Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it.
The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon. — fdrake
Describe what you see that access as, please? — fdrake
Are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience such that their mind-independent nature is presented to us or is experience nothing more than a mental phenomenon, with is features being at best only representations of those mind-independent properties? — Michael
Right, so for you "access" is something like introspective awareness? — fdrake
I'm finding it hard to see how the posts you're making are related, which probably means we have very different presuppositions and ways of thinking about the topic.
So if I'm hearing you right, you believe that knowledge is only of percepts, and thus access to the world is indirect? — fdrake
I only used the word "access" because it's the term Moliere used. He said "in terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object". Given that he referenced the epistemological problem of perception I assumed by "access" he was referring to knowledge. — Michael
In what sense is the mind-independent nature of distal objects and their properties not presented to us via perception? — Luke
You seem to indicate that unless perceptions provide us with complete and incorrigible knowledge about objects, then they don't provide us with any knowledge about objects. — Luke
I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism.
To be presented is to be present. If some distal object is presented in experience then that distal object is present in experience. If that distal object is present in experience then it exists within experience.
But experience exists within the brain and distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects do not exist within experience and so are not presented in experience. — Michael
I'm not sure what you take a direct perception to be. Must a distal object become part of one's body in order to have a direct perception? Who thinks this is a perception? — Luke
Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body. — Michael
Then so-called "non-naive" realists accept that indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists — Michael
That doesn't seem to be your position, though, nor that of indirect realists. Indirect realists do not claim that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. Instead, they claim that we perceive this mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. — Luke
I see trees, trees are a mental phenomenon... Wait, I thought you were a realist? — Luke
We see colours. Colours are mental phenomena, perhaps reducible to activity in the primary visual cortex, often caused by light interacting with the eyes (although not always given the cases of dreams and hallucinations). That's indirect realism.
Direct realism claims that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects à la the naive realist theory of colour.
These are quite clearly different positions and at least one of them is wrong. I say that the scientific evidence supports the former and contradicts the latter, e.g. from here:
A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011). — Michael
I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said.Arguing over the grammar of "I experience X" leads to confusion and misses the substance of the dispute entirely. See here. — Michael
It depends on the parts we are talking about to then say that something is "distal" or not, or which parts are direct or not.Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael
Where is the evidence for how neural activity interacts with the colors your experience? — Harry Hindu
There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1).
I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said. — Harry Hindu
The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.
To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.
The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.
I see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael
The phrases "I see" and "I feel" have more than one meaning. — Michael
According to indirect realists, these are all mental phenomena, no matter what you see or feel. What you see or feel can only be a representation, so it must all be mental phenomena. — Luke
Unless indirect realists are allowed to have both perceptions of a mental phenomena and perceptions not of a mental phenomena?
I have knowledge of percepts but I don't have knowledge of the proximal stimulus or distal object. — Michael
Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other.
Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of their objects in the sense that perceptual experiences are perceptions/percepts and that causes of percept properties are tightly constrained by distal object properties. Like reflectance spectra tightly constraining seen colour. — fdrake
An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived. — Luke
As I see it indirect realism is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, with naive realism claiming that distal objects are literal constituents of experience, entailing such things as the naive theory of colour. — Michael
Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In On the Soul he describes how a see-er is informed of the object itself by way of the hylomorphic form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed. — here
I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever.Direct realism was a resident of an idealistic world where the mind directly contacts the forms of things. Indirect realism came into existence when people started trying to become more materialistic about the mind and body. What do you think neo-directness is a response to? — frank
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