You should probably familiarize yourself with those arguments, since they are becoming more and more
prevalent. — Joshs

I have, they're not good. Nor, are they useful. Cognitive neurscience is superior for drawing conclusions, without contest.This being mainly because it is predicated on science (induction) and rationality (reason and logic).

Dennett is a good example of someone who has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. I dont think his view of rationality is what you think it is. Certainly it isnt compatible with your direct realism. — Joshs

I know he is. I'm referring to his work on the nature of Consciousness and how it was evolved to operate, not his conclusions he formulates about rationality. Reason and logic are methods of clarifying the representations of data received from the real word. To assert any proposition of any kind whatsoever, at anytime, requires rational assessment of correspondents from perceptions gathered from that reality, using a brain made by reality to rationally assess sensory data. But, feel free to generate languages and paradigms from non-data, or whatever it is you think replaces rational thought, if you wish.

But his approach to the rational simply doesnt grasp how it is that the rational is embedded with a frame of interpretation that gets turned on its head when paradigms shift. — Joshs

And the paradigm/ frame of interpretation shifts in revolution around new data that informs perceptions. The rationality of the human is what allows for that shift to take place. The paradigm shift doesn't somehow negate the rational assessments of those that came before, it merely adds to it. That's why Newton is still relevant in the age of gravitational waves. The paradigms, Kuhn asserts, are more about the culture and people within that framework, not the rationally gathered data and concept formulation that leads to paradigm shifts. A perfect example of this is the strong program of the sociology of science. They too, thought that culture was more relevant than data, you'll be pleased to know the program fell apart in humiliated shambles as a result of a paradigm shift that placed sociology back within the realm of rationally assessed data.

Think of an empirical theory as being like one of those optical illusions where you can either see the young woman or the old woman but not both at the same time. A gestalt shift is required to make one or the other appear. Now think of the individual facts comprising the body of an empirical theory as akin to the points within the picture. Notice that as one shifts from the old woman to the young woman, the role that all of the features of the picture play change their meaning. What was a line in one image becomes something else in the other image. — Joshs

That's not how rationality works. Rationality works like : think of an empirical theory as something that could shift its course depending on what data are added to it, or oppose it. So, no, I won't think of a theory in any such way, nor would I have any reason to. You're talking to a phantom of the mysticism that Wittgenstein predicates his logic on, not rationality.

In the same way, when a paradigm undergoes a gestalt shift , all of the subordinate facts it contains change their meaning in the new paradigm. The choice of which paradigm to pick becomes one of aesthetic and pragmatic preference rather than ‘rationality’ since each paradigm is describing different facts. — Joshs

No, they do not change their meaning, or reality. They change their contributive status to the system that all of the data represent both independently, as well as in the Gestalt collection. It only changes meaning for those within the paradigm (culture), not for the actual system of related date. For example, I operate under the pretense that evolution is a fact of nature, that's one of my hinge propositions predicating all of the rest. In science, it is rare that such a theory finds itself utterly debunked. Normally, there will be pieces missing that new data add onto what something like evolution generally posits, but enhances the resolution of it. That's how science itself works, irrespective of the culture those hinge propositions produce around them. If it comes time that the evidence suggests that there is more to evolution, data that negates previous propositions - because it turns out ALL propositions are subject to falsifiablity (thank you, Popper) - but doesn't negate the entire theory, then the views surrounding the theory will change, including my own, as a result of the integration of new, more coherent data. That's a rational progression of events, predicated on inductive data gathering. Again, hinge propositions are rationally developed, and rationally changed. They are not, in any manner, the hammer blow to the real world that Wittgenstein thought. A good way of knowing as much, is by asking yourself how Wittgenstein even generated this concept. The answer: rationality, his evolutionarily developed tool for understanding the reality within which he was suspended.

The paper uses a pretty common misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.

Tell me, could you use the article for your argument while at the same time doubting that it was in English?

Then in presenting your argument using the article, you are not in a position to be able to doubt that it is in English.

Or we might take the fallibalist approach, and claim that we are working on the assumption that the article is in English in order to make the argument, and that we will do so until there is sufficient evidence that the article is not in English... At which point I will probably reach for the poker.

That's a rational progression of events, predicated on inductive data gathering. Again, hinge propositions are rationally developed, and rationally changed. — Garrett Travers

Your model of rationality seems to revolve around the notion that you can peel data and evidence apart from
the theoretical edifice that makes sense of them. But Kuhn’s argument is that what constitutes evidence and data is dependent on the larger framework of interpretation. For someone without a background in modern or Newtonian physics, what constitutes
data for the later will be utterly invisible to them. Data for a stimulus-response psychologist is different than data for a cognitive theorist.

There is no empirical object apart from
some account or other , no fact of the matter independent of a value system.

“…interpretationism provides a penetrating critique of objectivism that is worth pursuing in some detail. To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective. But how are we to define the points of our everyday world? Points can be taken either as primitive elements, as intersecting lines, as certain triples of intersecting planes, or as certain classes of nesting volumes. These definitions are equally adequate, and yet they are incompatible: what a point is will vary with each form of description. For example, only in the first "version," to use Goodman's term, will a point be a primitive element. The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.

