Alternatively, materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical positions. — Marchesk
The fact that we don't know all the details doesn't entail that this hypothesis is incorrect. We don't know with certainty, to be sure, but seriously, what cogent alternative hypotheses are there to choose from? Also, bear in mind we don't know anything with certainty, so this hypothesis is by no means unique in that regard. — Janus
Not afterlife but I'm not sure about "idealist". I never got the split between idealism and materialism. They both just seemed to be using different words for what is practically the same thing, if not exactly the same thing. — khaled
At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno
All just seem like tools in a toolbox to me. — khaled
Never heard of a scientist who didn't use their intuition to come up with theories, or a philosopher that didn't introspect. — khaled
What role does "hello" play? Does this not mean that that utterance refers to the role that it plays?At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno
Leibniz' Monadology relies on the Master Monad (God), though; so it is a kind of theism. The problem with theism is that it cannot be tested, which kind of leaves it out of the set of cogent competing hypotheses. I'd venture to say the details of his monadology cannot be tested either. — Janus
Leibniz' theory is not as cogent and testable as an empirically based physicalist theory, though, simply because all testing is physical, empirically based testing. Materialism as a metaphysical presumption is not testable, obviously, but that's not what is at issue. — Janus
So you're pitting idealism against methodological materialism?
That makes no sense. You are a methodological dualist. We all are. — frank
So color-blindness implies a kind of privacy in practice - they can't make the color distinctions that normally-sighted people can. But that is a practical problem, not a philosophical problem. — Andrew M
Because you seem to be invoking privacy even between normally-sighted people. — Andrew M
Because you seem to be invoking privacy even between normally-sighted people. That would be true if there were an intermediary (phenomenal) layer between the person and the world that they are perceiving. That intermediary layer is what I'm rejecting.
Now a color-blind person's experience is different to a normal-sighted person. But there is no intermediary layer for them either. — Andrew M
I agree, intuition and introspection (and imagination) are very important for the sciences and philosophy (and of course for the arts), but in the former domains they are always subject to empirical and analytic scrutiny, modeling and testing. — Janus
Wow - all that results from a public concept? — Luke
"phenol-thio-urea., a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest. Is it bitter?" — Luke
Why must it come down to a matter of ability? — Luke
Sure, not if we don't see colours. — Luke
So why does it seem like we see colours? — Luke
So if someone doesn’t understand the public concept they do not have an experience? What about children then, do they have experiences?
And could you elaborate on what the “public meaning” of red exactly is? Because I would argue that the public meaning is a reference to an experience. — khaled
Do you still hold this position? Because it seems exactly like something I would say. Here you recognise that there is an experience X that cannot be communicated 100% accurately. — khaled
We certainly feel like we have some experience of "redness" when looking at a red screen — khaled
We can “cure” some forms of color blindness or deafness and you always see the participant being shocked at the experience. I’m pretty sure you’d still get the same reaction even if the participant had a PhD in neurology. — khaled
I still want to see how you explain to someone what "pain" is without referring to any experiences — khaled
I have an apple in my hand
I have a pain in my hand
So it's not that "'pain' does not refer to an experience", as if it might refer to something else. Rather, it's that "'pain' does not refer". At least, not in the same way that "apple" does. — Banno
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