Doo doo

Poor terrapin stationed in her doo doo mindedness

Creedence stomps the stones

If you accept morality, that presupposes freewill, whether you can explain it or not.

That is the extra claim you make, that I do not. And you keep making it and not justifying it. I'm unsurprised, because I have never heard any justification in many years of such discussion. — unenlightened

From where I'm sitting, you just keep repeating that there IS some undetermined part of the self that makes choices without being at all specific about what that is or whence it comes or how it works or ANYTHING.

When you take away biology, and you take away all the experiences of your life, WHAT is left of you that could make decisions?

The idea of free will is rooted in our defense mechanism against the concept of determinism. We desperately need to justify our own sense of control over ourselves and our life since the idea that we are part of a causality system is as close to cosmic horror we have in our knowledge about the universe. But the fact is that we can't escape the logic of determinism and any attempt to do so always fall flat when falsifying any argument in favor of free will. A common denominator for those arguing for free will is usually that they at the same time believe in supernatural elements to our existence and laws of the universe.

The closest thing to something breaking determinism is using quantum randomness as a deciding factor for choices and decisions, but that would only cause a physical representation of chaos that is causally undetermined, it would never grant the ability of free will. So, even if randomness were a factor within the causal system, it never supports free will as a system. However we verify or falsify the argument, free will never find solid ground outside of an irrational belief system.

When you take away biology, and you take away all the experiences of your life, WHAT is left of you that could make decisions? — NKBJ

I've never tried it. If you have, perhaps you can tell me, but your question is rhetorical, so of course you cannot, you merely show that you assume there is nothing, and cannot be anything.

However we verify or falsify the argument, free will never find solid ground outside of an irrational belief system. — Christoffer

However we verify or falsify the argument, determinism will never find solid ground outside of an irrational belief system.

However closely you examine the virtual world of a computer game, you will never find anything that violates the determinism of the program; you will never find any trace of the player, but only of his input, which you may see as 'either random or programmed'. But we know that people play games, and are more than their avatars.

My position is simple. It appears to me that I make choices, and the making of choices entails that they are not already determined. This could be an illusion, but no one has presented the least reason to think it is an illusion. So just as I do not assume the sky is pink because it appears to be blue, so I don't assume that I cannot choose because it appears that I can.

I've never tried it. If you have, perhaps you can tell me, but your question is rhetorical, so of course you cannot, you merely show that you assume there is nothing, and cannot be anything — unenlightened

Until you can explain to me what about the self could be free from determinism, your entire theory is based merely on wishful thinking.

For the record, it's not a rhetorical question. I'm dead serious. Biology is determined, experiences are determined, so to claim there is free will you have to show there is something else.

Until you can explain to me what about the self could be free from determinism, your entire theory is based merely on wishful thinking. — NKBJ

No it isn't. I just told you my theory is based on what appears to be the case, that I can choose freely, not at all on what I wish. And whatever the basis of my theory which is hardly theory at all, it is in no way dependent on what I can explain to you, fortunately.

I just told you my theory is based on what appears to be the case, that I can choose freely, not at all on what I wish — unenlightened

It doesn't appear that way at all. But since you can't explain it, I rest my case.

I rest my case. — NKBJ

Feel free. :grin:

Feel free. :grin: — unenlightened

It was determined since the big bang that I would do so. :joke: :kiss:

Thank you. You have a nice way of framing it all. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks

I would add there is also the important debate of whether predetermined factors allow for the existence of the will, and to what degree it is free in relation to those factors. — Merkwurdichliebe

True. It’s why I find interest in exploring the mechanisms of volition. It can’t be completely determined, nor completely undetermined. Nor are our lives and experiences helped out by forsaking the subject of volition on grounds of it being illusory—this due to upholding a model of causal reality that (as I previously tried to illustrate) is contradictory to causal efficacy.

The eternal decision. I think this is what makes the willing agent relevent, whether or not its decision manifests into reality. In fact, I would say that when the will does not correspond to any existing state of affairs, it takes on even more importance. — Merkwurdichliebe

Via example, what I generally have in mind is: there’s my decision to move my hand, followed by the state of affairs of my hand moving as I willed; likewise, when I decide to not move my hand, my hand does not move. So there generally is a uniform correlation between what I willfully intend to do and what ends up being done.

