept but that when we perceive a tree we are "perceiving treely", which is a mental state. — Michael

Trying to understand adverbialism

I agree that saying "we perceive a tree" is problematic for the Indirect Realist as it leads into the infinite regress homunculus problem.

We say that an apple has the properties green, circular and sweet, but take away all the properties and nothing will remain, as pointed out by FH Bradley (SEP – Bradley's Regress). An apple don't exist as a Platonic Form independently of its properties.

Similarly, take away what is being perceived and there will be no perception. There must be an Intentionality, as Brentano argued, where thoughts must have a content (SEP - Intentionality)

It follows that it is not the case that we perceive a tree but rather the tree is the perception.

As the Adverbialists propose, we don't "perceive a tree" but rather "we perceive treely", where treely is an adverb qualifying the verb to perceive.

Therefore, rather than say "I perceive a tree", "I perceive a house" or "I perceive a cat", more accurate would be to say "the tree is the perception", "the house is the perception" or "the cat is the perception"

But if this is the case, then the Platonic Form of a perceiver seems to have disappeared, in that the perceiver is no more than a property of what is being perceived at that particular moment.

Perhaps the consequence of the Homunculus problem is that there is no single perceiver who is perceiving all these things but rather is just a property of whatever is being perceived at the time.

In summary, as concepts only exist as rules governing how it may be instantiated as concrete particulars, rather than writing "We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept" perhaps better would have been "A tree is the perception. A tree is an particular concrete instantiation of the concept of a tree. Therefore, a particular concrete instantiation of the concept of a tree is the perception".

The argument from illusion is indeed one of the arguments against direct realism, much like the argument from hallucination and the common kind claim that follows. (2) is how some avoid the common kind claim, but this entails naive direct realism.

But you didn’t really answer my question(s). How does non-naive direct realism differ from naive direct realism? Does it reject (2) and so also (1)? If it rejects (1) then how does it complete the premise “something is an object of perception iff …”? And how does its version of this premise maintain the “directness” that was intended to resolve the epistemological problem?

The Direct Realist also believes that we directly perceive a hand, but then ignores any philosophical questioning in favour of the language of the "ordinary man".

This certainly covers some of them, although I would replace "ignore" with "sidestep" or "discount as confused." I would tend to associate this view more with adverbial and intentional theories of perception though. Particularly, this view tends to rely on a certain view of what language is, born out of the influence of Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein was a major influence on adverbial theories.

Even though the brain is part of the world, there is a distinct boundary between the brain and the world outside the brain. The brain only "knows" about the world outside the brain because of the information that passes through this boundary, ie, the five senses, and these five senses are the intermediary between the brain and the world outside the brain.

Per our prior conversation, is this boundary a real, ontological boundary, or one that only exists in mind?

Since cause, matter, energy, and information appear to flow across this boundary in the same manner as any other, I am not sure how movement across the boundary is supposed to be more "indirect." Information exchange only occurs across the surface of systems. This is as true for billiard balls and rain drops as it is for brains.

If outside the brain is a wavelength of 500nm, and inside the brain is the perception of green, even though the chain of events from outside to inside is direct, it does not of necessity follow that there is a direct relationship between what is on the outside and what is on the inside, and by linguistic convection, if the relationship is not direct then it must be indirect.

I am not sure what is supposed to be demonstrated here. Is the claim that there has to be some sort of necessity for a relationship to be "direct?" What sort of necessity? Sex doesn't necessarily entail pregnancy. You can have either in the absence of the other (e.g. IVF), but the relationship between the two seems pretty direct. Fertilization doesn't entail birth, but again, the relationship between the two seems direct. Neither does sunlight entail fructose production, but sunlight and photosynthesis seems to have a direct relationship.

Is this logical necessity or causal? If it's causal necessity, then it seems like this point doesn't stand. At least at the macro scale, the effects of light vis-á-vis the human eye and brain are deterministic. Logical necessity seems impossible to determine here. Does it even apply? In a pancomputationalist view it would, but then the logical necessity just is the causal one, and that appears to be here.

