I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions... — Sam26

Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent.

Langauge less creatures can look for things as well. Witt's framework struggles to take proper account of what that belief consists of.

Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it? — creativesoul

Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions aren't propositions in the normal sense. In fact, one could argue they aren't propositions at all. They look like propositions, but don't function as propositions. Moore, of course, would argue that they are functioning propositions, but W. is saying that they are something very different.

Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent. — creativesoul

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. I don't think he is offering a candidate that is statable, just the opposite. As far as I can see, there is nothing inconsistent here. It's just a different kind of belief, i.e., a state-of-mind reflected in our actions.

a state-of-mind reflected in our actions — Sam26

This makes it no different from beliefs in general (reflected in our action or sayings).

I can think of only two ways to interpret the idea that there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs:

1. To say that a belief is linguistic is to say that it is somehow made of words, that there are attitudes, comportments, or mental states that have an inherently propositional form, perhaps that they are identifiable thoughts. As if the holder of the belief is talking to himself: "I believe the world existed before I was born". This would be in contrast to prelinguistic, built-in expectations and habits.

2. Or, it means that some beliefs cannot be stated (hence Banno's question).

Both are anti-Wittgenstein. Unless there's another interpretation, the distinction cannot be one that is found in Wittgenstein's thinking.

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. Or, as photographer might have said, a post hoc thematization (or maybe it's schematization, not sure). We can say that he believes--or he "has a belief"--that the world existed long before he was born, but in doing so we are not identifying any individuated object, an aspect or element of thought or behaviour that exists prior to its rendering as a statement. What we mean is that he acts in a way that shows he expects such and such to be the case, or just doesn't expect not-such-and-such to be the case.

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. — Sam26

If all belief consists entirely of mental correlations between different things, then we cannot observe them in any reasonable sense of the term "observe".

I can think of only two ways to interpret the idea that there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs:

1. To say that a belief is linguistic is to say that it is somehow made of words, that there are attitudes, comportments, or mental states that have an inherently propositional form, perhaps that they are identifiable thoughts. As if the holder of the belief is talking to himself: "I believe the world existed before I was born". This would be in contrast to prelinguistic, built-in expectations and habits.

2. Or, it means that some beliefs cannot be stated (hence Banno's question). — jamalrob

I realize that this was not directed towards me, but I'm an advocate of non linguistic and linguistic belief.

It's the elemental constituency(the ingredients, so to speak) that matter most when talking about non linguistic and linguistic belief.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. Non linguistic belief consists of correlations drawn between different things, as does linguistic belief. That's the commonality that makes them what they are. The difference is the content of the correlation(the different things). Non linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things, none of which are language use. Linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between language use and other things.

I realize that this was not directed towards me — creativesoul

Actually it kinda was. :grin:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. Or, as photographer might have said, a post hoc thematization (or maybe it's schematization, not sure). We can say that he believes--or he "has a belief"--that the world existed long before he was born, but in doing so we are not identifying any individuated object, an aspect or element of thought or behaviour that exists prior to its rendering as a statement. What we mean is that he acts in a way that shows he expects such and such to be the case, or just doesn't expect not-such-and-such to be the case. — jamalrob

A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices.

Drawing a mental correlation between a specific sound and eating food does not require naming practices, nor descriptive ones. We can observe such situations. With a creature that has already drawn them, hearing the sound - again - after the correlation has been drawn between the sound and eating causes them to exhibit behaviour that clearly shows us that that connection has long since been made. It does not consist of propositional content. It need not be stated by the creature, for it has no language.

We can use language to acquire knowledge of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to being talked about.

I realize that this was not directed towards me
— creativesoul

Actually it kinda was. :grin: — jamalrob

:razz:

Hey Jamalrob. hope this finds you well!

:up: :mask: :strong:

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, — Sam26

That's Witt's idea.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional.
— creativesoul

I don't think this is true... — Sam26

Weren't many of his most trusted contemporaries proponents of JTB?