On occasion though, my will shall not be efficacious. If I decide to express an idea I have in confident manners but instead end up being tongue-tied in the idea’s expression, the resulting state of affairs will not correlate with what I willed to occur.

As I interpret it, then, you’re saying that the property of will is more important when it is not efficacious—this as per my second example of ending up being tongue tied.

I’m curious to find out more about why you think so.

It take it from your terminology, you hold to a few Aristotilean presuppositions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes. As I’ve previously expressed, I do believe in Aristotle’s four different types of determinacy.

In layman terms, causality is nullified by immutability, qua. the deterministic model. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nicely summarized.

The important distinction is, as you say: existing, versus standing out. But I might argue that this standing out is existing, as such. [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

The sneaky issue is that of the first-person point-of-view’s existence. It is, has being, but it does not stand out even to itself. You look into a mirror and see all the biological apparatuses via which you as a first-person point-of-view can physiologically see—but you never physiologically see yourself as that first-person point-of-view which is seeing … and which can also see with the mind’s eye. So if to exist is defined as to stand out, does one as first-person point-of-view of awareness exist?

It’s this same, ever-changing, first person point of view that does the choosing.

[...] And, if the deterministic model does essentially negate the deciding agent, then, then thing that exists is gone, and what are we left with: the model and irrelevant spectators. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup, I agree with the conclusion.

Quote from another interesting article on the matter:

"We can thus see that the free will wars – disputes about whether or not we should go around denying free will, and what free will really is – are a function of differing definitions. If you’re referring to our capacity for voluntary choice-making that gives us rational control over our behavior, and that makes us responsible, then it would be wrong to deny that. If, on the other hand, you’re referring to a contra-causal capacity that supposedly makes us more responsible than what deterministic voluntary action affords, then it would be wrong not to deny that, at least on the assumption that we want a well-informed public."

and:
"Given indeterminism, things might have turned out otherwise, but breaks in causal regularities in generating options to choose from can’t be credited to the agent. Moreover, we don’t want the agent’s choice among options to involve much randomness, since that would undermine responsibility by sidelining the agent’s character and intentions as primary determinants of the choice. What we can call agent determinism is necessary for control and responsibility. So, if a contra-causal swerve helps to determine a choice, that choice can’t more reflect the agent’s character or motives, so doesn’t make the choice more her doing in any morally significant respect than under determinism, even though she could, and might, have done otherwise. The upshot, it seems to me, is that it’s perfectly ok to tell folks they don’t have free will in this purportedly responsibility-enhancing sense, since there’s no good reason to suppose they do, even if determinism is false.[3] So go for it. But we have to make sure they understand that they can still, and will, be held responsible, since being held responsible is crucial in helping people do the right thing."

http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/what-should-we-tell-people-about-free-will

Well, yea, I was familiar with these perspectives prior to making my posts on this thread. Is there any particular argument you want to make? The quoted text is one of presumed authority, but no logical arguments are provided for its basic affirmations. And, as per the arguments I've previously offered against a completely causal determinism and for a (metaphysical) freedom of choice, I disagree with these basic affirmations. But we can always agree to disagree.

:roll:

Not making an argument; just trying to share an article I thought was interesting.

to explain freewill (necessary to comprehend it) we need to construct a causal model of it.

There are certain things that aren't as easy to explain verbally as they are by simply witnessing an embodiment of it.

For example, I begun entrepreneurial endeavors very early, but always struggled with how to sell things to people. No matter how many times I would be told to sell to people, how many ideas I would be given, it was very difficult to execute. Eventually I began to work for MetroPCS, where as a Sales Associate, I witnessed just a few transactions in my first couple days and I was blown away and enlightened. I saw how Evil they did it, but I turned it into my own way, which felt so much better. My communication skills improved because of it in the business sense and my performance showed that.

Similar to Aristotle's thoughts on Eudaimonia -- if you have the example, others will follow... and others...