My belief is that to say that inferred knowledge is direct knowledge is ungrammatical.

Is there any knowledge that doesn't involve inference? Pure intuition? But then people's prephilosophical intuition is that they know objects directly through perception. The Mars example is not generally how knowledge of external objects works. We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs.

So, on the one hand, it seems like this standard doesn't work because you can say unconscious inference is involved in any judgement. On the other, it doesn't seem like concious inference is involved in most knowledge of external objects. When I see a blue car, I don't feel the need to go through any concious inference to know it's a blue car. But if you say "do you really know it's a car?" switching to a philosophical frame, then I'd say this is just one particular way of knowing.

The larger problem I see is that this definition would seem to imply that any sort of concious introspection is also indirect, since this also requires inference. Do I understand my relationship with my father indirectly? Do I know that I like my co-workers indirectly because I have to reflect on the question?

The argument from illusion is indeed one of the arguments against direct realism — Michael

If you are arguing against bent paddles then I don't think any of us would disagree.

But you didn’t really answer my question(s). How does non-naive direct realism differ from naive direct realism? — Michael

My form of realism differs from the indirect realisms on offer by introducing an understanding of experience or understanding that is not either flatly perceptual or else schizophrenic between rationality and perception.

I am interested in the question of insuperable non-reliability vs reliability, and in the context of this thread indirect realism has been associated with the former, whereas forms of direct realism have been associated with the latter. On my view superable non-reliability is a species of reliability, and the difference between direct realism and naive realism is whether there exist local unreliabilities that can be overcome, including perceptual unreliabilities. Naive realism says the unreliabilities don't exist; direct realism says they do exist but can be overcome; and indirect realism says that they exist and cannot be overcome because they are not merely local.* For example, the context of the original quote you excised:

Both hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism, and if the point is only that, "Sometimes our perceptions are mistaken in knowing what is real, but reason can step in and correct course, thus providing us with 'indirect' knowledge of the real," then I don't really disagree. This would not be an insuperable universal relativizing, but only a superable local relativizing. Such a position opposes naive realism but not direct realism. — Leontiskos

Or:

I think it is a matter of accuracy or reliability. "Are we able to form true propositions which accurately and reliably get at what truly exists in the world?" The so-called direct realist says yes. The so-called indirect realist says, "No, we do not know whether our knowledge is about the world or merely about our representations of the world." — Leontiskos

You yourself have said similar things:

...whereas indirect realists argued that phenomenal experience is, at best, a mental representation of external world objects and their properties, and so is possibly unreliable. — Michael

Now I really think you're talking more about perceptual experience than phenomenal experience, because your understanding of experience seems quite flat, divorced from reason. But if you're positing superable unreliability then I don't think nearly as much is at stake. I don't want to get into an argument about philosophical anthropology which makes distinctions between views which all see unreliabilities as existing and superable.


* But I have tried to get others to define their terms so we don't talk past one another.

Well, I think that there is no “resemblance” between a thing’s appearance and a thing’s (objective) properties. The common example is colour. I reject primitivism. It is true that certain surfaces reflect light of certain wavelengths, and that certain wavelengths are usually responsible for certain colour sensations, but that relationship is nothing more than causal. There’s nothing like “resemblance” or “representation” involved. The same with smells and tastes. A sweet taste sensation does not “resemble” or “represent” any property of sugar.

And, as examined here, the same is also true of so-called “primary qualities” like visual geometry.

The world “behind” appearances is just a mess of quantum fields. I don’t know if this is what counts as “insuperable unreliability”, but in any case I can’t see how anything about this can correctly count as direct realism - and indirect realism in its simplest form is simply a rejection of direct realism.

and indirect realism in its simplest form is simply a rejection of direct realism. — Michael

Which must of course be defined if indirect realism is to have any content.