A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices. — creativesoul

I don't think it does. Take a person with no language at all, present them with a time machine (which works by reading your desires) and demonstrate it's use (perhaps by making several marks on the ground, taking him back in time to before those marks were made, or smashing some identifiable vase and taking him back in time to before the vase was smashed). Do this repeatedly and at some point the person may use the machine to undo unwanted damage of their own (we can train mice, even flatworms by repeated demonstration so we know this works without language, we also know pre-linguistic animals can interpret the intentions of others, and have a sense of time passing, or at least sequential events, so he could easily see how and why the machine was being used). If, at some point, the person uses the machine to travel beyond his own birth, then he holds a belief that the earth (the place he's expecting to end up) existed prior to his own existence), if he never does, we might assume he does not hold that belief.

A more simple example. Putting a seed in the ground from a tree one recognises as having been there all ones life, and expecting a similar tree to grow shows a belief that that tree grew that way and so must have existed as a seedling prior to one's own existence.

There's no belief in which language is actually required. There's just beliefs which are constituted of a tendency to certain linguistic responses most of the time.

This, of course, is not the same as saying that language did not, in practice, act to create sets of beliefs which would unlikely have arisen without it. The naming and reference process obviously proved instrumental in the formation of the vast majority of human belief. But a thing's being instrumental in something and it's being essential to something are not the same.

Suppose that belief is a mental state, independent of its expression in words or deed...

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "belief". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a belief is only by looking at his belief. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "belief" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

Coincidentally the same problem as on the other thread about direct/indirect realism. In removing the mental state of belief from discourse you remove the ability of those interested in the component parts of the process to talk about it. It may well be that the mental state component of belief drops out of most language games, but not that which takes place between two neuroscientists discussing how best to manage some patient with damage to parts of the brain responsible for certain beliefs.

Since we appear to be using metaphors as the best way to understand the situation, why not explain it in metaphors as well? A belief is the bedrock and the structure is something supported by the bedrock. What is supported by belief? Well structures are complexities built with specific purposes in mind, so the thing being supported could be similar in that regard. The significance of the structure? A farm is arguably more important than a bar, but each has its own purpose and important is relative. In other words the significance of the structure compared to other structures is a question that leads nowhere. In conclusion, wouldn’t your structure simply be more complex information? Bedrock beliefs are simple pieces of information that are most closely related to the world we directly sense, while the information we formulate using more basic information can be abstract and less related to the objects before us, yet also still be understandable to others through language.

I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285... — Sam26

Yeah, then he sets out 286, showing that he was having a bad day.

We seem to be going in circles, so let me see if I can boil this discussion down to its essence. Can a belief (a state-of-mind as I define it) have form apart from language? This has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind, but everything to do with our actions. So, the further question is, do our non-linguistic actions reflect beliefs apart from statements or propositions? My answer to both of these question is yes. If I'm wrong about this, then my conclusion is false. This is where the argument should start.

Can a belief (a state-of-mind as I define it) have form apart from language? This has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind — Sam26

A belief can be a particular neural network. It would function in exactly the same way - a tendency for some action to result from some circumstance. My belief that the pub is at the end of the road could consist entirely of the arrangement of neural connections which are responsible for my walking to the end of the road when I want to go to the pub.

So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition.

do our actions reflect beliefs apart from statements or propositions? — Sam26

I'm presuming that from your answer to @Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?

So what forms are we left with that a belief might take?

So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition. — Isaac

My only point in saying that it has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind is to address the beetle-in-the-box question, i.e., it's not like the beetle-in-the-box question, because our actions point to beliefs, viz., something happening in the world. So, for example, if I open the door, the action of turning the knob reflects the belief that there is a door. If I sit in a chair, that action reflects the belief that there is a chair.

I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. In particular, certain kinds of actions that give voice to what is happening in the mind.

I'm presuming that from your answer to Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?

So what forms are we left with that a belief might take? — Isaac

I am referring to beliefs which are not linguistically formed, not that they can't be, but that they need not be. All beliefs that are reflected in our actions (linguistic or non-linguistic actions) are products of the mind. In fact, that we have a mind is reflected in our actions.

There are three ways beliefs can be demonstrated, (1) simple actions, as in the opening of a door, (2) stating one's belief, and (3) writing out the belief. All are actions of a sort.

Yeah, then he sets out 286, showing that he was having a bad day. — Banno

Ya, it could have been a bad day. :gasp:

This doesn't answer my objection, and merely repeats what I objected to.

