Indirect speech acts (Wikipedia!)

In the course of performing speech acts we communicate with each other. The content of communication may be identical, or almost identical, with the content intended to be communicated, as when a stranger asks, "What is your name?"

However, the meaning of the linguistic means used (if ever there are linguistic means, for at least some so-called "speech acts" can be performed non-verbally) may also be different from the content intended to be communicated. One may, in appropriate circumstances, request Peter to do the dishes by just saying, "Peter ...!", or one can promise to do the dishes by saying, "Me!"

One common way of performing speech acts is to use an expression which indicates one speech act, and indeed performs this act, but also performs a further speech act, which is indirect. One may, for instance, say, "Peter, can you close the window?", thereby asking Peter whether he will be able to close the window, but also requesting that he does so. Since the request is performed indirectly, by means of (directly) performing a question, it counts as an indirect speech act.

An even more indirect way of making such a request would be to say, in Peter's presence in the room with the open window, "I'm cold." The speaker of this request must rely upon Peter's understanding of several items of information that is not explicit: that the window is open and is the cause of them being cold, that being cold is an uncomfortable sensation and they wish it to be taken care of, and that Peter cares to rectify this situation by closing the window. This, of course, depends much on the relationship between the requester and Peter—he might understand the request differently if they were his boss at work than if they were his girlfriend or boyfriend at home. The more presumed information pertaining to the request, the more indirect the speech act may be considered to be.

Indirect speech acts are commonly used to reject proposals and to make requests. For example, if a speaker asks, "Would you like to meet me for coffee?" and the other replies, "I have class." The second speaker has used an indirect speech act to reject the proposal. This is indirect because the literal meaning of "I have class" does not entail any sort of rejection.

This poses a problem for linguists, as it is confusing (on a rather simple approach) to see how the person who made the proposal can understand that his proposal was rejected. Searle suggests that the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts can be derived by means of a Gricean reasoning process[18]; however, the process he proposes does not seem to accurately solve the problem[citation needed].

In other words, this means that one does not need to say the words apologize, pledge, or praise in order to show they are doing the action. All the examples above show how the actions and indirect words make something happen rather than coming out straightforward with specific words and saying it.

Alternatively, materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical positions. — Marchesk

Materialism accounts for conscious experience by saying that it is a function of neural complexity; an emergent function that, like the emergence of life itself, occurs as a phase transition at a critical degree of complexity. The fact that we don't know all the details doesn't entail that this hypothesis is incorrect. We don't know with certainty, to be sure, but seriously, what cogent alternative hypotheses are there to choose from? Also, bear in mind we don't know anything with certainty, so this hypothesis is by no means unique in that regard.

So, it's not a matter of dogma, at least not necessarily so; even if it might be for some closed minds. It's a defeasible hypothesis that has no serious competitors.

The fact that we don't know all the details doesn't entail that this hypothesis is incorrect. We don't know with certainty, to be sure, but seriously, what cogent alternative hypotheses are there to choose from? Also, bear in mind we don't know anything with certainty, so this hypothesis is by no means unique in that regard. — Janus

That knife slices both ways.

Not afterlife but I'm not sure about "idealist". I never got the split between idealism and materialism. They both just seemed to be using different words for what is practically the same thing, if not exactly the same thing. — khaled

OK, thanks for answering honestly. As to the "split between idealism and materialism" they are based on substantially different metaphysical presumptions. As I said earlier, whether you are one or the other, seems to depend largely on whether you accept such things as introspection, personal intuition, religious traditions and scripture (all of these or just some) as being the most reliable guide to the nature of reality, or whether you accept empirical investigations and science instead as being more likely to show us what is fundamentally real.

That's an obscure comment; I have no idea what you want to say.

That's an obscure comment; I have no idea what you want to say. — Janus

it means most particpants could say it, each with the same sincerity.

At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno

Sure. Definitely those exist too. I realized I was mistaken when you pointed it out a long time ago. Some words just don’t have referents or definitions. But I still think words such as “red” or “pain” or “bitter” refer to experiences rather than being properties of the objects. Because as I said, “red” is not really a property of the apple. If you wore blue sunglasses the apple would appear blue (purple?), but since the apple didn’t change, only its color did, that leads me to believe that apples are not red, they just reflect high wavelength light. And since everyone here, quiners included, seems to agree you don’t really understand “red” without seeing something red, I believe the word must refer to the experience, not a property of the apple.

Are you going to argue that “red” and “bitter” and such are similar to “hello” in that they are simply words that do things, and they don’t need a referent?

At least this is my initial reaction, I'll probably edit a good bit of this in the future but I don't really have time right now.

All just seem like tools in a toolbox to me.

I don't see any cogent account, even a partial one missing some details, from the idealist side. Can you help me out?

