I have access to colours and pain and smells and tastes. These are all percepts. — Michael

Describe what you see that access as, please?

Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it.

The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon. — fdrake

You're giving up on the integrity of the self over time. We usually assume it's one self and a flood of everchanging perceptions. You have the ability to direct your perception as you wish. If you allow yourself to become fragmented, you've entered into complete nonsense.

Describe what you see that access as, please? — fdrake

Having a rational awareness/understanding of it. I can describe the colours I see as being red or green or blue or the taste I taste as being sweet or sour or bitter.

From this I then infer the existence of some object reflecting light of certain wavelengths or some foodstuff containing certain ingredients like sugar, given that I have some understanding of the usual relationship between stimulus and percept.

Having a rational awareness/understanding of it. — Michael

Right, so for you "access" is something like introspective awareness?

Are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience such that their mind-independent nature is presented to us or is experience nothing more than a mental phenomenon, with is features being at best only representations of those mind-independent properties? — Michael

I'm not sure what you take a direct perception to be. Must a distal object become part of one's body in order to have a direct perception? Who thinks this is a perception?

In what sense is the mind-independent nature of distal objects and their properties not presented to us via perception? You seem to indicate that unless perceptions provide us with complete and incorrigible knowledge about objects, then they don't provide us with any knowledge about objects.

Right, so for you "access" is something like introspective awareness? — fdrake

The epistemological problem of perception concerns epistemology, i.e. knowledge.

I might know that I see the colour red and taste a sweet taste but not know that some object reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm and that the cake contains sugar (e.g. because I'm a young child who doesn't know anything about physics or chemistry).

I have knowledge of percepts but I don't have knowledge of the proximal stimulus or distal object.

I'm finding it hard to see how the posts you're making are related, which probably means we have very different presuppositions and ways of thinking about the topic.

So if I'm hearing you right, you believe that knowledge is only of percepts, and thus access to the world is indirect?

I'm finding it hard to see how the posts you're making are related, which probably means we have very different presuppositions and ways of thinking about the topic.

So if I'm hearing you right, you believe that knowledge is only of percepts, and thus access to the world is indirect? — fdrake

I only used the word "access" because it's the term Moliere used. He said "in terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object". Given that he referenced the epistemological problem of perception I assumed by "access" he was referring to knowledge.

I only used the word "access" because it's the term Moliere used. He said "in terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object". Given that he referenced the epistemological problem of perception I assumed by "access" he was referring to knowledge. — Michael

That works for me. I'd claim that we have knowledge of perception and we have knowledge of objects.

It seems, right now, that the difference might be more on the other side of the problem -- rather than "the world", what is it that is in/directly related to perception which gives knowledge of the world through inference?

My attempt to phrase your indirect realism:

I/we:Percepts:the world

Where ":" is "gives knowledge" "is knowledge giving"? might be better -- or "is related in a knowledge-like way"

Whereas the direct realist claim might be, and I'd be sympathetic to this:

I/we=percepts, which in turn know the world (and which we are a part of, and so can come to know ourselves and our percepts).

In what sense is the mind-independent nature of distal objects and their properties not presented to us via perception? — Luke

To be presented is to be present. If some distal object is presented in experience then that distal object is present in experience. If that distal object is present in experience then it exists within experience.

But experience exists within the brain and distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects do not exist within experience and so are not presented in experience. The relationship between experience and distal objects is nothing more than causal.

You seem to indicate that unless perceptions provide us with complete and incorrigible knowledge about objects, then they don't provide us with any knowledge about objects. — Luke

They don't provide us with direct knowledge. Experience is the effect, distal objects are a cause. Knowledge of effects is not direct knowledge of causes. Knowledge of causes gained from knowledge of effects is inferential, i.e. indirect.

I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism.

I’m with you on that. I think the use of “distal” to describe objects in the world is used to get around the inherent question begging of the position, to contrast the rest of the world with mental objects before having to prove mental objects exist in the first place. Mental objects are afforded primacy as the true and known object while the sun, for instance, is relegated to the status of the unseen and unknown, “distal”. At any rate, it’s a silly piece of jargon.

To be presented is to be present. If some distal object is presented in experience then that distal object is present in experience. If that distal object is present in experience then it exists within experience.

But experience exists within the brain and distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects do not exist within experience and so are not presented in experience. — Michael

They are presented in experience as a perception of the object, not as the object itself. It is absurd to argue that in order to have a direct perception of an object then the object must be present inside your body.

I'm not sure what you take a direct perception to be. Must a distal object become part of one's body in order to have a direct perception? Who thinks this is a perception? — Luke

It seems to me as if my visual experience literally extends beyond my body and that distal objects are literally present within my visual experience. This is the naive view that naive realists accepted as true, but which the science of perception has now shown to be false. Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body.

Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists accept this indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists, probably because that get confused by the grammar of "I see X".

They've just redefined the meaning of "direct perception".

Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body. — Michael

That doesn't seem to be your position, though, nor that of indirect realists. Indirect realists do not claim that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. Instead, they claim that we perceive this mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. They do not consider the mental phenomenon or representation to be the visual experience; they consider the perception of the mental phenomenon or representation to be the visual experience.

Then so-called "non-naive" realists accept that indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists — Michael

Until you abandon the idea that the mental phenomenon or representation of the world is a perceptible intermediary, and is instead part of the perceiver, then our dispute is not merely grammatical.

That doesn't seem to be your position, though, nor that of indirect realists. Indirect realists do not claim that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. Instead, they claim that we perceive this mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. — Luke

I feel pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, therefore I feel a mental phenomenon.
I see colours, colours are a mental phenomenon, therefore I see a mental phenomenon.

You're getting so caught up in the grammar of "I experience X". It doesn't just mean one thing. It is perfectly appropriate to say that we see things when we dream and hear things when we hallucinate, and that the things we see and hear when we dream and hallucinate are percepts rather than distal objects. The indirect realist recognises that we see and hear these percepts when awake and not hallucinating too, and that these percepts can be thought of as mental representations of distal objects.

I feel pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, therefore I feel a mental phenomenon.
I see colours, colours are a mental phenomenon, therefore I see a mental phenomenon. — Michael

I see trees, trees are a mental phenomenon... Wait, I thought you were a realist?

I see trees, trees are a mental phenomenon... Wait, I thought you were a realist? — Luke

As I have repeatedly said, "I experience X" doesn't just mean one thing.

I see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon.

Both the direct and the indirect realist's grammar are correct. The phrases "I see" and "I feel" have more than one meaning.

The relevant question concerns which of these are correct:

I directly see trees
I indirectly see trees

Given this, one cannot simply define "I directly see a tree" as "I see a tree". Something else is required to make sense of the words "directly" and "indirectly", and that is what I have done in this comment.

We see colours. Colours are mental phenomena, perhaps reducible to activity in the primary visual cortex, often caused by light interacting with the eyes (although not always given the cases of dreams and hallucinations). That's indirect realism.

Direct realism claims that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects à la the naive realist theory of colour.

These are quite clearly different positions and at least one of them is wrong. I say that the scientific evidence supports the former and contradicts the latter, e.g. from here:
A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011). — Michael

This "evidence" sounds like a description from a naive realist, or someone who is describing the nature of perception from a naive realist perspective.

Where is the evidence for how neural activity interacts with the colors your experience? How does that happen? Is that a direct interaction? Neurologists talk as if they have a naive realist view of the brain as a physical object which creates the dualist dichotomy of the mind-body problem.

Indirect interactions are really accumulated direct interactions. It's possible that both indirect and direct realism are incorrect on their own, but true when understood that they are different parts of the same coin.

Indirect realism is dependent upon space and time having some objective existence where it takes time and space for the accumulated causes and their effects to happen. But what if space and time are like colors and are only mental phenomena? That would mean that the universe is happening all at once in the same place and everything is directly connected all at once. So your "scientific evidence" is based on a lot of assumptions.

Arguing over the grammar of "I experience X" leads to confusion and misses the substance of the dispute entirely. See here. — Michael

I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said.

The whole point of asking where "I" is in relation to the things that are being perceived is to show that distal objects are only distal based on where "I" is. Mental phenomena are distal in the same way that your neural activity is, in that I can't directly observe them, I only use them as explanations for your behaviors. Like you said,:

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

It depends on the parts we are talking about to then say that something is "distal" or not, or which parts are direct or not.

Where is the evidence for how neural activity interacts with the colors your experience? — Harry Hindu

Neural representations of perceptual color experience in the human ventral visual pathway

There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1).

---

I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said. — Harry Hindu

See Perception # Process and terminology:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.

I see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael

According to indirect realists, these are all mental phenomena, no matter what you see or feel. What you see or feel can only be a representation, so it must all be mental phenomena. Unless indirect realists are allowed to have both perceptions of a mental phenomena and perceptions not of a mental phenomena?

The phrases "I see" and "I feel" have more than one meaning. — Michael

But not as the indirect realist uses them.

According to indirect realists, these are all mental phenomena, no matter what you see or feel. What you see or feel can only be a representation, so it must all be mental phenomena. — Luke

No, according to indirect realists those statements are more specifically understood as:

I directly see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I indirectly see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I directly feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I indirectly feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon.

