Yes, to me, internally representing the world begets a representation of the world, something that represents, models, or stands for, the environment. We have a space in which representing occurs (internally), and presumably this representation or act of representation (sight) is the intentional object.

I could be completely wrong; that’s just how I always understood representationalism.

Yes, to me, internally representing the world begets a representation of the world, something that represents, models, or stands for, the environment. We have a space in which representing occurs (internally), and presumably this representation or act of representation (sight) is the intentional object.

I could be completely wrong; that’s just how I always understood representationalism. — NOS4A2

Right, but the direct/indirect realism discussion is also commonly framed in terms of whether we directly perceive real objects or whether we instead directly perceive a representation or other perceptual intermediary (and only indirectly perceive real objects). I reject that we perceive a mental representation and say that we directly perceive real objects.

As stated earlier, I think the naive realist position is based on the misguided notion that when we perceive a real object we perceive the world in itself (or somehow identify the perception with the object). A perception that is identical with its object is not really a perception at all; it is the object.

The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object.

I reject the direct realist notion that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself (or that our perceptions are identical with the perceived object) and the indirect realist notion that we directly perceive only mental representations of real objects. Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations.

Experience exists within the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects do not exist within experience.

Experience is causally determined by our interaction with distal objects, and its qualities causally covariant with the distal object's properties, but there's nothing more to the connection than that. It's naive, and inconsistent with the scientific evidence, to suggest otherwise.

Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations. — Luke

The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object. — Luke

What is the physical/physiological difference between us seeing a mental representation and a mental representation existing in our heads?

This is where I think you're getting so confused by grammar.

If mental representations exist and if distal objects are not constituents of these mental representations and if our knowledge of distal objects is mediated by knowledge of these mental representations then indirect realism is true, because that's all that indirect realism means.

I think you're misleading yourself by claiming that experience exists within the brain. I don't know about you, but I experience things out in the world, not in my brain.

I think the scientific evidence strongly suggests that experience is either reducible to brain states or supervenes on brain states.

I think the scientific evidence strongly suggests that distal objects are not constituents of brain states and are not constituents of any phenomena that supervene on brain states.

Therefore, I think the scientific evidence strongly suggests that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

I think we have direct knowledge of the constituents of experience and indirect knowledge of anything that is causally responsible for experience and causally covariant with its constituents.

I think the constituents of experience are mental phenomena (e.g. smells, tastes, and colours) and that distal objects are causally responsible for experience and their properties causally covariant with its constituents.

Therefore, I think we have direct knowledge of mental phenomena and indirect knowledge of distal objects and their properties.

This is all I understand indirect realism to be. Whether or not to describe this as "experiencing mental phenomena" is an irrelevant grammatical choice with no philosophical or physiological implications (e.g. it no more implies an homunculus than "I feel pain" does).

We have a space in which representing occurs (internally)….. — NOS4A2

With respect to the thread topic, re: realism, this space has been called “intuition”, the faculty of empirical representation, in which the matter of things perceived unite with a form “….which lies a priori in the mind…”, which gives rise to “phenomena”, that is, representations in the form of images, which are the first instances of becoming conscious of the particular nature of whatever was initially a mere sensation.

The respect for the thread title here is necessary, insofar as there is another internal space in which representation occurs, wherein perception is not a precursor, thus these must be kept separate for theoretical consistency.

Just, you know….FYI.

That may be so, but it doesn't follow that experience is in the brain.You are courting solipsism.

I think that's one of the central axes this debate is happening on. Direct realists in thread seem to see experience/perception as a relationship between the brain and the world that takes place in the world. @Michael seems to see experience/perception as a relationship between the brain and the world that takes place in the brain.

Edit: so we've got externalism+directness+action vs internalism+indirectness+representation.

I think that's one of the central axes this debate is happening on. Direct realists in thread seem to see experience/perception as a relationship between the brain and the world that takes place in the world. Michael seems to see experience/perception as a relationship between the brain and the world that takes place in the brain. — fdrake

And then, of course, there are direct realists who view experience/perception as the actualization of a capacity that persons (or animals) have to grasp the affordances of their world. Brains merely are organs that enable such capacities.

that takes place in the world — fdrake

And this would be wrong.

And this would be wrong. — Lionino

Eh, a perception is still an event in the world. Like your body adjusting under a load is proprioception.

And then, of course, there are direct realists who view experience/perception as the actualization of a capacity that persons (or animals) have to grasp the affordances of their world. Brains merely are organs that enable such capacities. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, that's a species of externalism isn't it?

Edit: removing some laziness in the question. There's the adage that externalism means "meaning ain't just in the head", ecological perception like Gibson sees signs and capacities for acting in nature. Environmental objects themselves are seen as sites of perceptual interaction, which imbues interactions with them with a dynamic/semantic content.

The dispute between naive and indirect realists concerns the phenomenal character of experience. You can use the word "experience" to refer to something else if you like but in doing so you're no longer addressing indirect realism.

Well we're kinda screwed if we can't agree what we're disagreeing about.

Well that is why I have spent 60 pages trying to explain that much of the dispute between indirect and non-naive direct realists is a confusion borne from each group using the words "direct" and "see" to mean different things.

The relevant consideration is the epistemological problem of perception. Do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties or only direct knowledge of the phenomenal character of experience?

The dispute between naive and indirect realists concerns the phenomenal character of experience. You can use the word "experience" to refer to something else if you like but in doing so you're no longer addressing indirect realism. — Michael

That's right. The phenomenal character of experience is something that is constructed and not merely received. The perceiving agent must for instance shift their attention to different aspect of it in order to assess the phenomenal character of their experience. But this is not a matter of closing your eyes and inspecting the content of your visual experience since when you close your eyes, this content vanishes. You must keep your eyes open and while you attend to different aspects of your visual experience, eye saccades, accommodation by the lens, and head movements may be a requirement for those aspects to come into focus. This is an activity that takes place in the world.

That's right. The phenomenal character of experience is something that is constructed and not merely received. The perceiving agent must for instance shift their attention to different aspect of it in order to assess the phenomenal character of their experience. But this is not a matter of closing your eyes and inspecting the content of your visual experience since when you close your eyes, this content vanishes. You must keep your eyes open and while you attend to different aspects of your visual experience, eye saccades, accommodation by the lens, and head movements may be a requirement for those aspects to come into focus. This is an activity that takes place in the world. — Pierre-Normand

The phenomenal character doesn't take place in the distal world. The phenomenal character takes place in the brain, albeit is (in the veridical case) causally determined by the body's interaction with the distal world. Indirect realists accept this.

I suppose it's also why people have invited you to reconsider the kind of things that can count as direct realism!

If we define our minds as being inside the world, yes. If we don't, no. For the former, the debate dissolves again into a semantic issue.

I suppose it's also why people have invited you to reconsider the kind of things that can count as direct realism! — fdrake

You can call anything you like "direct realism", but it is not a given that you are saying anything that contradicts indirect realism. Each group just means different things by the word "direct".

To suggest that if your direct realism is true then my indirect realism is false is to equivocate.

Edit: removing some laziness in the question. There's the adage that externalism means "meaning ain't just in the head", ecological perception like Gibson sees signs and capacities for acting in nature. Environmental objects themselves are seen as sites of perceptual interaction. — fdrake

Yes, the adage comes from Putnam and also referred to cutting pies. Susan Hurley also distinguished content externalism from quality externalism.

From her paper Varieties of Externalism, which I had found useful but read a very long time ago:

"My taxonomy consists in a two-by-two matrix: ‘what’ externalism contrasts with ‘how’ externalism, and content-related versions of each contrast with phenomenal quality-related versions. (I often say ‘quality’ as short for ‘phenomenal quality’.)"

This link downloads the pdf.

It seems that no one is really talking about naïve realism, it has nothing to do with the semantics of "see".

claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part) — https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml

The issue is that people will easily reject 3, many will reject 2, few will reject 1.

For example, one group defines "direct perception" as "ABC". They claim that "ABC" is true and so call themselves "direct realists". Another group defines "direct perception" as "XYZ". They claim that "XYZ" is false and so call themselves "indirect realists".

It is possible both that "ABC" is true and that "XYZ" is false and so that both the group that call themselves "direct realists" and the group that calls themselves "indirect realists" are correct.

Well that paper is very similar to the debate we're having.

The phenomenal character doesn't take place in the distal world. — Michael

Not in the distal world; in the world. Likewise, the action of kicking the soccer ball doesn't take place in the distal soccer field. It takes place on the soccer field. While the soccer player prepares to score a goal, she is experiencing the conditions for performing this action as they come into place. But this is an experience that she is active in producing. Her body isn't a puppet being manipulated by her brain. It is a part of her perceptual system which emcompasses her brain, her body, the ground that supports her and the structure of the optic arrays (the incident light around her). There is no magical boundary around the brains that keeps experiences out of it. Would the vestibular system be in or out? What about the spinal cord?

And then, of course, there are direct realists who view experience/perception as the actualization of a capacity that persons (or animals) have to grasp the affordances of their world. Brains merely are organs that enable such capacities. — Pierre-Normand

Most of that capacity is actualized without the involvement of phenomenal consciousness, so it's not clear to me what this direct realist is saying exactly.

Not in the distal world; in the world. — Pierre-Normand

Well, yes. Phenomenal character exists in the brain, the brain exists in the world, and so phenomenal character exists in the world. But it is still the case that phenomenal character exists in the brain, not outside the brain, and so the naive realist's claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of phenomenal character is disproven by the fact that distal objects and their properties do not exist in the brain.

the naive realist's claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of phenomenal character — Michael

I am gonna have to quote Amadeus here:

Is anyone truly positing that the screen infront of me is part of my experience? — AmadeusD

Naive realists. That's why they are naive realists. See What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

Note the distinction between the constitutive claim of naive realism and the merely causal claim of intentionalism.

Indirect realism is the rejection of naive realism (and is compatible with intentionalism; see Semantic Direct Realism).