All just seem like tools in a toolbox to me. — khaled

Tools do do what, though? Would you want to claim that the tools of science perform the same functions as the the tools of intuition, introspection, religious tradition and scripture?

intuition and introspection seem to be important yes. The other two not so much. Never heard of a scientist who didn't use their intuition to come up with theories, or a philosopher that didn't introspect.

Never heard of a scientist who didn't use their intuition to come up with theories, or a philosopher that didn't introspect. — khaled

I agree, intuition and introspection (and imagination) are very important for the sciences and philosophy (and of course for the arts), but in the former domains they are always subject to empirical and analytic scrutiny, modeling and testing.

don't see any cogent account, even a partial one missing some details, from the idealist side. Can you help me out? — Janus

Leibniz is a good one.

Leibniz' Monadology relies on the Master Monad (God), though; so it is a kind of theism. The problem with theism is that it cannot be tested, which kind of leaves it out of the set of cogent competing hypotheses. I'd venture to say the details of his monadology cannot be tested either.

At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno

What role does "hello" play? Does this not mean that that utterance refers to the role that it plays?

Leibniz' Monadology relies on the Master Monad (God), though; so it is a kind of theism. The problem with theism is that it cannot be tested, which kind of leaves it out of the set of cogent competing hypotheses. I'd venture to say the details of his monadology cannot be tested either. — Janus

Leibniz is cogent and as testable as materialism.

Leibniz' theory is not as cogent and testable as an empirically based physicalist theory, though, simply because all testing is physical, empirically based testing. Materialism as a metaphysical presumption is not testable, obviously, but that's not what is at issue.

Leibniz' theory is not as cogent and testable as an empirically based physicalist theory, though, simply because all testing is physical, empirically based testing. Materialism as a metaphysical presumption is not testable, obviously, but that's not what is at issue. — Janus

So you're pitting idealism against methodological materialism?

That makes no sense. You are a methodological dualist. We all are.

So you're pitting idealism against methodological materialism?

That makes no sense. You are a methodological dualist. We all are. — frank

Not at all! There is no methodological idealism except in relation to human reason-giving. like "I did this because...", and the like. When it comes to producing speculative hypotheses regarding the origins of life and consciousness physical theories are all we have, because only they are testable. That doesn't mean you can't speculate idealistically; it just means there is no way to test such speculations.

ok

:cool:

So color-blindness implies a kind of privacy in practice - they can't make the color distinctions that normally-sighted people can. But that is a practical problem, not a philosophical problem. — Andrew M

What is the difference between practical privacy and philosophical privacy?

Because you seem to be invoking privacy even between normally-sighted people. — Andrew M

I await your distinction between practical privacy and philosophical privacy. Either way, I don't think you've addressed the privacy issue that I noted previously:

"You can't perceive or experience another person's perceptions and experiences. That's just a fact of being you and not them."

The Wikipedia article on Qualia gives the following definition of privacy: "all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible."

Because you seem to be invoking privacy even between normally-sighted people. That would be true if there were an intermediary (phenomenal) layer between the person and the world that they are perceiving. That intermediary layer is what I'm rejecting.

Now a color-blind person's experience is different to a normal-sighted person. But there is no intermediary layer for them either. — Andrew M

If the difference between a normal-sighted person and a colour-blind person is not in their supposed "phenomenal layer", then how are they different? Why does colour-blindness involve a practical privacy but normal-sightedness doesn't?

I agree, intuition and introspection (and imagination) are very important for the sciences and philosophy (and of course for the arts), but in the former domains they are always subject to empirical and analytic scrutiny, modeling and testing. — Janus

Indeed, and intuition is very handy to design crafty experiments. Also to know what you are looking for in those experiments. Scientist without intuitions are just number crunchers.

Wow - all that results from a public concept? — Luke

Yes. Is there some limit you had in mind to the number of things a public concept can be party to?

"phenol-thio-urea., a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest. Is it bitter?" — Luke

How do you know phenol-thio-urea is a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest if we don't have a public meaning for 'bitter'?

Why must it come down to a matter of ability? — Luke

Public meaning. If it weren't public concepts and our ability to detect them, then we'd have nothing to speak of and would never have learnt the term for the concept in the first place.

Sure, not if we don't see colours. — Luke

'Seeing' is a process. It starts with an external state if the world for which we usually have a public model (a red apple). It ends (arbitrarily) with our response to that external state. Colours are part of the public model of those external states which produce our responses.

Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. The colour red is a public concept. We use it to indicate to other people some category of thing, we learn which word to use by experiment in early childhood (retaining those uses which work), There's nothing more to 'red' than the public use of the word.

