What you are doing in recognising that the juice is sweet is precisely recognising that the right words to use are "juice" and "sweet". Using the words correctly is exactly what understanding that the juice is sweet consists in. Recognising that the juice is sweet is already embedded in language, already a public act.. How does one know that the orange juice one drinks tastes sweet to oneself if not via direct awareness, with no ostension required in this. Or, as a more extreme example, how does an animal know whether what they put into their mouths to taste tastes good to them and is thereby worth being eaten? — javra
On this account, what you have called knowledge by acquaintance might be better termed belief based on ostension, so as to keep it distinct from propositional, justified knowledge. — Banno
The distinction in its present form was first proposed by British philosopher Bertrand Russell in his famous 1905 paper, "On Denoting".[2] According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is obtained exclusively through experience, and results from a direct causal interaction between a person and an object that the person is perceiving. In accordance with Russell's views on perception, sense-data from that object are the only things that people can ever become acquainted with; they can never truly be acquainted with the physical object itself. A person can also be acquainted with his own sense of self (cogito ergo sum) and his thoughts and ideas. However, other people could not become acquainted with another person's mind, for example. They have no way of directly interacting with it, since a mind is an internal object. They can only perceive that a mind could exist by observing that person's behaviour. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_by_acquaintance#%22On_Denoting%22
The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno
The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno
Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal. — javra
Nope. No ostension involved in awareness of that which is directly experienced. Not to oneself and not to others — javra
That which is deemed as food... — javra
Then it is awareness, not awareness of. An unpointed awareness is not an awareness of something. — Banno
You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"? — Luke
You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein. — Sam26
My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent. — Sam26
In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"
But do you want to go further and doubt that?
Where that is a act of pointing. — Banno
In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"
But do you want to go further and doubt that?
Where that is a act of pointing. — Banno
You would say that they were in pain even if they had no "unpleasant experience"? — Luke
I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. — Luke
I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover
I might not use the expression 'in pain'. It sounds messy "they're in pain but they don't know it". — Isaac
But something like "their body is being wracked by pains but they're unaware due to a malfunction of the thalamus" seems to make sense to me. At least I don't think I would be met with baffled failure to understand if I were to describe a person in those terms. There a condition in which increases the availability of 5-HT at the 5-HT3 receptors at a nerve ending, this results in a sensation of pain (or discomfort), but the rest of the pain pathway is absent. Some talk about this as not being in 'real pain'. Personally, I should stress, I disagree with that use of language, I think it undermines the felt pain of people who suffer from such a condition; but the point - as far as this discussion goes - is that people know what they mean, my disagreement is a psychological one, not a failure to understand what they mean. — Isaac
Yes, I agree. But Wittgenstein was not privy to modern understandings of cognitive psychology, so whilst I'm completely on board with the idea that if something could not 'come to be known' there's be no sense in doubting it (The insight Wittgenstein is qualified to espouse), he's wrong in his examples of those somethings, simply because he didn't know then what we know now about how we come to judge the causes of our sensations, including interocepted ones like the activity of nociceptors. — Isaac
Speaking in tongues, also known as glossolalia, is a practice in which people utter words or speech-like sounds, often thought by believers to be languages unknown to the speaker. — Wikipedia
Talking birds are birds that can mimic the speech of humans. There is debate within the scientific community over whether some talking parrots also have some cognitive understanding of the language. — Wikipedia
This reasoning would commit you to saying that patients under anaesthetic are in pain (or equivalent), whereas the entire reason for anaesthetic is to eliminate pain. — Luke
What are you claiming Wittgenstein is wrong about? He says (at PI 246): "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself." — Luke
If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be. — Isaac
In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. — Isaac
No, because anaesthetic acts differently. It might reduce conscious awareness of pain, reduce memory of pain (amnesiac effects) , it might reduce the signalling of pain at the nerve ending, or it might reduce the transmission of those signals at the brain stem or thalamus. At each point in this chain we can sensibly talk about 'the pain' and be perfectly well understood. If I say, "the pain reaches the thalamus but the the drug interferes with the communication between neurons from there on", no-one says "what do you mean 'the pain' - the patient isn't in any pain because they're anaesthetised? I've no idea what you're talking about". It's perfectly clear what I'm talking about. — Isaac
You literally decide if you're in pain. — Isaac
a public confirmation... is absent with pain. — Banno
You're not actually talking about pain. — Luke
If I use the word 'pain' and I'm understood by a reasonable community of language users, then I am 'actually' talking about pain. There's no objective definition, that's why I brought up the standard one, to show it's ambiguity, not to set it up as a gospel. — Isaac
The 7-38-55 rule indicates that only 7% of all communication is done through verbal communication, whereas the nonverbal component of our daily communication, such as the tonality of our voice and body language, make up 38% and 55% respectively. — Google
Then why did you say:
There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says. — Luke
253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain.
Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. — TLP 5.5303
Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".
253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain — Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, but you're no longer talking about the sensation of pain, like Wittgenstein is. — Luke
You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning. — Luke
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