I’m not trying to insult you , just get you to realize that dismissing out of hand the ideas of a thinker like Wittgenstein as ‘mystical’ and ‘out of touch with reality’ shows not just a complete lack of familiarity with his work but a poor grasp of where cognitive psychology and cognitivr neuroscience is heading. — Joshs

Yep. Wittgenstein was an engineer. He was responsible for the maintenance of heavy machinery during the first war, worked on wing design in England, and built several houses.

And again, I will say that the anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein is not the only reading, and I think it mistaken.

Firstly, it is anachronistic, since the notion of antirealism postdates his work.

Secondly, he clearly differentiates truth value from propositional attitudes.

Tell me, could you use the article for your argument while at the same time doubting that it was in English? — Banno

Of course not. However, I'm not sure why my commentary would lead you to ask such a question. You'll notice I have not claimed that hinge propositions are somehow not a thing in the human mind. That's because I would be lying if I said as much. I simply do not like the mystic's conclusions. That is what I am challenging.

Or we might take the fallibalist approach, and claim that we are working on the assumption that the article is in English in order to make the argument, and that we will do so until there is sufficient evidence that the article is not in English... At which point I will probably reach for the poker. — Banno

The use of english is the hige proposition required to engage in a reflexive manner. Again, actually assess what I am saying, so that we don't waste time on debating phantoms.

I simply do not like the mystic's conclusions. — Garrett Travers

Nor I; it's a poor representation of what Witti is up to.

Again, actually assess what I am saying, so that we don't waste time on debating phantoms. — Garrett Travers

You might do the same. In the interest of avoiding mere acrimony, might we not agree that it would be odd to call into question such things as that we are here using English and the internet?

But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre. — Garrett Travers

On Certainty is not saying that. The article you linked to does not seem to understand that Wittgenstein is questioning the extent of Moore's use of self-evidence as the basis for argument. That purpose is the opposite of saying that some propositions are given special status for the sake of advancing a theory. And it doesn't sound very mystical if Wittgenstein is using a shared reality to limit the utility of Moore's certainty:

155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

Your model of rationality seems to revolve around the notion that you can peel data and evidence apart from
the theoretical edifice that makes sense of them. — Joshs

That's because the human is the theoretical edifice maker, and data analysis sometimes indicates one's framework is faulty, misaligned, or sometimes even completely off the mark. String theory springs to mind. Good on paper, but not applicable to reality, no correspondence. A bit like logic in that regard. Once logic breaches the domain of reason, it fails, just like when reason breaches the domain of logic, it fails. For example A=A is correct, no matter what. It's also a circular argument, meaning logic fails to account for that which is of itself so in this particular example. Logicians call it a tautology and wash their hands. Doesn't mean the logical framework, or tradition generally are dismissed, that would be nonsense.

But Kuhn’s argument is that what constitutes evidence and data is dependent on the larger framework of interpretation. For someone without a background in modern or Newtonian physics, what constitutes
data for the later will be utterly invisible to them. — Joshs

Yes, this is how the human mind works, we do this naturally across all domains of knowledge. That isn't what I am challenging. I am challenging the idea that these hinge propositions that inform our frameworks are unchallengable, and that such frameworks determine reality for us, rather than the reverse. If you focus on what I am actually saying to you, you will notice that.

There is no empirical object apart from
some account or other , no fact of the matter independent of a value system. — Joshs

One, you just made a statement of objective fact. Two, objective, empirical entities, phenomena, and patterns are used to formulate systems of thought, action, and value. The greater the amount of data, the higher the resolution, the more refined the methods of analysis. It is exactly the opposite. There are only, in the universe, empirical objects and patterns.

interpretationism provides a penetrating critique of objectivism that is worth pursuing in some detail. To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman. — Joshs

There is nothing penetrating about this critique, other than the objective claim that objects do not exist independent of a value structure. Yes, there are many such objects, everything in the universe. The humans of Nagasaki didn't need a value structure to be vaporized by an atom bomb. But, we might have needed the bomb to go off, if only to know that such a thing is subject to human value structuralization. Values come from analysis of reality, not the other way around.

The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length: — Joshs

This is not what an objectivist demands about matters of relativity, which space is always subject to by its nature - meaning this guy specifically chose this specific topic to obfuscate his opposition. An objectivist would ask what the point is relating to, as "point" is a subjective measurement. An objectivist doesn't ask "what are inches really?" The ask what are you measuring? So that they can understand what you are investigating.

But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core. — Joshs

No, there's no onion. And "convention" isn't the proper term. Method, or metric, or standard are much more appropriate. And those are based upon empirical results from induction, and theorization (concepts) that comes from that induction. Over time, as coherence builds and validates the structure of evidentiary, empirically established theory, we formulate values and more concepts on top of them. All of this being based on empirical processes as the result of gathering data from reality. In other words, Wittgenstein's correct, he just has his conclusion backwards. As do you, and this gentleman above who doesn't understand objectivism.

Yep.