The common example is colour. I reject primitivism. — Michael

Remaining at 30,000 feet for the moment, Locke distinguished primary from secondary properties. Do you view shape the same way you view color? You think the unreliability associated with color is insuperable (or rather, from your side of the looking glass, asking about the ontology of color is misguided). Do you hold the same doctrine for all putative objects of perception? Even if one accepts your arguments regarding color, it's not at all clear that those arguments can arrive at this conclusion:

Well, I think that there is no “resemblance” between a thing’s appearance and a thing’s (objective) properties. — Michael

Do you view shape the same way you view color? — Leontiskos

Yes. Vision is not fundamentally different to any other sense. Are there "primary" taste qualities? Are there "primary" smell qualities? Are there "primary" sound qualities? I don't think so.

With regards specifically to shape, studies have shown that those born blind who are later able to see cannot recognise shapes by sight even though they can recognise them by feel. They have to learn the connection. So, shapes-as-seen are different to shapes-as-felt. When you say that shapes are primary qualities, is that shapes-as-seen or shapes-as-felt?

And, again, related to this is the thought experiment here addressing visual orientation. Neither group can be said to be seeing things "correctly" (such that the other group is seeing things "incorrectly").

When you say that shapes are primary qualities, is that shapes-as-seen or shapes-as-felt? — Michael

For Locke a primary property belongs to the object, and it seems obvious that one can interact with the same spatial property via both sight and touch. Activities like driving a car presuppose this. Some humans can interact with spatial properties via hearing, but there are other species which tend to be better at that.

I suppose a doctrine concerning objects might be opaque to someone who presupposes "indirect realism."

For Locke a primary quality belongs to the object — Leontiskos

If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of experience.

and it seems obvious that one can interact with the same spatial property via both sight and touch. Some humans can interact with spatial properties via hearing, but there are other species which tend to be better at that. — Leontiskos

If by this you just mean that there is a causal relationship between an object's properties and our experience then indirect realists would agree.

The relevant question is whether or not (and how) the relationship between experience and an object's properties is "direct".

Michael's unedited post:

If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. — Michael

I did see you make this strange argument earlier. As it turns out, we experience objects in various ways. But I'm not really interested in arguing against dogmas.

Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P. — Luke

Indirect realists also believe this. Perceptions of objects are representations of these objects, and so our perceptions of the object is indirect, because we perceive via representations.

Your position is this:

A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.
An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O. — Luke

Perceptions are representations, and so there isn't really "P (excluding R) of an O", unless you are talking about corner cases, such as flashes in the eye, tinnitus, etc.

The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct. — Luke

Experience of perceptions is direct. Experience of objects is indirect, this happens via perceptions.

Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P.
— Luke

Indirect realists also believe this. — hypericin

Yes, I said that, As you quoted me as saying:

Your [indirect realist] position is this:

A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.
An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O.
— Luke

Perceptions are representations, and so there isn't really "P (excluding R) of an O" — hypericin

That's my point. @Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object. My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation, yet Michael calls this a direct perception.

Experience of perceptions is direct. Experience of objects is indirect, this happens via perceptions. — hypericin

I would not say that our perceptions are something that we have an experience of. You have experiences and you have perceptions. You don't have an experience of a perception; you have a perception. Your perceptions are not external to, independent of, or separate from, you and your experience. Perceptions form part of your experience. Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct.

It seems odd to speak of simple organisms making inferences, conscious or otherwise, since the term usually applies to the deliverances of rational thought. — Janus

You and others (i.e. @Leontiskos)confuse inference with logical inference.

inference:

something that is inferred
especially : a conclusion or opinion that is formed because of known facts or evidence — Merriam Webster

As I understand there are deductive inferences, which if valid are necessary and inductive and abductive inferences, which are not logically necessary.

The former are purely logical and require symbolic language, whereas the latter do not require language and presumably have more in common with animal inferences.

