Do you all in here come from the say school of sophists????? oh boy here we go again.
I can validate empirically the value of Objective Verification....don't play with words just to earn impressions!!!! — Nickolasgaspar

Don't play with capitalizations and exclamation marks to make a point.

You essentially argue in favor of Magic. Magically an idea about the value of empirical verification came in to our minds without empirical input !!! — Nickolasgaspar

Not at all, see my replies to Hillary. Of course we have empirical input, we are bodily creatures. I tried to google objective verification... did not yield much.

The reason why Objective Verification has become a principle...IS BECAUSE its value is validated EVERY SINGLE TIME by the epistemic value claims have when they are are Objectively and Empirically verified. — Nickolasgaspar

This sentence is gibberish, objectively verified.

If you observe children you will find out that they are prone to accidents and the smart ones use those accidents to correct the model of reality in their minds. This is the first empirical indications we get about the value of Objective Empirical Verification..obviously not all of us have realize that.
Systematized methods like Logic and Science just defined it and included it in their principles. — Nickolasgaspar

No they start learning behavior that woks, they do not necessarily form ' a correct model of reality' in there minds. A monkey that gets sprayed with cold water every time it touches a banana will stop touching the banana but not because it has formed an accurate picture of the world in its mind. God knows what the monkey thinks. Maybe it thinks bananas are wet.

-Intuition isn't magic, it doesn't come out from thin ai. Our intuition is shaped and "trained" by our previous empirical experiences about our world. Read Daniel Kahneman's book on intuition and other heuristics. He won A Nobel Prize for his founding. Don't try to do philosophy without being aware of our Scientific Epistemology. IT is always a recipe for Pseudo philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

I am aware of the use of capitalization...

And on and on it goes. Can I sumarize your contribution by the imperative "Read Kahneman"? If so it is duly noted.

Sure, science has axioms, but those typically do not come from mythical lore. There is also a difference in dogma from law and from the natural science. Dogma in law is the reiterated doctrine of the authors, based on conceptual analysis. Dogma in science depends on laws of nature, perceived patterns of behaviour. When scientific dogma stops being an accurate description it will be replaced.

And how did that work out? Just take a look around you to see... — Hillary

I see a computer desk with a small notebook, thin and light. Next of me is a cup of brown liquid drawn from beans that originated somewhere in Africa or south America. I am communicating with someone possibly many miles away (or possibly my next door neighbour, since you understand Dutch and has a stint at the VU so I cannot be sure). I see a prosperity the world has not witnessed before and an abundance of what life has to offer... I know my generation will, if we are not wiped of this earth, live to become 80 years old... I know there are bad things too, but undeniably human life became a lot easier and pleasant with the scientific method.

No, of course it's not arbitrary. But why is scientific culture better than other cultures (of which many have been wiped away from the face of the world by science and western religion)? — Hillary

It is not necessarily better in any normative sense. Wiping out other cultures is a great atrocity. However now this is realized in any case in many parts of the world it is accepted as international law.

Every culture has a proven track record of obtaining results. — Hillary

Yes,, but those were generally less effective. One of my favourites, the Ottoman Empire had science and advance up to a par or better then Western Europe. However, Ottoman science stayed rooted in religious mysticism. Eventually its bureaucracy (great though it was in the 16th century) and milityary (equally great) could not keep up and were outpaced. Science based on mysticism simply did not get things done as effectively as the turn to empiricism in the 17th century did.

What I mean is that what we learn at school or universities is science. Math, physics, economy, chemistry, biology, etc. By law you have to go to school and learn about it. I don't care to learn, I was fascinated by physics and even voluntarily studied it at the VU (which you probably know). But why shouldn't, for example, astrology be learned by law? What's inherently better about science?

By law I mean that it's written in the law to go to school from young age already and learn about science. — Hillary

Of course I know the VU, been there lots of times. The reason why we teach chemmistry, physics, math etc and not astrology is cultural, but not arbitrary. It is cultural because in th Middle Ages one didd study astronomy (perhaps not astrology) but many forerunners of the scientific method were astrologers, such as John Dee. So it depends on the cultural one grows up in. It is not arbitrary though. Currently we are very interested in what works and less in written dogma. Therefore we teach the kids stuff that has a proven track record of obtaining results. things tht more accurately predic the behaviour of the natural and social world than astrology doesn. In regard to the natural world, physics an chemistry obtain more accurate results. The social world is more problematic, but also there sociology and psychology tend to offer more in terms of results than voodoo or the Kabbalah.

I refer on the method we recognize the value of Verification as a principle...or any other principle. — Nickolasgaspar

Circularity. You cannot empirically verify the value of empirical verification... One has to have had the idea that that is a pausible way to go beforehand. We also have that idea. Intuitively empirical verification makes sense. We have such notions pre-scientifically, practically.

((1) the law of contradiction, (2) the law of excluded middle (or third), and (3) the principle of identity.) — Nickolasgaspar

We cannot verify them emprically, they are a-priori truths. We can for instance not devise a test to falsify these axioms. Let's try to find a door that can be open and closed at the same time...

- I think Daniel will be very sad hearing about your disapproval(or was your disapproval aiming my capital O?) .(Either way I will make this joke) I hope he finds some consolation and comfort by cashing the check he received along with the Nobel Prize we won while studying human heuristics....(.no offense). — Nickolasgaspar

I have nothing but respect for professor Kahneman. His book 'thinking fast and slow' was the text book from which we taught (my institution, not me) first tear students the introductory course on psychology. It is just that it seems so eminently quotable. Someone says something and drops the name Kahneman. Especially those that dabble in psychology from other disciplines. That might not include you, but just an explanation for my reaction. It is like someone on this forum citing Bertrand Russel. Nothing but respect, but it seems the first go to source or something. An yes, the capital O exacerbated the the situation ;) I am sure though you are knowledgable so nothing bad meant there.

