There is an alternative, which is to reject the juxtaposition of direct and indirect experiences entirely, and admit that we do sometimes see (hear, touch, smell...) things as they are; and that indeed this is essential in order for us to be able to recognise those occasions in which we see (hear, touch, smell...) things in the world erroneously. — Banno
The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. The issue is no longer "Do we perceive representations (indirect realism) or do we perceive objects (direct realism)" since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect.Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. — frank
Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time.
— frank
The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. — Banno
since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect. — Banno
Both fall prey to the fallacy of ambiguity; there is some ambiguity with the verb "see", for example. In the case of hallucination there is no object of perception. If there was, it wouldn't be a hallucination. So we're confusing the object of perception with perception itself. — NOS4A2
We see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. Hence, we see the tree. — Banno
Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. I think the contemporary direct realist is trying to steer clear of the problems associated with it? — frank
The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.
:up:
— Michael
If that is what they modern DRist is trying to do — AmadeusD
One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem? — frank
Firstly, if direct realism is true then scientific realism is true, and if scientific realism is true then direct realism is false. Therefore direct realism is false given that it entails a contradiction. — Michael
We have direct perceptual knowledge of our body's response to stimulation. — Michael
Well, for instance, it's hard to see how disjunctivism could be indirect. That a veridical viewing of, say, a tree, could be an instance of viewing a mental image of the tree, while an hallucination was not.. — Banno
I think you are right that direct realism is the beginning position. I doubt that many folk think they see the world "exactly as it is". Rather folk realise that sometimes they see things amiss. This is what the various illusions bring into focus, so to speak.One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then he concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem? — frank
That we see illusions shows that we do not see the world exactly as it is; but it does not show that we never see the world. Nor does it show that what we see is not the world, but something else caused by the world.
That is those who advocate for indirect realism on this basis are grasping more than the situation will allow. That we sometimes see the world as other than it actually is does not imply that we never see the world as it is. — Banno
Another picture that may prove helpful, with the lines representing some relevant causal connection.
amr0096dgaltgb9e.jpg — Michael
When I look at something I can see its qualities: height, width, shape, colours, textures; I don't need to infer those properties. — Janus
But how does the cognition "see" anything? It is the mental image, the representation of the distal object, which is the "seeing"; the sensory perception. The cognition does not have its own set of sensory organs with which to perceive the mental image. — Luke
Indirect realism is the view that what we see is the representation. The alternate is that what we see is the tree, and that we see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. — Banno
The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it? — frank
I see things when I dream and the schizophrenic hears voices when hallucinating. Sensory organs are not involved. — Michael
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