The closest thing we have to free will is becoming aware of how things influence us, and acting accordingly.

You'd have other reasons that caused your action, though. — NKBJ

Using this train of thought as a springboard:

In common modern parlance, determinacy is not equivalent to causation. The material used in a construction determines the relative flexibility of the edifice (e.g., wood makes the edifice flexible in comparison to the material of stone); yet the material does not efficiently cause the flexibility of the structure: the material and the structure are simultaneous. The same can be said of formal determinacy—what determines some particular form (with emergent properties of constituents as one possible example)—as well as for teleological determinacy, namely those of motives that most always determine particular motions of sapient beings and which simultaneously co-occur with the given motions. Causation as commonly understood pertains only to efficient causation—wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect it has the agency to produce. (This, though, is not do deny that at times all four of Aristotle’s categories of determinacy can be addressed as causal factors—further obfuscating the issue with unnoticed equivocations.)

Freewill as defined by the op seems to me to be, at best, a logical contradiction: effects being themselves determined by some originative cause that a) is devoid of motives for the action of effect origination and also b) is non-stochastic.

If freewill does exist, it is always semi-determined by, at minimum, motives—which are not efficient causes. It’s just that what one chooses will not be fully determined by antecedent (efficient) causes. In other words, that which does the choosing will itself be a terminating efficient cause of the effects produced within the constraints of, at minimum, the motives that are present.

Yea, I’m battling with windmills in thinking this is going to hold any sway in soundbite form—though I find nothing irrational about what I’ve just addressed. And this is one means of going about a compatibilist universe: one where freewill requires determinacy for its very manifestation (but is contradictory to being fully determined by antecedent efficient causes, i.e. a causally deterministic universe).

You'd have other reasons that caused your action, though. — NKBJ

And then you'd need to hypothesise a cause/reason why one reason was causal and the other was not.

I call that cause my choice; my choice determines whether I act accord ing to this reason or that reason or no reason. But you want a cause for my choice...

You make choices based on a mixture of your personal biology and past experiences. Take away those two things and there's nothing left of "you."

There's nothing "free" about a free will, because it's just random and wouldn't be based on reason or values or experience or knowledge or anything. It would be chaos.

Do you agree, then, that Freewill can't be understood because it can't be explained since that would require a causal (deterministic) model? — TheMadFool

I agree.

But I don't even think a causal (deterministic) model would sufficiently explain freewill. Suppose freewill is an immediate process of an individual's internal state. It follows that free will only seems to be the cause of the state of affairs which occurs subsequent to its act.

The illusion of freewill is that an external state of affairs corresponds to what has been willed. Even if the will corresponded perfectly to the state of affairs, there is no indication that the will is the causal factor.

So a deterministic model would only give greater reason for why the universe is the cause of any state of affairs, rather than a free will.

You make choices based on a mixture of your personal biology and past experiences. Take away those two things and there's nothing left of "you."

There's nothing "free" about a free will, because it's just random and wouldn't be based on reason or values or experience or knowledge or anything. It would be chaos. — NKBJ

You are just going round and round, declaring without argument that everything must be like this because it must be. And you don't notice that it isn't like that after all.

If freewill does exist, it is always semi-determined by, at minimum, motives—which are not efficient causes — javra

What part is not determined?

And you don't notice that it isn't like that after all. — unenlightened

You haven't provided any substantive argument for why it wouldn't be so.

There's nothing "free" about a free will, because it's just random and wouldn't be based on reason or values or experience or knowledge or anything. It would be chaos. — NKBJ

If the will is the deciding agent for causality, then that would mean it chooses, and by choosing that implies some degree of freedom

If the will is the deciding agent for causality, then that would mean it chooses, and by choosing that implies some degree of freedom — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes, there is freedom in the choice, but that freedom of choice is dependent on being determined. On what basis would you make a choice if not by predetermined data?

You haven't provided any substantive argument for why it wouldn't be so. — NKBJ

No. And you haven't provided any substantive argument for why it would be so. But I have the advantage that people make choices, and I don't need to explain it, merely notice it, whereas you need to explain it away.

But even if the choice is predicated upon determinate factors, the choice itself is not predetermined

No. And you haven't provided any substantive argument for why it would be so. But I have the advantage that people make choices, and I don't need to explain it, merely notice it, whereas you need to explain it away — unenlightened

If you had been paying attention, you'd have noticed that I never said that people don't make choices. They do. But those choices aren't "free" or untethered to determined causes.

You're the one who has to make a case for what part of the self could possibly make an uncaused choice. What part of you is untouched by biology and experience?

But even if the choice is predicated upon determinate factors, the choice itself is not predetermined — Merkwurdichliebe

And what part of you is untouched by predetermining factors?

Or you could consider the Nietzschean idea that there are so many unknowns that factor into choice, that I have no idea what's going on, but like to think I cause things

Or you could consider the Nietzschean idea that there are so many unknowns that factor into choice, that I have no idea what's going on, but like to think I cause things — Merkwurdichliebe

Sure, that's how we act and think in the day to day. The predetermining factors of all the thousands of decisions we make are indeed so vast that we can't always comprehend them, so we go about our days with the impression that our wills are totally free.

And what part of you is untouched by predetermining factors? — NKBJ

Not one part.