-Why didn't you include my first sentence? "Imagination and fantasy can only help us to come up with out of the box hypotheses and make connections that our trained minds can't make."
You cherry picking a part of my reply allowing you to argue "against" something that we are in agreement ...lol — Nickolasgaspar

We might well be in agreement. It happens often on the forum. However your 'only' seems to imply it is a secondary category, something only applicable when we think 'out of the box'. I hold that also in the box (the average everyday paradogm) we need imagination cobbling together insights from literature arguments that stand the test of logic plausibility and possiblly but by no means always, empirical data. So while we may well agree, there is a difference of nuance.

No , you need empirical verification to identify the correct criteria and principles. — Nickolasgaspar

verification can only occur when there is something to verify... so verification comes after hypothesisation.

(Defuse thinking or Fast thinking (Daniel Kahneman).
At the end of the day we will need to Objectively evaluate every thought we make so imagination and fantasy are not necessary or sufficient or credible ways for the progress of our epistemology and philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

Ahh Kahneman... Objectively with a capital O... It does not impress me much. Of course imagination and fantasy are not credible. No one will state that her hypothesis is a product of pure imagination. It also is not. Hypotheses are the product of informed imagination, the knowledge of current debate, the knowledge of the literature and knowledge of current empirical findings. However, they are organized and considered in a certain way. One cannot do that without imagination, the forward looking assessment of states of the world.

The old god is the one in power before the enlightenment. The new god is the impersonal, so-called absolute, objective god of scientific thinking. Just look at all the tasks to be completed, the problems to be "solved" in the learning books, especially the math or "exact" ones. Which is all nice, I love them! But why, for example, should astrology not be learned by law? — Hillary

What do you mean by learning astrology 'by law'? Should apply a legal perspective to astrology, or an astrological perspective to law? I really do not understand, it is not meant sarcastically or anything.

Evidence-based is the only way to progress. Fantasy is only for entertainment. — universeness

Ohh come on now... we need fantasy and imagination to establish our criteria for evidence... they are themselves not evidence based you see... ;)

It caught my eye when reading through a short discussion about the morality of bearing a child and it threw me off because my initial reaction was to question how it could even be possible to make such an argument. — ratgambling

It is not possible to state this argument because it is impossile to value non existence.

@Hillary who is this new God you talk of and what slaves do I drive? Which system benefits from me? Why would you deny to teach math? Who is the old God?

Whether God exists... I had a lovely altercation with a student from the Christian students association just the other day. He came up to me because I was clad in black I suppose. He stated he was performing an inquiry and wanted to know what I thought about reality and if I had any questions. I had lots of questions you see... His companion pulled him away after some 30 minutes and gave me a death stare.

That seemed to be Isaac's problem, too. In his case it has to do with the notion of modelling used in neuroscience. And @Tobias is caught in a form of conceptual relativism perhaps resulting from a diet of legal mumbo. — Banno

I do not think I am a conceptual relativist. Some concepts work better than others. There might be better arguments for some distinctions than for others. I do think that the dstinction between brute facts an institutional facts is not easy to maintain. Every fact depends on some form of institutionalization to be aaccepted as such. The distinctions we accept as meaningful depends on the way we interact with the world.

And I could ask: am I ruled by some stupid rule if law allowing incasso to raise my debt by almost 1000 euro? — Hillary

Yes of course you could. The fact that a law is applied and even upheld in court, does not mean it is a good law. So by all means, campaign against the rule, mobilize citizens, make sure it appears on the political agenda. However a court of law is not a political arena. Granted, it does become more and more of a political arena, but there are severe problems associated with that. I rather ddo not see the politicization of the courts.

True, I didn't reacted to repeated pressure of the insurance company. But suppose they said, 1000 euro extra, for doing nothing (except sending a woman to court). What then? — Hillary

Then you would not have to pay. However they will not do so because they will have to give their reasons for such a verdict and these reasons have to have their base in the law (including principles of law). If they do not, because legally it cannot be defended, we would have a constitutional crisis on our hands. People would legitmately ask: are we ruled by the chosen legislator, or by the supreme court? We have a legal principle in the Netherlands arguing for judiicial restraint because the judge does not have democratic legitimacy.

And who made the law? Mainly the possessing class. Als de rechter linkser was (of linker) had ze aan mijn kant kunnen komen staat! — Hillary

I would like to ask to ask you to write in English, though I applaud your comment of Dutch. You are mistaken though. Also a left wing judge would rule against you. She is a judge not a political activist. She might agree with you in terms of content, but the role of the judge is not to be a political activist and misuse her power to force through social change. That is simply not her role in the legal system. Even if she would have found for you, the juddgment would be overturned by a higher court and with reason because it would be against the law. There are extreme cases of course and sometimes a judge has to go contra-legem, but that is very rare and only in case of overt violation of other legal principles. That is not the case here as far as I can see.

And who made the law? Mainly the possessing class. — Hillary

I am not so sure Hilary. Most people in the Netherlands, including the least well off, voted for right wing political parties with a law and order agenda. I would not be against fines that are dependent on the income of the person fined. In some countries such a system exists. However, in NL we do not have it. There is also no movement for it, no one asking for it and like I said, most people vote right...

