Thus to say that causality occurs between physical objects does not seem to prove that causality is physical, unless by "is physical" we only mean, "occurring between two physical objects." — Leontiskos
I think this is entirely wrong. We're looking at something observable, not abstract. We need to look at what actually happens in the world. Causation happens between physical objects, in a physical world with no evidence of any non-physical attribute involved. Philosophers don't seem to even think this is a coherent claim of a possible reality. I again want to bring in Jaegwon Kim and his pretty tireless arguments around trying to ascertain a non-physical mode of causation and landing on Supervenience of something undescribed as the only way out of hte physicalist corner. I tend to think no one has gotten further. I can't understand how you're getting yourself off hte ground, yet, though I find all of the discussions interesting. What we have to 'fall back on' as it were, is not something that points to causality being non-physical. And we don't seem to have much better than a fall-back. I do not know of any example of non-physical causation (mental causation is likely physical, reducible).
If there is no reason to claim that causality is physical, and there is no reason to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer, then why not simply abstain from affirming either of those things? — Leontiskos
I disagree with the former, so maybe we are on different pages here. I've not
affirmed either, though. There is reason for the first claim, and no reason for the second, both of which support the first. That's as far as I'll go.
Note though that if you think energy transfer is the transfer of physical matter, then it seems that you do think energy is a physical object, even though you said, "Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is." This is a large part of the difficulty. — Leontiskos
Its not difficult. I had assumed this would be intuitive.
"energy" is a description of effects gained by the interactions of bits of matter. That "energy" is not an object, or a "thing" at all. But it
obtains in the transfer described (i mean, it could be that "charge" is what transfers as, in that way, if its not the particles themselves, we may have more to discuss and might be hte page you're on).
The concept of "capacity to do work" (energy) is not physical matter, and yet you think the transfer of energy is the transfer of physical matter. — Leontiskos
The above should sort this out. The capacity to do work is exactly represented by hte physical attributes of the matter in question.
It is a Cambridge property. — Leontiskos
Very hard disagree, which should but paid to that part of the discussion. Something's position in space and time are properties of it. An apple has to be an apple at a certain time, in a certain place. It cannot simply be 'an apple'. That doesn't exist, anywhere. If you take away the spatio-temporal description of a physical object, you lose the ability to claim it as extant (on our current knowledge). This doesn't seem at all unusual or controversial to me.
Does the physicist see the "spacetime fabric" as physical? In what sense is it said to be physical? We can surely stretch the word "physical" far beyond what we ever generally mean by it, but I am not much interested in that approach. — Leontiskos
This is interesting. I think, yes, they do. I think intuitively, most would. I cannot understand the underlying strata of the universe not being physical. We are in a physical universe. If you're going to posit otherwise, You need to explain how to get from that, to this physical universe. No one can do that. So it doesn't make any sense to me to go down that route (at this time) despite it being interesting, to some degree or another. We don't live in a non-physical universe. Its actually hard to even point to a non-physical
thing in it (Though, i understand a few good candidates about). I guess, on similar thinking to some of your replies, I'm not prepared to look at some physical force like gravity and entertain that it isn't physical, yet. We have zero avenue to explain try to explain that. The other option is weird and difficult, but i prefer that currently.
I still don't see that (4) follows. There is no sufficient reason to believe that the (causal) interaction is itself physical. — Leontiskos
There is no reason to think it isn't is my position(and good reason to think it is). It obtains within a physical system, between two physical objects
in a physical event with no indication anything else is involved. When you adjust any physical parameter, the result differs.
At the very least, this should be accepted as the best explanation we have. Speculation abound, for sure. But there's nothing here that makes me think its even reasonable to start looking for an non-physical answer (except perhaps impatience, which isn't the worst reason, tbf).
This form of reasoning does not seem to be valid. — Leontiskos
Because it isn't. I didn't mention material. I mentioned mode. Theres a gulf between the two "reasonings" you've put up, which are non invalid, but essentially tautological (or self-evident in some other way). The reasoning I gave speaks about
mode not content. If the lines in the previous paragraph I've written above about why we have no reason to think about non-physical causation occurring go through, then the content is irrelevant. Any event which can described on that term would adhere to that reasoning. I would want to say calling something "human" is hugely different to calling something "physical". Largely, because in your examples, everything reduces to the physical explanations underlying those words.
Causation is not ... physical — Leontiskos
But that begs the question. I can't quite wrangle something helpful out of this explicative section..
If we just assume that everything is physical, including causality, then we lead ourselves into absurdities. In this case it is the absurdity which makes interactions the same kind of thing as that which interacts. — Leontiskos
Evidenced by this (out of order, sorry) making no sense to me. We don't "assume". We investigate and find nothing but physical interaction surrounding all change we see in the physical world. We are given no material on which we can explore a non-physical basis (descriptively) of causation. We may not have good answers, but we certainly don't have any reason to move off the line currently. Again, it's interesting to entertain and may well at some stage become something we can adequately explore, but we have nothing on which we can do so currently but speculation.
but it is still improper to say that the collision is itself phenolic resin. — Leontiskos
I am unsure it is. But its not saying the same thing as calling hte collision physical. They are asking different things. The collision between two balls of phenolic resin is clearly phenolic resin (they are just in contact with each other - changing nothing about the material we're wanting to name). The
mode is different, as I see it and requires a different answer.
I think its possible you are just flat-out wrong about what physicists would say about a collision. I also don't think that has much to do with our discussion. Whether a physicist
says x y z doesn't quite change anything in the world. Unless you're a total Continental.
is a strange and ambiguous phrase. — Leontiskos
Not at all. You just picked up something wrong in it. It means to deducible entirely in physical terms, from physical activity, assessed in physical terms against other physical activity. If you want to say the deduction isn't physical (because mental) I put the conversation down, as that's a very different thing for another time imo. Fraught, and something I'm only really getting into currently (that is, why it seems mental causation is a misnomer.