However we verify or falsify the argument, determinism will never find solid ground outside of an irrational belief system. — unenlightened

Determinism has solid ground mathematically through probability. At quantum levels, probability has a randomness that hasn't been combined with larger models yet, but the probability of anything other happening outside causality of larger than quantum events is so low that it's within infinitiy numbers.
Free will does not have such support. So saying that determinism has no solid ground outside of an irrational belief system is pretty much just nonsense.

However closely you examine the virtual world of a computer game, you will never find anything that violates the determinism of the program; you will never find any trace of the player, but only of his input, which you may see as 'either random or programmed'. But we know that people play games, and are more than their avatars. — unenlightened

How in any way does this relate to the laws of the universe? Are you using an analogy of a computer game to compare the free will of the player with the free will of our selves within our universe? I don't even need to break this down to show how irrational such an analogy is. Free will is governed by the same laws of physics and the same universe as anything else. Thinking that our free will and our sense of self is disconnected from that is both narcissistic and arrogant by us as humans. A desperation of holding on to an illusion based in a sense of importance to our existence within a universe that couldn't care less about us existing. And theological explanations have no solid ground to support such irrationality without including tons of cognitive biases.

It appears to me that I make choices, and the making of choices entails that they are not already determined. — unenlightened

If I program you, psychologically, to crave for a certain product through repetition of commercial exposure of that product; you will eventually include a will to use that product. Commercial work shows how infantile people are when thinking about free will. Corporations can control what people want by the illusion of what they need. So the choices you make do not appear in a vacuum, you have no isolated thinking that works as the basis for the will you act upon. So to detach your will from what creates that will is ignorance of how our mind actually works.

What "appears to be the case" is not in any way solid support for a conclusion that determinism doesn't exist and determinism does not mean "someone determined it", it's about causality, laws of physics. You need to ignore both the laws of physics and how psychology works in order to conclude your free will to be free of any influence and reason, both biologically and psychologically.

This could be an illusion, but no one has presented the least reason to think it is an illusion. — unenlightened

There's plenty of reasons and support for determinism, but if you have a cognitive bias towards believing determinism to be wrong, you will ignore those reasons and support.

So just as I do not assume the sky is pink because it appears to be blue, so I don't assume that I cannot choose because it appears that I can. — unenlightened

This line of thinking is just naive. Your mind and brain are not detached from laws of physics and the rest of the universe. You cannot use your subjective feeling as support against determinism. And the sky is blue because of physics and your eye register the blue color because of it. Your assumptions are totally irrelevant when judging the nature of what spectrum the sky shows. Measure the spectrum and you get the data and if you get brain damage, the sky might change appearance, but the data is still the same, i.e your assumption about the sky is irrelevant since it's affected by how your brain works, not the actual composition of how the sky produce the blue color. The sky is blue whether you want it to be or not, determinism is governing everything in the universe, including our brain and mind, whether you want it to or not. What you assume to be true about your sense of free will is irrelevant as support for free will. You cannot prove the validity of the book you read by using the book itself as proof, that's fundamentally corrupt and biased.

If, on the other hand, you’re referring to a contra-causal capacity that supposedly makes us more responsible than what deterministic voluntary action affords, then it would be wrong not to deny that, at least on the assumption that we want a well-informed public." — NKBJ

There are a number of problems with that article but the first is this. Just how are we managing voluntary control over anything if causal determinism is the case?

Thinking that our free will and our sense of self is disconnected from that is both narcissistic and arrogant — Christoffer

if you have a cognitive bias towards believing determinism to be wrong, you will ignore those reasons and support. — Christoffer

This line of thinking is just naive. — Christoffer

that's fundamentally corrupt and biased. — Christoffer

Yeah, but don't hold back, dude, let me know when I'm wrong. It's good to know that someone out there is rational and measured.

There are a number of problems with that article but the first is this. Just how are we managing voluntary control over anything if causal determinism is the case? — Terrapin Station

I paused at that line as well. The voluntary part doesn't bother me: you're determined to want to choose certain things over other things. Just because it's determined that these are the choices you would prefer, doesn't mean you don't "really" prefer them (as odd as that sounds).