So why does it seem like we see colours? — Luke

Because there's a public word for them. We're there no word, you'd be less likely to think you see colours. Note the differences in the colour names for different cultures. People actually claim to distinguish colour separations based on their language's colour names even when the difference in wavelengths are not as significant as colours they do not distinguish. I'm genuinely dumbfounded by the degree to which people seem to expect their introspection to deliver accurate information about their underlying mental processes. Why would it?

So if someone doesn’t understand the public concept they do not have an experience? What about children then, do they have experiences?

And could you elaborate on what the “public meaning” of red exactly is? Because I would argue that the public meaning is a reference to an experience. — khaled

The public meaning can't possibly refer to an experience, how would we ever learn what word to use if the only thing they referred to was private experiences? The public meaning is found in the use the word is put to in a particular language game. We're engaged now in just such a language game, so when I say X derives from Y I'm necessarily invoking the public concepts of both.

So the public meaning of 'red' is exactly that which gets you the apples you expect when you use it in the sentence "pass me that red apple". We learn to expect such a response by observation in a social context.

Do you still hold this position? Because it seems exactly like something I would say. Here you recognise that there is an experience X that cannot be communicated 100% accurately. — khaled

Yes. I don't think I've ever denied that our full experience at any given time may not be perfectly communicable. Though given enough time I think another person could come to know it no less well than you yourself do. Our memories are no less fallible than our language.

We certainly feel like we have some experience of "redness" when looking at a red screen — khaled

No. You have a disposition to communicate your experience in those terms post hoc. There's no evidence at all that you feel it at the time, neither from neuroscience nor phenomenologically. All you have is your dispositions to act in response to the stimuli. (Please see my response to Luke for an account, but really I've said this several times, it just doesn't seem to be getting across for some reason). If one of those responses is to reach for the word 'redness' or talk about qualia, that's no reason to draw any ontological conclusion. I could train a parrot to say 'red' every time a bell rings, doesn't mean it's having a phenomenological experience of 'red'.

Imagine your 'qualia' exist as this 'experience of redness'. What if someone implanted a false memory of this 'red quale', milliseconds after you perceiving a blue screen. How would you know? So when the evidence we do have from neuroscience suggests that there's no such event, our tendency to talk as if there was one is not good reason to deny it. We used to talk about Elan Vitale as well. Not so much anymore. Did it used to exist and now has ceased to exist? Or is it just that it's no longer used?

Where oh where does the color come from? — Marchesk

Our use of language.

This thread has already got very far from the OP, so I'd rather not discuss it here. It's been discussed at length in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6895/what-it-is-like-to-experience-x posiibly toward about page 30.

We can “cure” some forms of color blindness or deafness and you always see the participant being shocked at the experience. I’m pretty sure you’d still get the same reaction even if the participant had a PhD in neurology. — khaled

So it is still a thought experiment then isn't it. All we have is someone who obviously doesn't know all there is to know about red and you're assuming the reaction would be the same in someone who does know all there is to know about red. That's just begging the question.

OK, so let's get rid of "red". Secondary properties might have a distinct grammar and complicated the issue unnecessarily.

Here's the question we are dealing with:

I still want to see how you explain to someone what "pain" is without referring to any experiences — khaled

Let's instead consider theses two sentences:

I have an apple in my hand

I have a pain in my hand

Superficially their grammars are almost the same. Perhaps this superficiality hides a deeper difference. It looks as if a referent of the first is the apple, and one would expect that a referent of the second is the pain. Let's check that out.

We agreed that there is at least this difference; There is a difference between "I have an apple in my hand" and "I am experiencing and apple being in my hand"; but there is not an equivalent difference between "I have a pain in my hand" and "I am experiencing a pain in my hand". So there are at least some differences hiding here.

We also saw that some utterances don't have a referent - I used the example "Ouch!". Technically it's an exclamation rather than a sentence, since it has no subject.

What I would ask you to consider is that the deep grammar of "I have a pain in my hand" is not so much like "I have an apple in my hand" as it is like "Ouch!" That is, that it does not work by referring so much as by exclaiming.

There's more that might be considered. "We know Banno has an apple in his hand" fits in with the classic analysis of knowledge as justified true belief; the justification is there for all to see. But what of "We know Banno has a pain in his hand"? The justification is no shared.

So it's not that "'pain' does not refer to an experience", as if it might refer to something else. Rather, it's that "'pain' does not refer". At least, not in the same way that "apple" does.

So it's not that "'pain' does not refer to an experience", as if it might refer to something else. Rather, it's that "'pain' does not refer". At least, not in the same way that "apple" does. — Banno

So...following that principle...what does a 'painkiller' kill, metaphorically?

(Not nit-picking, by the way, just trying to follow through what you're saying).

:up:

Complaints.