I had to pay 580 euro. Which I didn't in time. The incasso raised the amount to 1300. I took it to the judge because I didn't agree. But, nonewithstanding my financial situation, the law is such and such. That's the way the money system works. If you don't pay in time, you have to pay almost 1000 euro extra. Dus, de rechter is niet recht maar krom. Ze is een krommer, geen rechter. — Hillary

Just to translate your last line, which actually doesn't translate well in English, but you state the judge is crooked not straight. (Using a pun on the word straight in Dutch which in dutch also means judge). Why do you think that? You did not agree with the fine, because you had a rough financial situation. The judge found for the state because the law is the way it is... I do not see something crooked there. The judiciary does not have the power to say, 'ohh, no matter what the law is, I find such and such fair and therefore the outcome is such and such!' If that was possible the juddges would de facto rule the country. They do not. The legislature does. Content wise I might be on your side, the judge might also be, but that is the point of procedure I dealt with above. If such outcomes are considered unfair, the law should be changed. The judge does not have the power to do so as she lacks democratic legitimacy. Materially the outcome might feel wrong for you, but legally the outcome does not seem wrong per se. That does not imply law is built on custom, it means law is a binding, authoritative rule.

Yes, I can taste the sweet candy you offer here, but I have experienced a lot of times that the musings of de rechter are based on custom and pre-established norms of conduct. De rechter kan behoorlijk krom zijn! Ook al zegt zuj rechter te zijn dan recht (supposing you are Dutch). — Hillary

I am Dutch... but I do not understand what you mean. You man that somehow judges judge wrongly because of custom? Every practice of course has its 'habitus' as Bourdieu would put it. I do not see so much legal wrongheadedness. Usually, if there is a judicial error it depends on faulty fact finding, but not faulty legal deliberation.

They are different because we decide the difference merits the distinction. Ipso facto there is a difference for which we might make that distinction. — Banno

For me that whole question is so odd to comprehend. Ipso facto there will be a difference between the bread you eat in the morning and that I do, even if it would so happen that we eat the same kind of bread, Yet yours will have slightly different ingredients than mine, more sugar, more grain, baked harder or what have you. Still we would say, "hey, what a coincidence, we eat the same kind of bread". The reason is we do not notice any difference, which might, ipso facto still be there. That would mean all our distinctions are not dependent on the matter in re, but on our finding some sort of importance in articulating it. Whether the bread is really really different or the same is a question of metaphysics that I think is pointless.

We make the words fit the world, and we also make the world fit the words. We know what wood is by cutting, carving, burning and talking about, wood. We know what lead is by melting, folding, feeling, and talking about lead. We cannot melt, fold, or feel wood. — Banno

Indeed, but that is the problem here no? The distinctions come to the fore in our practices. They are therefore institutionalized facts, not very different from say law. We also 'find law' by artculating it, drafting it, codifying it and applying it.

Well, I asked if modern day law is not based on habit and custom just as well. You replied it's based on case law, codyfied law, treatise, and legal principles. So law is based on codified law? Isn't that circular? — Hillary

No, because the word law in English is used in a dual connotation. It denotes the whole body of law, the legal institution, but it also denotes a certain codified piece of text, a certain law. In Dutch and German the distinction is much clearer. They make a difference between 'Gesetz' (Gr) or 'wet' (NL) and 'Recht' (NL GR), the latter denotes the legal institution, the former a particular written text with binding legal force.

Texts issued according to the proper legal procedures count as a source of law because they creates binding rights and duties an aspire to legitimacy, that is, they are meant for legal professionals and the populace to adhere to, often under threat of some penalty.

I think what you mean is whether ultimately the sources of law depend on custom and habit. I would say partly. They also depend on power. Not all law is an articulation of a prior habit. Some laws (texts) also mandate a certain behaviour to create such a habit. For instance the obligation to wear seat belts, or to drive on the right hand or left hand lane.

So the law accepts objective measures of moral, independent of human interest? — Hillary

que?

I see an ambiguity here that seems odd. On the one hand you have that there is no point in distinguishing institutional from non-institutional facts; on the other that "Wood is just easier to lift!".

This should be a very minor point, on that we can agree. Yes, "...we decided it was useful to distinguish between the two materials on some ground", but e can only do this because they are different. — Banno

They are different only because we decided that this difference merrited a distinction. Every material is different. My porcelain cup is different from your porcelain cup. The material will be different. However, we decided the difference was too small to distinguish between these materials altogether. Apparently we did find it useful to distinguish between some material we named lead and another we named wood. My guess would be we did so because we eperienced a difference in weight.

Perhaps it will be clear if I say that that difference is marked by, but not found in, those materials. That we can make the distinction shows that the distinction is there to be made — Banno

How can it be 'marked by, but not found in' materials? It must be a distinction useful to us to make. A being of infinite strength would not need to distinguish between the wood or the lead.

Or here: Someone who insists that lead is less dense than wood is mistaken, either in their perception of the world or in their use of words. — Banno

Certainly. However the proposition only makes sense when the distinction between wood and lead is already accepted. Let's say there is a a society in which the distinction between lead and wood is not made. Actually no distinction is made within matter at all. It is all just named 'matter'. Then the result is a meaningles statement: "matter is less dense than matter".

I guess I am not a realist, Well, perhaps only in streelight's sense that I thin the world could not care less about any istinction we make in it.

3) There are those obligatory games such as society where the person need make no promise to follow the rules are they are obliged to follow the rules and are committed to what they ought to do.

Unfortunately, I have to leave this game of philosophy, as we are about to get underway for Las Vegas to play a different kind of game — RussellA

Good luck and have fun in Vegas. Tell me, where do you see the problem? That you are not asked for consent to the rules or have been asked to promis to follow the rules? Do you think you are that important that, for the rules to apply, you have to give permission? You are not. You either play by the rules or you do not. If you do not, eventually, society will remove you from the game. In modern times it means they will lock you up. The funny thing is that people think they have made some agreement with society. They have not. They are simply thrown in.

Is there in the modern day? Isn't the source of law not still based on custom and habit? Good habits, bad custom? Be it custom of conduct and behavior, or habit of thought? — Hillary

No. It is also based on case law, codified law, treaties and some say legal principles, but that is debated. I know you mean something deeper with your question, but that to me, as the lawyer I am now in this discussion, is meaningles. the source thesis is also a technical aspect of and within law.

I think this the wrong way around, but the point is moot. — Banno

It is legal technical, my apologies, I ran a little roughshot: I meant to say " custom is a source of law". In the early days there was little else.

It may be that what must be added to the conversation are those status functions that we needs must accept in order that our conversation also acts upon the world and the body politic. So some parts of the conversation count as actions and implementations as we do things with words. — Banno

Yes and the question becomes who gets to do what with words. Austin's speech acts. When a witness takes an oath he she is by her speech act under obligation to tell the truth. When a legal professional such as a judge swears in a witness special criminal rules start to apply. Not everyone can do so though and not under all circumstances. who can do so and under what conditions depends on procedure. Shared intentionality is one thing, Yes we want there to be such procedures and they developed in the contunuous dialectic of rule creation and rule contestation. This is essentially what law is, a case by case redefinition of rules which get refined and systematised, sometimes end up codified over time.

It shows shared intentionality, but to a lawyer it shows more. It shows the performative and enabling nature of conflict. Every judication brings about new rules that allows us to calibrate our expecations of loving together better. Ontologically, it also shows we are rule following creatures. We perceive regularities and impose them on our world, the way we see them imposed by nature. We like regularity.

The point is that what you - and Searle - would like to restrict to a class of facts holds for all facts, in fact all language use, and that the distinction between 'intuitional' and 'non-institutional' is arbitrary and unrigorous. — StreetlightX

In social cnstructivism this is known as the debate between radical and moderate social constructivism. To me the latter seems incoherent, because what is considered ' non institutional' is itself a product of social construction. Especially in the English tradition there have been distinctions between primary and secondary qualities between essential and non essential properties etc and now between institutional and non institutional facts of which I do not see the point. There might be good arguments for making the distinctions that we make, such as between wood and lead, but those ddistinctions rests on them being commonly accepted. In the end the inspiration for the distinction will probably be bodily. Wood is just easier for us to lift. Chess pieces made of lead weigh a ton. So we decided it was useful ot distinguish between the two materials on some ground, lately their chemical make up I guess. That does not make them any less socially constructed though.

I am sure that Searle is correct when he says that the test of a social institution is whether it has deontic power in establishing duties and obligations on others. These deontic powers can only come from its own members, whether an elite minority or a heterogeneous majority. One further question to ask is how does one set of members gain deontic power over others of differing opinions. A further question is once having gained such deontic powers, how do they keep them.

Duty and obligation may be admirable, but surely not at the expense of the tyranny of a small elite or a heterogeneous majority.

If the other person is using the same words as I do, but defining them in different ways, I may be mistaken in thinking that they have made me a promise, and should not be surprised if they break what I think are their obligations. — RussellA

This takes us to the philosophy of politics and law. I must say, the more I delve into law, the ore I admire the simplicity of it, but also the deep understanding that goes into that apparent simplicity. The question ou asked is answered by the power of procedure. The base of deontic power is simply social convention and these social conventions arise out of the fact we can make things clear to each other using language. Through this possibility, we have devised a game in which bishops move diagonally, we call it chess. Does that mean chess cannot be played any other way? Sure it can. The rules of the game have changed over time. People have brought proposals to change the rules to the table, some have been adopted some have not. Usually through a change in customs. Custom is a form of law. People use a certain rule and feel that the rule in fact should be used and take issue with people who do not. Later on, when customs became codified and systematized and/or when egal professionals started to adhere to the judgments of their predescessors and this adherence became a rule in and of itself, law arose.

I mention legal professionals, because not all proposals to change rules have equal weiight and not all votes to change or not change have equal weight. In society a class of people started to emerge which had more knowledge of rules and also knew which rules were in place in earlier times. Some people were very skilled at arguing for the good or bad of certain rules. These were 'wisemen' and ' wisewomen', shamans or priests. They shared this knowledge among themselves. With professionalisation the lawyer entered the fray. They have an overview of the rules in place and therefore they are better equiped at arguing whether a rule change makes sense. Their sanctioning of a certain rule carries weight. So indeed often we are ruled by other people and our actions are sanctioned, in the end by a class of people chosen to do so, those are now known as judges.

Is that bad? Are we ruled by an elite of judges? Not really, because we have devised systems of checks and balances, further procedures, i.e. bodies of rules. They govern how one becomes a judge and what powers they have. Those rules also cover legislators, administrators, bayliffs to uphold judgments and so on. As long as procedures are in place and as long as these procedures are considered legitimate, there is no problem. You do not have to worry about the rules of the game of chess yourself. It has been codified for you. If your adversay moves the bishop in a wrong way you just tell her so. And you would be right to be annoyed. Had she bothered to look it up, she would have known. Of course, she mmay propose a rule change, but she should follow the designated procedures to make such a proposal. The whole paradox of the rule has something of Zeno's paradox for me. It is all nice in theory, but practice has found a way to easiluy refute the theory.

From this perspective, cultivating the right disposition is what defines "just". It's not a matter of telling a person you must do this, or you cannot do that, it's just a matter of letting the person know that everyone is free to do whatever anyone wants to do, so long as everyone chooses wisely. So cultivation is geared toward directing the person as to how to consistently make wise decisions in such matters. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree, but the problem lies with the 'choosing wisely'. Not everyone will do so and with what methods and means may the state create a role for you. That was the idea of Plato's republic and of the Greek ieal of justice in general. So justice cannot be prescribing everyone their role, but also not leaving everyone free to choose without guidance. So justice contains some guarantee of education geared towards civic duty in your view? It must on the other hand also create some exit option, there should be a choice, wise or unwise, otherwise we have no real choice. I think this is meant by modern notions of autonony.

But your approach is apophatic. This leads you to foundational things. Do no harm is THE defeasible default principle. It is arrived at, not in the complexities that stir the pot of ethical issues; there is nothing apophatic about this. After all of the "not this, nor that's" of apophatic reduction, do no harm is simply what is left. 'Harm" is exceedingly general, but it covers all possibilities for what justice COULD BE about. No harm in the balance, then no issue of a justice nature. — Constance

The harm principle is an important principle, but there are a number of problems with it. First it is overdetermined. If every harm done was unjust, then self defense would be unjust. However, in many legal systems (All I now of in fact) self defense serves as a justification, not only as an excuse. So some harm must be just.

Then again, it is also underdetermined, because sometimes one's action (or inaction) might not directly cause harm, but are still considered unjust. You do no harm when you do not save a drowning child because her drowning is not caused by you, but we might hold you acountable for not aiding nonetheless. This is more controversial, but I think it is relatively uncontroversial to think that when you can prevevent big damage by sacrificing very little one ought to do so.

You might well end up with the harm principle as an important principle after you complete your via negativa, but it is not the bedrock of justice, unless you define it so broadly that it totally covers justice. (envery injustice is harm and every harm is injuctice, that renders the principle meaningless).

These are absolutes. One does not argue about love being good. It always, already is. This means that it survives apophatic inquiry, the kind of weeding out what isn't necessary, or is merely accidental. Love cannot be bad. It is as impossible as a logical contradiction. — Constance

I like the inclusion of love, that draws us to the analogy of love and law. So, is there something loving about law? I think there is, but that is difficult to articulate. Staying on the path of the negative, law is not love, but is it then a kind of love, what relationship may there be between the two?

So we need not resort to silence, but might instead engage in a conversation, while keeping in mind the answer to Tolstoy's three questions. — Banno

Your post rearticulates what I am after very well. Thanks for that. So, justice has something to do with conversation... Perhaps it has to do with openness. Indeed justice is the 'right to challenge' perhaps. With that I mean there should always be an opportunity to explain one's actions. Justice is not a conversation, otherwise we would at an impasse though, we just scream yes and no to each other. But indeed it might have a conversational element. What could it be and how could we find out?

Perhaps. But it should be considered that in respect of both theology and metaphysics, there is (ostensibly at least) an over-arching framework - that of classical and traditional theology and metaphysics. And that in turn embodies further principles such as 'natural law' theory. But from the perspective of today's culture much of that framework is regarded as reactionary or at best archaic. So the question arises, could there be such a conception as natural law set against the backdrop of the supposedly mechanistic picture of the universe that secular culture envisages? — Wayfarer

In law we have frameworks as well. However, many articultate positve frameworks in the sense of rights. Currently we see this discourse crop up everywhere, rights of future generations, rights for natural entitities and so on. These rights are heavily dependent on natural law theory actuially. I am not convinced. I hold rights to be ontologically a leap of faith, practically dependent on a legal order that upholds your rights anyway and ethically an inherently agonistic conception of the relations between people. My 'via negativa' idea stems from dissatisfaction with the framework of (fundamental) rights that is currently so ubiquitously employed.

I actually think we are moving in the opposite direction to what you suggest. It's much more productive to cultivate a good disposition and attitude in a person, and encourage one to behave virtuously, then to try and name, and outlaw, all the things which are apprehended as bad. This is because the person who is inclined to do bad things will continue to find more, no matter how many things you name and outlaw, while culturing one toward a good disposition only requires a general idea of what constitutes a good attitude, and the will to cultivate this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, I am also not arguing for more thorough criminalization. However, is cultivating the right disposition just? It might be, but are we not crowding out a virtue that we like to cultivate, namely autonomy? I agree that this may well be a way forward and is a fundamentally different approach from a rights based approach, but leads to further questions of justice, who does the cultivating, to what end and is there or should there be a way for the individual to escape cultivation or at least object to it?

This is interesting. I've seen similar reductionist approaches to describing "truth" in Zen Buddhism. Even among Western world figures such as Eckhart Tolle and Alan Watts. I would enjoy reading more of your writings. Thank you for bringing this perspective to my attention. — Bret Bernhoft

Thank you, I will look into the names you mentioned. I only heard about Eckhart Tolle...

Suppose I love murder?

Not trying to be difficult here, but the idea that there is universal agreement on what is good (or not good as the OP suggests) and we just need to talk it out to see what it is so we can arrive at this naturally understood goodness necessarily assumes Attila the Hun and Adolph Hitler don't get a seat at the brainstorm session. On what basis do we exclude them?

That is to say, I have no doubt we, educated Westerners positioned in 2022 could all find some common ground regarding the ethics du jour, but that's as far as we'd get. The question would remain how we'd have confidence that our justice is true justice, and more meta-ethically whether speaking of True justice makes sense. — Hanover

Well, I am not suggesting a good conversation will solve it all, I am suggesting a roundabout way of doing legal theory or ethics. I think there is a lot of light between "Atilla the Hun and Adolf Hitler do not get a seat at the table" and "(only) educated westerners can find common ground". I doubt both. Even Hitler thought his crimes needed justification, so he recognized them not being clearly just. Moreover, I think we westerners will find that we actually share a lot of assumptions and intuitions with people from other cultures. It is not like we cross the border and suddenly people do not recognize the bonds of family anymore, or feel that every other day people above 40 years old should be subjected to heinously painful treatment. Sure customs differ and things we may hold to be unjust, others do not and vice versa, but usually the moral frameworks of others are recognizable as such. We debate moral question. Relativzing all ethical sensibility is I think impossible, it would make your judgment of your own acts or the acts of others arbitrary. I think in practice such arbitariness cannot be sustained.

"Regarding a rasha, a Hebrew term for the hopelessly wicked, the Talmud clearly states: mitzvah lisnoso—one is obligated to hate him." — Hanover

This indeed is interesting. So loving at least according to this tradition, is not always just. Hatred might be just, albeit under very rare conditions. So justice, we may say, is not universal love. Nor is it in the systems of criminal law I have knowledge of. This would be the way of the negative, articulating what it is not. However each candidate shows an aspect of justice nonetheless.

A reduction, then. It is there already, from Mill and before: do no harm. This is the principle you seek. Not so much apophatic, which is reductive to a vanishing point, like the eastern notion of neti neti, which leads to a vacuity where one finally discovers that it was language and the world of particulars that was obstructing insight. Apophatic inquiry leads to "silence". — Constance

No, that is not the principle I seek. Sometimes harm is needed for the greater good. Punishment, afterall, is harm. So, would you abolish all of criminal law? What about self harm? How far would you take harm? For instance drug addiction harms yourself but harms society as well, because of the costs of healthcare. When I am talking to a pretty girl or man, I might harm you because you wanted to talk to her / him instead. So no, unfortunately the harm principle sensible though it is, does not cut it.

Silence however... prhaps there is a deep insight here. The claims to justice might do more harm than good. So, perhaps, one of the first insights of the via negativa on justice is that one should not impose one's conception of justice on others...

The Via Negativa is associated with Orthodox spirituality and the negative theology of the Patristic tradition. The original point was based on the intuition that God was beyond all speech and description and could only be sought in silent contemplation - it is particularly associated with Orthodox monasticism. — Wayfarer

Maybe 'justice' is beyond all speech and description, positive justice that is. We never know what 'the rght thing to do' is, because we never know the consequences of our actions in the long term and we can never know the intentions by which an action is undertaken, not even our own. Therefore, one might approach the issue of justice differently, by asking what to avoid.
Understanding justice may be well beyond the realm of human understanding, but injustice might not be. Through understanding what we consider unjust, we may come to reflect on ethical and legal intuitions better than by trying to figure out "what the right thing to do" is, paraphrasing Michael Sandel's book title. I see here an analogy with coming to an understanding of God (theorlogy) or reality (metaphysics).

Great atrocities have been and continue to be committed with moral justifications being offered. — Hanover

No, people tend to respect the corpses of the respected, but the disrespected are often unceremoniously thrown into mass graves. — Hanover

The first comment I do not really understand. Sure, moral justifications are offered for crimes, but what does it hve to do with the topic at hand. The second is true, but it is a bit of an aside. Firtstly I do think it is always considered unjust, but that does not mean those acts are not committed.

Why not explore one thoroughly and test where it leads? The prohibition against killing, for instance, is almost meaningless in its application. Police can kill. We can kill in self defence. The state can kill. We can commit euthanasia in some countries; abortion in others. We can invade countries and kill and kill to defend our own countries. We can kill members of tribes as payback for crimes done to us. We can kill others with the products we can legally sell. We can kill gay people in some places and apostates in others. Etc. — Tom Storm

Well, because it does not lead anywehere for exactly this reason. The prohibtion against killing is of course not absolute, nor can any prohibition be. However, when faced with an act of indiscriminate killing, such as for instance the My Lai massacre, or th emassacre in Bucha, all, even the perpetrators I daresay would consider these acts to be unjust. They will claim an excuse, higheer orders, or temporary insanity due to the stress of conflict, but they will still condemn the act. If that is indeed the case, the question can be asked, why would such indiscriminate killing be wrong? This is not just, but what makes the act unjust? I would still not be looking for positive principles, like 'all life should be respected' or something but negative ones, what makes us recoil from such violence?

Take Rawls' thinking on justice: if you're going to go apophatically on this, the call for the most advantaged to address the needs of the least advantaged is essentially an ethical obligation, and so rests with ethics; so then, what is the apophatic indeterminacy of ethics? God, that is, meta-God (delivered from the incidental cultural and political BS). — Constance

I am afraid I do not understand you. Yes, Rawls offers us a cataphatic approach; under the veil of ignorance we would necessarily choose a system in which advantages for some are only justified when they also benefit the least well off. However, why would he need God? It is just the light of reason. Anyway, my approach would then be to look at cases which we find unjust and see whether we can distill such a principle from it, instead of resorting to reason under the veil of ignorance.

For me, so far, this
"irrealism" ... "actualism"
— 180 Proof
i.e. plural-aspect, or dialectical, holism (by internally negating monisms / dualisms). — 180 Proof

Would you mind unpacking this a bit? Acts of injustice as 'calling forth' a response? Or allowing for more perspectives on an act? The problem with the latter is, the approach would be based on the idea of a recognition of injustice. Indeed the question is "do we know injustice when we see it"? Not in fringe cases of course, but in clear cases.

We already know that what ought to be is not, and what ought not to be is. And that is why one cannot derive the one from the other. Do we not know this from the outset? — unenlightened

Well the is ought distinction is the basis for law. We know what is, but we also know what ought ot be, it is a basic premise one has to accept when dealing with law. My approach though would be more modest, not "what ought to be" but "what ought to be prevented at the very least".

And we know that the law seeks to remedy the unfairness and cruelty of what is - of the law of the jungle and reward virtue and punish vice, which is contrary to nature. — unenlightened

I wonder if this all is true. I do not think it is in fact. If I am right then we do recoil from acts of unjustice naturally. Law does not only punish vice, it also creates it and sometimes facilitates it. Like the law of war at times do.

I am still a bit at a loss in my project. How do we find out whether there is a root laying under all acts that we condemn. waht do we condemn and why? Is there in your opinion anything that is universally condemned?

1. Should courses in logic be mandatory? By that I mean courses to teach students how to identify and refute logical fallacies in everyday life? If yes, at what stage, and to what extent?

2. Since school funding is often problematic, which if any other school functions or classes should be subservient to classes in logical thinking, in terms of funding? — Elric

I know we cross swords in another thread but I do work in education, so hence my answer and I will take your questions seriously.

Ad 1. Well, I do not see why they should be mandatory. Many people get by just fine without them. Being able to reason in exactly the right way may be useful for some people, but not all. A bit like every form of education really. This applies a fortiori to formal logic, which is a kind of stylized form of argument. I do think that basic courses in argumentation and reasoning should be manadatory for lawyers (my field) and maybe some branches of science.

Ad 2: Also hard to say, it depends on which school you like to go to and what in what profile you want to develop yourself. If law is your cup of tea than you can easily skip mathematics, of engineering is, then that might be a bad idea. There is no one size fits all in education.

You'd evidently like them to be contradictory. — Elric

You think the contraictory quality of the statement resides in me liking them to be so? You must think highly of my capabilities.

Why? Does the idea of a political / ethical system based upon objective reality frighten you? — Elric

Not that I am aware of, no.

Are you a collectivist, a whim worshiper? — Elric

My whims are most surely peersonal, not collective!

Those people rely upon fantasy because they place their subjective feelings as superior to objective reality. — Elric

Why would they do so, if reality is self evident? How do you know your preference for 'objective reality' is not based on your subjective feeling?

objective reality can be reliably demonstrated — Elric

Please demonstrate to me ' objective reality' . Mind you, 'objective reality' is something else entirely from what we refer to as 'a fact' .

↪Tom Storm Despite these obvious things, millions do adhere to fantasy, religion, to guide their actions, rather than objective reality. — Elric

↪Tom Storm Objective reality is self evident, and behaving in accordance to it leads to survival. Ignoring it leads to the horrors of history created by religions and subjective political philosophies. — Elric

Meh... are those two statements not a teensy weensy bit contradictory? If objective reality was self evident then why would all those people rely on fantasy? Apparently it is not so self evident.

Before any ethical / political principles can be established, the questions of ontology and epistemology have to be answered.

Is reality independent of any individual's opinion, is it objective, not subjective? — Elric

Ohh dear we all missed the boat. I knew it, fuxx! However, on second thought, ethical and political principles have been established way before ontological and epistemological questions were answered. In fact, we cannot do without ethical and political principles when running a society and so, by necessity, they have to be in place before any ontological question is answered.

In any case, you would be arguing then that "free" sex of the 60s is "authoritarian" and a "violation of human rights"? Seems a little over-dramatic. — Shwah

No, your idea to give PhD's more sexual (and economic) rights is.

using philosophical language in terms of value, structures, benefits, crossover into epistemology (with education) — Shwah

Using terms that sound philosophical does not make it philosophy. Education is not the same as epistemology. For instance you equate sexuality with begetting children. That assumptions should be examined first. Moreover, your examples are sociological, for instance the question of a possible correlation birth rate and sexual orientation or the historical use of marriage and intrafamilial marriage. What I can make of your proposal comes down to a kind of regulation of sexuality and the question whether that is favorable. However, it makes so many questionable assumptions and flies in the face of our social order that it boils down to an outlandish fantasy. It is most certainly not anything like a philosophy of sexuality. Lastly, know though that your proposal is authoritarian and violates human rights.

What's the best sex structure? Are sex revolutions beneficial? What are the sex agents? What different sets of value are developed from it? What crossover does philosophy of sex have with other subjects like politics, economics etc? — Shwah

I think a philosophy of sex is very interesting and I think the sexuality of philosophy is even more interesting, but the questions you ask are more sociology of sex than philosophy of sex. Interesting too but a different kettle of fish.

I also wanted to mention that the benefits of monarchical sex may seem less obvious to us now, especially given all the republican (anti monarchical) propaganda, but it's effective at controlling power. — Shwah

Oh, but why would this be a philosophical question? Marriage was a tried and tested method of the ruling European houses to consolidated power, yes. That does not say anything about any normative implications.

but were rabid in intra-marriage sex (this is still carried on by amish today). — Shwah

How do you know this?

We can create new structures which have different value outputs. One would be to create a class structure by a (revamped) education system where the lowest, only high school education, has basic rights economically and sexually, and doctorates have more economic/sex rights. — Shwah

Why on earth would we want that? Sure, let's create an unfree under class, great idea. Problem is that it violates basic human rights, but who cares right?

By allowing doctorates to have more children it creates natural incentives for value to necessarily increase (the only axiom here is that good education necessarily increases value in any work or operation anyone gets a hold of). — Shwah

Even if that is true, which it probably is not, the question is why we would all want these doctorates.

It puts a top above and promotes education in all classes (I'm firmly of the belief that anyone can become a doctorate) — Shwah

Your belief does not make it so.

The puritan sex is interesting because their population growth is insane and makes them set to take over America in population in 200 years. Clearly value is developed/derived from it even if criticism may be there. — Shwah

Your whole proposal has nothing to do with a philosophy of sexuality but more with an outlandish and bizarre program of eugenics. It certainly will not get you your cherished doctorate.

The forum is presently dominated by fools with little to no grasp of basic philosophical or logical notions and yet with thoroughgoing confidence in their opinions; by those who have failed to learn how to learn. — Banno

I am not sure... I actually like many of the posters and I learn a lot from them, though maybe I am easily bewitched by the language of quantum physics, I do not know. Maybe it is just that Kant is forgotten or refuted when I had my guard down.. I do not know. Maybe I am milder at my ripe old age.

IIRC, there's nothing in Berkeley's speculation that says 'to be is to be self-perceived'. And even if so, that's mere solipsism, which I suppose pertains to the function of Berkeley's "God" as the Ur-perceiver (i.e. arbitrary terminus à la "unmoved mover" or "first cause" or "necessary being", etc). — 180 Proof

To be is to be self perceived... that is interesting no? Being iis purely abstract, it means nothing, I agree. Then the question becomes what does 'being talk' do? I think it is a question, an 'anspruch', it is a limit, how abstract can we go and therefore at the same time a demanding puzzle, can we articulate it? It (en)lights the one that asks this question and points to the one who asks the question of being. For who is it an issue? I would say it is an issue of human being, at least only human being dwells on being. That is basic Heidegger actually. However, even for an ardent physicalist, this points to something, namely, the characteristic of that being that questions its being. So being, the way we use it in metaphysics, is it really so odd to say that being is in the end self perception? Being, is nothing per se, being is an openness or a riddle with which self perception vexes itself. It is a look at the world, a look at the world in which our own face becomes visible. So being as self perception in practice says this: everything in the world we categorize in the same way as we see our own living body.

I've admitted to the unspeakable sin of being a physicalist, yes. But that's not the point. Idealism is just another version of physicalism. It renames the transcendent from "matter" to "mental". That's all. Until the truth can be proved one way or the other, physicalism is not invalidated by idealism.

I am amused by the contempt which idealists hold toward physicalism on TPF. — Real Gone Cat

Ahh probably a defensive reaction... I am always puzzled by the heaps of scorn idealists here receive... You see, it is after all a matter of perspective... :razz:

Don't be silly. The point is that idealism is unnecessary. It adds nothing to understanding. Does it render science moot? Count Tim doesn't think so. — Real Gone Cat

Who said that science is moot under either physicalism or idealism? Perhaps idealism adds nothing, but you simply accept physicalism as the default position. That is an unphilosophical approach, as philosophy engages and critically examines presuppositions. From my post it shows I think that I find the whole question whether the world is made of matter or made of mind rather moot as any investigation into the 'real' nature of things harps back to premodern metaphysical times. It brackets the subject, but the subject cannot be bracketed since any metaphysical speculation is limited by our human perspective. That does not make metaphysics moot in my opinion but any categorical assumption about what the real actually is, seems to me A. idle because it does not matter to us what it is and B. unprovable.

That is why I would find it more interesting to investigate the assumptions behind something like "esse est percipi", the central role given to perception over action for instance. The hierarchies embedded within the history of ideas says something about our being in the world, but speculation does not.

The problem with Esse Est Percipi is that it is too passive. One also acts upon the world. While jgill's look shows that others exist, it's what you do that makes you who you are. — Banno

I do like this notion... "esse est percipi" prioritizes an observer over and above the inner life of the observed. It also prioritizes a detached look at things. What if we just transform the sentence a bit. "To be is to be used", or "to be is to be of use". Is a broken cup still a cup?

Not having read this work yet, I wonder if you might shed a little more light on this idea. Is it just another attempt to rename "matter" as "mental"? — Real Gone Cat

What is this matter you speak of? I find it ridiculous to elevate the way we think about the world (as consisting of wood, steel and dirt) and somehow proudly proclaim that that must be how the world is apart from us. Come to think of it, such a claim is the height of idealism. "I experience the world as such and such and therefore it is such and such".

What I also find interesting is that these kind of metaphysical questions, "what is really really real? as opposed to what is real", seems to be all the rage on TPF these days. Why would you want to affirm the real reality of wood steel and dirt, over just its reality whether it is in the end mental or physical? The only reason I can think of is to make the claim that a third person analysis is a more accurate description than taking into account first person experience. I have the hunch this metaphysical gambit is played to be able to argue some sort of reductionist move. I doubt that works though.

Really? Can there be thinking without something that is thought? Even if thinking about something there is still an object of thought, that which is thought. — Fooloso4

Well in the whole thread we discuss the question what is real. Reality is a category, yet there is no such 'thing' as reality. Thought can be discussed in the same way, without a reference to thinking something concrete. Just like walking can be discussed without taking into account that walking is always to somewhere.

Do you mean thinking thinking itself or thinking itself? If the former then there is something thought, some object of thought, that is, thinking itself. If the latter then it refers to the activity of thinking rather than the activity. We do not walk by examining walking. — Fooloso4

Yes, the former, but what is than being thought is equally empty, the same emptiness you object to. That thinking that is being thought has itself as its object, so without something concrete being thought. Thinking that is thinking about itself, is not thinking about thinking that has an intentionality, but thinking that thinks itself thinking, pure self referentiality. We do not walk while we examine walking, but we think while we examine thinking.

Splitting the nucleus of an atom was the result of several scientific discoveries. It was the result of the development of scientific thought, of changes in thought. — Fooloso4

No it was the result of us thinking about different things. The activity of thinking is still qualitatively the same. It uses the same concepts, just applies them differently. Or do you think there is some qualitative jump, now not with QM but the emergence of the scientific method? And if so, was not the scientific method itself the result the result of some prior event or development? Or is, in your view, thinking different from every moment to the next? Does thinking ever recognize itself as such according to you?

So when we think of nuclear war, do we do the same thing as we are doing when we think about QM or are we doing something completely different?