Thanks to you as well.

Just because we can use our ability to count to describe a situation does not mean that those in it must be able to count. All they need do is see that scarcity is not sufficiency or abundance, and reflect on the nature of the difference.

The point of focusing on how we count was to point out how much of our conceptual apparatus (and not only that but other practices as well) must already be in place to do it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, counting requires that we have developed the idea of number, but that is not difficult. All we need is for our mate to be happier when we bring home 2-3 birds or melons instead of one.

that's the cardinality of the set of sheep they have. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, it is, but you don't need to generalize from a flock concept to a set concept to count them. All you need is an ownership concept -- my sheep or our sheep. I learned to count at 3-4, long before I knew about sets and cardinality.

There's no counting without both the mental constructs — Srap Tasmaner

We should not equate instruments of thought, like concepts and judgements, with constructs, which imply we have added constructive elements. If you want to say we've added elements we did not find in experience, you have to do more than say we have used concepts.

What point were you making with the example of shepherds? — Srap Tasmaner

I was responding to why shepherds count sheep, not all possible sets of sheep.

Philosophy moved on a bit after Aristotle. And after the Tractatus. — Banno

Yes, but moved on does not mean rightly moved on.

It's pretty hard to refute this action view — JerseyFlight

It's been around since Aristotle.

What counts as a thing, is an ostensible reality with intrinsic unity, i.e. an Aristotelian substance. The unity of an organism is not a mental construct. Each part of it serves the good of the whole independently of whether we think it does. A three-legged sheep is wolf bait.

I'm nonplussed here. It's precisely because it is conditional that it is fundamental. If you would play chess, then this is how you must move the bishop. Doing otherwise is not playing chess — Banno

Fundamental means that we are at the absolute starting point. The consequences of chess rules can't be a starting point, because the rules themselves are more basic -- the starting point from which we derive the consequences.

I said quite a bit about these topics in my immediately preceding comment.

The basic act of knowing is awareness of present intelligibility. Intelligibility is usually present via sensation, but in mystical experience it is present in our very act of existence.

It is usual to think of ourselves as separated from what we sense, and spatially, that is usually true. Dynamically, it is a gross error. We sense objects because they act on us, and we can detect and neurally encode those actions, forming neural representations (which the Scholastics called "sensible species"). From the object's perspective, our neural representations are its action on us, its modification of our neural state. So, our neural representations are identically the object's action on our neural system. So, dynamically, sensing subject and sensed object share the same being: its action on us is our representation of it. We might call this "existential penetration."

But, as I discussed earlier today, sensations are not thoughts. We may have, and respond to, sensations without a hint of awareness. It is only when we become aware of the neurally encoded content that it becomes knowledge. As long as it is only a neural state, it can be no more than knowable = potential knowledge. Nothing that is merely potential can operate, and so what is merely knowable cannot make itself known. To become actually known, the neurally encoded content needs to be acted upon, and it is our awareness (Aristotle's agent intellect), that does this. When we turn our attention, or awareness, to some content, to some present intelligibility, it becomes actually known.

Again, there is a dynamical identity: our being informed is identically the object informing us. "The object informing the subject" and "the subject being informed by the object" are just two ways of describing the identical event. So, we are not (dynamically) separate from our objects of knowledge, but partially identical to them. Our knowledge of the object is the object informing us.

Am I wrong in inferring that you are striving in the direction of properly basic belief? — JerseyFlight

Basic, yes. Belief, no. Beliefs are commitments to the truth of some judgement, and so acts of will. Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility, and an act of intellect.

So if there are n things on the table -- I can't even set up the question neutrally! -- we say there are n things on the table, not 2n, because we don't count all the sets as things. — Srap Tasmaner

It is because sets are not things, but mental constructs (ways of grouping elements in our minds). Primitive shepherds counted sheep by tying knots in a string. (Similarly, in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, the attack was synchronized by untying a knot each day.) Why count sheep and not relations or sets? Because shepherds are not generally interested in possible relations between sheep, but in the number of sheep they have.

I am suggesting that how we think about things is driven by our interests. Some are practical, but some are theoretical -- we just want to know.

But then we're back to this not being something a child could conceivably figure out through the exercise of natural reason but only in a context where the conceptual apparatus is already in place. — Srap Tasmaner

That is why we teach children mathematics, rather than letting them discover it from scratch. Children want to please us, so they do as we ask.

This is why your use of "awareness", glossed as "infallible knowledge by acquaintance", troubles me. — Srap Tasmaner

I would define awareness as the actualization of intelligibility. It is infallible because it is inseparable. Aristotle points out that before we know, there is an intelligible object (something which has the potential to be known) and a subject with the potential to be informed. One act, that of awareness (aka "the agent intellect"), simultaneously actualizes both potentials. There is no becoming known without a mind becoming informed -- and vice versa. Because only one act is involved, there is no possibility of an intervention preventing success. It is the union of object and subject in their joint actualization that is the basis of knowledge.

Judgement is quite different, for it invariably involves at least two acts: (1) the separation of certain notes of intelligibility from the whole (abstraction/concept formation) and (2) the recombination of at least two concepts. So, there is the possibility of an intervention preventing success.

However that side of the story works, a lot of the conceptualization of our experience is taking place below the level of awareness — Srap Tasmaner

I would deny the very possibility of concepts below the level of awareness. The concept <apple> is merely someone thinking of apples. It is not a thing, but an act. We can't think without being aware, because to think is to be aware of certain contents.

Of course, the mind is more than awareness. There is a lot of physical data processing going on, and most if it, we are unaware of. We form neural net connections underpinning Humean associations, but associations are not judgements. I may associate an orange moon with a citrus, but that does not cause me to think that the moon is a citrus.

So, I would say that a lot of association is taking place below the level of awareness.

The way you distinguish knowledge from judgment — Srap Tasmaner

I am not distinguishing knowledge from judgement. All knowledge is awareness of intelligibility. Some awareness is mere acquaintance ("I know the house on the corner"). Some knowledge is awareness of identities, i.e. judgements (we see that what evokes <Socrates> is identically what evokes <human>).

What is mental, but not knowledge, is concepts. To think <oranges> or <uincorns> is not to know anything, as no relation to an object is implied.

Personally, I've had knee pain for a long time and can usually tune it out. When it goes away, I learn that I was in pain then but adjusted in a manner where I didn't feel it. But at the time before it went away, I would not have believed I was in pain. Seems like the presence of sensations very much can be inferred, but perhaps only after a transition in their intensity. — fdrake

Let me suggest that there is a difference between having a sensation, and being aware of it. We get uncomfortable sitting a certain way, and change our posture without a moment's thought. Some people can, as you suggest, tune pain out. Aristotle's point in De Anima iii, 7, is that sensory representations (nerve signals) are intelligible, but not actually known until we attend to them (in his language, actualized by the agent intellect -- which I identify with awareness). So, having a sensation does not automatically mean that we have a cognitive experience.

1. How does a fluent adult speaker of a natural language perceive things as categorized in the terms of her native language, or in terms of the conceptual apparatus common perhaps not just to speakers of her native language but to many other people, or even all people? — Srap Tasmaner

I hope I'm responding to the point you are interested in. We each have what I call a "conceptual space," a set of concepts that we know and use to understand experience. As an American trained in physics and read in Aristotle and Aquinas, I have a different set of concepts than someone raised in a Chinese or Indian cultural tradition. For example, I don't use a Chi concept, or have an adequate concept of nirvana. I lack many concepts current in analytic and in continental philosophy. Yesterday I added <Stove's Gem> to my conceptual space.

A two days ago, I sent in the final corrections on a paper defending the compatibility of evolution with classical theism. In it, I defended the legitimacy of alternate taxonomies, with alternate species definitions. Because reality is complex, and abstraction attends to some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others, we can form different species concepts (different universal ideas), given the same data. (At least 26 different definitions of "species" have been proposed in the biological literature.) This is not nominalism, because we're not assigning categories arbitrarily (without an adequate basis in reality). Rather, it is moderate realism, because we're using different features to form alternate classification schemes, so that each scheme's concepts have an adequate foundation in reality.

We tend to project our experiences onto our pre-existing conceptual space, seeing them in terms of familiar concepts. Sometimes we recognize that none of our concepts fits our experience, and so we form a new concept --articulated in a new word, or a new use of an old word. Thus, language grows.

We can learn other people's ways of conceptualizing the world. E.g., I learned physics, abstract mathematics, evolutionary biology, mysticism and a number of philosophical theories.

2. How does a pre-linguistic child learn how to do this? — Srap Tasmaner

I am not well-read in Piaget or more recent child psychology. My working theory is that children learn to associate sounds with experiences. I remember that one day my mother was talking to me in the dinning room, and it suddenly dawned on me that there was a "me" inside listening and that is what she meant by "you". I think I was 3 or 4.

3. How did mankind begin doing this? — Srap Tasmaner

I wasn't there. So, I would be giving pure speculation. I suspect gestures and shared goals played a large role.

I do think how children learn has a bearing, as children grow up to become us. Take counting and mathematical abstraction. After children count enough different kinds of things, they see that the relations of the numbers do not depend on what we count (abstraction) but on the act of counting alone. This is the basis for learning arithmetic.

If one violated the unspoken condition that one is playing standard chess. — Dfpolis

...in that case, the rule isn't wrong; rather the action goes against the rule. — Banno

Then, the rule is incomplete, because it does not state its condition. Further, since it is conditional, it is not fundamental.

Perhaps it would be better to say that our new knowledge of subatomic structure supplements our knowledge of what it is to be solid; it does not supplant it. — Banno

The problem is that "solid" is equivocal, as it can be understood in two ways. First, pragmatically, as meaning that our tea service will not fall through it -- and this is justified by experience. Second, mathematically, as meaning that no magnification will ever reveal anything fundamentally different, which is not justified by experience. So, the error is extending our claims beyond their experiential basis -- and that happens quite often.

We are not wrong to say that the table is solid, and yet mostly consists of the space between particles. — Banno

That is not what "solid" usually means. When things have lots of empty space we say they are porous.

we might be able to look at how the way we use words such as "solid" forms a foundation in language, and hence in science. — Banno

Yes.

This is right; and to it we might add that experience here is not just the experience of the individual, but the experience of those around her... — Banno

I think we pretty much agree. Language is a primary instrument of our being social animals, and science is a social endeavor.

Abstraction from what? — Srap Tasmaner

Abstraction from the sensory representation, aka the phantasm.

If the datum is raw, unconceptualized, it's going to be useless for knowledge that's supposed to be inferred from it. If it is already conceptualized, then it's not independent. — Srap Tasmaner

Baloney!. I already explained that, by attending to various notes of intelligiblity, we actualize various concepts. What is intelligible is knowable, not known, and so neither conceptual nor propositional. Further, I explained in general how, in attending to our representation of Socrates, we can actualize not only a substantive notion, <S>, <Socrates> (tode ti = this something), but also a predicate concept, say <human>, and finally, that recognizing that both <Socrates> and <man> derive from the same representation justifies us in judging <Socrates is a man>.

You may object that we need several instances of humans to develop the concept <human>, but more experience is not inference. And, if we didn't recognize the humanity in each independently, we couldn't see that it's a common trait. Rather, more experience helps us clarify which notes of intelligibility are best included in the concept we choose to use. Perhaps we will learn that you don't need to be white to be human.

You really need to read De Anima iii, 7, and perhaps Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic or Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite or the Degrees of Knowledge.

Remember above you did end up reaching for an infallible foundation after all — Srap Tasmaner

Not for truth. The infallibility of awareness is not propositional. It is judgements and propositions that are properly true or false.

Is this knowledge conceptualized? — Srap Tasmaner

No. It is awareness without abstraction. Abstracting, which forms concepts, leaves data behind and sets the stage for misplaced concreteness.

Is it "I'm experiencing that" or "I'm experiencing the red triangular facing surface of an object"? — Srap Tasmaner

Once we start applying prior concepts, we are making a judgement <This is an instance of that>, and so open ourselves to error, because there may be more to <that> than what we are experiencing. But, we don't need concepts enhanced from other experiences to judge this experience -- or even named concepts. All we need to do is abstract notes of intelligibility from the whole and then predicate it back to the same whole.

I read the SEP article on Sellars' section on epistemology.

"(1) There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations to any other cognitive states. I call this the Epistemic Independence Requirement [EIR]."

"(2) Every nonbasic cognitive state can possess positive epistemic status only because of the epistemic relations it bears, directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states must provide the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge, which I call the Epistemic Efficacy Requirement [EER]."

"Sellars denies not only that there must be a given, but that there can be a given in the sense defined, for nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be truth-evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements."

I am proposing that we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, but that this awareness is not proportional knowledge. Let's use Aristotle's terminology and call the combined sensory representation we are aware of a "phantasm." If the phantasm as a whole properly elicits a subject concept, <S>, and the identical phantasm properly elicits a predicate concept <P>, we are justified in judging <S is P>. (The copula "is" betokens the identity of source.) While the datum (the phantasm) is not a judgement, by abstraction and identification (division and reunification), we can use it as the basis for sound judgement.

As Aristotle points out, to make justified inferences, we need to find middle terms (aka connections). Thus, if we judge <S is P1> and <P1 is P2>, we may conclude <S is P2>. What this means, it is that a phantasm capable of eliciting <S> is also capable of eliciting <P2>.

This account seems capable of satisfying both EIR and EER. Or, have I missed something?

The question is how you are to give knowledge a foundation you acknowledge is non-epistemic — Srap Tasmaner

I take it that you mean non-propositional by non-epistemic.

perilously close to traditional empiricist foundationalism, which is a mistake. Read "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." — Srap Tasmaner

"Perilously close" means "different from." I'll look at Sellars' argument, but I am pretty sure it doesn't work against my position.

(3) The features of the object of knowing included in our judgments are those features adequate to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

This isn't my conclusion. What I'm saying is that knowing only how reality relates to us (and not exhaustively as it is) is not a problem, because we only deal with reality in relation to ourselves.

What you tell them is, for their purposes, true, even though for other purposes what you are telling them may be false.

But this is not what (1) claimed. This is

(1') We are committed to the truth of some judgments we can prove are false. — Srap Tasmaner

That is not what I said, nor is it implied. Still, it has some merit.

What in (1) I am following Aristotle's observation that we cannot prove everything. So, we must accept some things as given. Reflecting, what we accept as given is what is given in experience.

Raw experience is infallible, because whatever we are aware of is what we are aware of. Still, there is a difference between being aware of something (knowledge by acquaintance) and making judgements. Since we are infallibly aware of whatever we are aware of, there is no question of its truth, but there is a question of the truth or falsity of judgements. That question derives from abstraction.

Universal concepts are derived from abstraction, but they may not be the result of abstraction alone, but also of construction -- combining associated data from different experiences. Concepts are universal because each of their instances is capable of evoking the same concept. But, it may be that the aspects (notes of intelligibility) one object that evoke a concept are not the same as the aspects of a different object that evokes the same concept. For example, we have may have seen Jane nude and know she is female, and Kathy made up and dressed in a skirt, and think she is also female. Perhaps, Kathy is a transvestite or transgendered, and biologically male. Then we have erred in judgement.

How did we err? Not by a mistake in awareness, but by miscategorizing -- by attributing to Kathy aspects we did not experience and she did not have.

We need to reflect on how we make experiential judgements and what justifies them. If the identical object that evokes the concept <tiger> also evokes the concept <sharp teeth>, I am justified in judging <the tiger has sharp teeth>. This is fully justified as long as my concepts do not carry the baggage of other experiences, but, almost invariably, they do. It is this associative baggage that is typical the source of false judgements.

It is, then, theoretically possible, but very difficult, to make reliable experiential judgements -- because the habit of association, while corrigible, is typically unconscious.

So, back to (1) and (1'): It is a fact that we can't prove everything. So, we have to commit to things we can't prove, but that does not mean that we can't analyze them and root out sources of error. Of course, we don't root out all our errors. So we wind up being committed to things that can be proven false. Still, there is hope. As social animals we can expose our assumptions to others with different life experiences and perspectives, and so root out further errors. One way of doing this is to value the reflections of previous generations enough to hear them.

Your claim is that there is no requirement to take into account the contexts in which the judgment is false; — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think I claimed that. If we're to be serious thinkers, we need to reflect on the limits of what we know.

we only think there is such a requirement because we imagine a context in which we have knowledge not relativized to our needs, "objective" knowledge, which would therefore be exhaustive. — Srap Tasmaner

And so, impossible for human beings. This is the error of making divine omniscience the paradigm against which we judge human knowing. All we need to do is be humble and admit, that while we know many things, we don't know everything about anything.

(iii) What we leave out are features of the object of knowledge irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

Not quite. What we actually leave out (in coming to know) is what does not interest us, and hope that what does interest us is adequate.

(iv*) Therefore if we leave out a feature of the object of knowledge, it must be a feature irrelevant to our needs. — Srap Tasmaner

No, which is why I did not accept your (iii). Still, this often happens in practice. Critical evidence or lines of reasoning may be ignored because we have "made up our minds" -- which means we have closed our minds.

What are you leaving out is that you know what you are telling your students to be false. — Srap Tasmaner

No, it is not false. That is the point. It is an adequate to what they will deal with. If you do measurements in the Newtonian regime and compare them to the equations, you will find no discrepancies. The scientific method will never give us absolute truth. It may, and often does, give us a theory that represents our observations adequately.

What we say is never exhaustive. Every discourse is limited. Even the most "objective" news stories include some facts and exclude others. If these inclusions and exclusions are made in good faith, we place no blame. Still, the story is (and has to be) intrinsically imperfect. So also is it with teaching, journal articles, books and so on. We will accept these imperfect discourses as true if they do not lead us into error -- if they are adequate to our needs.

what you are telling them is true "for all practical purposes"; it is an approximation, and will serve in the contexts in which they will make use of it. — Srap Tasmaner

That is the very nature of science. The so-called "theory of everything" (TOE) is a theory of everything but 96% of the stuff. Darwin's theory of evolution knew nothing of DNA transcription errors, toolkit genes or punctuated equilibrium. Our best understanding of quantum physics contradicts our best understanding of gravity. We accept these theories not because we think they are metaphysical truths, but because they provide adequate accounts of the aspects of reality we apply them to. That is why naturalists who treat them with religious reverence are so foolish.

(a) Because it will not matter to them that it is false, relative to their needs it is true. — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps you are having difficulty because I haven't made it sufficiently clear that I don't see truth as a univocal concept. That is, "truth" does not mean the same thing in every context. Instead, "truth" is analogically predicated by an analogy of proportionality. What that means is that the requirements for being true are proportioned to the needs the truth is intended to meet. If we're doing metaphysics, we want it to be exceptionless, but if we're building a bridge, a set of reliable equations adequately modelling the conditions to be encountered are a true description -- in fact, one that corresponds to the relevant domain of reality, even though it may not correspond to irrelevant domains.

The complete formulation would be "P is true in context C", or "P is true relative to needs N" or something like that. (b*) imagines there is truth relative to no particular needs, that there is (I can't resist) "needless truth" — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is close. I am not sure that there actually is "needless truth."

This sounds reasonable enough, but if we want eventually to come back to (b*) and define "truth (full stop)" as "truth relative to human needs", we will engage in further abstraction, but what will we compare humans to? Is abstraction enough to get you there, or will we compare humans to other animals, and then be forced to talk about the judgments of animals? — Srap Tasmaner

I think we are justifiably anthropocentric, because the problems we have to deal with are human problems -- not that we should not value other species. It is just that we can never know what it is like to be a bat.

Thank you for taking so much time reflecting on my post.

The knowledge of what was adequate, can you say that that was ONLY based on knowledge? No gut feeling? — Ansiktsburk

Choosing what to do is a moral decision -- based not on absolute certitude, but on moral certitude, i.e. on what is generally true, given what we know. So, my assessment was based on knowing what most engineers do. Certainly, some will go on to highly specialized work, in which advanced physics is needed, but, as I said, they will take other courses to prepare.

If you're visually impaired, I could record the OP and send it to you privately. Otherwise, you'll need a text reading app.

Interesting. In the article, to be fallible is to be capable of being false, wrong; hence it speaks of fallible foundations. I followed the usage. — Banno

Perhaps the title was confusing, but in the body I only said humans are fallible.

in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be wrong, or false? — Banno

If one violated the unspoken condition that one is playing standard chess.

Is that different from what I said? — apokrisis

You seemed to be arguing that the knowing self is a construct, not an experienced reality. If so, then yes, it is different.

My point is that this is something that has to develop. Every newborn has to go through the process of discovering its own hands as something “they” control. — apokrisis

Of course. And, it takes time to develop a set of concepts to reason with. Still, I would not say that most of our concepts are "constructed." They are abstracted, which means that they actualize some notes of intelligibility in our perceptions to the exclusion of others. We have to accumulate experience to learn which abstractions are most useful in dealing with the world.

Yes. Stove's gem. IS that closer to what you have in mind? — Banno

I just looked up Stove's Gem, as I had not heard of it before you mentioned it. From the little I could learn in a short time, I agree with Stove that instances of his Gem are fallacious.

While we can and do know our thoughts, primarily, our thoughts are not what we know, but means of knowing.

Given the title of this thread, that would seem to be the issue: in what way could the foundational rule, that the bishop moves only diagonally, be fallible? — Banno

Rules can't be fallible, for they do not think. It is thinking subjects that can fail to think correctly. We can make routine mistakes, or suffer the devastation of Alzheimer's. As we use our brains to process data, and brains are subject to trauma, we are all to the possibility of error.

Should we consider these failures? A purest might. Or we might just consider these as alternate forms of chess. — Banno

I return to the conditional nature of such rules, "If we are playing chess, ..." If you remove the condition, the rule looses its force.

I would argue God would arrange truth as well although he would have full knowledge, I wonder if you might argue differently though? — Judaka

Classical theism, as represented by Aquinas, sees God as entirely simple and immutable. So, God does not elaborate positions over time, nor does He design, then execute. Rather, God sustains all existence in a single act and knows it by knowing His sustaining act.

I think that we deal with an intellectualised version of reality, which is mostly based on rulesets which function epistemologically but do not fall apart regardless of it corresponds with reality. — Judaka

I would find examples helpful in understanding your position. I am thinking of science as your "intellectualised version of reality," but see new evidence as falsifying old theories. So, I don't quite understand what you're saying.

I think when something works well to help us to navigate a complex issue and it is useful then that should be sufficient. — Judaka

Yes, it is "adequate to reality," and so close enough to be taken as true. When we aren't concerned with practice, but just want to know, pragmatism fails us.

A fully relational view of knowledge makes the psychological observation that the "we" who observes is a construction, not something already given — apokrisis

What is experienced, here the knowing self, is neither constructed nor assumed. Acts of knowledge are self-reflective. Every act of vision informs us not only about what is seen (its objective object), but also that we can see (its subjective object). Similarly, acts of cognition not only inform us about the object of our attention (its objective object), but also that we are informed (its subjective object). There is no knowing, no being informed, without a subject being informed. You may not wish to admit this, but I can think of no cogent objection.

So of course it is taken for granted that we do exist - as creatures modelling an actual world — apokrisis

Do you even realize how incoherent your position is? Without knowing subjects, there is no agent capable of "modelling an actual world." We model by positing relations between concepts that can only exist in knowing minds.

If you think concepts can exist mind-independently, or that we could model without being knowing subjects, then on what basis do you believe this? Surely it cannot be on the basis of evidence, for, ex hypothesis, you can know no evidence. In fact, we can do nothing as there is no we -- not even a single I.

But it also then makes the point that the model is "self-interested" in its knowledge. — apokrisis

Models are not subjects, and so can have no knowledge or interests.

There is no point in commenting further on the consequences of this incoherent theory.

No. It is foundational to chess. — Banno

OK, but chess is not foundational to reality. The purpose of philosophy is not to understand chess, but reality.

Am I in the neighborhood of your approach? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't have a problem with anything you said, but what I'm saying is that we know things in terms of how they relate to us, and while that is not exhaustive, it is what we need to know to be human in the world.

If you only wish to take shots at my thread management, and not actually discuss your objections, I can't help you.

Wait a second. This is not fair, it is intellectually dishonest. You were the one who introduced "divine knowledge." — JerseyFlight

I introduced it as a concept, not as a reality. I could have said the same thing if I were an atheist. It is not part of my present argument that there actually is omniscience. I am only saying that it is a bad paradigm for human knowledge.

There is nothing dishonest or emotional in managing the direction and scope of a thread. If you wish to discuss theism or omniscience, I would be happy to do so, either privately, or in thread dedicated to that topic. This one is about human knowledge.

Which option do you prefer?

I was not aware there was such a thing as divine knowledge? — JerseyFlight

I do not wish to go off on that tangent in this thread. Here, one can take it as an ideal standard for human cognition I am rejecting.

I want to hear more about belief and knowledge. You gloss "believing that such-and-such" as being committed to the truth of such-and-such. Does that come in degrees? — Srap Tasmaner

Think of Descartes telling us about his methodological doubt. He begins by telling us that he was in his chamber. He knew, therefore, that he was in his chamber, which is an act of intellect, of awareness. Nor does he cease to be aware that he is in his room when he chooses (an act of will) to doubt it. (Just as dramas call for a willing suspension of disbelief, so Descartes willingly suspended his belief.) As he continued to know he was in his chamber, even as he suspended his belief that he was, knowing cannot be a species of (say, causally justified true) belief. So, nothing in the Descartes reflections ever calls knowledge into question, only his commitment to the truth of what he knew.

