H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells. — Patterner

You are leaving out many possibilities, dissolved substances, heavy water, etc.. No natural water is pure H2O. Your argument is nothing but a gross oversimplification.

Or point me to any other macro characteristic that is not explained by how the micro properties of its constituents behave under the conditions it is in. — Patterner

Here again, you argue against your own thesis. The "conditions" is something completely distinct from the micro parts. You argue that the macro is nothing other than a composite of the parts in an arrangement, but now you qualify with "under the conditions it is in", which implies a larger context. The larger context is something other than the micro.

You argue that the macro is nothing other than a composite of the parts in an arrangement, but now you qualify with "under the conditions it is in", — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it's under the conditions it is in. I said that back in this post:

"Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes."

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily.

If I say someone weighs less on the moon than they do on earth, because the moon has less mass than the earth, and, therefore, the attraction between the person and the body they are standing on is not as strong, do I really have to specifically say "These are different conditions"??

About an hour after my post to you, I happened to stumble upon this video of Annaka Harris. At 3:20, she says:

And when i use the word consciousness, I'm not talking about higher order thinking, or complex thought, or things that we think of in terms of human consciousness. But when I use the word consciousness I'm talking about consciousness in the most fundamental sense. Um, this, this bare fact of felt experience. — Annaka Harris

That's what i have in mind.

Thoughts are not the same.
— Patterner

Yes, describing things from the outside seems so far removed from what it feels like to be inside. Experience does seem drastically different, hence the hard problem.

I've been listening to a new audio book, a so called "audio documentary" that touches on this. It's called Lights On by Annaka Harris. Perhaps not up your street because she's an unabashed physicalist, but she explores concepts of fundamental consciousness because she's become increasingly convinced that that's more the right approach to talking about experience. — flannel jesus

This is one if the reasons I started this thread. Whether or not my thinking agrees with Harris', I'm sure she's not a substance dualist, so didn't want to further derail MoK's thread.

Thank you for the recommendation! I'm loving it! I'm a few hours in, talking to Sean Carroll atm. I wish there was a ebook version. I usually have audio and ebook versions of things, so when I want to discuss a particular thing, I can just copy & paste the quote.

I don't know why she calls herself a physicalist if she thinks consciousness is a pervasive, fundamental field. I could say I'm a physicalist for thinking proto-consciousness is a property of matter, as mass and charge are. But I don't think it's a physical property, and I wouldn't think her idea is that it's a physical field.

In any event, based on the little I know, I can't disagree with her. It might amount to the same thing I have in mind. The fields could be why every particle has the property of proto-consciousness. But then we could also suggest that mass is a pervasive, fundamental field, and that's why all particles have mass.

But then we could also suggest that mass is a pervasive, fundamental field, and that's why all particles have mass. — Patterner

Yes, so if mass is a fundamental part of our universe, you wouldn't immediately can that non-physicalism, so I guess for Annaka the same is true of experience.

Although as you get later (spoiler alert), you discover that she DOESN'T think mass is fundamental, primarily because she doesn't think space-time itself is fundamental (and mass is itself defined in relation to space time)

So I guess she calls herself a physicalist because she believes there's the physical world, and experience is a part of that physical world, not a separate thing

Although as you get later (spoiler alert), you discover that she DOESN'T think mass is fundamental, primarily because she doesn't think space-time itself is fundamental (and mass is itself defined in relation to space time) — flannel jesus

Well it will be interesting to hear how she thinks of space-time if it's not fundamental!

I believe it's in chapter 11, they discuss a block type view of the universe where causality and space time both are emergent features, emerging from a deeper structure. Tell me what you think when you get there.

8 chapters away, but I'll get there.

Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess. — Patterner

Although its been a few days now, you might want to reread my post: I said nothing to the contrary of this.

I did not address intelligence but the faculty of understanding innate to consciousness - which can be of greater or lesser magnitudes when comparing one being or species of such to another. And, in a breaking away from traditional conceptualizations going all the way back to Aristotle, I stated that this faculty of understanding (e.g., an ameba understands, however minusculely, differences between predator and prey when faced with another ameba in its environment) goes by the synonym of the intellect, i.e., that to which things are intelligible. To then be explicit, thereby granting an ameba a minuscule degree of intellect (which is not a synonym for intelligence - ameba don't understand and then apply principles, for example - although, in lifeforms, intelligence will itself be contingent on the degree or magnitude of this faculty of understanding which, again, is intrinsic to all consciousness)

As to intelligence and consciousness being different things as exemplified by AI, I've already mentioned the same in my initial post in this thread:

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc. — javra

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of?

The property dualism although it can explain bottom-up causation, the existence of experience for example, cannot explain top-bottom causation, for example, how a single experience like a thought you have can lead to you typing the content of your thought.

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of? — javra

Yes, that is my thought. Consciousness is always the same. It's just the subjective awareness of the thing in question. A rock's consciousness is extremely limited. Certainly no understanding/comprehension. Nothing I would even know how to discuss. Skrbina's "instantaneous memory-less moments of experience." But it's there; the basis of all, including human, consciousness.

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*.

* By “subjective” I so far understand there being the minimal requirement of these two types of tacit understanding on the part of the subjective awareness in question: a) a tacit understanding as pertains to what is and is not self (this sense of self being the subjectivity in question), and b) a tacit understanding of this self as to whether this self experiences something of significance to it in its environment (rather than, for example, experiencing nothing of significance). Neither of which necessitates the occurrence of memory, btw.

-----

I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. (Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.)

Hm. I somehow missed your recent post that begins with "Although its been a few days now..." I do everything on my cell phone, so I sometimes miss things. (I also have a ton more spelling errors than I would typing, because my phone"corrects" me a lot.)

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*. — javra

I have some quotes in my OP. They are at the end here. The idea is that understanding isn't intrinsic to all consciousness. I think that idea is a mistake.

I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. — javra

Long to explain...

I don't think a rock has subjective awareness. I apologize. I know I said it that way, but it was just for the sake of posting sooner than later. Busy day. Rather, each particle has subjective awareness. Physical bonds don't make a rock a single unit, as far as consciousness is concerned, so they're all on their own in that regard. A rock doesn't have consciousness, and breaking a rock in half doesn't give you two rocks with consciousness. An old grandfather clock is not one unit, as far as consciousness is concerned. Physical connections aren't enough.

Information processing is what makes a group of particles one unit, in regards to consciousness. A system processing information subjectively experiences as a unit. I use the term proto-consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of units.

It all started with DNA. DNA is extraordinary beyond words. DNA, mRNA, tRNA, ribosomes, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases, and other things, are part of the information processing system that produces the amino acids and proteins that are coded into DNA. One unit that is processing information. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit.

Add more information processing systems, all one unit/one organism, all working to keep the group of systems/the organism alive. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit. And what that unit is experiencing is much more than what the unit in the previous paragraph is experiencing.

Add any kind of brain, an information processing system that controls and coordinates all the others, and we're talking about consciousness of something serious. Building up to the human brain, which is obviously capable of thinking things, and kinds of things, no other species is. Even thinking about information. Even thinking about information just for the sake of thinking about information.

Maybe AI has consciousness, because it processes information. But maybe it needs more information processing systems before it will subjectively experience anything like we have. We aren't just pure information, as AI is. We are several times more information processing systems than I know about.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation.


-------------------------------------

In this article, Philip Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

The property dualism although it can explain bottom-up causation, the existence of experience for example, cannot explain top-bottom causation, for example, how a single experience like a thought you have can lead to you typing the content of your thought. — MoK

Sez you :grin: I'll tell you what I think about causality asap. Hopefully tomorrow. And everyone reading this who already thinks I'm off my rocker will want to call the men in the white coats after that.

Thank you for the explanation. Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation. — Patterner

To be honest, given that life evolving out of non-life can only be part and parcel of the non-physicalist philosophical views I hold, I too end up speculatively concluding that pansychism is in fact the case. Still, as previously mentioned (and as you yourself also note) - as with everybody else - I don't presume to have any understanding of how it might work. Hence my questioning in regard to what proto-experience / proto-consciousness might be. :wink:

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside. — javra

Put aside?? Seems like important stuff to me! :smile: Not sure it's anything we could describe. But I think it's there because, a) I think human consciousness needs to be explained by the properties of the particles that we are made of, but none of the physical properties fit the bill, and b) if the primary particles that we are made of are interchangable with any other primary particles anywhere else in the universe, then all particles must have the property in question.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. Yet, it feels. Cold, warm, hungry, danger... It may react to any of those feelings without thought, via what, in Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, Antonio Damasio calls "non-explicit competences—based on molecular and sub-molecular processes".

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be — javra

I've had the idea (and I'm still partial to it, but it's only a speculation and I'm by no means convinced it's true) that it's about sensitivity.

A thing (a process) has an "experience" of the things that it's sensitive to.

So protons are sensitive to the presence of nearby protons and nearby electrons, so their "what it's like to be" involves an experience of being sensitive to those charged fields. It feels different for a proton to be in one situation, with maybe a balanced field where it doesn't feel pushed/pulled in any direction, compared to an unbalanced field where there's a bunch of negative charge to the left and positive charge to the right.

But the what-it's-like-to-be doesn't involve what we would think of as memories, complex thoughts, boredom, etc, because they aren't sensitive to the sorts of things that could generate those experiences.

So that's one take on proto experience, it might not be true but hopefully it makes enough sense.

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. — Patterner

So you do argue against what you claim. What's the point of making such claims then?

I am done with your nonsense. I have literally read my last post of yours.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. — Patterner

To be clear, the tacit understanding I've been addressing does not require, nor is it equivalent to, conceptual understanding. Tersely expressed, a concept is most always an abstraction abstracted from particulars . As abstraction, it is a thought one thinks or else cognizes. One which can then be understood in various ways and to various degrees by the respective ego - such that the concept is other than the ego which contemplates the concept. But what I addressed in my previous posts as tacit understanding is not this: it is not something other than the ego (which the ego then comprehends) but instead is innate to the ego itself, fully unified with the ego or consciousness, such that no duality whatsoever occurs between the ego/consciousness in question and its tacit understanding. And it is due to the ego's tacit understanding as innate and nondualistic faculty of consciousness that the ego then holds any capacity whatsoever to understand anything which is other than itself - be it a physiological percept of that which other or a concept, etc.

A worm, even one as simple as a nematode, will of course be able to distinguish self from other. It wouldn't be able to live otherwise - e.g., if not being able to discern predator from food from self and thereby act/react accordingly. And this very innate, here likely genetically inherited in large if not in full, ability of the nematode to discern and discriminate what is predator, from what is food, from what is self will - in and of itself - be the nematodes faculty of tacit understanding - which is innate to and utterly nondualistic with the nematodes ego/consciousness (however different from our own it might be). And which, again, the nematode holds without in any way contemplating concepts - conceptual understanding being neither innate to the ego nor fully nondualistic in relation to it.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). And this sense of self then entails a (non-conceptual) tacit understanding of what is and is not self on the part of the organism the organism's awareness.

Could make sense (from a distance at least :smile: ) Thanks.

Sure.

I thought about that from just the basic observation that our own experiences are rooted in variables changing that we're sensitive to. When I decided to humor the idea of fundamental consciousness, it seemed to me like a viable path to go.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). — javra

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive?

As I've said, I think the key is information processing. That's what makes the proto-consciousness in all the particles into a unit with consciousness. But that needs to build before there's any sense of self. The system processing of the information in DNA, the first step of all, isn't felt as a self. How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. But where does it kick in? How many information processing systems, or kinds of IPSs, does an organism have to have before there's a sense of self? Maybe worms do, I just used them as an example.

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree.

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive? — Patterner

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism).

How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. — Patterner

Microbial intelligence (known as bacterial intelligence) is the intelligence shown by microorganisms. This includes complex adaptive behavior shown by single cells, and altruistic or cooperative behavior in populations of like or unlike cells. It is often mediated by chemical signalling that induces physiological or behavioral changes in cells and influences colony structures.[1]

[...]

Even bacteria can display more behavior as a population. These behaviors occur in single species populations, or mixed species populations. Examples are colonies or swarms of myxobacteria, quorum sensing, and biofilms.[1][3]

[...]

Bacteria communication and self-organization in the context of network theory has been investigated by Eshel Ben-Jacob research group at Tel Aviv University which developed a fractal model of bacterial colony and identified linguistic and social patterns in colony lifecycle.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microbial_intelligence

By in large, if not in full, none of which would be possible in the complete absence of any discernment between friend and foe relative to one’s own being, aka self. Then there is the notion of autopoiesis which seems ubiquitous to all lifeforms - differentiating life from non-life (e.g. prions and viroids, this among other simpler structures of organic molecules).

Even sperm (which are not self-sustaining organisms) can be readily seen to sense and react to their environment – and thereby exhibit some sentience (via which one’s own being is discerned from that which is not) - all the while somehow innately knowing how to move via variable environments toward that which they deem to be the goal, this being the egg. (And, arguably, the egg itself seems to exhibit sentience in selecting which of the many sperm attached to it it is to unify with.)

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree. — Patterner

Fair enough. All the same, irrespective of this:

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience?

Physical connections aren't enough. — Patterner

Perhaps it's more like "some, or even most, kinds of physical connections aren't enough".

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism). — javra

Only if consciousness equals psyche. I think they are different things.

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience? — javra

Only if experience equals understanding. I think they are different things.

According to my ideas, everything has subjective experience. The nature of the thing that is subjectively experienced is what determines whether or not there is awareness, self-awareness, understanding, psyche, intelligence, sense of self, and other things. I thought I just recently posted this somewhere, but can't find it. I might compare it with vision. I can look at a blank wall. Or I can look at the Grand Canyon, an Escher drawing, or the Aurora borealis. My vision is the same, no matter what I'm looking at. The thing I'm looking at determines what I see. I know that sounds silly. But the thing experienced is what's different, whether it's a particle, a worm, or a human. The analogy is flawed because I can't experience being anything other than myself, the way I can look at different things. But consciousness is unique, and no analogy can work.

I don't agree with all the things you think have a sense of self. But I have considered the question enough to have fully formed thoughts about it, or a way to articulate it. But now you've got me thinking.

Physical connections aren't enough.
— Patterner

Perhaps it's more like "some, or even most, kinds of physical connections aren't enough". — Janus

Not sure if I expressed myself well. What I meant is, just joining things together doesn't mean the larger physical unit will have consciousness as a unit. A physical unit isn't necessarily a conscious unit. Most of the universe is physical units that aren't conscious units. They're just a bunch of particles, each with the experience of being a particle, even though joined together physically with other particles. Yes, the first level, and any particle might become part of a conscious unit at some point. But at the moment, not much going on.

I think the connection must involve information processing. Like taking the information encoded in DNA, and making proteins. Chemical reactions are all physical, but they don't all have anything to do with information.

What is DNA if not chemical combinations? Of course not all chemical complexes are conscious...it doesn't follow that none are, or that consciousness cannot emerge in certain kinds of chemical systems.

My point is that not all chemical processes are processing information. That's what makes DNA so special. It processes information. And it's the basis of life.

And it's the first time a group of particles subjectively experienced as a whole, rather than the individual particles all on their own.