Then I'm not sure I understand your objection.

I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. — Sam26

OK, that makes perfect sense, but you asked about the 'form' of a belief and that still confuses me. I understand your three ways in which a belief can be expressed (although I prefer to just call them all actions and have done with it), but I'm not seeing what type of answer you want to the question of 'form' that wouldn't simply be 'neural architecture'. The form of a belief is neural architecture, it's identified (in the absence of being able to read that architecture directly) by behaviour. Acting as if some state of affairs were the case indicates that we have some particular neural architecture which is responsible for our tendency to do so. Is there still something missing from that description?

A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

I don't think it does. Take a person with no language at all, present them with a time machine... — Isaac

Time machines require language.

A belief can be a particular neural network. — Isaac

There is no one to one correspondence between particular beliefs and neural pathways/networks.

Is there still something missing from that description? — Isaac

The content of the belief(about-ness, I've seen it called).

I suspect that there is some fairly profound misapprehensions occurring in the way folk are thinking about belief, the result of the considerable baggage the term carries around with it. I propose not to talk about belief for a while. This has resulted in a post far longer than is typical for me. I hope some of you might be bothered to read it, and perhaps some few of you might give the argumetn her eosme consideration.

Instead of talk of belief, let's talk about what is taken to be the case, and to do so without further definition except as may come in the discussion that follows.

So I take it to be the case that this is a sentence of English in a thread about Wittgenstein. I take it to be the case that I am typing this post, and presumably you might take it to be the case that you are reading this post.

So one observation we might make is that taking something to be the case is a relation between some state of affairs and some individual, or if you prefer, some agent.

We might also find that on occasions what we have taken to be the case turns out not to be so. We may have taken it to be the case that the cat is in the kitchen when the cat was in the hall. In such cases we are mistaken.

So the next observation might be that, because we can be mistaken, what we take to be the case is distinct from what is the case.

Now to what some might see as a more controversial topic, but which in present company we might accept without too much debate: we learn from Wittgenstein that everything that is the case can be stated; that the limits of our language and the limits of our world coincide. The word limit here needs to be seen as malleable, since of course both the stuff of the world and the words used to set out what is the case are in a state of constant flux. Hence a state of affairs that at first blush might seem unstatable can be stated with the addition of new terms or the modification of old.

So if we follow Wittgenstein here, what we take to be the case can be stated.

Note, and unfortunately experience tells me that this needs to be pointed out, that it does not follow that what is the case must be, or have been, stated. There are plenty of states of affairs that go unstated; but they have in common that they might be stated.

A corollary of this is that the agent who takes such-and-such to be the case need not state that such-and-such is the case. Indeed, they may not be capable of making such a statement.

Further, most things that are taken to be the case are indeed unstated. One need not state that one has feet, nor that the floor and walls are solid, for one to take these to be the case.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English.

I think it goes without saying - despite my having to say it - that there is no particular neural network that in some sense corresponds to or represents my cat's taking it that the floor is solid.

If we must find a place in my cat's neural network for his taking the floor to be solid, it will be evident in such things as his capacity to make his legs work in such a way as to walk across the floor, to jump, run, and otherwise to engage with a solid floor.

That he takes it to be the case that the floor is solid is not something that is represented in a part of my cat's brain.

______________________________

Now what one takes to be the case is what one believes.

And hence, what one believes can be stated.

And what one believes need not have some corresponding neural network.

I feel honoured to be have been here at the moment you posted this, possibly the longest post in your forum career. I also agree with it--as far as it goes.

I hope that from what I've just written it is clear that we can rephrase your question "Can a belief have form apart from language? " as "can what is taken to be the case have form apart from language"; and that in so doing your point is made all the clearer - yes, it can.

But in so doing I also hope that the difference between a state of mind and what is taken to be the case is made more apparent.

And I hope it is now clear that taking something to be the case is not the very same as having some particular state of mind.

A belief is not an item of mental furniture.

Well done Banno...

I could certainly raise issues, but those would be based upon our frameworks. What you've set out here is perfectly in line with your own... and Witt's as far as I can tell.

Kudos. I second Jamalrob's notion.