Indirect realists claim that it is only mental phenomena that is directly experienced and that distal objects are indirectly experienced, with the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" being explained in my comment here.

Unless indirect realists are allowed to have both perceptions of a mental phenomena and perceptions not of a mental phenomena?

Yes. There are direct perceptions of mental phenomena and indirect perceptions of distal objects.

I have knowledge of percepts but I don't have knowledge of the proximal stimulus or distal object. — Michael

Right so let's go back to this. I'm trying to find something we can agree on a framing of so that we can start having a productive chat.

I agree that we have knowledge of percepts. To me that is distinct from forming a percept - ie perceiving. So to me, forming knowledge of percepts is distinct from the problem of whether perception is direct or not.

For reference I'd like to use SEP's characterisation of direct realism.

This has a few claims. We've touched on some of them.

• Ordinary Objects: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects.
• Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of their objects.
• Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.
• Common Kind Claim: veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences (as) of an F are fundamentally the same; they form a common kind.

I'd agree -with some caveats- to ordinary objects, presentation, direct realist character, but reject the common kind claim (I imagine I'm some kind of disjunctivist). My caveats would be:

• Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other. By this I don't mean that your red is identical to my red, but that if we both see the same apple, we can come to agree on whether it's red or not. For the dress, we can come to agree that it's either black and blue or gold and white.
• Presentation caveat: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of their objects in the sense that perceptual experiences are perceptions/percepts and that causes of percept properties are tightly constrained by distal object properties. Like reflectance spectra tightly constraining seen colour.
  
• Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects. No caveats here.

I'd reject the common kind claim, for me illusions and hallucinations don't seem like an instances of perception. But for different reasons. Hallucinations don't have an in principle manipulable distal object or set of environmental causes, and thus aren't subject to the causal constraints of active perception. Illusions my jury is still out on.

For me, whether something seems to be X to me is not paradigmatic/definitive that I have perceived X. For example, I could have misperceived X, or what my perceptions seem to me to be (upon reflection, memory, the next moment...) may not be what they are. The paradigmatic instance of perception for me, then, is a veridical perception in an active account of perception.

I imagine, though please correct me if I'm wrong @Pierre-Normand, that my ordinary objects caveat is similar to @Pierre-Normand's reference to Evans'. Though I come at it from the belief that there's good evidence perception - as well as its character - is socially mediated.

Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other.

Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of their objects in the sense that perceptual experiences are perceptions/percepts and that causes of percept properties are tightly constrained by distal object properties. Like reflectance spectra tightly constraining seen colour. — fdrake

But the indirect realist agrees that mental phenomena like smells and tastes and colours are causally determined by distal objects and their properties.

So clearly direct realism cannot be defined in this way.

As I see it indirect realism is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, with naive realism claiming that distal objects are literal constituents of experience, entailing such things as the naive theory of colour.

I believe i understand what you're trying to point out, but this is not shown by what you claim to be showing support for the claim in that comment, though. It's not even partially relevant.
That some people have bad eyesight does nothing for the previous, lets call it 'layer of indirectness' posited by the IRist. A bad camera also receives bad data, and constructs a bad image. It does not perceive anything.

An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived. — Luke

Because that's clearly true.

Imaginary friends aren't perceived. — Pierre-Normand

Then nothing is perceived.

As I see it indirect realism is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, with naive realism claiming that distal objects are literal constituents of experience, entailing such things as the naive theory of colour. — Michael

You mean like direct realism = the apple is distal object is numerically identical to the apple percept?

@Banno

Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In On the Soul he describes how a see-er is informed of the object itself by way of the hylomorphic form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed. — here

Direct realism was a resident of an idealistic world where the mind directly contacts the forms of things. Indirect realism came into existence when people started trying to become more materialistic about the mind and body. What do you think neo-directness is a response to?

Here's the point, again; one does not see the representation; seeing is constructing the representation.

Direct realism was a resident of an idealistic world where the mind directly contacts the forms of things. Indirect realism came into existence when people started trying to become more materialistic about the mind and body. What do you think neo-directness is a response to? — frank

I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever.

But I do not wish to be dragged in to a discussion that I think misguided; that there is merit in the distinction between direct and indirect.

When you move around the room, you see and touch and interact with its furnishings. In so doing you construct a model, a representation of the room. You are not seperate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room.

Further, it's silly to say you infer the existence of that bloody footstool you bruised your shin on.

Have you had a read of the Midgley article I linked to recently? Seems somehow pertinent.

All assertion and no argument. I'll wait until you present an argument to address—responding to mere assertions being a waste of time.