What I am disagreeing with are ideas such as that my seeing a tree is an inference.

My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation — Luke

Reading this, why wouldn't you conclude: perception is inherently indirect?

Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct. — Luke

No problem. Lets say then, experience, including perceptual experience, is direct.

How do you reply to this argument from hallucination? Nothing logically prevents us from hallucinating in a way that appears identical to the real thing. Any object O you perceive may either be real, or hallucination.

You either have faithful perception:
P of O

or hallucination:
P (of false O)

But which one of these is the actual case is unknown to the perceiver. All the perceiver knows is P.

Therefore, that we are in the everyday, veridical case, P of O, cannot be a part of the perception P itself. It must be an inference (We are wide awake and alert, O is consistent with memory and environment, others acknowledge O). Similarly, if we are hallucinating, we only know that by inference as well (We are delirious, O is incongruous, no one else acknowledges O).

In short, that what we experience is real, is an inference, not a perception. We are indirectly aware, via inference, of the realism of the world, and only directly aware of perceptual content.

My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation
— Luke

Reading this, why wouldn't you conclude: perception is inherently indirect? — hypericin

Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get.

Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct.
— Luke

No problem. Lets say then, experience, including perceptual experience, is direct. — hypericin

No problem. Assuming you mean experience of the world, or perceptual experience of objects in the world, then that makes us both direct realists.

How do you reply to this argument from hallucination? — hypericin

How do you reply to it?

Nothing logically prevents us from hallucinating in a way that appears identical to the real thing. — hypericin

Sure, I think that's what a hallucination is.

Any object O you perceive may either be real, or hallucination. — hypericin

Okay.

Therefore, that we are in the everyday, veridical case, P of O, cannot be a part of the perception P itself. — hypericin

This is irrelevant. The dispute is about whether our perceptions of the world are direct or indirect; it is not about how we know or whether we know that those perceptions are veridical or not.

It must be an inference (We are wide awake and alert, O is consistent with memory and environment, others acknowledge O). Similarly, if we are hallucinating, we only know that by inference as well (We are delirious, O is incongruous, no one else acknowledges O). — hypericin

The dispute is over whether we directly perceive objects or not; it is not over our knowledge of our perceptions. Our knowledge about (the veridicality of) our perceptions is not our perceptions.

In short, that what we experience is real, is an inference, not a perception. We are indirectly aware, via inference, of the realism of the world, and only directly aware of perceptual content. — hypericin

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? The dispute is not over our (direct or indirect) awareness of our perceptions. This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step; to create a gap between ourselves and our perceptions (much like your earlier talk of "experience of perceptions"). We do not perceive our perceptions; we perceive the world.

That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object. My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation, yet Michael calls this a direct perception. — Luke

I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying, but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism.

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? The dispute is not over our (direct or indirect) awareness of our perceptions. This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step; to create a gap between ourselves and our perceptions (much like your earlier talk of "experience of perceptions"). We do not perceive our perceptions; we perceive the world. — Luke

I'm aware of colours. Colours are not properties of distal objects. Colours are features of phenomenal experience alone. They are something like sensations/sense-data/qualia. Therefore, I'm aware of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia. The same with smells and tastes and pain and all other so-called "secondary" qualities.

When I dream, I see things. The things I see are not distal objects. The things I see are features of phenomenal experience alone. Even the so-called "primary" qualities in dreams are something like sensations/sense-data/qualia.

The indirect realist argues that the "primary" qualities of veridical experience are of the same kind as the "secondary" qualities of veridical experience and the "primary" qualities of dreams and hallucinations, and that the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when I dream and hallucinate are the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when awake and not hallucinating.

This is the common kind claim.

The difference between veridical and non-veridical experience is only that veridical experience has the appropriate distal cause.

One argument against the common kind claim is that distal objects are not just causes of but actual constituents of (veridical) experience (in lieu of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia). That’s the naive realist view.

If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation.

Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get. — Luke

"Direct" does not mean "as direct as you can get". "As direct as you can get" may still be indirect. What is it compared to? The directness of the perceptual experience itself.

The dispute is about whether our perceptions of the world are direct or indirect; it is not about how we know or whether we know that those perceptions are veridical or not. — Luke

The dispute is over whether we directly perceive objects or not; it is not over our knowledge of our perceptions. Our knowledge about (the veridicality of) our perceptions is not our perceptions. — Luke

How can "perceptions of the world" be "direct", if the "of the world" must be inferred from the perceptions, and other context? In direct realism, we perceive objects themselves, not the proxy of perceptual experience. How can we perceive objects themselves if even the object's existence at all is not a part of the perception?

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? — Luke

I think the distinction is clear. The feeling of heat on my skin, feelings of anger or contentment, the sound s and feeling of playing the drums, are all direct. My awareness of the exact temperature from my thermometer, my awareness of what Jodie said, via Bob's telling me this morning, and my awareness of your thinking on this subject, are all obviously indirect.

This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step — Luke

You will have to provide a convincing argument that we are not aware of our perceptions. On the face of it, perceptions are exactly what we are (directly) aware of.

Wittgenstein was a major influence on adverbial theories. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that we directly perceive a hand, and both are Adverbialists in the sense that what is being perceived cannot be separated from the process of perceiving. IE, if nothing was being perceived, then there would be no process of perceiving, in that what is being perceived is an intrinsic part of the process of perceiving.

The adverbialist view of Wittgenstein is more relevant to thoughts. Consider "I hope you come" or "I hope X". The traditional philosopher would say that "I hope" is a process and X is separate to "I hope". But Wittgenstein as an adverbialist would say that X is the manner in which one hopes, such as "I run quickly". (Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State - Francis Y Lin)

Adverbialism is a form of Indirect Realism (SEP – Epistemological Problems of Perception).
===============================================================================

Since cause, matter, energy, and information appear to flow across this boundary in the same manner as any other, I am not sure how movement across the boundary is supposed to be more "indirect."...Is this logical necessity or causal? — Count Timothy von Icarus

On the world side of the boundary is the wavelength of 500nm and on the mind side of the boundary is the perception of the colour green.

I am sure that both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that the chain of events from the object in the world to the perception in the mind is direct, being determinate. However, there is no causal necessity as the chain of events could be broken at any moment.

Indirectness enters the picture because of inference. Inferences are made about a new situation using reasoning based on prior knowledge .

Toni never eats sushi, so I infer Toni doesn't like sushi. That man is running towards the bus, so I infer he wants to catch the bus. I see red dot in the night sky and from my knowledge of astronomy infer that it was caused by the planet Mars. As I know my neighbours moved in last week, I infer they are causing the noise.

In none of these real life cases does my inference lead to direct knowledge. I have no direct knowledge that Toni doesn't like sushi, or the man wants to catch the bus, or the red dot was caused by the planet Mars or my neighbours are making the noise. IE, there is no logical necessity that my inference leads to direct knowledge.

The Indirect Realist would say that they infer that the red dot has been caused by the planet Mars. The Direct Realist would say the red dot is the planet Mars, assuming a knowledge that they can never have.
===============================================================================

Is there any knowledge that doesn't involve inference?...We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I perceive the colour red. This is a direct perception and doesn't involve inference as it is within my mind. Is this knowledge? Probably, as one Merriam Webster definition of "knowledge" is "the fact or condition of being aware of something".

I go back to my diagram. Within the diagram we see dots, analogous to parts in the world. I agree that parts ontologically exist in the world as primitives, ignoring the exact nature of these parts.

The question is, do wholes ontologically exist in the world?

Within the diagram we may see the shape X, the shape L or the shape of a chair. Because we see the shape of an X, L or chair in the diagram, does it of necessity logically follow that the shapes X, L or chair must exist in the diagram independently of any observer?