The accusation of mysticism might be a result of a misguided reading of the notion of silence, or of Wittgenstein's scantly articulated thoughts on religion and ethics.

The accusation of mysticism might be a result of a misguided reading of the notion of silence, or of Wittgenstein's scantly articulated thoughts on religion and ethics. — Banno

My scantily articulated thoughts on religion and ethics bear a distinct difference.

A difference to... What?

155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

" In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind."

Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke. My mistake was not the creation of this dissociated "conformity of mankind." Yes, this is a very mystical mind/body type dissociative idea, mentally speaking.

Again, it's Wittgenstein's conclusions from these ideas that are the issue. Not the issue of the hinge proposition, or how young people develop their thoughts before verification, or any of that.

A difference to... What? — Banno

"From" what, is the proper question.

You might do the same. In the interest of avoiding mere acrimony, might we not agree that it would be odd to call into question such things as that we are here using English and the internet? — Banno

No question.

Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject. — Garrett Travers

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes.

Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all.

@Garrett Travers
SO where do you think mysticism enters into this discussion?

I'm not following your argument.

157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?
158. Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?

Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke. — Garrett Travers

I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text.

One aspect I do think I understand is that Wittgenstein is not saying that hinge propositions are "beyond rational confirmation." You will have to do more than assert it when Wittgenstein specifically rules that out.

Edit to add:
Oh wait, I get it, It is the shared reality you oppose to objectivity. By that measure, you will never be wrong.

I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all. — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them.

SO where do you think mysticism enters into this discussion?

I'm not following your argument. — Banno

No where in particular. I just like to remain aware of it when dealing with linguists.

My argument is that hinge positions are certainly within the boundries of assessment, even from within the framework. And that they are produced from the human as a result of sensory data collection. Little more than that. Neuroscience sheds more light on this phenomenon than Wittgenstein does. Although, I do agree with him on much of his views, as I have stated.

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on......

I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text. — Paine

Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis. The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor. I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of. That's fundamentally what I'm saying. Again, I'm not denying much of anything Wittgenstein has posited. If Wittgenstein is not saying that hinge propositions are not open to verificaion, or falsification, please clarify the issue for me, as I may be coming in contact with a fundamental misunderstanding.

Ok, understood.

Now what you have said does not mesh with what I understand of what Witti is describing.

He is quite explicit in saying that what counts as a hinge changes over time - the riverbed analogue.

Further, they are not mere observation. Hinge propositions are inherent in actions. They are the things taken as true in order to engage in a given activity. Hence the two quotes cited by myself above...

So the link to neuroscience, at the least, would need considerable explanation. Neuroscience is doing a very different thing to Wittgenstein. That's not to say there could be no overlap, but that would be a grand enterprise.

Now what you have said does not mesh with what I understand of what Witti is describing.

He is quite explicit in saying that what counts as a hinge changes over time - the riverbed analogue.

Further, they are not mere observation. Hinge propositions are inherent in actions. They are the things taken as true in order to engage in a given activity. Hence the two quotes cited by myself above...

So the link to neuroscience, at the least, would need considerable explanation. Neuroscience is doing a very different thing to Wittgenstein. That's not to say there could be no overlap, but that would be a grand enterprise. — Banno

That is, quite literally, 100% more clear of an explanation than anything I've been able to glean from Wittgenstein. You see, it's this linguist shit that loses people. I can't stand a philosopher that won't speak straight, or does so in paucity. Yes, this goes without question. His teleology is making more sense now. In fact, my own epistemology incorporates these concepts, although my langauge is much clearer. What I was pulling from neuroscience was the process by which we incorporate data to build concepts, concepts being what we use to predicate action, action to experience (more data), concepts form into value systems and you get moral codes. It's a whole process. I thought Wittgenstein was commenting on that, and, in a certain way, I'd say he's still kind of relevant to it. But, yeah. Way more clear.

Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein said as much.

The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor. — Garrett Travers

A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them.

I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of. — Garrett Travers

Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are.

Wittgenstein said as much. — Paine

Yeah, Banno provided an explanation that cleared up my confusion.

A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them. — Paine

Yes, that's coming to my attention as we speak.

Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are. — Paine

I doubt it, but I see what you mean. A good deal of my current reading is being obfuscated, I believe, as a result of relying on online sources.

Cheers. If you wish to understand Witti better, I would commend Anthony Kenny's Wittgenstein. A short book that covers the whole of his philosophy in detail, the only such by one of the executors of Witti's literary estate.

I'll go grab a pdf. I appreciate it. I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. I am now updating that exploration with a follow up essay revising my position. So when I say I appreciate it, that's exactly what I mean. Is this what the beliefs are propositional debate is in relation to, by the by?

Is this what the beliefs are propositional debate is in relation to, by the by? — Garrett Travers

I suppose it must be related, at least in some minds. There was an article being discussed here that seemed to be arguing that there were "animal" propositions that did not have a truth value, but which somehow were hinge propositions.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. @Sam26 was entertaining that idea here.

There are plenty of very odd interpretations of Wittgenstein out there.

Did you find a PDF for Kenny? Happy to read it with you.