"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use. — Moliere
Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use.
Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view. — Moliere
and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance. — Moliere
Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use. As understood today, the naïve realist claims that, when we successfully see a tomato, that tomato is literally a constituent of that experience, such that an experience of that fundamental kind could not have occurred in the absence of that object. As naïve realism, thus understood, sees perception as fundamentally involving a relation between subjects and their environments, the position is also sometimes known as “relationalism” in the contemporary literature. Typically, today’s naïve realist will also claim that the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. On such a view, the redness that I am aware of when I look at a ripe tomato is a matter of my experience acquainting me with the tomato’s color: the redness that I am aware of in this experience just is the redness of the tomato. As such a view appears to commit its proponent to a version of claim (3) above—that for one to see an object to have a feature, the object must actually have that feature—the inheritance of the name “naïve” realism seems appropriate. As for whether there can be naïve realist theories of senses other than vision, this is an issue that awaits a more detailed exploration.
The key parts are in bold.
Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense." — Michael
...our visual perception of [...] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part)
...the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. — Michael
The existence of something like a mental representation is what it means for our perception of distal objects to be mediated. — Michael
I addressed this before when I asked you to explain the difference between "seeing" a mental representation and "having" a mental representation. You were unable to do so. And that is precisely because there is no difference. — Michael
And this is where you're reading something into the grammar that just isn't there. — Michael
If you agree with this, then you are arguing for direct realism. If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material object is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). — Luke
You misinterpret what "perceive mental phenomena" means. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hears voices, and these voices are a mental phenomenon. I see colours, and colours are a mental phenomenon. This is all that is meant. — Michael
Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data? — Luke
If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material object is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). — Luke
Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data? — Luke
Something that exists in one location cannot be a constituent of something that exists in a different location. — Michael
[N]aïve realists have to accept what might be called a radically non-Galilean ontology – i.e. an ontology that, far from kicking the sensible qualities upstairs, into our minds, rather locates those sensible qualities within the external world we see and sense. As Campbell (2010, p. 206) puts it, naïve realism ‘depends on the idea that qualitative properties are in fact characteristics of the world we observe’, whereby this is because, according to naïve realism, ‘our experiences have the qualitative characters … they do in virtue of the fact that they are relations to those aspects of the world’.
Naïve realism is thus a radically externalistic view about the nature of perceptual experience. For it implies that our perceptual experiences, rather than being ‘narrow’ mental events which occur just inside the head, instead reach all the way out to the external things they are of and thereby ‘literately include the world’ (Martin, 1997, p. 84). As Logue (2009, p. 25) observes, on naïve realism, our perceptual experiences ‘literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of’.
On the sense datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E's intrinsic nature can be characterised independently of O).
On the sense datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E's intrinsic nature can be characterised independently of O).
I would ask whether *anything* could ever count as *indirect* under this view. — Apustimelogist
On the othet hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in *some* sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.
I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells. — Apustimelogist
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