In a similar vein, you still have control over which choices you make, in the sense that you are still the rational agent making the choices. Determinism is not a mystical force driving your decisions. It's just that the way you were raised, the experiences you had, and your dna and rna and all that lead to the fact that you are the kind of person who will be choosing x instead of y.

For me, the question really becomes (and I think the article doesn't do this justice) what does that mean for ethics? It seems then that the point of anything we do in reaction to bad or good actions should not be to punish or reward that past behavior per se, but to encourage or discourage certain behaviors in the future.

So, in a sense, determinism is what makes having choices possible. — NKBJ

How is this possible? The antithesis of freewill is determinism. Determinism is defined in terms of causality. Freewill, if present, must be acausal.

Let's think of it like this:

Everything simply is.
There's no reason, cause or purpose to its being outside of simply being.
This is a self-determined act; so in that sense, sure, it's an accordance.
But it isn't influenced by anything, it is willed (determined) but also completely free.

When you think of free will think of actions, not intent.
Actions themselves are completely free; determinism arrives from intent.

How is this possible? The antithesis of freewill is determinism. Determinism is defined in terms of causality. Freewill, if present, must be acausal. — TheMadFool

There are two things at stake here:
1. The theoretical concept of a "free will" that denotes uncaused choices and actions.
2. The concept of "free will" that most people actually mean when they use the term.

Think about 1. for a second. If your actions are totally uncaused, they must also be uncaused by emotions, reason, past experiences, and anything else. What would that mean for your actions? Would they still be your "choice" if reason and experience weren't factors? I don't see how. They would be random (mis?)firings of the brain.

As for 2, most people aren't worried about "free will" being informed by reason, emotions, and experience. They just insist that they have "free will" in the sense that they do not know themselves to be externally coerced, and that they are able to make decisions based on a combination of their own personal reasoning, emotions, and experiences.

Determinism allows for #2, but obviously contradicts #1.

Intentionality and “free-will” from a neurodevelopmental perspective

There are two things at stake here:
1. The theoretical concept of a "free will" that denotes uncaused choices and actions.
2. The concept of "free will" that most people actually mean when they use the term.

Think about 1. for a second. If your actions are totally uncaused, they must also be uncaused by emotions, reason, past experiences, and anything else. What would that mean for your actions? Would they still be your "choice" if reason and experience weren't factors? I don't see how. They would be random (mis?)firings of the brain.

As for 2, most people aren't worried about "free will" being informed by reason, emotions, and experience. They just insist that they have "free will" in the sense that they do not know themselves to be externally coerced, and that they are able to make decisions based on a combination of their own personal reasoning, emotions, and experiences.

Determinism allows for #2, but obviously contradicts #1. — NKBJ

I see. Perhaps being uncaused has its own set of problems. Yet, I feel that to be completely free we must be, somehow, unaffected by causation but still be able to inject ourselves into the causal chain. In short, freewill, in my view, requires us to be causes but not effects. I guess I'm saying that to be truly free we must be able to overcome any and all influences including emotions and reason.

I guess I'm saying that to be truly free we must be able to overcome any and all influences including emotions and reason. — TheMadFool

And then on what basis are you deciding things? If you make choices absent any good reasoning, or just absent any cause, are they really choices? Wouldn't that make them random?

It just seems to me that being subject to random firings of the brain that can't be controlled or directed by reason or experience is tantamount to being a ragdoll in a hurricane or tornado where you'll be tossed to and fro who knows where or why. I imagine that would be what it feels like to be insane.

To me, freedom means being able to make informed choices and being in control of myself and what happens to me. Yes, determinism tells us that we are not uncaused, uninfluenced agents, because we are always acting in accordance to the sum of our experiences and genetic make-up. However, it also tells us that the more aware we are of these influences, the more we can employ reason, the more we are able to comprehend the complex nature of our choices, the more in control of them we are.

Think about 1. for a second. If your actions are totally uncaused, they must also be uncaused by emotions, reason, past experiences, and anything else. What would that mean for your actions? Would they still be your "choice" if reason and experience weren't factors? I don't see how. They would be random (mis?)firings of the brain. — NKBJ

Wouldn't they still be your choices - albeit unrecognized and unforced?
Choices that don't know or care about options