Unfortunately that is not a sensible, or even meaningful, thing to say.. — Janus

Status quo for Janus, the standard reply.

When the discussion extends beyond the tight boundaries of Janus' preconceived conceptual enclosure, Janus recoils and strikes. Nonsense! There's something outside those boundaries Janus, or else you wouldn't need to be making those judgements. And dismissing that external world as meaningless and unintelligible, does nothing to propagate understanding.

I found Matt Strassler's article about matter and energy very interesting, as it casts doubt on the assumption that matter is energy. Perhaps the equation of the two is simplistic. I need to explore this question further. — Janus

Energy is taken to be equivalent to mass, and mass is taken to be the fundamental, essential property of matter. There is a difference, because it is only by removing "matter" from the conception, that "energy" is allowed to be the property of a bodiless substance, light. This allows the essential property of matter, mass, to be equivalent to bodiless motion, making energy and light the same thing, bodiless substance.

The problem is that the concept of matter disallows the possibility of assigning to it an essential property. Therefore the energy-mass equivalence simply evades the issue of "matter" altogether.

For me the fact that the mind is not "passive recorder" is uncontroversial. We are affected by what is external to our bodies via the senses... — Janus

Far more than this, living beings are active, as self-moving. This is the big difference between the determinist perspective and the free will perspective. The determinist perspective sees the actions of living beings as effects of external causation. The free will perspective sees an internal cause of action which has an effect on what is external.

Presumably it's possible because I have experienced the universe and I have registered that it can exist without conscious minds. — Barkon

But didn't you just say that the universe is a concept? Unless this concept is a true concept, by what means would you say that the universe can also exist without conscious minds? If you claim that you "have registered that it can exist without conscious minds", this means that you have judged it to be a true concept. How would you justify this judgement?

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets. — RussellA

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical?

The Vertiginous:

This section appears to describe an approach to truth. Vertiginous is distinguished from bottomlessness. And truth is vertiginous, (makes one's head swim) rather than bottomless as the abyss of untruth.

The last paragraph of the section appears to be describing the difference between coherency and soundness. The "frame of reference" provides the basis for a coordinate system, and everything within the system is consistent. But the soundness of the coordinate system, and the frame of reference itself, is generally not questioned. But, it may simply be a product of stipulated axioms.

That, the coherent coordinate system, is contrasted with a philosophy which throws itself at objects. This throwing itself at objects creates a vertigo described as "index veri" (index of truth). The index to truth is revealed in negativity, as untruth.

Fragility of the Truth:

Here we get a deeper look at truth. He appears to be saying that we must let go of what gives us comfort. Clinging to what gives us comfort, which is really untruth, is actually the bane.

With these human beings fear they will lose everything, because they have no other happiness, also none within thought, than what you can hold on to yourself, perennial
unfreedom.

Later in the section, this turns out to be what is popular, I'd say conventional.

Philosophy must "continually renew itself". It makes "few concessions to relativism", and "drives past Hegel".

Then there is a paragraph that I have difficulty to understand, which appears to be directed against the absolutism of Hegel. There is a jettisoning of that which is first to thought, but the jettisoning does not absolutize it. The jettisoning seems to be intended to remove the content of thought, from thought. But it's irrational to think that the content of thinking could be removed from thinking, because this would leave thinking as something other than thinking.

Even in the logical abstraction-form of the
Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part
does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that
which thinking would like to cancel out, whose non-identity is that
which is not thinking.

So, it seems to me, that Adorno is criticizing this type of thinking, which conceives of thinking as having creative power to put abstractions outside the mind, as this is fundamentally contrary to the meaning of "thinking".

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

He then gets to the fragility of truth, "fragile due to its temporal content". Contrary to the beliefs of some, who say that truth cannot be lost, Adorno says that truth can be lost, and we can fall into the abyss. This is because truth requires great effort.

Only those thoughts which go to extremes can face up to the
all-powerful powerlessness of certain agreement; only mental
acrobatics relate to the thing, which according to the fable convenu
[French: agreed-upon fiction] it holds in contempt for the sake of its
self-satisfaction.

How it is, that thought can actually find truth, when it is easily led astray by what is popular, and "nothing notifies it that it has adequately satisfied itself in the thing", is another question.

The consistency of its execution, however, the density of the web, enables it to hit what it should.

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something. — RussellA

Sorry RussellA, but I'm not able to follow you. The concept of nothing is quite a bit different from the concept of zero. Sure you could use "zero" to mean nothing, and be using it metaphorically, but that would be to give "zero" a meaning outside of mathematics. But that's not to use mathematics metaphorically. When someone says "the rabbits are multiplying", that is to use the word "multiplying" metaphorically, not to use mathematics metaphorically. It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics.

That is the nature of language, where concepts are about the sense of things in the world rather than refer to things in the world (Frege). — RussellA

I really don't understand what you mean by "about the sense of things in the world". It seems to me that this is just a convoluted, ambiguous phrase, meant to avoid the issue of what concepts which do not refer to anything in the world, are actually doing. This would include concepts like mathematical concepts. Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical.

I think that the following is still relevant to Berkeley's Idealism and ‘esse est percipi’.

A photon is an example of a massless particle.

A massless particle may be defined as immaterial.

I agree when you say "and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial"

I believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But you also said "In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition."

So, both photons and God are immaterial, where immaterial means the same thing.

But if a person believes in the real existence of photons then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But if a person believes in the real existence of the immaterial, and God is immaterial, then should not a person believe in the real existence of God? — RussellA

Your conclusion doesn't follow. If I list off three item types which are said to be classified as the further type, class A, and you agree that item type number 3 is a type of real item, of class A, I can conclude that you believe that there is real items of class A. This in no way implies that you believe that item type 1, and item type 2, are real items.

Notice, class A stands by the same definition throughout. The issue is whether item type 1, item type 2, and item type 3, which are proposed as items which fit that definition, are real items. For example, I could say that horses and unicorns are of the class "four legged animals". If you believe in the reality of horses, you believe in the reality of four legged animals. But this does not imply that you believe in the reality of unicorns. And, "four legged animals" has the same definition throughout.

As far as I know mathematics exists only in the spatiotemporal world. There can be no order without things to be ordered. — Janus

That conclusion is drawn from the unstated premise that "things" by your usage exist only in a spatiotemporal world. However, we are talking about immaterial "things", which are not spatiotemporal, meaning, value, and intention.

In classical metaphysics there is a very strong logical argument, the cosmological argument, which demonstrates that there must be something immaterial which is prior in time to all material existence, as active cause of the first material thing. This implies that we ought to conclude that your unstated premise is false. Therefore your argument is unsound.

And of course, those who practise mathematics demonstrate every day, that things being ordered need not be spatiotemporal things. So you really ought to reject your own argument.

The problem is that we have every reason to think there is a world prioir to perception... — Janus

Likewise, we have every reason to believe that there is an immaterial world prior to the material world.

