You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.
An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived. — Luke
You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.
An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived.
— Luke
Correct. — Michael
The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it?
— frank
I wouldn't say so. That scientific realism entails indirect realism is contingent on a posteriori facts, not a priori truths. — Michael
One salient feature of hallucinatory and dream states is that when we experience them, our abilities to notice their anomalous nature is diminished or suppressed. — Pierre-Normand
It's that the scientist starts by assuming direct realism, then disproves direct realism. It's an ouroboros. — frank
Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How do colors come from something colorless?But as it stands the science of perception supports indirect realism and so a direct realist must reject the science of perception, although I don't know how he can justify that rejection. — Michael
I don't quite get what you're saying. Flat earthers assume that the Earth is flat, do experiments, and determine that the earth is not flat. It's not a paradox; it's just that the experiments have proven them wrong. — Michael
The question is about why you have confidence that your observations reflect the facts, when you've concluded that your observations are creations of your brain. — frank
If a color is directly perceived and the wavelength is indirectly perceived, and your mind with all of it's colors and sounds and feelings, are part of reality, then isn't it safe to say that you directly experience part of the world? If so, then doesn't the distinction between indirect vs direct realism become irrelevant? — Harry Hindu
Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How are colors come from something colorless?
What role does the observer effect in QM play here? — Harry Hindu
What part of you directly interacts with the world? What is "you" or "I" in this sense? If you define "you" and "I" as your body, then isn't your body directly interacting with objects by holding them and with light by opening your eyes? — Harry Hindu
Indirect realism only makes sense if you define "you" and "I" as homunculus in your head.
If the direct realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter then the indirect realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter. — Michael
I don't see how using "direct" and "indirect" is useful here. We perceive objects. If there is no difference in the information acquired, then there is no useful distinction between "direct" and "indirect".The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly perceive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael
The observer effect does not assume that objects are present in conscious experience, rather that act of observing distal objects has an effect on those distal objects and how they are perceived.No, the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. Some believe that it is reducible to brain activity (e.g. pain just is the firing of c fibres), and some believe that it is some mental phenomenon that supervenes on such brain activity. Either way, few (if any) believe that conscious experience extends beyond the body such that distal objects and their properties are literally present in conscious experience. — Michael
Then "direct" realism is the case? Again, if we can directly interact with certain parts of the world and a direct interaction is a necessary component of an indirect perception, then "direct" and "indirect" is a false dichotomy. It's not either or. It's both.Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael
How can I be reading to much into the grammar when I'm just trying to get some clarification of your use of the word, "I".No it doesn't. "I feel pain" doesn't entail a homunculus. "I see shapes and colours when I hallucinate" doesn't entail a homunculus." Saying that these very same mental percepts occur when awake and not hallucinate doesn't entail a homunculus. You're just reading far too much into the grammar of "I experience X". — Michael
But the direct realist relies on the observations that support belief in electrons (like the light dots on a CRT). The indirect realist has to say that those light dots are creations of the brain, and so may not reflect the facts. — frank
A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011).
Practicality probably. Is that the source of the indirect realist's confidence? — frank
Perhaps, yes. Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael
does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world? — Michael
Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael
Both the direct and indirect realist infers the existence of some entity from some effect it is claimed to have caused — Michael
I directly perceive the entity. — Moliere
I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism. — Moliere
The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.
To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.
The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.
Which means what? — Michael
The same as it means to perceive causes and effects -- one has to start somewhere. We can call that starting point "blotches of color", "cause-and-effect", "the cup", or any other such things. In terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object, be it causes, cups, or color-blotches. — Moliere
The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly receive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael
I think much of the dispute between direct and indirect realists may revolve around the fact that direct realists limit the meaning of the word "perception" to sensory perceptions that are stimulated by distal objects, whereas indirect realists give the word "perception" a wider meaning that includes non-sensory "perceptions" that lack any external stimulus, such as hallucinations, dreams and imagininings. Neither side has the monopoly on correct usage, but given the question of whether or not I directly perceive some distal object, the former meaning would typically be assumed. — Luke
We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus (dreams and hallucinations being the notable exceptions). The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object.
The nature of our percepts is determined by the structure and behaviour of our sense organs and brain such that different distal objects can cause the same percept and that the same distal object can cause different percepts (e.g. the dress that some see as white and gold and others as white and blue).
This is indirect realism. Any direct realist who claims that this is direct realism has simply redefined the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness. — Michael
We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus. The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object. — Michael
We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. It is through this access that we are able to determine when we are hallucinating or dreaming and when we are not.
So, direct realism. Both percepts and world are accessible. — Moliere
Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it.
The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon. — fdrake
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