the mind needs information from the other side of our senses — RussellA

Let me stop you there at the heart of our disagreement. The self is not 'behind' the senses or its data. The self is (I claim) a discursive performance of the body, a creative appropriation of community norms. The self is a way that a body acts in a society of other such selves. The self is a body that is trained to track itself for decency and the coherence of its claims and (in some cultures) for the amplification of its autonomy. This self is mostly inherited and reconstituted community 'software', including especially a language in which selves make sense, in both senses of the phrase. I mean we understand selves (make sense of them) as origins of claims (and other less symbolic deeds) for which they are then held responsible. Part of our training involves learning to apply concepts properly (within claims).

RussellA perceives direct realists only indirectly: the direct realist in his head does not resemble the direct realist as it is in the external world — Jamal

It seems you are redefining Direct Realism to include linguistics in a way not generally used in the literature, for example, SEP The Problem of Perception.

Closest I can come is to imagine how perception works when we're wrapped up in a physical activity, like running to catch a ball or playing an instrument (or hammering of course). These don't seem very linguistic to me, though I could well be wrong. I'm not committed to perception-as-essentially-linguistic — Jamal

It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are. — Jamal

You say that on the one hand you're not committed to perception as essentially linguistic but on the other hand you say that perception is linguistic.

Regardless, Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not about the nature of language.

You say that on the one hand you're not committed to perception as essentially linguistic but on the other hand you say that perception is linguistic. — RussellA

No, I was switching between provisionally explaining the argument that perception is linguistic as if it were true, and expressing doubts about it. This should be obvious.

Regardless, Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not about the nature of language. — RussellA

Respectfully, I claim that you don't yet understand the position. 'Mind-independent world' is potentially nonsensical, almost definitely misleading. 'Private experiences' too.


This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough).

Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast to this direct awareness, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
...
Direct realists might claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms that may refer to perception. Perception exemplifies unmediated contact with the external world; examples of indirect perception might be seeing a photograph, or hearing a recorded voice. Against representationalists, direct realists often argue that the complex neurophysical processes by which we perceive objects do not entail indirect perception. These processes merely establish the complex route by which direct awareness of the world arrives. The inference from such a route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic fallacy.

https://psychology.fandom.com/wiki/Direct_realism


There's just the world, friend. And we talk about things in the world. It's that simple. No need for folk psychology. Just look at how we do philosophy, how we make our cases.

It's a lifeworld, not a green vertically scrolling source code that we paint colors and smells and values on. Instead we shatter the 'original' unity of this symbolically articulated lifeworld for various practical purposes ---- and because some wacky philosophers talked us into it.

What needs to be explained is the meaning of "direct".

One such explanation is given here:

...the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness [understood in context to be some mind-independent property of snow] manifesting itself in experience.

Another is given here:

Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience.

That experience is direct is that the object itself is present "in" the experience. That experience is indirect is that the object itself isn't present "in" the experience; that experience is (at best) representative of the object.

And to repeat something I said earlier: consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be constituents of my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be.

What needs to be explained is the meaning of "direct". — Michael

'Direct' should be read as inindirect, a negation or cancelling of the original mistake. Cut out the middle man. Sweep away the metaphysical cobwebs.

I'm curious whether that description of naive realism was written by a naive realist. It's possible. But I prefer my approach in its simplicity. 'Experience' might be a misleading word here. It's fine for ordinary use.

I see snow through my window. I talk about the snow, say that it is white. This snow is in our world.

consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be "present" in my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be. — Michael

Consciousness (the semantically slippery eel) seems to extend to distant stars in some sense, or astronomy is bunk.

I say forget about internal theaters and secret screens. The apple is in the world. Yes, we know that light bounces off the apple and hits the retina. This is why it's so important to go back to conceptual norms. Which apples are we talking and therefore thinking about ? The one we may eat, the one that may be poisoned. We make claims about our shared world. Concepts play a social role. Worrying about images is a distraction. Anything totally private can play no role in science or philosophy.

There's just the world, our world, the one we talk about. — plaque flag

Yes, this relates back to the Kant passage, but it doesn't address the question as to whether we have indirect or direct knowledge of this world.

The point is that concepts are public norms. The concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience. — plaque flag

If the concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience, I stub my toe and feel pain, where does it get its meaning from ?

The self is not 'behind' the senses or its data. The self is (I claim) a discursive performance of the body, a creative appropriation of community norms. — plaque flag

I don't think that "the self" is normally defined as part an individual and part the community in which they live.

Respectfully, I claim that you don't yet understand the position. 'Mind-independent world' is potentially nonsensical, almost definitely misleading. 'Private experiences' too. — plaque flag

You quote: Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

Isn't an external world a mind-independent world ?

'Direct' should be read as inindirect, a negation or cancelling of the original mistake. — plaque flag

Which is no answer at all.

The direct realist says we directly experience external world objects.
The indirect realist says we directly experience mental imagery.

What does "directly" mean?

Consciousness (the semantically slippery eel) seems to extend to distant stars in some sense, or astronomy is bunk. — plaque flag

To repeat again what I said earlier, this is the “illusion” of experience (and in particular sight), and is I believe the driving force behind direct realism. It seems as if external world objects are constituents of my conscious experience, but our scientific understanding of the world and consciousness (as much as we do understand it) shows that this isn’t the case.

For someone who rejects the existence of any kind of private, immaterial thing, I don't know how you can think that consciousness extends beyond the brain, let alone towards distant stars.

I say forget about internal theaters and secret screens. — plaque flag

There is no "internal theatre" or "secret screen". We feel pain and the schizophrenic hears voices, and the pain we feel and the voices the schizophrenic hears aren't external world objects. This is a perfectly acceptable description of the facts and doesn't suggest anything like a "homunculus".

consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain — Michael

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for?

Yes, this relates back to the Kant passage, but it doesn't address the question as to whether we have indirect or direct knowledge of this world. — RussellA

Less is more. But direct.

If the concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience, I stub my toe and feel pain, where does it get its meaning from ? — RussellA

Tentative partial answer : community norms governing the inferential relationships between claims in which the concept appears. Meaning is what we do, what one does. Meaning is public. But individuals can shift meanings, be creative, etc. A new meme can take off. Before long we'll be calling bots 'conscious.' Maybe.

I don't think that "the self" is normally defined as part an individual and part the community in which they live. — RussellA

To do philosophy is to impose on (negotiate / update / criticize) conceptual norms. I'm suggesting one way to understand the self. Kant seemed to start this idea. Brandom made it more explicit.

Isn't an external world a mind-independent world ? — RussellA

I suggest dropping that terminology. External to what ? The ghost we have abandoned as a piece of confused theology ? And the world we talk about, for just that reason, is not mind independent. It's an articulated lifeworld, including people pineapples pensions parabolas and perfumes.

Some folks like to think there's some unspeakable mindindependent Really Real World named X. Then they call our world, the only real world we get to peel at, something like an f(X), a function of X. A mere illusion or appearance. Poor us. But all this talk of X is just that.

But all of this machinery looks like an weirdly complicated way to admit that we can be wrong as individuals and wrong as communities. That we can come to know more and more facts, etc.

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal

Yes, and given that consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain, neither does intentionality. Unless you want to argue that consciousness is some immaterial substance that does extend beyond the brain, the physics should be clear on this (unless there's some hidden physical aspect to consciousness which has so far evaded detection).

consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain — Michael

To me this is a strange and very questionable statement. This really does sound like a ghost story from over here.

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal

To repeat something else I said earlier: we might nonetheless want to say that the experience is of external world objects, but then what do we even mean by this? What is the word “of” doing here? What does it mean to say that the painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, or that I’m talking about my parents? It’s certainly an interesting question to consider, but I wonder if it actually has anything to do with the epistemological problem of perception. It seems to be an unrelated issue of semantics that isn’t prima facie incompatible with indirect realist theories. The painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, and yet the painting is made of paint and canvas, which are not features of Lisa del Giocondo herself. And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself.

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal

:up:

Directedness of human activities, like what an arrow is flying toward ?

Well, of course I’m showing that “extend beyond” is ambiguous here. You take it to be merely about physical substance, but if when we discuss consciousness and perception we mean experience, that is, phenomenology (loosely speaking), then intentionality extends to its objects. Intend literally means stretch towards and extend literally means stretch out. You can dismiss etymology, of course, but it is significantly suggestive.

To me this is a strange and very questionable statement. This really does sound like a ghost story from over here. — plaque flag

Not at all. Consciousness might just be reducible to brain activity, and brain activity obviously doesn't extend beyond the brain.

If there's a "ghost story" at all it's with your theory that consciousness extends beyond the stars.

And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself. — Michael

Well yeah, there’s an irreducible subject-object dualism for sure. I am not the apple.

No, I was switching between provisionally explaining the argument that perception is linguistic as if it were true, and expressing doubts about it. This should be obvious. — Jamal

Though you cannot doubt that perception is linguistic, as previously you wrote "It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are."

My last reply to you covers it.

Not at all. Consciousness might just be reducible to brain activity, and brain activity obviously doesn't extend the brain. — Michael

I claim that the concept of consciousness is something we perform. I personally think the term is more trouble than it's worth in this context.

If there's a "ghost story" at all it's with your theory that consciousness extends beyond the stars. — Michael

Astronomers, while conscious, make claims about far away stars. Their claims are about those star and not their photographs of those stars. They may use photographs of those stars in inferences whose conclusions are claims about the stars themselves.

I suggest that language and its concepts are something we do with our bodies, like an extremely complicated version of wiggling a finger or vibrating a larynx. The [ lonely , singular ] ghost in the machine is a good metaphor for a trained loci of responsibility up to a point, because conventionally bodies are 'given' (treated as containing, while alive ) one 'soul.'

But this normative/discursive entity is still a task or a process that happens materially (in the everyday sense of stuff in the world). It, the mind, does have extension. Mind is something a body does , a patterned way of moving. Even that minimal monologue is moving parts.

I suggest dropping that terminology. External to what ? — plaque flag

This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough). — plaque flag

The term "external" comes from the resource you recommended.

Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

Mind is something a body does , a patterned way of moving. Even that minimal monologue is moving parts. — plaque flag

I've accepted as much when I said that consciousness is reducible to brain activity. The "moving parts" of my inner monologue is the firing of certain neurons.

What I reject is the claim that thinking or perception must be some overt act recognisable by ordinary humans in ordinary situations, e.g. that being in pain is just taking aspirin or that seeing red is just stopping at a red light, to refer back to some things you've said before.

The term "external" comes from the resource you recommended. — RussellA

Just pretend it's not there. Like I said, close enough.

Just pretend it's not there. Like I said, close enough. — plaque flag

If you have to advise people not to use certain words, that's a bad sign. There's something you don't want to face.

I've accepted as much when I said that consciousness is reducible to brain activity. The "moving parts" of my inner monologue is the firing of certain neurons. — Michael

:up:
Cool. So we can agree on embodied cognition.

But perhaps we do not agree that selves are discursive normative entities performed in a social world ?
That language is directed at that shared world ? Toward objects and other selves in it ?

I talk about the tree in the / our world by conforming to various semantic norms.

If you have to advise people not to use certain words, that's a bad sign. There's something you don't want to face. — frank

Please review the context. I think you'll see in this case that Russell is just being difficult. <smile>

Please review the context. I think you'll see in this case that Russell is just being difficult. <smile> — plaque flag

You might be right.

For the record, I know that the normative approach is counterintuitive !

All right my friends I gotta hit the hay. [ Sorry to leave just as you arrive, ]

Cool. So we can agree on embodied cognition. — plaque flag

Except here we have a problem. We accept that me thinking of a number is just the firing of certain neurons. But the firing of these neurons, although not private in principle, is private in practice. You don't open up my head and examine my brain, and even if you did, you wouldn't know what to look for (unless, perhaps, you're an expert neuroscientist).

And yet we can talk about and understand other people thinking of a number. Even young children who know nothing about the brain's neural activity and its relationship to consciousness can talk about and understand other people thinking of a number. They are talking about and understanding something that, even though not private in principle, is private in practice.

Now consider a variation of Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box where we can see inside each others' boxes but that we never do. It's private in practice but not private in principle. Does that make any difference at all? I don't think it does. And so if we can talk about something that's private in practice then we can talk about something that's private in principle.

It's really just not that hard to believe that other people have the same kind of inner life that we recognize ourselves as having and so talk about it. We're clever, empathetic creatures.

That language is directed at that shared world ? Toward objects and other selves in it ? — plaque flag

When we talk about the tree it's directed at the shared world. When we talk about our feelings it isn't.