The dispute between direct(/naive) and indirect(/non-naive) realism concerns the epistemological problem of perception; does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world?

Direct(/naive) realists believe that experience does provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge of experience and that the external world is a constituent of experience.

Indirect(/non-naive) realists believe that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge only of experience and that the external world is not a constituent of experience. Knowledge of the external world is inferential – i.e. indirect – with experience itself being the intermediary through which such inferences are possible.

So-called "non-naive direct realism" is indirect(/non-naive) realism. The addition of the (redefined) word "direct" in the name is an unnecessary confusion, likely arising from a confused misunderstanding of indirect(/non-naive) realism.

ecently, I stumbled upon a paper titled "Alignment of brain embeddings and artificial contextual embeddings in natural language points to common geometric patterns" (published last month in Nature Communications) and I asked Claude 3 Opus to help me understand it. I was puzzled by the fact the the researchers had chosen to look into Broca's area rather than into Wernicke's area in order to find semantically significant neural correlates of linguistic representations. Claude 3 informed me that:

"Historically, the Wernicke-Geschwind model of language processing has been influential, positing a division of labor between Broca's area (in the IFG) for speech production and Wernicke's area (in the superior temporal gyrus) for speech comprehension. However, more recent research has challenged this strict dichotomy, suggesting a more distributed and integrated network for language processing in the brain. — Pierre-Normand

On this point I'd offer rather than an objection, just the reason I've had trouble understanding those who talk about embodied consciousness. It's that in order to explain what you mean by holism, you'll use atomic biological concepts. So it's a case where the revolution needs the previous regime to make sense of itself.

This is vaguely inspired by Fodor's criticisms of meaning holism. As appealing as Wittgenstein-inspired meaning holism is, it doesn't work out on the ground. It's not clear how a human could learn a language if meaning is holistic. Likewise, the student of biology must start with atomic concepts like the nervous system (which has two halves). Eventually it will be revealed that you can't separate the nervous system from the endocrine system. It's one entity. But by the time this news is broken to you, you have enough understanding of the mechanics to see what they're saying. And honestly, once this has happened a few times, you're not at all surprised that you can't separate the lungs from the heart. You can't separate either of those from the kidneys, and so on.

This isn't new. As I mentioned, the boundary between organism and world can easily fall away. Organisms and their environments function as a unit. If you want to kill a species, don't attack the organisms, attack their environment. It's one thing. And this leads to my second point: you said that philosophy is the right domain for talking about this issue, but philosophy won't help you when there are no non-arbitrary ways to divide up the universe. Your biases divide it up. All you can do is become somewhat aware of what your biases are. Robert Rosen hammers this home in Life Itself, in which he examines issues associated with the fact that life has no scientific definition. The bias at the heart of it is the concept of purpose. He doesn't advise dispensing with the concept of purpose because there would be no biology without it. What he does is advise a Kantian approach.

So I'll throw those two things at you just as food for thought: you can't dispense with science and atomic concepts, and what you're calling a philosophical problem is really a matter of biases. Maybe an anti-Descartes, anti-Chalmers bias? I know it's not that simple.

I look out into the distance and see a tree in the yard. There's a squirrel running around the tree, doing its thing. You're claiming that the squirrel and the tree are either not distal objects or - if they are - they are not(cannot be) constituents of experience.

Is that about right?

I look out into the distance and see a tree in the yard. There's a squirrel running around the tree, doing its thing. You're claiming that the squirrel and the tree are either not distal objects or - if they are - they are not(cannot be) constituents of experience.

Is that about right? — creativesoul

Yes. Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Experience and distal objects are in a very literal physical sense distinct entities with a very literal physical distance between the two.

So-called "non-naive direct realism" is indirect (non-naive) realism. Their use of the word "direct" in their name is an unnecessary confusion. — Michael

Do you have an argument to support this assertion?

Indirect (non-naive) realists believe that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge only of experience and because the external world is not a constituent of experience. Knowledge of the external world is inferential – i.e. indirect – with experience itself being the intermediary. — Michael

Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. Likewise, non-naive realists believe that our perceptual content can be about distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptual content is only about mental representations or sense data. Therefore, non-naive realism is not the same view as indirect realism.

Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. — Luke

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body.

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here?

Perhaps you'll find that what non-naive direct realists mean by "of" isn't what indirect realists mean by "of" and that, given their different meanings, both claims are mutually agreeable.

Yes. Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Experience and distal objects are in a very literal physical sense distinct entities with a very literal physical spatial distance between the two. — Michael

It follows that no constituent of experience extends beyond the body.

Is that about right as well?

It follows that no constituent of experience extends beyond the body.

Is that about right as well? — creativesoul

Yes.

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body.

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael

Are we no longer discussing whether indirect realism and non-naive realism are the same view?

What it means to say that an experience is of some distal object is that the distal object has somehow interacted with one's senses to cause the experience.

Okay. I'm currently drinking coffee. Kona coffee to be precise. I'm also talking to you, thinking about what you're writing, and listening to the sounds coming from the other room where some friends of mine are playing cards. I can hear the sounds of shuffling cards. I can hear the sharp smack of card faces against the table as they're being played. I can also hear the clacking of card edges against the table as players contemplate their next move. I can also hear the conversation between the players as it progresses. It includes much more than the game being played.

We're all getting hungry. We've been discussing which bread to use to make French toast. We have different kinds of bread here. Some is frozen. Some not. There are also all sorts of things in my direct line of sight; from the vantage point I'm currently positioned at in relation to all the other distal objects I can see, smell, hear, and feel from here. There's also a faint scent leftover from a particular cleaning solution that we used yesterday while cleaning the house.

Are you saying that none of that counts as a distal object?

What it means to say that an experience is of some distal object is that the distal object has somehow interacted with one's senses to cause the experience. — Luke

The indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience.

Are you saying that none of that counts as a distal object? — creativesoul

I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience, much like Hitler is not a constituent of some book about him. Each are separate entities.

Physical constituent then?

The indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience. — Michael

Okay, but you asked me:

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael

If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not sure what to make of this:

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. — Michael

Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception.

Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

Okay. So then are distal objects mental constituents of experience?

If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not sure what to make of this:

"Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body." — Luke

Why not?

The Sun is physically separate from the grass, but (light from) the Sun has physically interacted with the grass to cause it to grow. It seems pretty straightforward.

Likewise, the apple is physically separate from my sense organs, but (light from) the apple has physically interacted with my sense organs to cause a conscious experience. Also pretty straightforward.

Okay. So then are distal objects mental constituents of experience? — creativesoul

Distal objects are physical objects. What would it mean for a physical object be a mental constituent?

None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.

I'm still dyslexic... it's actually to my right.

Funny that.

I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see. — creativesoul

I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. The grammar of "I see X" has nothing do with the epistemological problem of perception, much like the grammar of "the book is about X" has nothing to do with any epistemological problem of a history textbook.

The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.

None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.
— creativesoul

I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael

So, what I see is not a constituent of my experience or the heater grate is not a distal object?

Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what it means to say that an experience is "of" some distal object. I answered that and you said that an indirect realist would agree. I'm no longer sure what you are arguing for or where you disagree.

The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences. — Michael

I think what I'm offering here is relevant.

Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what it means to say that an experience is "of" some distal object. I answered that and you said that an indirect realist would agree. I'm no longer sure what you are arguing for or where you disagree. — Luke

You said that indirect realism and non-naive direct realism are different positions because non-naive direct realism believes that "my experience is of distal objects" is true and indirect realism believes that "my experience is of distal objects" is false.

But you say that "my experience is of distal objects" means "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience".

Indirect realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true.

So given that both indirect realists and non-naive direct realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true, what is the difference between being a non-naive direct realist and being an indirect realist?

It seems to be that their only disagreement is over what the phrase "my experience is of distal objects" means. But that's not a philosophical disagreement; that's an irrelevant disagreement about grammar. And a confused one, because there is no 'true' meaning of the phrase "my experience is of distal objects". It just means whatever we use it to mean, and clearly non-naive direct realists and indirect realists are using it in different ways and so to mean different things.

Philosophically, non-naive direct realists and indirect realists are the same: they agree that distal objects are not constituents of experience, although play a causal role, and so that there is an epistemological problem of perception; our knowledge of the external world is indirect, inferred from experience.

Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.

How does one know that experience is the causal consequence of his body interacting with the environment if he only has direct knowledge of his own experience, and not of what causes it?

How does one know that experience is the causal consequence of his body interacting with the environment if he only has direct knowledge of his own experience, and not of what causes it? — NOS4A2

Inference.

How do we know that a Geiger counter measures ionizing radiation? How do we know that the Higgs boson exists? How do we know that Hitler is responsible for the Holocaust?

Not all knowledge is direct knowledge.

Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.

We infer on the basis of evidence and reasoning, but since we only have direct knowledge of experience, we cannot be aware of the evidence of anything outside of it.

We infer on the basis of evidence and reasoning, but since we only have direct knowledge of experience, we cannot be aware of the evidence of anything outside of it. — NOS4A2

Experience is the evidence. From it we infer the cause. Much like from the screen readings of a Geiger counter we infer the nearby existence of radiation and from reading history textbooks we infer the past existence of a man named Adolf Hitler.

The how do you infer that experience is caused by the environment, for example?

It's considered the most parsimonious explanation for the existence and regularity and predictability of experience.

Although subjective idealists disagree.

But given that direct and indirect realists are both realists we can dispense with considering idealism in this discussion.