First, denying this would require either that material things came into existence from absolutely nothing, or that they have existed forever. Both of these possibilities are contrary to empirical evidence. Material things do not come into being from nothing, nor do they exist forever.

Second, the nature of time indicates to us that actual material existence comes into being at the present time, now, while the future consists only of possibilities for material existence. This implies that the possibility for any material thing must precede, in time, the actual existence of that thing. Since the possibility for a thing is not necessarily a material thing in itself, we must conclude that there has always been something immaterial prior to any material thing, as the possibility for material things, in general.

Not that I think the question and the answer to it matter that much, at least not to those who just accept that we live in a material world consisting of many, many things which don't depend on us for their existence. — Janus

The philosophical mind however, wants to know the nature of these things which don't depend on us. To simply assume, and accept, that the nature of these things is adequately described by the concept "matter", therefore we live in a "material world", is not good philosophy.

Do we know of any meaning, intention and value outside the context of this spatiotemporal existence? — Janus

Yes, I told you, "order" itself. It is value not restricted by spatiotemporal context. It provides the foundation for mathematics upon which spatial temporal concepts are constructed.

Now you are contradicting what you said earlier. Differentiation just refers to the existence of more than one thing. So "selection" on our part is not logically required for there to be more than one thing. — Janus

For some reason, you have a tendency of stating things backward. You reverse the order of logic, presenting illogical statements. Here you say that the existence of more than one thing is required for differentiation. In reality though, the act of differentiation is an act that divides, thereby producing more than one thing. So you have the logical order reversed, to produce the illogical statement you make. In reality, for there to be more than one thing requires an act of differentiation, and this is an act of selection, the act which divides according to selected principles. Without this, your proposed "more than one thing" is an unintelligible infinity of divisions already made. An infinity already accomplished is illogical.

So "selection" on our part is not logically required for there to be more than one thing. — Janus

Selection on someone's part is required for there to be more than one thing. Someone has to choose by what principle one part is to be separated from another part, making more than one thing. How else could there be more than one thing, without assuming the infinity of divisions mentioned above?

Yes, there are at least two ways to think of gravity. One is as a force and one is as the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass energy. — RussellA

In other words, "force" is purely conceptual. It is only one of a number of conceptions which can be applied toward representing the effects of gravity, but not the only one. "Force" doesn't represent gravity, it is a method of categorizing the effects of gravity.

I think you are are making a logical leap too far.

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "immaterial" as "not consisting of matter".

As photons don't consist of matter, they can be considered immaterial.

The article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material.

Premise 1 - God is immaterial
Premise 2 - Photons are immaterial
Premise 3 - Photons have a real existence

Conclusion - as some immaterial things have a real existence and as God is immaterial then God has a real existence. — RussellA

I don't understand what you are saying here. Last post, you listed some things which are believed to be immaterial, concepts, ideas, intentions, also God. I explained why massless particles ought to be included in that list, and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial. I made no conclusion about God.

Personally, I believe that massless particles are nothing but an idea, a conception, and not real in the sense of independent. I think "photon" is a concept created in an attempt to explain the photoelectric effect. The problems of quantum mechanics demonstrates that "photon" is a faulty concept for explaining how light energy transmits. Therefore it is false, and not referring to anything independent.

.

Kant allows things in themselves, which Schopenhauer takes him to task for, because it is inconsistent with his claim that space and time are only forms of intuition and have no other existence, and you can't have things without differentiation, space and time. Schopenhauer then posits that there can only be a 'thing in itself', and that this is a consequence of Kant's own contentions. — Janus

Differentiation need not be spatial nor temporal. We have differentiation of meaning, intention and value. This is the basis of "order", "hierarchy", a differentiation of value. Spatiotemporal differentiation is dependent on, and derived, from this more basic form of differentiation based on value.

the point at issue is whether it follows logically from the accepted fact that differentiation is required for perception to occur, that there is no differentiation absent perception. — Janus

If the one is required for the other, and the other is not required for the former, then we can conclude that the one is prior to the other. In this case, since differentiation is required for perception, and perception is not required for differentiation (as explained above, differentiation may be based purely in order), we can conclude that differentiation is prior to perception.

I want to hear an actual argument for why space, time, differentiation, form, matter and all the rest cannot exist beyond the context of perception. And I should note, I acknowledge that if there is space, time, differentiation, things in general outside the context of perception, we should not expect them to be just as we experience and understand them. That would be naive realism, and I'm not arguing for that. I have in mind something along the lines of Ontic Structural Realism. — Janus

Above is an argument as to why the act of differentiation exists beyond the context of perception. It is prior to perception. This act of differentiation is intentional.

As I said, I simply want any kind of argument clearly laid out that demonstrates that space, time, differentiation etc. must be confined to the world as cognized. — Janus

Differentiation is necessarily an intentional act. It involves selection. Understanding what "differentiation" means is all that is required to demonstrate that it is confined to "the world as cognized". Differentiation is an intentional act carried out by cognition. Furthermore, differentiation in its basic form (order) as explained above, is necessarily prior to spatial or temporal differentiation. Therefore cognition is prior to spatiotemporal differentiation, and perception in general.

we cannot be certain that space and time and differentiation exist in the in itself, but nor can we be certain that they do not. There is no such thing as any definitive "misuse of concepts". That is purely stipulative. There are no "concept police"―we each decide for ourselves what makes most sense to us. It is just here that I see dogma creeping in―in notions of "philosophy proper" and "misusing concepts" and "cannot be applied beyond them". — Janus

We can be certain that these things, space, time, differentiation, do not exist "in the in itself". This certainty is supported by an understanding of what it means to differentiate, and subsequent form, "differentiation". To differentiate is an intentional act. Any attempt to portray it as something other than this ought to be immediately arrested. I am a self-declared member of the "concept police", and I hereby give you warning that you are in serious violation of the 'dogma of philosophy proper'. Without stipulation, dogma, any field of study loses all dignity. Without stipulations as to how words will be used, logic is impossible, and discussion rapidly degenerates into nonsense.

If you refuse to uphold a proper definition of "differentiation", as an act which requires selection, just so that you may equivocate, then you make philosophical discourse impossible.

We can quantify the force of gravity. On Earth, the average gravitational force is about 9.81 m/s². On the Moon, it is about 1.63 m/s². — RussellA

There is more than one thing involved in that formula which you call "gravitational force". There is space and time. The formula must be understood as conceptual, rather than something independent, because it unites these two features in an artificial way, conception. Notice that within the theory (conception) of general relativity, "gravity" is understood in a completely different way. It is not conceived of as a force, but as a property of spacetime. This is because space and time have already been united by the conception of special relativity, and this union must be adjusted to properly account for gravity. Therefore in general relativity gravity is already included into the conception of space and time. So we have two very different ways to conceive what you call "gravitational force". One is as a force, the other as a property of spacetime. The latter is distinctly not "a force".

Basically…

Mass-energy curves space-time — a new version of Hooke's law.
Objects trace out world lines that are geodesics (paths of least action in curved space-time) unless acted upon by a net external force — a new version of the law of inertia.
Gravity isn't a force, it's the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass-energy.

https://physics.info/general-relativity/

Even someone who believes in Determinism may know their past but cannot know their future. — RussellA

Right, so as I say, this presents us with a premise describing a real difference between past and future. Do you agree that this is a real difference? Can you agree that a person can know one's past and cannot know one's future, and because of this we ought to conclude that there is a real difference between past and future?

If we have agreement on this, then we can proceed to inquire exactly what this difference consists of.

The article What Sorts of Things Exist, & How? writes

But the immaterial things are the philosophically more interesting. These include consciousness, thoughts, words, meanings, concepts, numbers, emotions, intentions, volitions, moral principles, aesthetic experiences, and more. What would philosophy be without them?

However, the article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material. In other words, God is not made of any kind of matter, material, or substance which entails that he cannot be seen.

There are different meanings to "immaterial". — RussellA

I don't think those two examples constitute two different meanings. They are applying the same definition of "immaterial" to refer to different things. The definition is "not composed of material". In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition.

We could add to that list of immaterial things, massless particles. And if such things are believed to be real, independent and not merely conceptual, then we'd have a belief in the real existence of the immaterial. Mass is the essential property of matter. However, many materialist/physicalists will insist that since there is a mass-energy equivalence then energy also is material. But this is a misunderstanding of "equivalence".

Equivalent means that equal things have been assigned the same value, it does not mean that the two things are the same. So if matter has mass, and energy does not have mass, therefore no matter,, and there is an equivalence between these two, this means that we have conceived of a mathematical relationship between the material and the immaterial. But it does not mean that the immaterial is material. We need to account for the specific postulates of that relationship.

n language, one can justly say that "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". Some of these words are figures of speech, some are concrete and some are abstract. — RussellA

You are still not getting the distinction I explained to you. What causes the stone to fall is gravity. "Force" is not an independent thing in the world which causes anything. "Force" is a mathematical concept, how we quantify the effects of things like gravity.

It really makes no sense to say "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". When we analyze that statement, it's plain to see that "force" has no meaning here. What would "force" refer to here, some invisible, unobservable property of an invisible unobservable thing, gravity?

However, when someone says something like that we easily understand it, because we can just ignore "the force of", and understand it as "gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". "Force" has no intelligible meaning in that context so it is simply ignored.

When we consider the universe to be real or fake, what do we mean?

If it is real, does that mean it is all loaded in at once, in one big containment; and if it is fake, does that mean it's load is efficient, such as by having local systems load in and far away systems not loaded in? — Barkon

I think that our concept of "the universe" is a useful fiction.

I found your saying that rather amusing. — Janus

That's how it was meant, amusement. However, we must be careful with our use of such, because making fun of another is a form of amusement which is mean, and I don't mean to be mean.

I can understand your words easily enough, but they seem irrelevant and thus pointless, so I think our starting assumptions are probably so far apart that the effort required for me to unpack what you might be getting at seems to be not worth it. — Janus

OK, so you express the second option, rather than an intellectual disability, you have an attitudinal problem which discourages you from making the effort to understand.

Let me remind you of the issue, just so that you can see for yourself, that it is not a matter of what I say being irrelevant, but a matter of your attitude. You had refused to accept the importance of intuitional knowledge, claiming that only observation experience could provide reliable knowledge, i.e. empirical knowledge.

Let's grant for the sake of argument that (intellectual) intuition sometimes might give us an accurate picture of the nature of reality ("reality" here meaning something more than mere empirical reality, that is not merely things as they appear to us, but rather some "deeper" truth metaphysically speaking). How do we tell when a particular intuition has given us such knowledge?

I won't respond to the rest of your post as it seems like either sophistical nonsense or inaccurate speculations about my motives. — Janus

The problem with your attitude, exposed here, is that any knowledge we are born with must be intuitive. And, a certain basic knowledge is required even to support the human being's observational capacity. Note, that to observe is to take notice of, and this requires that your attention be directed by your intention, at the thing to be observed.

The basic foundational knowledge, which a person is born with, provides the substance, through this form of direction, upon which all observational (empirical) knowledge is constructed. Therefore it is impossible that the observational knowledge is more reliable than the intuitive knowledge, because the intuitive knowledge is what supports the observational knowledge. Your attitude demonstrates that you would believe that a logical conclusion is more reliable than the premises which it is drawn from.

My intention was that from the viewpoint of a human observer, even in a deterministic world, they cannot know the future. — RussellA

All right then, let's start from this premise. If a human observer cannot know the future, but can know the past, this implies a real difference between future and past. How can a determinist adequately account for this difference?

The free will believer understands that the future holds possibility, therefore the epistemic concept of truth and falsity is not applicable to the future. This accounts for that difference. So this difference is actually very simple to understand when we employ the right premise.

We don't need to know whether Newton's Laws apply to those parts of the Universe that we don't observe, we only need to know that they apply to the parts of the Universe that we do observe. — RussellA

If the determinist laws (the laws of physics which support one's belief in determinism), are not believed to extend to all parts of the universe, then how is the belief in determinism supported. Wouldn't it be possible that nondeterministic activity reigned in some part of the universe, and there could be some interaction between the various parts?

Remember, the principle you are supporting is superdeterminism, and this theory requires interactions with that other part of the universe, as hidden variables. The question is, what supports the belief that the supposed hidden variables are deterministic. The deterministic laws which we know, are Newton's laws. If the hidden variables are not acting according to Newton's laws, then why believe that they are deterministic?

I suggest to you, that you consider the basis of determinism, the primary premise, to be the inertia of mass, (matter), which is expressed by the first law. A person who believes in free will, and the reality of the immaterial in general, does not allow that Newton's first law extends to a living body moved by final cause. Also, this person is easily able to see that the problems of quantum mechanics arise from the physicists' experimentations which involve the massless, the immaterial. It is this determinist bias which you demonstrate, which makes people want to establish compatibility between Newton's deterministic laws, which apply to massive material bodies, and the massless immaterial substratum.

However, this is backward. Since the immaterial is the substratum, this means that the deterministic, the material aspect is what emerged from the immaterial. This implies that we need to understand the reality of the non-deterministic immaterial aspect of the universe first, and determine how a deterministic, material aspect could have come into being from it.

It seems that in In God's Will, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the final cause, the unmoved mover. A human's will is free providing they use their will to move towards this final cause, this unmoved mover. — RussellA

I don't think that is correct. The concept of free will allows that we choose freely. This means that we can choose either way, bad or good, so we do not necessarily choose according to "God's Will". "God's Will" is a concept used to explain why material bodies of mass move in an orderly, deterministic way, in a universe where the substratum is non-deterministic. If, for example the universe is assumed to have begun as endless possibility, infinite potential, and some process started selecting from possibilities to create the actual universe, we need to assume some form of intelligence (Will of God for example) to account for the emergence of actual order, from the seemingly endless possibility. Without any intelligence, possibility would actualize in a random way, but this is inconsistent with our observations.

There is only one past, one present and several possible futures. — RussellA

How is "several possible futures" consistent with determinism? If determinism is the case, then the future has alredy been determined, as well as the past, and there is only one actual future, not several possible futures.

We could conceptualize possibilities, as logical possibilities, or epistemological possibilities, but these would be imaginary, and not the actual future, which is what I think you are talking about. Then there would be no difference between past and future. But this is clearly not consistent with our experience.

In free will, as there is only one present, one of the several possible futures must have been chosen, and it is this choice that determines the one present.

Even in fee will, the present has been determined — RussellA

This doesn't make sense either.

A choice doesn't determine the present because it gives direction to a very small aspect in a very big context which is "the present". Even with the large number of choices being made by human beings, there is still a massive aspect of reality which is modeled by Newton's laws of motion, and this aspect is active without human choice. Commonly, by those who believe in free will, this activity is accounted for by "God's Will".

But today not everyone agrees. Some believe in Superdeterminism, in that there are hidden variables that we do not yet know about. — RussellA

Yeah, yeah, that's the ticket, "superdeterminism". How is that any better than "God's Will"? It's not, it's much worse. It requires an immaterial, non-spatialtemporal force, which is active throughout the entirety of the universe over the enirety of time. That sounds just like "God's Will". However, there is one big difference. "God's Will" is consistent with human experience of choice, free will, the known difference between past and future, and our knowledge of final cause, while "superdeterminism" is not. That's a very significant amount of evidence which superdeterminism simply ignores, in order to keep up the determinsit premise. Meanwhile, "God's Will" is a sound theory, supported by the experience of every human being who makes choices. And "superdeterminism" is just the pie-in -the-sky clutching at straws of deluded determinists.

I hope you can see the problem.

Here's an analogy. Consider Newton's first law. This law is applicable to a very large part (if not all) of empirical (observable) reality. We can ask why is this law so effective in its descriptive capacity.

You can answer that the law corresponds with a hidden feature of the universe, which extends to all areas of the universe, over all time, and this hidden feature ensures that Newton's first law will always be obeyed, everywhere, all the time. That is analogous with superdeterminism.

On the other hand, we can say that Newton's first law applies only to the aspects of the universe which our sense capacities allow us to observe, and evidence indicates to us that there is an extremely large portion of the universe which we cannot in any way observe with our senses (the future for example). And, since we cannot in any way observe this extremely large portion of the universe, to see how it behaves, we have no reason to believe that it behaves in the same way as the part which we can observe.

So, superdeterminism, instead of following the evidence which we do have, evidence of free will and final cause, simply makes a ridiculous conclusion based on no evidence, that there is a law of determinism, like Newton's first law, which extends throughout all features of reality, even those which we cannot possibly obsevre.

This statement is incorrect according to Newton’s first law of motion (the law of inertia). — Wayfarer

My mistake, thanks Wayfarer. I think i was half asleep when I wrote that, glad you're checking.

But we still have the issue of self-caused acceleration, in living beings which are self-moved. This is a case of the acceleration of a body which is not caused by an external force. I will address this issue below in my reply to RussellA. I would appreciate if you could read that, and give me your opinion concerning my thoughts on this matter. If my speculations are unintelligible to you, I may be inclined to think that Janus is right in dismissing it as gobbledygook.

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts. — RussellA

Maybe, but to avoid the vicious circle, the realism which grounds idealism cannot be experience based, which is what you say. It must be prior to experience, that's why it's a Platonic realism.

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration. — RussellA

Yes, Wayfarer corrected me on that. However, Newton's laws cannot account for the reality of free will, where the cause of motion is internal to the body which accelerates. Therefore we ought to conclude that Newton's laws of motion are not properly "universal", as they do not cover all cases of acceleration.

You can opt for determinism, deny that free will, intention, or final cause, is a valid cause, but this is what I argue leaves a hole in your ability to understand reality. This is why physicalism is commonly associated with determinism. If we accept that Newton's laws of physics cover all aspects of reality, then there is no place for final cause, and we have determinism. If we want to allow for the reality of final cause, then we need to open up Newton's laws, determine where they are inconclusive, and find out where final cause can have a position.

What I've explained already, is that Newton's first law is fundamentally determinist, and does not adequately represent the real difference between past and future. The difference is that the past consists of "actuality", what actually is, or has been, and cannot be changed, while the future consists of indeterminate "possibility". Representing time as a continuity from past to future, as Newton's first law does, assuming that what has been will necessarily continue to be as it has, unless caused to change by something else which continues to be as it has been, produces the determinist premise. But this form of "necessity" which Newton's first law is based in, is what Hume rejected, as a premise of attitude rather than truth.

The theological/mystical premise, which allows for the reality of final cause, also rejects this proposed necessary continuity of temporal existence, supported by a difference of attitude. In this perspective, since the future consists of possibility, and the past consists of actuality, a selective cause is required to account for the activity of the present. In Christian theology this selective cause is the Will of God, and it is understood that the continuity represented as Newton's first law requires an active cause.

The principal difference between the two perspectives is that from Newton's premise a cause is required to alter the continuity of existence known as inertia. Inertia is taken for granted as given. From the theological/mystical perspective a cause is required to produce the continuity of existence known as inertia. The Newtonian premise of continuity, if taken as absolutely universal, disallows the reality of final cause, so that is a significant problem for it. Furthermore, the modern physics of quantum mechanics indicates that the separation between past actuality, and future possibility, is likely very real.

Therefore, I believe that it is time for us to reject the universality of Newton's first law, as fundamentally insufficient, and representative of a misleading attitude toward reality. We also ought to accept the real separation between past actuality and future possibility as strongly supported by evidence, and this is inconsistent with Newton's first law. That change in attitude will provide a much more sound position for a true understanding of the nature of motion and activity, one which allows for the reality of final cause.

No, because I know my command of the English language is such that I would be able to understand any coherent explanation. It doesn't follow though that I would necessarily agree with it. Are you one of those who think that you are so right that if anyone disagrees with what you write, they must therefore not understand it? — Janus

Your replies are indicating that you do not understand what I write. They are not indicating that you do not agree with me. You say things like "that passage reads like nonsense", and "Gobbledygook".

The obvious conclusion is that either you are incapable of understanding me, or unwilling to try. Either way, to me, it appears as if you have an intellectual disability. I apologize for saying "mentally handicapped". Google tells me that this is outdated and offensive, and that I should use "intellectual disability" instead.

Do you recognize that replies like that would indicate to me that there is some sort of intellectual disability on your part?

Or, is it really the case, that you just disagree with me, but you are incapable of supporting what you believe, against my arguments, so you simply dismiss my arguments as impossible for you to understand, feigning intellectual disability as an escape?

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism) — RussellA

You can say this, as many do. But the point I made is that nominalism provides no ontology to substantiate the existence of particulars. Particulars are nothing other than perceptions in the mind, as Berkeley argues. Then to validate ontologically, the idea that particulars have independent existence, as a philosophical realism requires, the only principles which will do, are those of idealism. That's why Berkeley needs God. That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. You can readily claim to believe in incompatible ontologies when you do not understand the principles.

However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, — RussellA

This is not true. When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. And, that physicists conceptualize this type of causation as "force" is just a convention. Furthermore, I can cause my own body to accelerate without requiring any external force, as causation, simply by getting up and moving. That's an internal force acting which causes it to move.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world. — RussellA

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed. And so, by extension, even if everyone believes in something this ought not be considered to be evidence of the thing believed.

However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. So I don't see any point to what you have said here.

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind. — RussellA

This is a serious problem with the beliefs of many physicalists. They claim that things like "forces", and "energy" are physical, and they also deny the reality of Platonic realism. However, upon analysis, it can be demonstrated that these things are purely mathematical conceptions. The physicalist will commonly ignore this, and insist that these terms refer to something independent from the conception, which the conception corresponds with, but that is really nothing more than claiming that there is an independent idea, which the human conception corresponds with. And that is exactly what Platonic realism is.

For example, the physicalist might say that there are independent "laws of nature" which correspond with the humanly conceived "laws of physics". Or, one might believe that there is a number "two" which corresponds with the conception of two. There are many examples of Platonist beliefs which physicalist have, and generally they will continue in to incoherently argue against Platonism. I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma — RussellA

It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means. Force is a quantity. It is a figure produced from measurement and application of mathematics. Therefore it is very clear that any force between the earth and the moon is the product of human knowledge of the relations between these two. To say that there is a force which is independent of measurement, as that which is measured, is incoherent. This is because "force" is complex, a product of multiple properties, as "ma" signifies. Very clearly it is a human creation.

If we cannot coherently conceive of something being real without it existing somewhere at some time or everywhere at all times then that tells against your position. — Janus

I can very easily conceive of something being real without existing somewhere at some time, or everywhere at all times. However, if explained to you, you dismiss such writing with phrases like "that passage reads like nonsense".

Do you recognize that this may indicate that you are in some way mentally handicapped? Or is this an attitudinal problem, a refusal to put in the effort required to understand such conceptions? Are you by any chance determinist, thinking that effort is not required to understand, believing that either the universe will make you understand, or not understand, as fate would have it?

Possibility for example, doesn't exist anywhere, at any time.

You reason it through. If you have a large glass then you will feel tired. If you feel tired then you may miss the train. If you miss the train then you may be stuck in the city. If you get stuck in the city then you will have to pay for a hotel. But you have no money on you. You therefore conclude that you will stick to a glass of water. — RussellA

Well, I strongly believe that reasoning through anything is an awful lot of work. And if the world is deterministic, it's obviously unnecessary work. Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. We can avoid all that unnecessary work, and have much more fun this way, if we believe in a deterministic world.

The Universe is, according to theory, constantly expanding, and as a result (or many results of said result) will, allegedly, succumb to "Heat Death."

This is a widely accepted scientific theory. — Outlander

I wouldn't call this "scientific". To be science requires convincing experimental evidence.

What I'm saying is, perhaps the speaker of the message is simply aware of the inevitable result of such, which, no matter how long it lasts (say X as freedom), it will inevitable turn into a certain state (say Y as lack of freedom). — Outlander

I can't see how this is relevant. I'm going to die, therefore lose my freedom, long before the proposed heat death of the universe, so how is this relevant?

In simple terms, say you're in a desert next to an oasis. The person is telling you that oasis, the water within, and as a result all life situated next to it that makes it unique from the barren desert-scape around it, is temporary. This is a fact. You consider what is temporary as a permanent concept, because, for all you know, and have ever known, it logically seems to be -- while the other person has seen that it is in fact, not. At least, that's a reasonable counter-argument to the aforementioned quote of yours. — Outlander

Sorry, i still can't see the relevance. Are you suggesting that RusselA is arguing that determinism is permanent? How is that relevant? How could determinism be any thing other than permanent?

Not an infinite regress, as we eventually arrive at the (indivisible) fundamental particles and forces.

There are four fundamental interactions known to exist: Gravitational force, Electromagnetic force, Strong nuclear force, Weak nuclear force. — RussellA

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts. Which are you proposing, fundamental forces (idealism), or fundamental particles (materialism)?

There is also a strong argument that ontological relations don't exist in the world but only the mind. As numbers and mathematics only exists in the mind (are invented not discovered), these relations are expressed in the mind mathematically. — RussellA

So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?

Current scientific thinking seems to be that fundamental particles and forces exist in the world. Accepting that ontological relations between these fundamental particles and forces only exist in the mind, there is no necessity for space to be understood as a real active substance. — RussellA

But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles. How do you propose that we can provide an ontology for real active forces in the world, without allowing for a medium of activity? This could by "space", as a real active substance.

As I see it:

The fundamental particles and forces exist in the world as ontological Realism

The relations between these fundamental particles and forces exist in the mind as ontological idealism — RussellA

I think you need to reconsider this position. "Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. How is this anything other than a concept concerning how the motion of one object can affect the motion of another object? If you want to believe that forces are real things existing in the world, you need some substance for them to exist as. Otherwise "forces" will continue to refer to conceptualized relations between objects.

Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.

They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.

Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen

Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen. — RussellA

Let's consider "pixels". You say that there are pixels which have spatial relations between them. But a pixel, which is normally thought of as a fundamental element of a picture, is actually composed of smaller parts which have spatial relations. And if we think of "physical matter" in this way, we get the appearance of an infinite regress, because each time we find what looks to be the fundamental elements, we then find out that they can be broken down into further spatial relations.

There is a strong argument for the ideality of spatial relations. We use mathematical tools of numbers and geometry, which are concepts, and we try to represent the supposed independent reality with those concepts. Intuition tells us that reality cannot exist solely of spatial relations, there must be some material in these relations, so to the infinite regress may be avoided with the positing of fundamental particles, "matter". However, nature throws a curve-ball, and complicates everything with the fact that time is passing, and spatial relations are continually changing. Now, "spatial relations" may be replaced by "spatial activity".

So, the primary intuition was to believe that there must be some form of foundational matter, substance which exists in spatial relations that are expressed mathematically. However, the passage of time necessitates that we understand this as activity, and the supposed foundational matter appears so rapid, that it makes the activity of any proposed fundamental matter unintelligible.

Now we have a second possible intuition. Perhaps there is no fundamental matter at all, and the activity is simply the activity of space. What was represented as particles of matter existing in 'changing spatial relations', may actually be just 'changing spatial relations' without any real particles of matter. These 'changing spatial relations' are what is known as the field, and the wavefunction.

The developing problem, is that as described above, the "spatial relations" are ideal, conceptual mathematics and geometry. And, unless there is some form of substance existing, in these relations, we lose any form of physical realism, relying solely on Platonic realism, to understand these ideal features, fields and wave functions, as real. This is why space itself needs to be understood as real active substance. Traditionally, space was known to be an aether, and the waves of electromagnetism was understood as the activity of that aether. And this is what is missing from our current understanding.

We have removed the substance, fundamental matter, which is proposed as existing in active spatial relations, to understand the activity simply as active spatial relations. The supposed matter, particles, simply cannot exist in the contradictory relations represented by the mathematics. So the accurate representation is just mathematical relations. However, unless the substance of space is identified, and properly observed, all we have is a Platonic idealism within which these mathematical relations are the substance of the universe.

To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined. — RussellA

That looks like an infinite regress in the making. You are telling me to forget about forgetting about making an effort, because whether or not you will forget about it has already been predetermined.

In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom, because you don't have any. That might work on some people, but you can't pull the wool over my eyes.

Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas. — RussellA

Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way?

Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world. — RussellA

Sure, but if I have no choice as to whether or not I do something, isn't it illogical for me to deliberate? I mean deliberation requires a lot of effort, which is stressful, often difficult, annoying, and even frustrating. If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. I'll just go with the flow, and let the deterministic world force deliberation upon me, if and when it must. If I believed in determinism I would not take up that painful and hypocritical position of deliberating voluntarily. Why would anyone, if they truly believed in determinism?

My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time. — RussellA

I don't know about that, relativity theory says they won't necessarily show the same time, depending on external conditions.

Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words. — RussellA

But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium?

Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.

Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.

Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.

In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.

In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.

In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present. — RussellA

You can make that conclusion, but it displays a gap in understanding. What is the source of that freely willed act?

To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do.

So I believe that determinism is a cop out, a refusal to address a huge aspect of reality.

For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B. — RussellA

The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it.

I don't believe so. Newton like others of his period was deist. Deists believed that God 'set the world in motion' but that thereafter it ran by the laws that Newton discovered. Hence LaPlace's declaration (LaPlace being 'France's Newton'), when asked if there were a place for the Divine Intellect in his theory, that 'I have no need of that hypothesis'. — Wayfarer

I've read a lot of Newton's material, and I think you misunderstand him. He clearly believed his laws of motion to be descriptive. He did not believe that he had discovered God-created laws which govern the world. This is very evident in his work, especially on optics. He was a very good scientist, looking to describe the natural world, and very respectful of the fact that anything he produced could be a mistake.

Therefore he clearly did not believe himself to be discovering divine laws, which would allow no possibility of mistake. Or would you think that there is an infinite number of laws out there to be discovered, and one set is "The Divine Set". If so, how would one distinguish "The Divine Set" of laws from the infinite other possibilities, when searching for these divine laws.

I don't understand your reference to LaPlace. It seems self-contradicting. If Newton believed that he had discovered divine laws, then clearly there is a requirement for Divine Intellect as creator of those laws. But this is not what scientists do. They do not seek to discover divine laws, they seek to describe the world. That is the point of the scientific method, a method to ensure what is known as "objective" descriptions. The scientific method gives no direction about prospecting for divine laws. That's more of a metaphysical interpretation of what the scientist does. A very faulty interpretation, I might add.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God — RussellA

This is the inevitable conclusion when we take the reality of free will, final cause, to its extreme. To allow the reality of choice, we must allow for real possibility at each passing moment of time. This implies that there is no necessary continuity from the past, through the present, into the future. The observed continuity is supported by the Will of God. The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice.

For example, consider that the white ball is moving toward the red ball, and by physical projections will cause the red ball to move in the future. Let's assume that the hand of a human being (analogous to the Will of God), can interfere at any moment to prevent that occurrence. And if we look to the source of the movement of that hand, we might consider energies in the human body, but ultimately it is the free will, a free choice without any prior efficient cause. In this way "final cause" puts an end to any proposed chain of causation, as an action which begins without prior causation. Now, we have a source of activity which theoretically, at any moment in time could interfere with the inertia or momentum of any existing object, at any moment in time. If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future.

This supports the mystical perspective that each and every existing physical object, and the entirety of the physical universe must be recreated at each moment of passing time. From this perspective, the continuity, and consistency which we observe as inertia, mass, and momentum, cannot be taken for granted. If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. In the theological metaphysics, the recreation is supported by the Will of God. God willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment, in the consistent way that we observe, allowing us to predict from past to future.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly. — RussellA

This is what naturally followed from Newton's project of the laws of motion. Newton was able to describe the observed continuity and consistency of temporal existence, in the form of laws, "what is given", thus creating the illusion of necessity. Therefore instead of understanding the consistency in the passing of time as dependent upon the choice of God, to choose from future possibilities, we actually exclude real possibility with "Laws of Nature", and end up with a determinist physical world. Hume is very helpful toward understanding this lack of necessity which the idea of "Laws of Nature" negates with imposed necessity.

That is not something that Newton himself would have said. It’s true that his discovery of inertia fundamentally changed the conception of matter, but I don’t think Newton had any doubt that physical objects were really physical. Newton didn’t eliminate “matter” from his vocabulary or ontology — he simply avoided metaphysical speculation about it. — Wayfarer

I did read somewhere, that Newton himself declared that his first law of motion depended on the Will of God. Newton was religious. Newton had no doubt that physical objects were physical, just like Berkeley had no such doubt. But Newton did eliminate "matter" from his ontology. He replaced it with 'the Will of God', which is the mystical perspective described above. He then represented the effects of the Will of God, for the purpose of physical understanding, as inertia and momentum. Effectively, God as a loving, caring supreme being, has a Will which we can depend upon. This provides for us the necessity of inertia and momentum, which is not an absolute necessity but dependent on God's choice.

So, what he did was quantify matter as "mass", and this is not consistent with Aristotelian "matter", as quantity is formal, and there is a categorical separation between form and matter.. Therefore he gave matter itself, a fundamental quantifiable property, "mass", which effectively supplants "matter". The one must replace the other as the two are inconsistent with each other. This is why today, "matter" is just a philosophically and scientifically useless, ambiguous term, without any rigorous convention.

Recall that in the newly-emerging physics — Wayfarer

In the newly emerging physics, Newton had done something very interesting with his first law of motion, commonly known as the law of inertia. What Newton did, is replace the concept of "matter" with "inertia", as the defining feature of a body. We can understand a body as having inertia, instead of understanding it as having matter. So the emerging physics, which understood the principal property of a body as inertia, rather than as matter, rendered the concept of matter as redundant.

The concept of inertia was revolutionary, because it allowed "momentum" which is the opposing equivalent of inertia, to be transferred from one body to another as "force". Matter did not have this capacity, it was fixed within the body. The new physics did not require "matter" as a concept, "inertia" serves the purpose in a far more versatile way. And, that we could adequately understand the external reality without this concept, "matter", is what Berkeley argued.

For him, perhaps it was; but nonetheless "matter" is very useful as a working assumption (like e.g. the uniformity of nature, mass, inertia, etc) for 'natural philosophers' then as it is now; certainly, as we know, not as "useless" of a "concept" for explaining the dynamics in and of the natural world as the good Bishop's "God" (pace Aquinas). — 180 Proof

I argue above, that "inertia" effectively replaced "matter", making it a useless redundancy. The problem for many people, is that "inertia" is apprehended as far more abstract than "matter", and many cannot get their heads around the notion that a body is composed of inertia, something completely abstract. They like to think of "matter" as something non-abstract, which could provide the substance of a body. In reality, "matter" is absolutely abstract as well.

The trend at the time was to overthrow all Aristotelian principles of physics. Matter was an Aristotelian principle. Inertia was used to replace matter, and inertia's inverse principle, momentum allows that force is transferable from one body to another. Matter" could not provide this. So this theoretical principle, which replaced matter with inertia allows for the reality of energy-mass equivalence.

So, what is really the case, is that overthrowing the Aristotelian concept of "matter", leaving it in the dustbin, in preference of "inertia", is what enabled modern physics. That allowed for the mass-energy equivalence. Berkeley was quick to recognize that the concept "matter", had become obsolete, and was useless to science.

I take post-consumption to imply a deification process, where theory becomes live and kicking, in the subject, from its reified static and external state. — Pussycat

I don't buy this. He says that it disappears into experience. So the best we can say is that it becomes a part of experience. As such, you would think it is govern by the whole, like Adorno's food analogy. The food is consumed and the nutrients are used within the living being which has consumed it. The food is not alive and kicking within the subject, it is now a part of a system. But, it plays a very special role, and this is why you say it is "live and kicking". Think of the food you eat as energy, in a sense it is "live and kicking" as energy is active, but we tend to believe that it is controlled by the system that has consumed it. In the analogy, theory is consumed by experience, but it maintains a very special, active role, which is why you say that it is live and kicking. Nevertheless, we tend to believe that it is governed by the subject which consumes the theory.

Do you think we can figure out the special role which Adorno assigns to theory, after it disappears within the intellectual experience of the subject? To me, it seems like the subject is first repulsed by non-identity within the theory, and reacts by retreating into itself. This might be like a sort of toxicity in the food. So a separation of difference is still maintained after consumption, between subject and object, the object being theory here. There is a reciprocal relation between theory and intellectual experience, but theory is very limited and cannot fully provide what is desired by the subject, which is freedom, the ability to move.

The result is a dialectical movement, and this rebels against the system. So, is "the system" here, that which consumed the theory, the intellectual experience of the subject? Does theory now, from within the subject, in this immanent, authentically dialectical process, being open-minded self-consciousness, rebel against the very intellectual experience which consumed it? Is that what is meant by "Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each other’s critique, not through compromise."?

But specifically for Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, he does not believe in a world of material substance, fundamental particles and forces, but he does believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God. — RussellA

I take Berkeley to be arguing that we can do without the concept of matter. We can have a sufficient understanding of the external word, without the concept of "matter" to support substantial existence. In fact, I believe that the principal point he made is that "matter" does absolutely nothing for us, in aiding our understanding of reality. I think he believed it to be a completely useless concept.

Why would that necessarily be so? For all we know there is nothing more fundamental than quarks. There does seem to be a limit to the possibility of measurement, that much is known. — Janus

As I said, the the evidence is experiential. Not long ago atoms were the smallest particles.

Quarks have not actually been produced in isolation, because of the unintuitive nature of the strong force. So it is just the result of an unintuitive theory, that quarks are believed to be the most fundamental particles.

Measurement problems are temporary.

Do you have a reference or an argument for your 'fundamental matter/ energy' claim? — Janus

You mean the claim of infinite regress? The evidence is experiential. Every proposed fundamental particle has been broken down into further particles in experimentation, implying infinite regress.

Should we take science as our guide to determine which seems more plausible, or should we take our imagination, intuitions, wishes and so on? — Janus

Science provides no guidance on this. It is a metaphysical question. The fundamental matter/energy assumption falls to infinite regress in scientific experimentation. Since science demonstrates that fundamental matter/energy is problematic, the deity is posed as an end to the infinite regress. So science gives us no guidance as to which is more plausible. Neither, the infinite regress of matter/energy nor the deity is supported by science.

Theory, in the passage I attempted to interpret, is not like the theory in the passage after. — Pussycat

I think we need to assume Adorno was attempting to be consistent, and not ambiguous or equivocal. So I see the difference as a matter of perspective. That is why I spoke of pre-consumption and post-consumption, from the perspective of a particular subject. Consider that theory is fed to the subject as an educational tool in the form of ideology, in the process of the subject's intellectual experience. Also, the subject might freely choose theory for consumption. But post-consumption, theory is within the subject, and is then a tool of that subject. The analogy is one of eating. Food is fed to a child, who then learns to choose one's own food. But in both of these cases, after consumption the food is then used by the subject who consumes. The difference is an external/internal difference, and the point you appear to be claiming is that there is a difference between the thing when it is external, and the thing after its been internalized.

Experience is proper to the subject, yes, but I think its also more broad than that, as to all the happenings in the world. For example, Auschwitz was an experience, no matter if we didnt experience it. And since Adorno's death in the late sixties, new experiences were added in the world: the moon landing experience, the sixties movement, the bringing down of the Berlin wall, the internet experience, now the AI experience etc. Have our philosophical theories been able to keep pace with technological progress? Because progress seems to be running pretty fast, and our heavy feet are a problem. — Pussycat

I'm sure that we can learn from the experience of others, but that involves the process of internalizing the external which is described above. So if I say that your experience is "an experience", I need to respect that difference. It is an external experience. And if you approach me with that experience, and attempt to educate me, I should also understand that this is a case of you using theory as a tool.

I don't think there is an issue of keeping pace. The process of internalizing external experiences is not hindered by slow pace, it is hindered by faulty direction. Even this process of internalizing external experiences, can be divided into two, those which are force fed to us as a child, and those which we choose as an adult. The philosopher has the will to choose, but one's direction is most often still guided by educational systems. Because the ambitious person is strongly motivated, I do not think that keeping pace is an issue. What is an issue is finding direction.

I agree that science depends on the working assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us. That’s the stance of objectivity, and it’s indispensable for observation, experiment, and prediction. But that stance is methodological, not metaphysical. It’s a way of working, not a complete account of what reality is. — Wayfarer

I don't think it is the case that science depends on the "assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us". I believe that idea is a misunderstanding of the true "objective" nature of science. Experimentation involves human action, and what we are looking for with this activity, is a reaction from our environment. So the experiment, being derived from hypothesis, is directed by the hypothesis.

This implies that any assumptions about a reality which is independent of us, are hypotheses dependent. In many cases, of scientific experimentation, the implied assumption is actually the opposite of that. This is clearly evident with the use of relativity theory in the creation of hypotheses. Relativity theory is based in the assumption that if there is a reality about what is, independent of us, this reality is irrelevant to our modeling of observed activities. In other words, the premise of relativity theory is that we can produce an adequate understanding of activities without assuming "a reality that is what it is, independent of us".

So, our attitude toward "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", need not be one of affirmation or negation, when we engage in scientific experimentation. And, I would say that this attitude, be it relativistic or non-relativistic, greatly influences the type of experiments which we design. Notice in the paragraphs above, the experiment is directed by the hypothesis, and the hypothesis is directed by the underlying assumptions or attitude.

Phenomenologists like Husserl showed that even the most rigorous scientific observation is grounded in the lifeworld — the background of shared experience that makes such observation possible in the first place. This doesn’t mean reality depends on your or my whims; it means that what we call “objective reality” is already structured through the conditions of human knowing. Without recognising this, science risks mistaking its methodological abstraction for the whole of reality.

So yes, objectivity is crucial. But it is not the final word — it’s one mode of disclosure, and it rests on a deeper, irreducible involvement of the subject in the constitution of the world - a world in which we ourselves are no longer an accident. — Wayfarer

According to what I wrote above, "reality" to a large degree does depend on the whims of individuals. That is the whims of the scientists devising the experiments. Of course these whims are shaped by the social environment, and the ideology which informs the scientific community. Notice the modern trend, which is greatly influenced by the relativistic perspective, is toward metaphysics like model-dependent realism, and many-worlds. These are ontologies which deny "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", or perhaps could be described in the contradictory way of, 'the reality that is what it is independent of us is that there is no reality which is what it is independent of us'.

But still, there's a twist in the story, with Adorno there always is, and even this sarcastic and ironic jab can be transformed: instead of the diner eating the roast, the roast eats the diner. — Pussycat

Well, I think you're grasping at straws Pussycat. Invisible straws at that! There is clearly no reason whatsoever, to interpret this as "the roast eats the diner". Here's the complete context, notice that one "lives by ingesting" the other.

If a standpoint is demanded of the latter, then
it would be that of the diner to the roast. It lives by ingesting such; only
when the latter disappears into the former, would there be philosophy.

So it seems that I was half-right: the diner to the roast is the old-school wrong traditional epistemology, and the diner (theory) being devoured by the roast (experience) is the correct one. — Pussycat

Well, if you look back at the passage, "experience" is the former, and "theory" is the latter.
Look:
"The scientific consensus would probably concede that even experience would imply theory."
And he says, "the latter disappears into the former". So it is clear that he is saying that theory is devoured by experience.

Question for you Pussycat. Why do you need to make "theory" analogous with the diner, and "experience" analogous with the roast, so that you end up with the diner being devoured by the roast? Why not just make "theory" analogous with the roast, and "experience" analogous with the diner? Then you have experience devouring theory just like the diner devours the roast, without the absurdity which you propose.

So after all this, we get the impression that Adorno crowns experience king. Alas no, yet another twist, as he is preparing for his dialectical moment which continues in the next paragraph. — Pussycat

"Experience" is proper to the subject right? "Theory" is a bit more complex though, because it may be ideology (objective), or it may be speculative (subjective). Notice above, that experience consumes theory. But in the next paragraph, post consumption, theory can also be used to resist ideology.

I'm starting to believe that the "diner to the roast" is the wrong old school model. And that experience is consumed into theory, not the opposite. — Pussycat

I don't think it's a matter of seeing that there is a right way and a wrong way of describing things. I think it's a matter of understanding the way that he describes things. if, in the end, it doesn't work for you, you cannot perceive what he is describing, then reject it. Is that what you are doing?

But "unregimented thought" is only a part of negative dialectics. It is the part where thought steps beyond the methodology of dialectics. — Jamal

Yes, at the beginning of that little section, Adorno specifically mentions "the subjective share of intellectual experience".

Ideology lurks in the Spirit which, dazzled with itself like
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, irresistibly becomes well-nigh absolute.
Theory prevents this. It corrects the naiveté of its self-confidence,
without forcing it to sacrifice the spontaneity which theory for its part
wishes to get at. By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it.
In the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative.

There's a number of interesting points made here. The first thing I notice is the "painful exertion" of the subject. This, I believe refers to the effort and disillusionment required to approach the reality of "non-identity". Non-identity is apprehended as negative, so it is like a problem which is being forced upon the subject, such that pain is induced, and effort required for resolution.

The second thing is that a reconciliation is implied. It's not quite clear to me yet, what that reconciliation might be. I don't think it's a rejection of the retreat into the subject, but something which happens after the subject confronts the limitations of one's fullness. I would describe this process as how the subject's attitude toward its object is reformulated. After the negative experience described above, and the subject apprehends its limitations through critical self-reflection, it can then approach the object with "open-minded self-consciousness". This is a completely different approach to "the ability to move", a new understanding of freedom, and a new attitude toward the object.

So, I am very interested in Adorno's proposals for the objective share of intellectual experience, the new approach to the object. In your description you said that intellectual experience refers to a mode of thinking which progresses by "immersing itself in particulars", but I haven't really seen this yet from Adorno.

I've mentioned a number of times, that Aristotle's resolution was the law of identity. This, as "a thing is the same as itself", puts the identity of a particular thing into the thing itself, as a sort of relation between the thing and itself. This recognizes the temporal extension of a thing, allowing that an object changes as time passes, yet maintains its identity. Aristotle reacted to the sophistry exposed by Socrates and Plato, so we can say that his reaction was a reaction to the non-identity in the ideology of his day.

Now, I think Adorno has outlined his proposal with his discussion of free thinking at the end of the section. Notice that the ability to move is described as a double process. The first stage is "the authentically dialectical", but the second is "something unfettered which steps out of dialectics".

Since free thinking is very subjective and idiosyncratic, I'm very interested to see how Adorno describes the unfettered which steps out of dialectics. Strangely, this would be the objective share of intellectual experience. This makes the freedom to move, of the particular, the individual, subjectivity in general, something objective.

That seems to be factually incorrect at least when it comes to philosophers: — Janus

Philosophers make up a very small percentage of the population. So your proposed facts are irrelevant.

That passage reads like nonsense―can't find anything there to respond to. — Janus

Well, aren't you special.