Except maybe that part of me where my decisions are made

Suppose the predetermined factors are infinite, would that then give infinite possibility to the deciding agent? If so, that would make the will beyond free

But you want a cause for my choice... — unenlightened

Just because there are predetermined factors, it doesn't necessitate that they are the cause of choice

And just because a state of affairs corresponds to the will, it doesn't necessitate that willing is the cause

...

What part is not determined? — NKBJ

If the non-equivalence between determinacy and causation as I’ve previously described it is accepted, freewill could then be argued to be necessarily (pre)determined at all times.

--> It would only not be fully determined by antecedent efficient causes—such that the decision-as-effect which is produced holds that which makes the decision to be the metaphysically terminating origin—hence, originating efficient cause—of the decision (... this rather than the decision being a link in an infinite chain, or web, of efficient causal processes devoid of any exception).

One means of potentially arguing this is to provide for the contradiction of (a fully) causal determinism: In summation of one such argument, we agents (i.e., sentient beings; hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. BTW, to hypothetically then claim that awareness is an illusion on grounds of the model used is to place the cart before the horse: it is our awareness which devises models of what being is; not vice versa.

If this logical contradiction is valid and if awareness holds ontological presence (rather than being chimerical), then (a fully) causally deterministic universe is rationally concluded to be an error of reasoning. This, minimally, then facilitates the possibility of freewill as I’ve just described it.

Another means is to address experiences (here granting that our awareness is not perfectly chimerical): we are aware that we strive to choose which alternative to commit to whenever we deliberate between alternatives. We are typically aware via non-physiological sensations (i.e. emotively) that there is a want in us whenever we so deliberate. This want, whatever it may be, is the a propelling motive for us to make a choice between alternatives—and this propelling motive determines our motion (roughly, our change of being) in actively making a decision; i.e., determines that we engage in the psychological action. Each want (each propelling motive) has some either ready established or else not yet established resolution that is pursued. The resolution to the want attracts us—and it too is a motive that determines what we choose; it is a fully teleological (goal-based) determinant that is entailed by the want. So when we deliberate in order to come to a decision we are determined by our propelling want and by that end/goal which we deem to resolve the given want. As to the actual alternatives between which we chose, at any given moment of deliberation, these are not determined by us as aware agents (but are instead determined, arguably, by our unconscious mind); these ready alternatives, instead, (pre)determine what our future courses of action can potentially be at any given instance of choice. We choose that alternative which best satisfies our motives—our desire when this is conceptualized as a propelling motive of want that simultaneously entails a sought after resolution to the same want, the latter being the telos/end that attracts or pulls.

In short, we are always determined by motives and by the alternatives we are aware of in the choices we make. Our choices are thereby never chaotic.

But add to this the following possible paradox: when we deliberate between alternatives, each alternative will be both a credible means toward the attracting motive we are determined by (otherwise we wouldn’t entertain it) AND each alternative will be to some extent an uncertain optimal means toward the attracting motive, which serves to determined what we choose (otherwise, were we to be certain that one alternative is better than all others, there would be no need for deliberation). Choosing which alternative is the best means toward the telos-motive, then, is a matter of metaphysical freedom—freedom strictly from antecedent efficient causes. We at these junctures of deliberation in essence momentarily become the causal origin of the ensuing decision as effect--thereby rationally holding responsibility for our choices.

I’m not claiming that what I’ve so far expressed is comprehensive. Though it’s an expansive topic, I’ve already written a mouthful, I’m thinking.

I am wanting to claim that what I’ve expressed does rationally illustrate how our choices are always determined and yet are—or at least rationally can be—metaphysically free from an otherwise infinite web of perfectly fixed efficient causations … and this without being in any way chaotic.

Perception of "free will" is an evolutionary device instrumental in our progress toward nonorganic replication. Since we became self-aware, much of our focus has been on prolonging our lives artificially and making imitations of ourselves that won't expire. It's strange that we would treat "free will" as internal but "gods" as external. It's strange that we would spend so long forcing mystery incrementally onto ourselves before forcibly removing it incrementally from ourselves and our environment, and we still believe we're free-willed.

yet are—or at least rationally can be—metaphysically free from an otherwise infinite web of perfectly fixed efficient causations … and this without being in any way chaotic. — javra

The will derives its freedom by relating itself to infinite possibility through the rational imagination. So, in one one sense, it is in the creative will that metaphysical freedom is obtained, and in a way that averts chaos.

Though more vague than what I had in mind, I think I can relate to that. The mechanisms to volition is what most intrigue me in relation to this theme.

This want, whatever it may be, is the a propelling motive for us to make a choice between alternatives—and this propelling motive determines our motion (roughly, our change of being) in actively making a decision; i.e., determines that we engage in the psychological action. Each want (each propelling motive) has some either ready established or else not yet established resolution that is pursued. — javra

So are you saying that this "want" or "motive" is determined or the part of choice that is not fully determined?

Repeat post - my laptop bugged out on me.

I appreciate that you are examining from multiple perspectives. It's worth a re-read

So are you saying that this "want" or "motive" is determined or the part of choice that is not fully determined? — NKBJ

Stating it differently: there can be no choice (an action or motion) without some form of want (a driving motive where "motive" is understood as "something that determines motion"). The motive--irrespective of what it itself is determined by--determines the process of choice making.

Stating it differently: there can be no choice (an action or motion) without some form of want (a driving motive where "motive" is understood as "something that determines motion"). The motive--irrespective of what it itself is determined by--determines the process of choice making. — javra

I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink:

I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.

The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy.