As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game. — Fooloso4

Do you have something in mind for this specifically, or would it be alright if I tried typing up a thread? I say this because I was working through this a bit and think I have something to perhaps start off the discussion. Otherwise, I'd be happy to wait until you started your thread and comment there :)

I also don't want to sidetrack this project, if I am being unhelpful.

To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college) — Fooloso4

Yes, I'd also think this analyzes into aRb, in which case, if I'm understanding correctly, "a" and "b" would be our objects with R just being a possible relation that can hold between them. Not itself an object.

I believe that we might have a similar understanding which is simply being obfuscated due to loose language.

As Frege once pointed out (I can't recall exactly where at this moment)...due to the nature of everyday language, we often times have to rely on the good nature of our interlocutors when trying to get our points across. Especially when approaching technical issues.

I'll look for the quote tomorrow. I believe I have an idea which paper it's from.

↪013zen You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs. — Sam26

I am saying:

1. Fact can either be the case or not be the case.

In the event that it is the case, a certain set of atomic facts obtain. In the event of a fact not being the case, a certain set of atomic facts does not obtain.

In the event that they obtain, Witt calls it a positive fact. In the event that they do not obtain, Witt calls it a negative fact.

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)" (2.06).

↪013zen You are misreading it. There are no untrue facts. — Banno

I believe that you are, my friend.
Please tell me to what the expression "Any one" in 1.21 is referencing? Any what?

1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. 

An item is only a fact if it is true. — Banno

It's not a misquote. The quote is:

"Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21).

Any one here is in reference to the previous two points:

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.

Any one is referencing facts.

No, it can't. If it is a fact, then it is the case. — Banno

"[Any fact] can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21.)

There can be no false facts — Banno

What do you mean by "false fact"? When I say:

As you (@Sam26) point out, a fact can either be true or false. — 013zen

I mean to say, a fact can either be the case, or not the case.

The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. — Sam26

Just a bit of nit-picking for consistency's sake.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads:

"An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact".

So, here we can kind of see what Witt has in mind.

A black spot is like a positive fact that obtains. There IS a cat over there.
A white spot is the absence of any fact (since the paper itself is white). There is NO thing over there.

But, importantly, we already know to what a negative fact corresponds in order to be able to say it is false. We understand the sense of "The spot is white".

I think Witt touches on this when he says:

"Why should one not be able to express the negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (Like: if "a" does not stand in a certain relation to "b", it could express that aRb is not the case.) But here also the negative proposition is indirectly constructed with the positive. The positive proposition must presuppose the existence of the negative proposition and conversely" (5.5151).

A negative fact can still furnish a proposition with a sense because the negative contains the positive as prototype. To know what it means to say:

"The spot is black" we must know what it means for it to be white, and visa versa.

The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world. — Fooloso4

I believe that you're right, that this is what Witt was struggling with in the notebooks, at times. You point that out, rightly - it's a main component of the Tract. But, I think he tries to show that he has come down on one side of the issue, namely that there are physical elements that correspond to logical simples. His analysis tells him that there must be logical simples, otherwise propositions having sense would rely on another proposition was true. Why does he say this?

Well, consider:

"The young man is starting college tomorrow."

I know what that means regardless of any content. I don't need to know who the young man is, what college he's going to, what todays date is, or anything one might otherwise suspect I'd need to know in order to make sense of the expression. I don't need to know if anything else is true in order to understand its sense. So, there must be logically simple entities which can be applied to any number of particulars. Any young man, any college, any date, etc.

But, Witt does try and give any idea regarding what these forms might mirror in the real world when he says:

"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
It is form and content. Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.024 -2.0251).

Wittgenstein suspects that particular arrangements or forms in things like space, time, and colour that persist over and over again must exist, for how else could a flower 200,000 years ago be red, and so can the coke can sitting on my desk today? Like the necessity for some general logical form which allows many particulars to fall under it by only containing a logical form allowing relevant aspects of the particular in question, so too must there be a general physical form which allows particulars to insatiate a quality.

Now we can be lost together! — Fooloso4

This is why we do philosophy, after all. :)

This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name? — Fooloso4

So, we know that facts/propositions are analyzed into atomic facts/elementary propositions. Regarding their structure Witt says:

"It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination" (4.221).
"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).

So, we learn that elementary propositions have a structure which is names in immediate combinations.
But, how do we know when we have reached the end of our analysis and gotten to the objects?

Well, Witt says:

"Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.

The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of
the object.

The object is simple" (2.014 - 2.02 )

I believe what he is saying is simply this: In order to determine if a sign is signifying a simple object or a complex object, you simply have to ask "Can this name appear in an atomic fact?" You know that you have the proper form for an object if its possible for it to occur in one. This is what is meant by it being simple.

What do I mean by this? Well, Witt. says

"The names are the simple symbols, I indicate them by single letters (x, y, z). The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form:

'fx', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc.

Or

I indicate it by the letters p, q, r" (4.24).

So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here.

Your original question:

Plato is a man — Fooloso4

should analyze into:

fx or more clearly F(x)

with F being "man" and x being "Plato".

This has the structure of objects in "immediate combination". In fact, we can now clearly see what Witt says that:

"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).

Because:

"[He] conceives [of] the proposition like Frege and Russell as a function of the expressions contained in it" (3.318 ).

He believes that proper analysis results in you culling the excess and superfluous aspects of a proposition, resulting in two things:

1. Only those things which are logically necessary for the meaning of the proposition (These are the objects)
2. The form that the proposition is instantiating.

"A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental are the features which are due to a particular way of producing the propositional sign. Essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense" (3.34).

So, what do we learn by analyzing "Plato is a man" into "F(x)"? Well, what does "F(x)" mean?

Witt says:

"For 'fa' says the same as (∃x) . fx . x = a" (5.47).

"(∃x) . fx . x = a"

Says: There exists at least one x that satisfies the function f(x), and "a" is that "x".

Or whatever is meant by the concept "man" at least one thing falls under it, and "Plato" is that thing.

Witt says as much in 5.471-5.4711.

"The general form of proposition is the essence of proposition. To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world."

So, the relation contained in the original expression is just that of a Function and input. So these are the names that correspond to our objects, perhaps. Witt does say:

"One could therefore say the real name is that which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common. It would then follow, step by step, that no sort of composition was essential for a
name" (3.3411).

Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man? — Fooloso4

Two things:

1. I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition.

Witt says of analysis that:

"Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes" (2.0201).

2. In the sentence "Plato is a man", Plato is a definite description, not an object.

But, I actually think you pointed out something that corrected my previous way of thinking, so thank you.

The relationship goes more like:

Thoughts>Concepts
Propositions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts (objects)

I believe that

"Socrates is a man" analyzes into:

∀x[Fx]


But, let me read a bit more and I'll comment more later. Thanks for the direction!

My goal is to explain, as simply as I can, the main thrust of his work, and to point out that Wittgenstein’s later thinking, on the logic of language, is a continuation of his early thinking with some important changes. What changes is his method of attacking the problems of language, and what Wittgenstein means by the logic of language changes. — Sam26

This is interesting. I actually share this view, although I will admit that I am far more knowledgeable about the Tractatus. But, from what I have read in the LE and PI I also feel that the two works are essentially saying the same thing - or rather, presenting the same problem from a different perspective. So, naturally, nothing really changes, except perhaps how we are talking about the problem.

↪013zen You're making so many assumptions that this conversation just isn't worth it anymore. — Echogem222

Okay.

↪013zen
For 1, let’s imagine an entity that is definitely free. I put a gun to the entity’s head and tell it to pick a number between 1-10. Having no information about the number, what it means, if it will have any effect at all or otherwise, the entity still has 11 options (1 being to not answer at all).
— 013zen

No, this is false, if they truly had free will, they would not be limited by your knowledge, after all, in their mind, they can react to things you say however they want, suffering would not affect them, they could shut off all of their senses, and killing them would not be possible because their body and mind would be fully them, you could not use things to control how they experience anything. — Echogem222

1. How does "being free" entail the ability to "shut off all of [one's] senses"
2. How does "being free" entail that "killing [the thing that is free is]...not possible"?

For 2, first of all why not and second of all I don’t believe that we have a predisposition towards knowledge, but we learn over time that knowing things is beneficial and try to actively acquire knowledge for that reason. This has nothing to do with our freedoms. In fact, some people freely choose to not acquire knowledge.
— 013zen

Some people freely choose to not acquire knowledge?? Where is your evidence for that? Am I just supposed to believe that you're telling the truth? — Echogem222

Many people do not know, for example, how to do basic maintenance on their car. Doing oil changes, fixing headlamps, etc. These are problems that come up regularly throughout life, and present opportunities for people to learn how to do these things. Instead, they pay others that did seek out the knowledge to do it for them.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. — Fooloso4

Norman Malcolm asked Wittgenstein for an example of a simple object, and he records Witt's response in his memoir.

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70).

Wittgenstein arrived at the conclusion that there must be simple objects through logical analysis. What those objects turn out to be is a question for science.

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word philosophy must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)" (4.111).

If I reformulate your three points as:

1.) If we do not have knowledge then we can not act freely since knowledge is a prerequisite to acting freely
(If not A then not B)

2.) If we are free then we should not have a predisposition towards knowledge
(If B then not C)

3.) If we have a predisposition towards knowledge then we are not free.
(If C then not B)

Conclusion: We do not have free will.
(Not B)

--------------

First, I'd like to point out: Structurally, there is no contradictions present here. You keep saying “...contradict logic”. A contradiction is a logical entity, it doesn’t contradict logic. A contradiction would be of the form: If A then not A.

Second, I’d like to point out that I have no reason to accept 1, 2, or 3.

For 1, let’s imagine an entity that is definitely free. I put a gun to the entity’s head and tell it to pick a number between 1-10. Having no information about the number, what it means, if it will have any effect at all or otherwise, the entity still has 11 options (1 being to not answer at all).

For 2, first of all why not and second of all I don’t believe that we have a predisposition towards knowledge, but we learn over time that knowing things is beneficial and try to actively acquire knowledge for that reason. This has nothing to do with our freedoms. In fact, some people freely choose to not acquire knowledge.

For 3 basically the same as 2.

Notice in your quote:

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

Those are objects "in the original sense" i.e. these are complex entities which we normally refer to as objects. These are not objects in the Tractarian sense. This notebook entry was written while Witt was thinking through his ideas which would become the Tractatus. That he even goes through the trouble of pointing out that he is using the word objects here "in the original sense" shows he's already thinking about a stipulative usage of the word that's different than the every day sense.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.
— Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality. — Sam26

I agree with Sam..."Plato" is not a simple object. Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. Things such as his mortality, his being a man, his being a philosopher, his being bipedal, etc. A simple object can only be named, not analyzed further. Wittgenstein might say it has no "parts" to which we can take it to pieces, so to speak. Yet, Plato can be taken to many pieces, as illustrated.

But Tractarian objects are not physical:

... only by the configuration of objects that they [physical objects] are produced.
(2.0231)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.
(2.027) — Fooloso4

You quote 2.0231, but let's look at the entire quote:

"The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions first formed by the configuration of the objects" (2.0231).

Wittgenstein says that "material properties" are determined by "the configuration of objects". This neither implies that:

1. objects are not physical
nor that
2. the configuration of objects makes something physical.

Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. But, notice that Witt is talking about 1. propositions and 2. objects; each of these corresponds to a different aspect of the isomorphism. One, at the level of language and two at the level of reality.

Thoughts>Concepts>Simple concepts
Propositions>Expressions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts>objects — 013zen

Witt is saying that a material property, such as a particular ball being red is expressed at the level of the proposition "The ball is red". To this proposition corresponds a definite arrangement of objects in the physical world which determines that the ball is red. If the arrangement of objects were different, the ball could very well be a different color, more or less firm, or perhaps not a ball at all.

We cannot say what the objects of the world are. From the Notebooks:

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one.
(21.6.15) — Fooloso4

Correct. This is why I said originally that your post was correct, but I didn't believe it was exhaustive of Witt's view. Witt arrives at the necessity of objects through a logical analysis. He is a philosopher not a scientist. Recall Witt says:

"...there must be objects and atomic facts" (4.2211).

This is because:

"Objects form the substance of the world" (2.021).

and

"If the world had no substance...It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false) (2.0211-2.0212) .


---Edit---

I accidentally submitted the post before I was finished. I'll leave it at that for further discussion, but the end may not be so clear due to me having originally intended to say more lol

The passage you quoted:...might seem to support that there are, independent of us, simple objects that combine to make the physical world. I have sometimes read it that way, but I think that is wrong. One problem is that if such objects are non-material, then how do non-material objects combine to make material objects? — Fooloso4

I'm sorry, I don't entirely follow. To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality.


Thoughts>Concepts>Simple concepts
Propositions>Expressions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts>objects

"We make for ourselves pictures of facts. The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and on-existence of atomic facts" (2.1-2.1).

"The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space" (2.202 ).

"The logical picture of the facts is the thought" (3).

"The picture is a model of reality" (2.12).

"Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol). (The proposition itself is an expression.) Expressions are everything essential for the sense of the
proposition that propositions can have in common with one another. An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31).

To an object corresponds a name, to which corresponds a simple concept which is indefinable or analyzable. These build up to form complex concepts, "classical objects" which are characterized by a "form and content" and are what different propositions have in common. For example, when I used the example "The ball is red" earlier, "ball" is simply the general form and content of particular objects which can have wildly different properties. It's only in the coupling of concepts in thoughts and propositions that objects are vested with properties "The ball IS red", and these map to possible states of affairs.

I could be wrong about this however. But, I don't see the issue that you're referring to.

If the ball is an arrangement of objects then it is composite. — Fooloso4

It is composite. The ball is not a wittgensteinian object. It is made up of Wittgensteinian objects.

That's what I said.

"solid", "hollow" "spherical" — 013zen

are objects.

Wittgenstein's simples are not Democrates' atoms. Further division is superfluous because it would not make better sense of the proposition. — Fooloso4

While I believe that a lot of what you said is true, I don't believe that its exhaustive of Witt's view in the Tractatus. In a sense, an object is both logical and physical.

You're right, Wittgenstein's endeavor is a logical one, not a scientific one, but Witt holds:

1. Logic tells us there must be logically simple objects
2. To these objects corresponds a definite atomic fact.
3. To each atomic fact corresponds a definite state of affairs

"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211)

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality" (2.06).

I think Witts thoughts are more like this:

Consider the fact: "The ball is red". This fact can itself be analyzed into atomic facts, these facts would be about 1. the ball and 2. the color red. An atomic fact is a definite arrangement of objects.

"The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact" (2.0272).
"In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way" (2.031).

What does this mean? Well, what is a ball?

Just a quick google says: " a solid or hollow spherical or egg-shaped object"

okay, well what is "solid", "hollow" "spherical"?

Trying to define these words simply results in synonyms. This is because in some sense, these concepts are simple. We learn them not by definition, but ostensively. "Red" is the same, not something that can be taken to pieces by a definition so to speak. You either know what it is or you don't. These are objects. So, "The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. Logically its sphericalness that has either firmness or hollowedness. To this corresponds a definite complex in space - a ball - which depending on whether it is solid or hollow exists a certain resistance to pressures in a sphere form which obviously corresponds to a definite arrangement of atoms.

I think this way you get both the logical aspect of Witt's thought with the indefinable aspect of logically simple objects as well as their tie to reality.

Truthfully, though, I am still wrestling with this so I could be wrong.

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color. — Sam26

This is a good write up, and I think you're on to something. I think that Witt's concept of object is heavily influenced by Russell, and Russell was heavily influenced by Mach.

Russell's position during the early 1900s was neutral monism which stems from the work of Ernst Mach. The neutral monism of Mach postulated reality as being composed of elements; these elements were: colors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, etc.

“As to the sum of my physical findings, these I can analyse into what are at present unanalysable elements: colors, sounds, pressures, temperatures, smells, spaces, times, and so on. These elements depend both of external and internal circumstances; when the latter are involved, and only then, we may call these elements sensations…” (KE, 7).

These elements built up into ‘complexes’ or ‘bodies’ and those complexes which are “relatively more fixed and permanent...engrave [themselves] in memory, and express [themselves] in language” (AS).

I think that this is what Wittgenstein is going for.

"Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.0251).

Objects, give complexes their form, and their material properties. It would be senseless to say they themselves have the property, it is only in the instantiation within the complex that these properties are manifested. This is why Wittgenstein says: “The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties.

A fact, that “my car is black” is first presented in the proposition which pictures it, but that my car is black is dependent upon a certain arrangement of elements which give it the form of being both a car, and black.

If we define “stupidity” not as lack of intelligence but lack of judgement, one might justly say that Artificial Intelligence is intelligent but still stupid in its own way. I am referring here to the Kantian concept of “Urteilskraft”. According to this philosopher intellect (Verstand) is the power to create rules whereas judgement is quite a different faculty, enabling us to decide, whether a specific rule applies to a single instance.

Rules are always common to many different cases. To find out, if a singular case applies to a rule, judgement is necessary. There is no way to find this out by exerting another rule, as this results in an infinite regress. So my argument to support the provocative title of this discussion is: AI is indeed intelligent in that it is able to find patterns in huge amounts of data but there is no way AI could reach to judgements like we humans can.

Such discussion might sound academic, but it has impacts on the proper use and possible dangers associated with this technology. AI is still in the state of infancy right now, but it is nevertheless amazing what it is able to do. No doubt, it can be of invaluable help in finding medical diagnosis or related precedences in jurisdiction. But to leave decisions regarding therapy entirely to AI or replace judges and jurors by AI would be fatal.

The road to our house is quite steep, winding and narrow, but once in a while big trucks get stuck there because the drivers relied entirely on their navigation system instead of applying common sense as well. To put our faith solely on AI might get us into the same situation unless we properly exert judgement and check, if the outcome is plausible at all. — Pez

I think that you're on to something. From my limited understanding of Kant, and as you pointed out, the intellect or understanding provides concepts and when we judge something we are determining whether or not that particular falls under the concept. The concept itself, though, provides the rule for determining whether or not the particular is captured by the concept. I believe that ai can more or less do this now, as Lionino pointed out,... At least in theory, with the right systems and data.

But human understanding can also supply its own concepts in instances where one isn't supplied beforehand. And human reasoning can form judgements about judgements made by the intellect. If an ai could ever form its own concepts we could perhaps say that it understands those concepts. If it could form judgements based on its understanding of those concepts, then perhaps we could say the ai can reason. ai is clearly nowhere near this, but its foundation is there in principle.

While I don't believe that there is, as of yet, any AI capable of passing the Turing test, I see no reason why it isn't likely that one will be able to do so at some point in the future. But, if you think about it, the original Turing test may be set up wrong. What I mean, is that the tt really only measures an ai's ability to use language capably, and reason in a manner analogous to humans. By doing so, it convinces the human conducting the test that the ai is itself conscious. But, its primarily a grammatical test and only secondarily measures an ai's ability to "understand" what its saying by its ability to discern context. But discerning context is largely influenced by human nature.

Why suppose that a conscious ai ought to pass as a human in any meaningful way? Sure, if we equip it with the ability to truly discern and apply syntax and semantics of language it will encode outputs in that way, but why suppose its consciousness would resemble anything like our own. That it would express ideas similar to our own? What we choose to express, and why we choose to express it is wholly dependent upon our desires, and those desires are largely regulated by our physical state and inputs from our environments. An ai has no sensations mapped to physical states or from stimuli in its environment. So, if these play such a crucial role in determining what we express, why should we suppose a truly conscious ai to express anything resembling what a human might? Really, the tt should be humans using a model of their own consciousness to try and anticipate what a consciousness devoid of the same underlying influences and motivations as a human might "think".

I don't think that ai's at some point becoming conscious threatens our notion of free will either. We are preprogrammed with certain drives and yet we exercise a wide range of freedoms regarding how we choose to fulfill those drives. There are degrees to freedom, and we have a far greater degree than say a rock. Being "truly" free isn't what we want anyways as that's the same as randomness.

If an ai is capable of a wide range of options in how it chooses to operate and that operation is dependent upon an understanding of internal maps of its own state then i'd say in a meaningful way we could say its conscious, but I wonder what it would choose to express.

The whole point of a pzombie is that it behaves identically to a human, it simply doesn't have the inner experience to go along with it. So, the short answer to your question, I think would be yes, they'd still procreate since we do.

But, you've raised an interesting question...

Do we procreate simply due to our inner experiences? Emotions, urges, logistics, etc? Hmm, that's a hard one...

Well, we know a virus or even a simple single called organism procreates. What degree of inner experience do we assign to them? Certainly not emotions... maybe a prototypical kind of urge? I don't think it can even be called an urge at this point. Yet, they reproduced nonetheless.

It's physically possible for superman to murder and rob from those less fortunate than him (in the marvel world). It's even logically possible. But, insofar as such actions are inherently antithetical to supermans identity (any possible world in which superman does possess such traits, in a real way, he ceases to be equitable with superman in some sense). This is a poor example, but I hope you can take my point.

another type of tautology emerges, referred to as 'deep.' — javi2541997

In his notebooks, Wittgenstein referred to a song as "... A kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself".

This shows that Wittgenstein had a very particular understanding of tautologies. That there could be different kinds. In language and logic, tautologies may have no content, they don't "say" anything, rather they "show" it. They show how symbols an words are to be used (their internal structure), and they show they are complete without relying on any facts to determine them.

But, a beautiful song is itself complete in a way. When you listen to it, it shows itself to be beautiful without any recourse to the facts. I think this is why Wittgenstein compared logical propositions to those of ethical ones. The former is formed of tautologies as we typically refer to them, but Wittgenstein seemed to hold the latter was it's own kind of tautology. That something is important to us shows itself in how we view it, talk about it, regard it without recourse to any facts in the same way a tautology in language and logic does. This is why the happy man can see the same world in a different light than the unhappy man. Just how I can be moved to tears by a song, and regard it as perfectly constructed needing no improvement, while another finds it less than ideal. Ethics and aesthetics are one. And while senseless these are the deepest problems we know.

They use a complex vocabulary which seems to only be sent to their 'Vienna' group. They make premises and arguments which are interesting, but nonetheless are difficult to follow if someone - like me - is not used to logical language.

On the other hand, I don't consider Wittgenstein 'senseless' (I read this adjective about him a lot) but complex to follow. — javi2541997

It's difficult because there is a difference between "nonsense" and "senseless" in Wittgenstein.

Consider:

"Purple vocabulary is very car"

Vs

"A triangle is either a right triangle or not"

The first has no context in which it's meaningful. It's totally meaningless. The second is always true (tautology) and it's simply unclear when you'd utter it.

Wittgenstein calls his own work senseless because he is borrowing Frege's concept of "elucidations".

Frege determined that propositions can feature words which are in the wrong "logical position" but nonetheless aren't totally meaningless.

Consider:

The dog is black

And

The concept horse is a concept that's easily understood

The first example Frege says is an object "dog" connected with a concept "black". Object and concept therefore play different logical roles. An object cannot be used as a concept and a concept cannot be used as an object.

But, in the second example is seems we're using a concept as an object... "The concept horse". Frege says, in fact, "the concept horse" cannot logically be a concept, and must be being used in a different way logically than say:

"Tom understands the concept horse"

Language obfuscates the logical structure. Making it seem like a concept is being used as an object.

Frege thought you could only show this not say it. Just like I've tried to show using different examples. These kinds of examples are elucidations which show how a word is being used even if the proposition itself is incapable of exact analysis.

Frege thought elucidations were a way we could come to understand one another, but ultimately are to be discarded as incorrect.

Like how we explain electricity via water analogy.

Consider:

Watts = Amps x Volts

What's an Amp? What about a volt? A watt??

Well it's like water in a tube:

Amps is like the the rate at which the water flows through the tube

Volts is like the pressure of the water in the tube

Watts is like how much water is passed through the pipe over an hour.

Now, electricity isn't water. What I just said is properly speaking incorrect and not true, but it helps you understand the words "amp" "watt" "volt", and once you understand them you can discard with the elucidations I provided. They only serve the role of acquainting you with the words being used. Ultimately elucidations are to be discarded.

Hence the final lines of the tractatus.

What was the origin of Y, the so-called picture theory of prepositions? Wittgenstein's explanation of logical neccesity, which depends on Y, still to be given.

What does Y is about? To present truths in logical space? Or does David Pears refers to X and Y logical structure? — javi2541997

You've touched on a lot and I can't answer it all concisely especially not in regards to Pears, but I can talk a little about this point and see if it helps.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein gives a picture theory of language. But, picture theories were not original to Wittgenstein. During the late 1800 early 1900 there was serious debate in science and philosophy regarding what exactly we are up to when we develop a theory, and more importantly to what extent science can give us knowledge about the world.

Do our theories tell us anything about the world, or are they simply useful tools we invent that prove useful (pragmatic).

See, Hume stated we can only have understanding of the world by couching that knowledge on our experiences. I literally can't understand something that is totally unlike anything I've experienced before. The more something resembles past experience, the more I can understand it by developing a theory which explains it.

Consider this:

You have a bag with a random assortment of colored balls.

If I asked what color ball do you think you'll pick out next?

You wouldn't know.

You reach in and take a ball out one at a time, noting the color:

Red, red, red, blue, red, red, blue

Now, if I asked, what would you say?

Perhaps red? Maybe you say about 70% chance red 30% blue?

Hume said we can only describe reality, though and our theories merely call many facts under a single header (like Newton did with gravity). From Hume, Comte developed positivism, which basically said we scientific theories can only describe positive facts about the world, that is those based on experience alone. Any theories using "hidden forces" are to be discard.

This ultimately lead to Ostwald and Mach to deny the existence of Atoms because there was no experience proving their existence. Fictions like Atoms that make up reality might be useful on paper but they don't belong in science.

This lead thinkers like Boltzmann and Hertz to develop a different concept a theory. The picture theory which essentially states that theories are pictures we invent that are based on both experience and logic which are ultimately accepted or rejected based on how successful they are.

Logic determines their validity just as much as experience.

Ultimately these pictures are only one of many ways we can represent reality, as opposed to being constrained by experience.

This flexibility allowed Boltzmann to further develop and utilize the theory of Atoms for explaining the expansion of gasses. But, many scientists rejected the idea because they were positivists.

Wittgenstein develops his own picture theory, but starts from a positivist beginning which he got from Russell and Russell got from Mach. But then he shows how you can introduce logic and arrive at theories like Boltzmann and Hertz.

But, because of the beginning many early thinkers took Wittgenstein to be a positivist. Really he was a picture theory sympathizer. He believed like Boltzmann and Mach that our pictures can always change as more elements are added. And logic coupled with reality leads the way.



"I don't believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me."

-Wittgenstein


Sorry if this was unhelpful or not clear.

OK! Fair enough, I understand what David Pears is about on the very first pages of his book. I really appreciate your commitment to explaining both tautologies and David Pears' commentary. I probably will have some questions while continuing the reading. So, if you don't mind, I would like to share them with you.

Until then. Nice to meet you and welcome to TPF! :up: — javi2541997

I'm glad that I could help, even a little! But, for sure; let's think through it together. ☺️

agree, but Pears says:
so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

Maybe it is me, but I think that David Pears sees empty tautologies as a weak statement in an argument. — javi2541997

The proposition has no factual content, meaning it tells you nothing about the world or how it could exist. A fact describes a possible state of affairs.

"Material object" is a tautology insofar as an "object" is only ever material; the concept of material is contained within the concept "object" in the same way "mortal" is contained in the concept "human".

Pears is calling attention to the fact that Wittgenstein uses tautologies, which he himself refers to as "sense less" in that they lack "sense", which is a possible state of affairs. They should therefore say nothing, and yet Wittgenstein seems to take them to be saying something. This is a common issue in the tractatus. How to make sense of the fact that Wittgenstein uses statements which he himself takes as lacking sense.

Clear and good example. I am starting to understand the role of tautologies better. I can conclude that tautology can't help me to achieve the truth in a philosophical analysis and this is why it is rejected by logicians and critical thinkers, generally. By the way, thanks for commenting and helping me out with the understanding of tautologies. — javi2541997

Tautologies aren't so much "rejected", as they have their place. A statement is a tautology if it's always true. It tells you what's the case in every "possible world".

Consider:

"The ball is either red or not red"

But, a sound deductive argument is also a tautology.

Consider:

1) "All humans are mortal"
2) "Socrates is a human"
3) "Socrates is mortal"

tautologies — javi2541997

Hello folks, I have a question. What is an empty tautology? I am currently reading David Pears' book on Wittgenstein, and the author says: Given that a word has a certain meaning, philosophical analysis can tell us exactly what will necessarily be the case if a statement containing that word happens to be true. Here the necessity will be tautological, or at least definitional, so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

I would appreciate it if someone could explain to me what David Pears means in that paragraph.

In addition, Pears says: The difficult thing is to understand the status of Wittgenstein's conclusion, and the argument which was supposed to establish it. The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies.

Why does David see empty tautologies as a problem in an argument? — javi2541997

A proposition is a statement about the world; it tells you how things are or could be. They have content that describes a possible state of affairs.

Consider:

"It is raining"
"This filament has conductive properties"
"The car is black"

A tautology, however, has no content because it doesn't tell you anything about the world.

Consider:

"It's either raining or it's not raining"

Etc

This is empty of content, as it tells you nothing about the world.

My view is that determinism must be true.

At the most basic level, things happen because they are caused by other things.

If you roll a pair of dice, the result is not random, but determined by the laws of physics. If you knew all relevant information (e.g. force of throw, distance of throw, angle of throw, nature of surface, etc.), you could figure out what the result would be.

Take that simple example and apply it to everything. The fact is that you couldn't have all the information to determine what could happen, for example, with human behaviour. But hypothetically if you did, then you would be able to predict it with ease.

How different are we from ants, really? Ants are just less complex. How different are ants from dice? Think about it.

Free will must be an illusion. You only do things because something in your brain told you to. If you understood all the chemistry and physics behind the operation of your brain, you would be able to see why you do things.

Ultimately, the free will vs. determinism debate is useless and probably harmful. If you believe in determinism, people become depressed and feel hopeless because they view themselves as prisoners. From a practical standpoint that isn't a useful way to live a life.

If you believe in determinism, people will ask what happens of criminals who commit atrocious crimes. Well, that is still determined. Should they bear the blame though? Absolutely - because otherwise civilisation would not work.

But putting aside morality, etc. -- if you think about this question on the most fundamental cause/effect level, it is undeniable to me that determinism simply MUSt be true. What exactly is truly random? Events in the universe only occur as a result of the operation of physical laws.

Boltzmann once wrote in his preparatory notes to a series of lecture hes gave at Cambridge regarding a topic that was considered by many scientists to be nonsense – the existence of atoms – that:

“It’s easy to go to atoms from representations, but it is hard to go from appearances to atoms.”

The problem, Boltzmann contends is that we have to somehow “...choose the most suitable expression” despite “...want[ing] to define things which cannot be defined”. Because of this, Boltzmann claims that “...it is not merely accidental if one should despair about how to explain nature and spirit”, we are simply – as Wittgenstein would say – running up against the walls of language.

Why do I mention this segment from Boltzmann? Because, he recognized that, in some sense, we are forced to use certain expressions to picture reality, yet at the end of the day, these are simply words we’ve created, and we are really just picking the best expression. If I set up a dichotomy between “free” and “determined”, and ask “which should I apply to myself?”, I’ve in some sense created the problem. Is “free” vs “determined” a meaningful way to set up the problem? Especially if I am inclined to disavow the very possibility of anything in the entire universe as being “free”? What then is the meaning of the expression? Clearly, there are “degrees of freedom” since we never truly encounter anything which I can contend is “truly free”, yet I can meaningfully delineate between those things which have some degree of freedom and those which have none. So, “freedom” is not an absolute term, but a relative term – something is more or less free than something else. Using your manner of speaking, we might say something is more or less “predictable” such that some things are fundamentally unpredictable despite being determined, and some are.

My point, is that this whole debate is really a tangle of words. We invent the expression and then apply it, and then are confused by the application – asking, at what point does this break down? Clearly, I am more free than a rock, or an ant, and this has meaning that we all agree to. But, when we ask, “well, are we ‘trulyyyyy’ free???” We are just caught in the illusion of our words, thinking they mean more than their application.