As my belief is that relations have no ontological existence in the world, it follows that neither do I believe that wholes ontologically exist in the world.

We both may see a chair within the diagram. Why do you think that just because we both see the shape of a chair in the diagram, the shape of a chair must exist in the diagram independently of any observer?

That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object...
— Luke

I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying here — Michael

What part don't you understand? You said earlier that:

Distal objects are not present in phenomenal experience and the features of phenomenal experience are not the properties of distal objects. That is indirect realism to me, as contrasted with the direct realist view that distal objects are present in phenomenal experience and that the features of phenomenal experience are the properties of those distal objects. — Michael

It follows that your criterion for a direct perception is to have the distal object somehow be physically present in one's phenomenal experience. In other words, your criterion is that the object is identical with one's phenomenal experience. How would that work? How is that kind of perception possible? If this is not what you mean by a direct perception then please clarify.

...but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism. — Michael

There's a difference between my position and indirect realism. As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. Representations are not the object of perception, as indirect realism asserts; instead, representations are formative in having perceptions. Or, as you put it earlier, representations are part of the "mechanics of perception".

What I am disagreeing with are ideas such as that my seeing a tree is an inference. — Janus

We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We certainly don't "just see" trees and chairs. What we see are very incomplete visual details of one angle upon the tree and chair. Then, we use this information, coupled with expectation, context, and prior experience with the visual categories of "tree" and "chair" to make the seemingly instant determination that there is in fact a tree or chair in front of us.

The fact that this mostly or entirely occurs without conscious awareness does not belie the fact that there is an incredibly complex inferential process at work. One measure of this complexity is the daunting task of implementing this logic in a computer. It is so difficult that it had to wait for AI, which applies immense computational resources to automate algorithmic development itself, before it could be satisfactorily done.

There's a difference between my position and indirect realism. As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. — Luke

It sounds like you think the difference between indirect and direct realists is just semantics. It sounds like the person you're replying to believes the difference is in *more than just semantics*.

The indirect realist argues that the "primary" qualities of veridical experience are of the same kind as the "secondary" qualities of veridical experience and the "primary" qualities of dreams and hallucinations, and that the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when I dream and hallucinate are the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when awake and not hallucinating.

This is the common kind claim. — Michael

Forgive me for not following the argument along traditional lines. I would probably tend to agree that primary and secondary qualities are of the same kind; it's all just phenomenal experience.

If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael

My argument is that the indirect realist's concept of a direct perception is incoherent. Therefore, their indirect position has no contrast. Your concept of an indirect perception, with representations being part of the mechanics of perception, is what I would call a direct perception. This has a contrast with coherent examples of indirect perceptions such as seeing objects in a mirror or looking at a map.

EDIT: I note that your concept of an indirect perception, with representations being part of the mechanics of perception (e.g. as you describe here), differs from indirect realism's concept of an indirect perception, which is a perception of a representation of an object.

Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get.
— Luke

"Direct" does not mean "as direct as you can get". "As direct as you can get" may still be indirect. What is it compared to? The directness of the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

You don't perceive your perceptual experience. Your perceptual experience is a perception.

How can "perceptions of the world" be "direct", if the "of the world" must be inferred from the perceptions, and other context? — hypericin

What inference(s) are you making? Are you inferring that your perceptions are indirect because they're of the world, or are you inferring that your perceptions are of the world because they're indirect?

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness?
— Luke

I think the distinction is clear. The feeling of heat on my skin, feelings of anger or contentment, the sound s and feeling of playing the drums, are all direct. My awareness of the exact temperature from my thermometer, my awareness of what Jodie said, via Bob's telling me this morning, and my awareness of your thinking on this subject, are all obviously indirect. — hypericin

I don't understand the meaning of "indirect awareness". What makes it indirect? It seems like you've labelled experiences without an external cause as "direct" and experiences with an external cause as "indirect". That's kind of just stipulating that perception of real-world objects is indirect, which is begging the question.

You will have to provide a convincing argument that we are not aware of our perceptions. On the face of it, perceptions are exactly what we are (directly) aware of. — hypericin

We are aware of our perceptions. I take issue with your distinction between direct/indirect awareness.

It follows that your criterion for a direct perception is to have the distal object somehow be physically present in one's phenomenal experience. In other words, your criterion is that the object is identical with one's phenomenal experience. — Luke

It's not my criterion. I'm summarising the various views as explained here:

Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

...

Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.

...

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.

It is not enough that some distal object causes some sensation (even a "representative" sensation) for perception to be in any meaningful sense direct.

How would that work? How is that kind of perception possible?

It's not, which is why direct realism is false.

As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. Representations are not the object of perception, as indirect realism asserts; instead, representations are formative in having perceptions. Or, as you put it earlier, representations are part of the "mechanics of perception". — Luke

I think you're just reading too much into the grammar. I see a mountain when I dream. What sort of thing is the object of perception when I dream? The indirect realist claims that whatever sort of thing is the object of perception when I dream or hallucinate is also the sort of thing that is the object of perception when awake and not hallucinating. The only difference is that when awake and not hallucinating the experience has an appropriate distal cause.

If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael

3.3.1 Intentionalism in Outline

The intentionalist holds that we directly experience ordinary objects. The distinguishing feature of the view is a specific conception of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects: here the intentionalist appeals to intentionality conceived of as a form of mental representation (hence it is also sometimes called the representationalist theory of experience)...

Intentionalists endorse the Common Kind Claim. So, a veridical experience of churchyard covered in white snow, consists in direct representation of such a scene, but so do corresponding illusory and hallucinatory experiences: these experiences have the same nature...

3.3.5 Intentionalism and Perception of the World

In response to this, the intentionalist can suggest that although they reject Direct Realist Presentation, they do not reject Direct Realism. They can suggest that the former is not the only way to understand the latter. As we saw above, another way to understand Direct Realism is with a causal understanding of direct perception.

...The object-directedness of experience is at the heart of their approach. Even though intentionalism denies that experiences involve the direct presentation of ordinary objects, it (a) respects and is motivated by the phenomenological observation that experiences are directly of ordinary objects, and (b) offers an alternative account of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects. As we’ve seen, instead of presentation, the intentionalist appeals to representation.

Thus, the intentionalist can maintain that when you see a snow-covered churchyard for what it is you do directly perceive a snow-covered churchyard. This is not because your experience itself directly presents you with a snow-covered churchyard. It doesn’t. After all, your experience is of such a kind that it could occur in a hallucination, where it wouldn’t directly present any ordinary object. It is rather because your experience directly perceptually represents the presence of a snow-covered churchyard and is non-deviantly caused by the churchyard in question. This is what direct perception amounts to for the intentionalist — SEP article

As I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean something different by "direct" than what is meant by naive and indirect realists.

On this point it is worth reading Robinson's Semantic Direct Realism:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

So, naive realists argue that perception is direct₁, indirect realists argue that perception is not direct₁, and intentionalists argue that perception is direct₂.

The claims that perception is not direct₁ and that perception is direct₂ are consistent, and so indirect realists and intentionalists can both be correct.

And as I've mentioned before, the core of the issue is the epistemological problem of perception, and if perception is not direct₁ then even if it's direct₂ the problem remains.

And as I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean something different by "direct" than what is meant by naive and indirect realists. — Michael

This strikes me as a no true scotsman. You asked for a non-naive version of direct realism. Intentionalism is a non-naive version. According to the SEP article, direct realism is the thesis that "we can directly perceive ordinary objects." It doesn't say only in the "direct" sense of naive realism.

Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects'
...

It is this concept of an "unmediated awareness of objects" that I consider to be incoherent. Do indirect realists only hold the negative view that this concept is incoherent? Or do they also hold the positive belief in their position that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects?