Socrates makes a three-fold distinction:

1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman. — Fooloso4

I believe the best representation of this three-fold distinction is like this.

The basic example consists of three beds, one made by God, one made by a carpenter, and the third being a painting of one made by the carpenter. You can see how the third is an imitation, and not even a real bed. So artists, poets, and playwriters who imitate (sometimes translated as narrate) like this are frowned upon, for producing something less than real. The point is that there are different perspectives, and the artist's imitation is from a perspective, therefore lacking in truth, and inherently deceptive.


Now, to understand how this relates to good and bad, and Homer's representation of the divine, we are guided to take the analogy one step further. So, consider the following. The carpenter makes a physical bed. This physical bed is a copy of the carpenter's idea (form) of a bed. The carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the ideal bed, the divine Form of bed or best bed. The carpenter attempts to produce the ideal form of bed. Notice how the carpenter's material bed suffers the same problem of "imitation" that the painter's bed suffered. Rather than being based on the divine Form of bed itself, it is based on the carpenter's representation of what he believes is the divine Form. So it's an imitation produced from a perspective, and therefore lacking in truth.

This is how we are instructed to look at Homer's representation of good, bad, and the divine, as opinion. There are three levels, the divine, the poet's ideas of the divine, and the poetry. We are inclined to believe that the poetry is a representation of the divine. But this leaves out the very important medium, which is the poet's own ideas of the divine. So the poetry really only represents the divine through the medium, which is the poet's ideas.

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.
11 hours ago — Dan

When someone forces someone to do something, they are using the physical forces of the universe to their advantage. So from the perspective of the person who is said to be forced, the two are the same in principle. In the first case, the person being forced by physical forces has to understand and deal simply with those forces of the universe. In the other case, the person has to deal with the forces of the universe being directed by another's intent. This makes the latter type of force more complex, therefore more difficult to understand and deal with, because intention is an integral part of it and intention is difficult to understand.

This is why I say that you need to look closely at the relationship between the free agent, and force, to understand that force cannot actually restrict the free agent. And this is regardless of the type of force. So if the free agent is restricted, this is a feature of the agent itself, making it not truly free. And this feature creates challenges for the agent in dealing with forces (that includes all types of forces, including physical and the intent of another). It is not the case that a specific type of force restricts the agent, it is the case that the agent has restrictions inherent within (making it less than free), which renders it vulnerable to specific types of forces.

But if this is the case, then we must drop the premise that the agent is free, and adopt the premise that it is inherently restricted. Then we would need to analyze the nature of the agent to see what sort of restrictions inhere within.

In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. — Dan

That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good.

No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does. — Dan

Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".

Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom.

What I suggest, is that if you look closely at the relationship between force and freedom, you will first see the inherent contradiction, (which I referred to earlier), inhering within the idea that force restricts freedom. "Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free. Therefore, if our primary premise is that the agent is free, we need to assign freedom to the agent, and then develop the relationship between the agent and forces from this premise.

That the agent is free implies that it is impossible that forces restrict the agent, because this would contradict the agent's freedom. Therefore we must conclude that the free agent's response to forces, (which create the appearance that the agent is being restricted by the forces), are really free choices made by the agent, decisions made as to how deal with the forces.

See how the contradiction is resolved? The agent remains free. Forces surround the free agent. The agent responds to the forces freely. The free response of the agent to a force creates the appearance that the agent is being restricted by that force. This is the first lesson from Plato's cave allegory, to learn how to distinguish appearance from reality. The sensible world which we observe is the realm of appearance. We need to look into the mind to access the real.

I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. — Dan

Final cause is defined by Aristotle as that for the sake of which. The example given is that health is the final cause of the man walking. Why is he walking? To be healthy. The reason he is walking is to be healthy, he is walking for the sake of his health. That really seems like "intention" to me. It's what Plato called "the good".

It seems we're very far apart as to what moral philosophy is. I think its principal function is to teach, you think it's principal function is to learn. I suppose it must involve both, because learning is necessary for teaching, but until you recognize the importance of teaching, there's not much for us to discuss.

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher escapes the cave out into the sunlight, and recognizes the sun. The sun is analogous with "the good", as that which makes visible objects visible, in the same way that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible. After seeing the light, the philosopher does not just sit around and bask in its glow, he must return to the cave, and teach the others what has been revealed to him. That, I believe is the position of moral philosophy.

I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does. — Dan

The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere.

I think the principle of plenitude actually is important to Aquinas' version of the cosmological argument. Basically, if all existence is contingent existence (coming into being from a prior possibility), then it would be possible that there was a time with no existence. By the principle of plenitude, an endless amount of time prior to now would necessitate that there was a time prior to now when there was nothing. But if there was ever nothing, nothing could ever have come from that, so there would still be nothing. However there is something now. Therefore not all existence is contingent existence, and necessary existence is real.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood. — Paine

I didn't see any need to comment on the Aquinas quote. He was explaining what you and I both agreed upon, that Aristotle said we understand the meaning of actuality in its relation to potentiality. The aspect of the passage from Aristotle which I was interested in, what I would call the content, or substance of that chapter, was the distinction between the two different senses of "actual". This is what I said is the key to resolving the problem you indicated earlier here:

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I replied, that the way to resolve this issue is to understand that Aristotle distinguishes two senses of "form". "Form" is understood as "actual", and in Ch 6, Bk 9, Aristotle is clearly distinguishing two distinct senses of "actual". Understanding this is the way toward resolving the problem which you quoted from SEP.

The passage in question is not claiming that result. — Paine

That's right, as I said, after finishing that chapter, with the clear conclusion and distinction made between "movement" and "actuality", as the two types, "movement" being related to the type of potential known as "potency", and "actuality" being related to the type of potential known as matter, he proceeds from that conclusion. So the result which you refer to follows later in Bk 9, when he demonstrates that actual is prior to potential in an absolute sense.

There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. — Dan

We can take this as a true proposition, that the consequences of our actions are caused by our actions, and apply it as the foundation for a moral philosophy, but that would produce an inadequate moral philosophy. This is because of the gap between efficient cause and final cause, which I've been referring to.

There are causes of freely willed actions, which are "not wholly caused by preceding factors". We understand these causes as intentions, or in the classical terms, "final cause". Since these causes, final causes, are the principal causes, the most significant causes, of a freely willed act, they are the subject of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy seeks to induce good actions, therefore the subject matter of moral philosophy, is the cause of those freely willed actions, which we know of as intentions, or final cause.

In your portrayal of consequentialism, you describe the consequences of an action as the subject of moral philosophy. From an examination of the consequences, one can make a judgement as to whether or not the act was good. Notice that this is a judgement of something which has occurred, in the past, a fact, what "actually is". From this perspective, there is nothing to induce us, persuade us, or even force us, to do what is good. It simply provides the means by which we can judge actions as good or bad. Because of this, it is not a moral philosophy at all, it is more like a science of morality. There are theories concerning what constitutes good and bad (such as your principle of protecting one's own choices), and there are principles provided, by which actions can be judged according to consequences, but there is nothing to incline or inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good. To incline and inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good, is the goal of moral philosophy.

This is why consequentialism is not a moral philosophy. It offers us no way to shape or form a person's disposition, one's character, attitude toward actions. And that is what defines moral philosophy, it's capacity to provide us with formative principles, upon which we educate human beings so that they are inclined to act in the way that we believe is proper. The difference between moral philosophy and consequentialism, is that the former has as its subject, intentions and final cause, while the latter has as its subject, the consequences of actions, and the efficient cause relation of the consequences to the actions.

Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc. — Dan

This is how the focus on efficient causation, which is taken for granted as the principal form of causation by consequentialism, completely misleads us into misunderstanding. Since the "necessity" which is required for a judgement of of "cause" by the concept of efficient causation, is not present in the case of final causation, due to the fact that the will is free, then we cannot allow final cause, or intention, to be a valid cause. This is an issue with the "scientific" approach to morality, as science focuses on efficient causation. On the other hand, moral philosophy apprehends intention or final cause as a valid form of causation, it seeks to understand this type of causation, and work with it to inspire goodness in humanity.

So for example, you state here, "you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information". In this statement, you simply exclude final cause as a real form of causation when you say "you can't really cause other people to...". However, when I have a specific goal, or intention in my mind, and I communicate this goal to you, so that you carry out the means to that end for me, (I may offer to compensate you, or we may just have a friendly relationship), then I have caused you to do something. That's plain and simple, if final cause is accepted as causation. However, restricting causation to efficient cause, and not allowing final cause as a real form of causation, induces you to say that this is not "really" a case of causing.

Now there is a serious hole in your moral philosophy, which I will call it "the abyss". Your scientific approach to morality has inclined you to exclude final cause as a real form of causation. However, your common sense, and intuition, allow you to temper your scientific approach with an appeal to "libertarian free will". Your real, lived experience, 'forces you' to accept the reality of freely willed choices. Now, your adherence to the idea that efficient cause is the only real type of causation, makes libertarian free will completely incomprehensible. People influence the choices of others all the time. However, this cannot be "causation" or else your idea of libertarian free will would be excluded. That reinforces the belief that all real causes are efficient causes. But it also renders a libertarian free will choice as nothing but random chance. You see, you have no way to account for the supposed "influence". Libertarian free will excludes the possibility of it being causation, and so it is morally irrelevant to you. A person still chooses freely, despite being "influenced", so the "influence" is not morally relevant.

The abyss is this "influence". The scientific approach denies that it is causation, because it's not efficient cause, and the libertarian free will approach endorses this scientific approach, by saying that it cannot be causation or else free will would be negated. But that renders the "influence" as completely unintelligible, and dismissed as irrelevant. It doesn't fit into the scientific approach of efficient causation and consequentialism, nor does it fit into the libertarian free will side of things. So it's discarded as not morally relevant, and dismissed, even though it is what moral philosophy considers as its subject. Therefore you loose the entire content of moral philosophy into this abyss you have created by rejecting final cause as a real form of causation. What's the point to your project, morality without content? Al the real content of moral philosophy has been rejected as not relevant.

Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. — Dan

If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way.

So the possibility of infinite universes is a 'tidier explanation' than a higher intelligence. — Wayfarer

The old principle of plenitude, to the rescue. Given enough universes, one's got to produce intelligence. Given enough monkeys with typewriters... Typewriters went out of style before a monkey could even produce a two syllable word. I imagine the same thing will happen to the multiverse.

OK, if I still have your attention Paine, I will continue.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. — Paine

Right, this is the point I was making, the different senses of potentiality. That is what had been pointed to in Ch 5. One sense is related to movement, the other sense is related to being.

Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present: — Paine

Now, in Ch 6, he proceeds to discuss the two principal senses of "actuality" which are related to those two senses of potentiality.

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so. — Paine

Of course it uses the the antithesis between actuality and potentiality, you and I always agreed on that. But the significant point, the importance, of the chapter is the two distinct senses of "actuality" which correspond with the two distinct senses of potentiality, in the relation of antithesis. What I said already is that he states that we must use this relation between potential and actual as the means for determining which sense of "actual" is being referred to by the word.

You seemed to be ignoring, or simply denying, the substance of Ch 6 which is the distinction between two separate senses of "actual". He is saying that since there are two distinct senses of potential, if we maintain the antithesis, there must be two distinct senses of actuality. This is the analogy, wherever the analysis of "potential" has led us (to two distinct senses), so we must follow with "actual", to maintain the antithesis.

So, according to my Ross translation, Ch 6 progresses in this way.
"...let us discuss actuality..." 1048a,26
"...we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move something else...but also use the word in another sense..." 1048a, 27-29
"Actuality ,then, is the existence of a thing not in the way that we express by 'potentially'". 1048a, 30
"Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis and potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually...for some are as movement to potency and others as substance to some sort of matter." 1048b, 4-8
"Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but are relative to an end...but that movement which the end is present is an action. ... At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. ... Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities." 1048b ,18-28
"The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement." 1048b, 34

The final statement above is how he closes out the chapter.

He has distinguished two principle senses of actual, corresponding by analogy to the two senses of potential distinguished earlier . One sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential which is known as potency, and this is movement, activity, and it exists relative to an end. The other sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential known as matter. This is substance, "actuality", and it has the end within itself.

Notice, that in his conclusion, he has not only distinguished these two principal types of actuality, but he has even gone so far as to have given one of them a different name "movement". This allows him to proceed with clarity as to what kind of thing "actuality" is, having been separated from activity and movement. "Actual" describes what exists as substance in relation to the potential which is known as matter. We know have "actual" in the sense of being, as distinguished from motion (what we call "activity") in the sense of becoming.

After having distinguished "actual" from "movement" in this way, he proceed to question which is prior, "the actual" (substance), or "the potential" (matter). He concludes by the so-called cosmological argument that the actual must be prior to the potential, and since he has separated "actual" from "movement" in this way, it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement.

Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy. — Shawn

You misunderstand what Wittgenstein was saying. It is not the case that philosophy is in need of therapy, it is the case that philosophy is the therapy. Look at the quote from @Banno.

255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — Philosophical Investigations

See, the illness inheres within the general population, as a deficiency in the way that we think, and it is exemplified by the way that we use language, common usage. Philosophy is the therapy which is required to treat this ailment. That is why Wittgenstein engaged in philosophy, rather than simply accepting the mistaken ways of thinking which he noticed as abundant, and thereby becoming a part of the disease, he wanted to be a part of the cure, and act as a philosopher.

It is a fine line to distinguish the boundary between the cure and the disease, as Plato found out in trying to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. The therapy then, philosophy itself, is shown to be this activity of distinguishing the afflicted thinking. Apprehending the mode by which the illness is recognized, is the therapy, and this distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist. As Wittgenstein explains it involves understanding the role of "purpose", what Plato called "the good".

He says it’s Part 2, although part 1 doesn’t seem to be published yet. — Wayfarer

That's the trend, leave room for the prequel. Biologists should get themselves up to date with the modern trends, and instead of leading people toward believing in abiogenesis, they should leave an opening for the prequel, the prior agency.

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10: — Paine

Your interpretation of "sharply separates", when Aristotle is talking about the difference between a definition, and understanding by analogy, is a fabrication by you. Please, stay true to a respectable translation, rather than making up your own translation, to suit your purpose.

Your post makes no sense Paine. You seem to be completely confused as to what Aristotle is explaining in Bk 9 Ch 6. You start out by saying that Aristotle is talking about sharply separating different ways of understanding meaning, then you end the post by saying that he "yokes together the two senses".

What he is saying about the two senses of "actuality" discussed in Ch 6, is that they are different meanings for "actuality", and these meanings are explicitly separable. But the difference in meaning is not one understood by referring to two different definitions, rather it is understood through analogy. The "analogy" spoken about involves reference to the related senses of "potential".

Please, try reading the entire chapter, beginning to end, then decide whether you still disagree with me. The chapter is not long, and although it is somewhat difficult, so it needs to be read slowly, it's not extremely difficult

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is: — Paine

The point is, that in the chapter you quoted, Aristotle says we refer to analogy to understand the sense of "actual" which is implied in a particular instance of usage. We refer to analogy by determining what sense of "potential" is referred to in the usage. So sometimes "actual" is related to a potency, a power, and in this sense "actual" means active, or movement. But at other times "actual" is related to the potential of matter, and in this sense "actual" means what is substantial, what is real, or what exists.

Notice your quoted paragraph, from 1048b: "for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter" These are the two senses of "actual" which we distinguish by determining the related sense of potential (analogy).

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6. — Paine

No it is not the same pair of terms. He is not talking about "natural being" in the section we are discussing, he is talking about "actual", and its two distinct senses which we distinguish through the type of "potential" which is related in the particular instance of usage. The issue is whether "actual" means movement, or active, as when it is related to potency, or whether "actual" means real, existent, or substance, as when it is related to the potential of matter. These are the two distinct senses of "actual" which he is describing, and he says that we distinguish one from the other through the use of analogy

You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing. — Dan

I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,

What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will.

Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. — Dan

Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.

This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".

But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.

This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought".

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning.

I suggest you read more carefully. Ch. 5 discusses potency, then chapter 6, starts out with the following sentence:

"Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related to movement, let us discuss actuality ---what, and what kind of thing, actuality is."

The issue in this chapter, is that there are different senses of "actual", and he wants to distinguish a special sense of "actual". So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". He wants to distinguish the special sense, which is what is meant when we say that something "actually exists", (or what is "actual"), from another sense which is "active", or "movement". This specific sense of "actual", as we say, "what is real", is what his analysis intends to bring out.

Your quoted paragraph refers to how we must relate "actual" to "potential", in order to determine what sense of "actual" is actually being used. At the end of that paragraph he makes the following statement:

Here is your quoted translation from Reeve:

"But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter."

Here is the translation of W. D. Ross:

"But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy---as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D, for some are as movement to potency, and others as substance to some sort of matter.

So we have two principal senses of "actual" being discussed, movement which is related to potency (understood as active), and substance which is related to matter (seemingly passive as 'being', but still "actual"). The chapter ends with an interesting distinction between "actuality" in the present tense, as being active, moving, and "actuality" in the past, as what has been is "actual" in the sense of real, but it is not currently active.

"But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call, an actuality, the former, a movement."

@Dan
My last post shows the two significant problems with your thesis, the faulty assumptions you work from.
1. You misrepresent "freedom".
2. You misrepresent "morality"

Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case. — Dan

You're working from a false assumption. It is not force which restricts freedom, it is impossibility which restricts freedom. We can find our way around force, and even use it to our advantage toward getting what we want. This is the case with our use of "energy". Force is power, which may be used to assist us with our freedom when we understand it properly. To portray "force" as that which restricts freedom is a mistaken conception which demonstrates the misunderstanding of "freedom" which you have, and I've been trying to help you to see, and to address.

I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". — Dan

You clearly have a "consequentialist bias". Your stated moral framework is consequentialism, and you refuse to think outside the box, closing your mind to the possibility that consequentialism is woefully inadequate as a moral philosophy. See below.

Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

We disagree because you present an ill-defined concept of making one's own choices. As I said you override the stated definition with principles which force the employment of subjective and arbitrary judgement. Naturally we disagree.

Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them. — Dan

This is more evidence of the consequentialist bias in your moral principles. It is not the act of providing false information which you judge as immoral, it only becomes immoral if it has observable consequences which are judged as immoral. This is the gap you create between final cause and efficient cause. Whenever a link between the teaching (misinformation), and the acts which follow, cannot be adequately established, so as to be able to decisively say that the person "convinces" someone else, then the teaching is judged as not morally relevant, due to an inability to establish the link between the teaching and the acting. This renders the majority of teaching (all that is not forcefully "convincing" another to make an act with bad consequences) as morally irrelevant. But in reality, teaching is the most morally relevant thing there is, and you simply turn a blind eye to this fact, refusing to accept the significance of ideology.

I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus. — Paine

I think we have to be very careful in what it means to say that Socrates held so and so in high esteem. Socrates was very respectful of all his interlocuters in Plato's dialogues. That was his mode of inquiry, show great respect for the individual philosopher, and great interest in his philosophy, so that the philosopher would explain and reveal as much as possible. Then after learning the information Socrates would address the weaknesses. So I think that if Socrates held Parmenides in high esteem in Theatetus, this doesn't really mean much relative to the question of whether Plato came to regard Parmenides as a sophist.

There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon. — Paine

That looks exactly as I said, we learn what "potential" means through its relations to "actual":

" what is building is in relation to what is capable of building"
"what is awake is in relation to what is asleep"
" what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight"
"what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter"
"what has been finished off is to the unfinished"
" some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential]"

Your translation says "analogy", I would prefer "comparison", to describe how Aristotle explains these relations which give meaning to words like "potential", and "actual", because "analogy" has slightly different connotations in modern usage.

Notice also, that your quoted paragraph, is from BK 9 Ch. 6, where he is discussing the word "actuality", after he has already discussed "potential" in the prior chapter. The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential".

It's easy to invert what Aristotle says, to suit one's purpose, because his writing is full of inversions. But in the big picture, to understand him clearly, it's better to adhere strictly to what he says, and not be swayed to create your own inversions. This will help to reveal inconsistencies like those in Book Lambda, which betray inauthenticity.

I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear. — Dan

I used that example, as an extreme, to bring to your attention the complexity of human interactions with "property" as the medium. If you dismiss the car stealing example, because the intent of the thief is to do something with the other's property, even though the thief is using one's own property (tools) to do this, then we also need to dismiss cases of purchasing, where on uses one's own property (money) with the intent of doing something with another's property (what is purchased).

"There are potentially some complicated cases" is a gross understatement. The reality is that the vast majority of human interactions are "complicated cases", making your simple principle "one's own choice", completely ineffective, and unsuitable for the task you assign to it, due to the subjectiven, and arbitrary principles which you are forced to apply in your judgements as to whether a choice fulfills the criteria of "one's own". In reality, you simply apply some preconceived ideas about morally good and bad, to make that judgement, even though you insist that it is not. Then, "protecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices" turns out to be nothing more than encouraging moral restraint, as I pointed out earlier.

Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case. — Dan

The point I am making is that we do not need to involve property or human bodies in these examples. We have three distinct items named, mind, body, and property. Without involving property, or body, we can discuss mind to mind relations, which occur through the medium of communication. These interactions consist primarily of one mind affecting another mind, and as such are morally relevant.

However, you dismiss these, and refuse to discuss them as morally relevant because (I assume), you cannot see and observe the consequences of these interactions (that is your consequentialist bias). The only observable part is the physical symbols (language) used in these intentional acts, and it is apprehended as innocuous. But these physical symbols are simply the tools by which the perpetrator carries out the intended act, just like the thief uses tools to steal the car. Therefore to be consistent you need to consider the intended consequences within the other's mind, in the case of communications, just like you consider the intended consequences to another's property, in the case of stealing the car. It is apparent, that since these consequences are unobservable, you dismiss them as not relevant.

It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice. — Dan

Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception.

f I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car? — Dan

This goes back to what I said at the beginning of the thread, which you seemed to have difficulty understanding. Every choice which an individual makes limits the person's future choices, by determining the person's current situation. So, if you offer to educate me, just like if you are a scammer and offer me something but it's really a scam, I can choose to proceed with you, or turn away. That choice is a reflection of my attitude toward future relations with you, and the choice hardens my position, one way or the other, thus limiting my future choices.

If I walk away, then you have not educated or scammed me. That is not the situation I am talking about though. I am talking about the situation when I do not walk away. After choosing to engage you, I have limited my own future choices accordingly. I can proceed with extreme caution, exercising principles of skepticism, or I can throw care to the wind and suck up everything you say. Again, this is an attitudinal choice which I must make, and most of us are inclined toward the principles described by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, following an intermediary path, not too skeptical, not to rash.

Now, my examples concern cases where you actually do educate me, or you actually do deceive me, so all those past choices, where you say that I could have walked away, and I limited my own freedom through my own choices, are irrelevant now, even though your approach had a great effect on this limiting. We are in the position where you have engaged me and I have chosen to listen.

It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept.

So, I don't see the distinction you are trying to make between my mind, and your car. In one case, the object of my intention is your property, your car. In the other case, the object of your intention is my mind, to educate it. In the former case, if you are worried about your property, you will go through extreme measures to protect it from my advances, and I will simply find another easy target. In the latter case, if I am extremely worried about false information, I will take extraordinary measures to resist all attempts by you to educate me, and you will end up leaving me alone. In principle the two are very similar.

Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help. — Dan

As I said, this principle you are trying to impose, "one's own choice" is not viable for the reason's I have described. In your attempt to make it viable you give preference to a person's property rights, "stuff", and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. When the effects of a person's acts are within another's mind (education, deception, etc.), these consequences cannot be observed, and so they are dismissed as not morally relevant (effectively, there are no consequences). Then, when the person who has been so affected (educated, deceived, brainwashed, etc.) acts in the world, the consequences of the person's acts are judged as the products of that person's choices, without respect for the "education" which that person underwent to get into that attitudinal head space.

You ought to be able to conclude that this is very problematic because it provides no bridge between "final cause", which is the product of one's wants, desires, ideologies, and other immaterial, "mental" principles, and "efficient cause", which is the results of one's actions in the world. The results of one's actions in the world (efficient cause) are judged as morally relevant. However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant.

I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean. — Paine

I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic.

Anyway, I agree that we ought not classify the Eleatics altogether as sophists, nor do I think Plato or Socrates was doing such. That's why there was such a long discussion about how exactly to identify the sophist, so that we might separate the sophist from the philosopher, by reference to the individual, not to the type. Within the Eleatics, Zeno stands out as sophistic, using logic to prove things like motion is impossible.

Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos). — Paine

There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. So I do not know where you get that idea from. It is a concept which is developed by use, and he uses it in relation to actual. So "potential" is a word which derives its meaning in relation to the meaning of actual. Since "actual" has two distinct senses, just like "form" and "substance" each have two distinct senses, this allows potential to be the concept which relates these two. This is how "matter" provides the relation between "form" as universal, and "form" as particular, which is also the difference between "primary substance" as the individual, and "secondary substance" as the species. Matter partakes of one, but not the other.

But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice. — Dan

I don't agree with your description of "choice", as I explained. I choose to take a walk in a specific place, the specific place is an essential part of the choice. Without it, I would not walk anywhere because i would not have decided on a place to walk. Since I would not walk anywhere, this cannot be a choice to take a walk. What you call "the choice to take a walk" is not a choice at all, it's just a general desire, the desire to take a walk, which does not become a choice until a specific place to walk is chosen. Only when I have a specific place chosen to walk, do I have a choice to take a walk, because without choosing a direction, a walk will not follow.

but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property — Dan

The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.

It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement.

It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework. — Dan

We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself.

This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. — Dan

The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding.

You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. — Dan

Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift

This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you — Dan

Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise?

I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that. — Dan

You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it.

I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always. — Dan

This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person.

Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings. — Dan

I always assume consistency until I encounter what appears to be inconsistency. Then I ask the author to clarify. If the author cannot clarify, I conclude inconsistency. What I've discovered with you is that you have proposed a concept "one's own choice", with specific precepts. However, the concept is not viable under the precepts you assume ought to constitute it. So the proposed concept gets lost and is not viable.

No, I don't think your version is in error, more like incomplete. So I'll address specifically some aspects of your post with suggestions as to how I think it can be filled out better.

The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed. — Paine

The "new concept of the soul" is the one Aristotle proposes as a form which is the first actuality of a living body. The powers of a living being were understood as potencies, and this would lend itself to the idea of the soul as a power, or potency. But Aristotle showed that since the potencies of the living body are not always active, there is a need to assume an actuality which activates them when they become active. This is the soul, instead of a potency, it is an actuality.

Further study of his metaphysics reveals that this form, or actuality, "soul", must be prior to the body, as the cause of it being the particular body which it is, and not something else. By the law of identity, a thing must be what it is. However, it being what it is, is still contingent on a cause, and this is the prior form. In the case of a living body, it's the soul. Simply put, potencies are possibilities, and something must select (acting as cause) which possibilities will become actual (making the body, the body which it is rather than something else). This cannot be random chance, because the body is an organized body, so the cause is that form, (actuality), which is prior to the body.

There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics. — Paine

The Greeks were principally scientists, focused on becoming, while the Eleatics were more like philosophers, considering the nature of being. The incompatibility between being and becoming is strongly discussed in Plato's Theatetus, I believe. In my interpretation of The Sophist, the Eleatics are treated as sophists by Plato. But Plato is very careful to explain that it is a fine line, even an undistinguishable line, between a sophist and a philosopher. That seems to be a main point in the dialogue, to determine how to distinguish a sophist from a philosopher or vise versa. So Socrates claims high respect for the Eleatics, but also demonstrates that their philosophy is sophistry.

I think It's pretty clear that Aristotle treats the Eleatics as sophists, especially Zeno. At one point he explains how sophists, by adhering rigidly to the law of excluded middle, in cases of becoming, can prove absurdities. This is why there is a need for the concept of "potential" which violates the law of excluded middle (as what may or may not be), to account for the reality of becoming.

That being and becoming are incompatible is demonstrated by Aristotle in the following way. Suppose there is a change form state-of-being A to state-of-being B, between these two is a case of becoming. If we posit a further state-of-being, C, as the intermediary between A and B, to account for A becoming B, then we have a succession of the following states-of-being, A, C, and B. But now there is a case of becoming between A and C, and also between C and B. Therefore we would need to posit further states of being here, and this becomes and infinite regress of states-of-being without ever accounting for the reality of change, or "becoming", which is supposed to happen between two distinct states-of-being.

It's very similar to the question of real numbers, and the number line. The real number is a point, and there is assumed to be a line between two points. There is always more points, (real numbers), to an infinite regress, and we never account for what the line is, which supposedly exists between points.

The reason why Aristotle is so dismissive of the Eleatics ought to be evident. Zeno for instance, describes motion and change with states-of-being (the arrow is at point A at t1, and point B at t2 for example), and then proceeds from those premises to demonstrate that motion, is impossible. That's Zeno's mode of argumentation, to proceed from assumed states-of-being to show that things like motion and becoming are impossible.

The problem is that there is something very intuitive about states-of-being, so we cannot simply dismiss the concept as unreal. That's why dualism becomes necessary, to account for the reality of both. Then, from dualist premises, becoming and change, being supported by empirical evidence, (sense observation), is subject to skepticism. So we go around, and the inquiry is never ending.

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I find that the way to resolve this apparent problem is to understand that in Aristotle there is two distinct senses of "form", just like there is "substance" in the primary sense and in the secondary sense. Notice, if substance is form, and there are two distinct senses of "substance" then there must be two distinct senses of form to correspond. This is what allows for two distinct types of actuality, and what makes Aristotle the dualist who resolved the interaction problem, following Plato's revelations concerning the deficiencies of "participation" theory.

It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you. — Dan

I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.

I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities.

I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices. — Dan

You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential

Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic. — Dan

It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices.

so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). — Dan

This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices.

The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. — Dan

You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice.

An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not. — Dan

See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition.

No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is. — Dan

I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy.

I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you. — Dan

This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk?

Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. — Dan

This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition.

simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. — Dan

See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).

Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals.

but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. — Dan

It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence.

Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. — Dan

See, very clear evidence that you prioritize property ownership. The person doesn't own the park so the choice automatically does not belong to them, no exceptions. However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant?

By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice. Much property is public, and if people have no ownership over their choices to use public property, then the middle category of neither one's own choice, nor not one's own choice, becomes extremely inflated, to the point where the principle "one's own choice" becomes useless.

It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. — Dan

This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. So the judgement is just based in arbitrary, subjective principles and prejudice. You say that having an effect on property which is not your own makes it so the choice does not belong to you, but having an effect on a mind which does not belong to you does not bring about the same judgement call, because you provide an exception. There is no rule, because there is no longer a definition.

Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post). — Dan

This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body?

I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. — Dan

Your principles clearly demonstrate that you value an individual's property higher than an individual's mind. As we discussed, by your principles, stealing another's property is a choice we do not get to make, it's not one's own choice, but teaching, or corrupting, another's mind is a choice we get to make, as one's own. See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance.

The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds.

Luckily, in English we have "power" and "potency" to (sort of) distinguish what Eriugena terms "nothing through excellence," (pure, immutable power beyond any defining actuality) and the nothing of prime matter (a "nothing on account of privation"). Or at least, translators seem to use "power" more for Plotinus, which I think works better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of pure immutable power, is what Aristotle took issue with. Such a power would not have the capacity to actualize anything. If absolutely anything is possible, then there is nothing actual to cause anything, and the situation will always remain the same, as absolutely anything is possible. That is why Aristotle assumed an actuality which is prior to all potential, and the logical need to assume this actuality negates the possibility of pure immutable power. The prior actuality is the cause which accounts for the reality of this particular existence, which consists of limited possibility, rather than an endless existence of infinite possibility, or power.

Plotinus sort of grasped this problem and tried to deal with it by portraying the pure power, the One, as something other than a cause. So the reality which we know emanates from the One, rather than being caused by the One. But this description fails in the capacity to explain how any particular thing could come into being from a pure potency, or power. We need something to account for this existence rather than some other existence, a choice, and this is an actuality such as a will.

(This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act). — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Plotinus' "One" is pure potency rather than pure act. This is the principal metaphysical difference between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism.

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. — Paine

This claimed "inseparability" needs to be qualified as unidirectional. Matter cannot be separated from form, to produce "prime matter", but form is separable from matter. In principle this is how sensing, and abstraction is explained. The human mind receives the form of the object without the matter.

This understanding of abstraction created a problem for the ancients (exposed by Plato and Aristotle), because the form in the mind (the abstraction) is not precisely the same as the form in the material object. Aristotle explained this difference with the concept of "accidents", the form which the material object has is complete with accidents, while the abstracted form consists only of the essence of the object. The problem, well demonstrated by Plato in The Timaeus, is that if the form which comes to be in the human mind is an abstraction, an essence, it is categorized as a universal, yet the individual material object has a "form" which is particular to itself, complete with the accidentals which makes it a unique thing. Now, the question was, how does an object come to have a unique form, when "forms" as they are known to the human mind, are universals. So Plato grappled with the question of how universals produce particulars.

The solution presented by Aristotle, with reference to a further premise, the law of identity, is that the form of a material object must preexist the object's material existence. So in BK 7 of Metaphysics Aristotle discusses how an artist gives matter the particular form which it has, in the case of a work of art, by putting the form into the matter. He then proceeds to explain why natural objects must be generated in a similar way, the form preexists the material object, and is put into the matter.

This principle validates the separation of form from matter, in the sense that pure form is prior in time to matter. That is the principle which Aquinas and other Christian theologians exploit, claiming God to be pure Form, pure act, and Creator of matter. This representation is derived from Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, which shows that since it is necessary that the form of an object preexists its material presence, there must be a form which preexists all material presence. Then we must conclude that matter comes into existence from this primordial Act, and must always have form, making matter inseparable from form.

The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice. — Dan

I really don't think I am understanding what you are saying, but maybe this is the key to why I am having difficulty. Are you proposing a third category of choice here, those which belong to no one? And, any choices made which concern "public property" are choices which belong to no one?

So I conclude that when you say "one's own choice" is a choice which concerns one's own mind, body, and property, "property" is really the defining feature. So if I choose to write my name on the moon (as your example), or just to take a walk in the park, this concerns public property, and so it is no one's choice to make. I would have thought, that walking in the park, or going to the moon, since it concerns doing something with my own body, is my own choice to make. However, I'm now starting to understand that "my own mind and body" are accidentals in the judgement of whether the choice is mine, and property is the essential determining factor. So regardless of the fact that I am using my own body to walk in the park, the property is public, therefore it is a choice I make which does not belong to anyone.

Now, when you say that we need to protect the ability of people to make their own choices, what it means to people like me (who value their mind more than their property), is that you want to protect their rights to do what they want with their own property. To me, this is very problematic, because "one's property is not something static, and we need principles by which one can come to own property, and accumulate it.

I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference. — Dan

Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals.

Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals. — Dan

Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption? — Dan

Sorry, the double negative threw me off. We may agree here. I disagree that it is irrational to treat your own ends as more valuable than others, but I think this is consistent with traditional moral principles. I do not think it is consistent with your principles. Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property.

Notice I used the naming of "God" and "soul" as examples. I would propose something like "the immaterial".

What do you mean about dropping the Platonia-type thing"? The whole point is that we need to account for the reality of the Platonia-type thing, and as I said it's better just to name it than to describe it, because our descriptions rely on empirical based terms. So when a name for the "Platonia-type thing" is employed, over time specific descriptions (you might call this the connotations) become associated with the name, as in the examples of "God" and "soul". Then the best thing to do is to choose a new name to avoid the implied description which has accumulated over the years.

You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else. — Dan

You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice?

In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. — Dan

Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you?

That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues — Dan

How could you justify cooperation without common goals?

* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa) — Dan

Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense.

* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out) — Dan

This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person.

Cooperation is derived from common ends. But there is a big difference between taking another's end as one\s own, in cooperation, and allowing that there is no difference of importance in any goals of all others, like the principle you propose. The former (holding one's own as the most important) encourages rational judgement of any ends before passing judgement on importance on them. The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own.

I think we all know, the "God" commonly referred to, is dead.

No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me. — Dan

But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good.

If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic. — Dan

Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway.

This is the word use issue I was discussing with Patterner. It doesn't make sense to talk about Intelligence outside of time, because "intelligence" as we know and use the word, refers to a property of material beings which are temporal. However this does not invalidate the logic which indicates that there is a cause of intelligence, which is outside of time. We just do not know how to describe this immaterial cause which is outside of time. But rather than use descriptive terms like "intelligence", it is far better just to name it, as we do with "soul", and "God".

It would be interesting, and I'm sure we'd think of ways to block the subjective activity, so a person would only detect like a machine. — Patterner

I don't think so, and that is the problem I've been describing to you in the inverse form, (separating the pure immaterial subjective agent, sometimes called soul, or mind, or intellect) from the material object is not possible. We learn from logic, that the two are separable in theory, but in practise they are not. This is because "practise" necessarily involves both.

So our theories about the pure immaterial active agent end up involving material representations (eternal circular motions for example), and our practises, (the experiments meant to represent "machine sensing" for example) incorporate the immaterial aspect of human intention, and the two are never properly separated.

This is the nature of "attention". It incorporates both of the two aspects. The "detection" aspect serves to assist in the synthesis of information 'after-the-fact'. The 'intention' aspect serves to direct the attention, in the role of anticipation, based on a 'prior-to' analysis. The two are separable in principle, as memory of the past, and anticipation of the future, but not in pracise, because separation would annihilate the conscious experience which the separation is a representation of. And so we have all sorts of theories about the prior and the posterior, to account for the reality of this distinction, which cannot be supported by empirical science which relies on the posterior.

You say material had to have been preceded by immaterial, and organized had to have been preceded by un organized. If not, the current would not have been preceded; it would simply be a continuation of. Perhaps I have that right? — Patterner

Generally speaking, yes that's about right. The "continuation" is commonly known as infinite regress.

First of all, I don't know why that is the assumption. It could be the current is a continuation. if there was anything prior to the Big Bang, the Big Bang erased any empirical evidence of it. So we just don't know. — Patterner

I do believe that understanding causes requires that we move beyond simple "empirical evidence" to the employment of logic.

There was no material or organization prior, but there was life? — Patterner

That. I believe, is where the logic leads.

What Is unorganized life? — Patterner

I don't know.

And why assume this particular quality of the current existed in the prior, when no others could have? — Patterner

Now that is a good question, and I believe the answer is approached in Aristotle's "On the Soul". For him it was called "the soul", we tend to just call it "life". What happens is that logic leads us toward the need to assume an agential cause of living organisms. Then we put a name to it, "the soul", or "life". Notice that the name does not refer to a "particular quality" at all, it's a name that philosophers have used, as referring to the cause of a body being alive.

The interesting thing is that it doesn't really have a place in our empirical understanding of the organized living body. That is, there is nothing we can point to as life", or "the soul", there is just the living body. There is no property we can attribute to the living body, as "life". So "life" really has no meaning to the physicalist and that is why they can talk about non-living matter becoming living matter, there is no real distinction between the two. And so "life" is not really a "quality of the current". It only really makes sense to talk about "life" as the cause of the body being alive. Even though we commonly talk of "life" as if it is a quality, it really makes no sense because it's not anything we can describe.

Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off. — Dan

Before, you were qualifying types of choices. The choice to steal your car was a choice which does not belong to me, and this judgement was made based on principles of "one's own mind, body, and property". Now you seem to be saying that there is something to prevent me from making such a choice; I do not get to make a choice which does not belong to me.

It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'.

This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect" — Dan

Now it's my turn to say that you misunderstand me. Saying that a specific approach is "wrong", and dismissing it without demonstrating why it is wrong, is showing complete disrespect for it. However, you may actually understand it very well, and have very good reasons for saying it's wrong, and therefore actually have respect for it. But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect.

The same principle goes the other way to claim tradition is correct, without showing why, is apprehended as an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is not that tradition is necessarily correct, so I am not making an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is that there is much information to be learned from the study of traditional principles, and your off-hand rejection of tradition as wrong, instead of demonstrating the faults in tradition, indicates that you have probably not taken the time to understand these principles. And this inclines me to think that you really do not have a good grasp of the principles which your theory attempts to deal with.

You've lost me. Care to explain what you're asking?

What you say makes sense, and was what I was expecting you to say. But I'm thinking, we know a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized, and b) the material that the immaterial caused is organized. Don't these two things present a good case for thinking the immaterial that caused the material was, itself, organized? — Patterner

No, I do not agree. "Organized" is the outcome, the effect. It does not make sense to use the same word to describe the cause, as is used to describe the effect. This tends toward annihilating the separation, or distinction between the two, making them one and the same thing.

That is the problem I referred to above, what happens when we describe the immaterial in words which are used to describe material things. "Immaterial" is distinctly not material. So describing the immaterial with the same words that we use to describe the material, cannot be correct. That is what has happened to quantum physics. If "the wave function" refers to something immaterial, and "the particle" refers to something material, then when they start describing "particles" as a feature of the wave function they come up with something incoherent.

So I can question the truth of "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". Depending on how we relate "immaterial" to "material" it may not be possible for the immaterial to be organized. If we say that the two are absolutely opposite, then clearly it would not be possible for the two to have any shared properties. But that is rather extreme, and it is representative of the interaction problem. For example, temporal and eternal are absolutely opposite.

So the better way is to make them separate categories. As separate categories they might share some properties, and this allows for "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". However, b) fails to make the case. That the effect is organized, does not provide the logical necessity required to conclude that it is likely that the cause is organized. We must not allow ourselves to get trapped in this type of word usage because it can be very misleading

I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. — Dan

Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC.

It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others. — Dan

You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.

Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others?

There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. — Dan

As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track.

I'm not talking about the act of putting marbles into a jar. I'm talking about the marbles are stacked up in an organized way. There's no organizer that stacked up the marbles on top of each other so that they'll stacked up in an organized manner. — night912

You are not making sense. If the marbles are in a jar, and you are talking about whether or not there is an organizer who cause them to be in this position, then obviously we must look at "the act of putting marbles into a jar". Or, are you assuming that they've been in that position forever?

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example. — Patterner

This is why the subject is difficult. I believe that if we adhere to a strict definition of "immaterial", and do a thorough analysis of these examples, logic and mathematics, we will find that they are not actually immaterial things. All sorts of logic and mathematics rely on symbols, and symbols are not immaterial. What I think, is that in reality, the purely immaterial does not actually enter into what we call "our experience", or "our consciousness". The purely immaterial has a causal relation to what is consciously present to us, but it is not actually present within the content of our consciousness. What is present within our conscious experience is already a unified material/immaterial dualism, (Aristotelian matter/form), and this is due to the living being's dependence on a body.

So, this is why there is so much disagreement amongst different people, as to whether or not the immaterial is real, and even amongst those who believe it is real, as to how, or what type of existence it has. We only know about the reality of the immaterial through the dual nature (dualist representations) of what is present to us. This is not a pure "immaterial" existence because it is already contaminated by material aspects, so the dual nature of things serves only to demonstrate to us, the reality of the immaterial, but the purely "immaterial" remains unrevealed to us. This is what Aquinas says about God, we know God through His effects, but so long as the human being remains united to a body [and its intellect relies on that body] the human being can never truly know God, as purely immaterial.

Aristotle took up a related issue with the Pythagorean idealists, and certain "Platonists". There had been proposed a divine realm, of eternal circles of the heavenly bodies. The heavens were considered to be aethereal, divine, and eternal. Aristotle showed in "On The Heavens", that a circular motion necessarily involves something moving in that motion, and this thing moving in the circular motion must be material, bodily, and therefore not eternal. Then, in "On the Soul", he criticized these same idealists for saying that the soul, and intellect are immaterial and eternal, but they provide a representation of the soul (eternal circles) which include material aspects.

This is the problem we have with "the immaterial". We have very good evidence and logic to support the reality of the immaterial. However, whenever we produce representations of how the immaterial works within the material world, we assume material elements within our models of the immaterial. This is because that is how the immaterial appears to us, in the combined form of hylomorphism. And if we try to distance the immaterial from the material, we end up with the interaction problem. The subject is extremely difficult, and many are inclined to dismiss the reality of the immaterial altogether, and happily live in Plato's cave of denial. The fact is that we do not well enough understand the nature of time, to properly model the role of the immaterial within our world.