I think there are degrees (or, more properly, regimes) of belief. We may be willing to act as though p is true in some operation regimes, but not in others -- or we may be absolutely committed to the truth of p.

The whole idea of knowledge as justified true belief comes from a careless translation of Plato. The term doxa means "judgement" as well as "belief" and "opinion." It seems pretty clear from the Teatatetus 190A, that Plato meant "judgement," not "belief," by doxa in the context of knowledge.

Do you treat "knowledge" as a primitive, not to be glossed or explained? — Srap Tasmaner

I treat "knowing" as naming an actual human activity, the nature of which we can reflect upon. Denying that we know is, therefore, an abuse of language.

Now isn't there something a bit mad about the assertion that there are two tables? — Banno

I read it as two table concepts.

do we agree that, the bishop remaining on the same colour for the duration fo the game is a foundational truth, rather than a truth known by experience? — Banno

It is a conditional conclusion, and in no way foundational. The condition is, "If one follows the rules of chess, ...".

Truth is not correspondence to reality. Why? First, because our knowledge is not exhaustive, but leaves an untold amount behind. It is only a diminished projection of what we encounter. Second, because we do not and cannot know reality as it is, but only as it relates to us. — Dfpolis

This already claims to know beyond what it says cannot be known. — JerseyFlight

No, it does not. It reflects on our surprise when something we thought we knew teaches us something unexpected. From this we learn to be humble and not complacent in our knowledge -- to realize that in knowing, we do not know all.

Seems to me this criteria of exactitude that you seem to leverage is unproductive. — JerseyFlight

I'm unsure what you think I am proposing, I am merely saying that divine knowledge is not a proper paradigm for human knowing, and that infallibility and Cartesian certitude are foolish and inhuman goals. Our knowledge is human, not divine, knowledge, and it can suffice for a well-lived human life.

I know mountains, grass, stones, words, successful surgeries are performed on the basis of empirical knowledge. I reject the kind of skepticism (and I have good suspicion of where you got it) that says knowledge must entail exhaustive comprehension. — JerseyFlight

We agree completely.

Although I am a theist, my mention of God is merely to make the idea of perfect knowledge concrete.

But what if we use this "psychological" fact as the stepping stone to the larger metaphysical picture? — apokrisis

It is an epistemological fact that must be considered in our metaphysical reflections.

So your argument is that the "truth of reality" seems problematic as we appear caught between a subjective and objective viewpoint. It is we who construct the abstract concepts by which we understand the physical world. So all becomes modelling and the thing-in-itself never truly grasped. — apokrisis

No, that is not my argument. I am following Aristotle in De Anima ii, 7. We are not "caught between a subjective and objective viewpoint." To view, someone (a subject) must see, and something (an object) must be seen. So, it is not that we are caught, but that in knowing, we enter into a relation with what we know. Since knowing is relational, it cannot exist independently of its relata, viz. its subject and object.

In knowing we do not construct concepts. Rather, we encounter intelligible objects, i.e. things that can be known. (Remember that "knowing" names an activity that humans actually do, and that philosophic reflection seeks to understand the nature of that activity.) So, the content of our concept derives from the intelligibility of the object known, not from us. If we already had the content, we'd already know the object and no encounter would be needed.

Since, we grasp the object's intelligibility, we know it, and not our own construct.

. Objectivity must be forsaken and subjectivity accepted? — apokrisis

No. Subjectivity and objectivity are correlative poles of the relation called "knowing." While objects may exist independently of subjects, they cannot be known independently of knowing subjects.

It is still going to be an exercise in abstraction. But now the goal is to generalise the very idea of a modelling relation. — apokrisis

Humans do model, but knowing is not modelling. Knowing actualized prior intelligibility. Modeling adds hypotheses to what we know to filling the gaps in our knowledge. Or, perhaps, it may simplify what we know on the hypothesis that part of what we know is not needed to attain our goal.

That becomes pragmatism writ large. — apokrisis

There is nothing wrong with being pragmatic, as long as we limit our pragmatism to the practical order. Humans also want to know, not for the sake of doing, but purely for the sake of knowing. As there is no practical goal in theoretical knowledge, there pragmatism is irrelevant and useless.

I am unsure how Rosen's remarks are relevant to what I am saying.

I look forward to your further reflections.

Thank you.

I do not think that knowledge is either a normative concept or a species of belief. If knowledge were a form of belief, we would necessarily believe (be committed to the truth of) everything we know. We do not. We may know that we cannot afford a purchase, or that smoking is bad for us, and choose not to believe it.

Knowing that the table is also made mostly of space, and has a certain atomic structure, does not mean that we are wrong about the table's being solid. — Banno

I agree. The example is from Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, who reflected on the table of common sense vs. the table of science. The lesson is we shouldn't extend the meaning of "solid" beyond its experiential basis. Saying it is solid is adequate to what we want to know, e.g. that your coffee cup is not going to fall through it and make a mess of the carpet.

I noticed a preponderance of physical examples. — Banno

You caught me! My degree is in theoretical physics. I tend to go to science for examples because reflecting on it raised a lot of my questions.

I know, for example, that the bishop remains on its original colour, the one that starts on my left will remain on the red squares for the whole of the game. That's not a truth that is known by making observations of the way things are and then describing them, but a truth that is in a way constitutive of playing Chess; were it otherwise, we would be playing a different game. — Banno

Yes. I agree that knowledge has a justified range of application. Of course, in doing philosophy we want a consistent framework for understanding the full range of human experience, from mysticism to cosmology.

Truth is a species of goodness, that appropriate to judgements and the propositions expressing them. — Dfpolis

Is this Aristotle? — Srap Tasmaner

Not that I recall. It just came to me as I was writing my response.

But why must it be exhaustive? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think knowledge needs to be exhaustive. Still, if we demand that what we know correspond to reality, then, if we think a table is solid, and later find that it has an atomic substructure structure, we will conclude that our initial knowledge was as nothing in it corresponds to atoms.

If a state-of-affairs includes aspects A, B, C, D, E, and F, and we only describe it as having A, B, and D -- is that not true? — Srap Tasmaner

It depends on the context. If F is the fact that we were at the murder scene when the murder was committed, and we leave that out of our witness statement, then our statement is inadequate and false. If F is the fact that we scratched our noise before going to bed, that will not make the statement inadequate and false. Formally, these cases are the same (F is left out), but materially, they are very different.

It would be false if we claimed it only had aspects A, B, and D, but we needn't claim that. — Srap Tasmaner

We do not have to make an explicit claim for a statement to be false, because truth and falsity are context dependent.

What we want is correspondence between what we claim is there and what is there. — Srap Tasmaner

I think we want more and less than that. We want more if there is more known relevant to our needs, and we do not care if more is known that is irrelevant to our need. If you know that a material will fracture at the temperature that I tell you I'm going to use it at, but meets my requirement at room temperature, and you leave the relevant information out, what you say corresponds to reality, but is substantially deceptive. If I tell you F=ma, leaving out the relativistic corrections you have no need of, what I said does not correspond to reality, but is substantially true.

You can reasonably say "correspondence" should be a bijection, not an injection, but that's just semantics — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you can and I think must specify the kind of correspondence you mean if that is your theory of truth. Still, since human knowledge is limited, a one-to-one mapping is not possible.

Truth is a species of goodness, that appropriate to judgements and the propositions expressing them. It seems to me that goodness is adequacy for purpose. Is my representation of reality sufficient/adequate for the action I contemplate, the theory I am constructing, or the information I am conveying? It is if it includes the relevant factors and not otherwise -- and that depends on context in a way not captured by formal correspondence.

"To say of what is that it is" while avoiding saying "of what is not that it is", and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

I am not arguing with Aristotle, but with a purely formal view of correspondence.

Exactly. Ergo there is nothing objectively evil about cancer, only subjectively evil about my cancer or the cancer of a loved one, or my general reduced life expectancy because of the existence of cancer (immature railing against death). — Kenosha Kid

No.

I am surprised to find that you think we are designed at all. — Dfpolis

In the blind watchmaker sense :) — Kenosha Kid

The fact that it is relational does not make it subjectively dependent. Whether or not you like it, cancer cells in people deprive them of good health.

There is absolutely no basis in reality for Dawkin's view -- a discussion for another time,

That there is nothing 'evil' about it. It's merely a fact of life, without which we'd have nothing to complain about... Or with! — Kenosha Kid

Evil is not about complaining, it is about objective inadequacy. As we grow old, our bodies become increasingly inadequate to support a healthy life. That is an objective fact, whether or not one is reconciled to it.

I was saying that nothing deteriorated — Kenosha Kid

But you did. Don't pull a Trump and deny what is on the record.

Cancer is a physical evil because it, itself, is a privation of health. — Dfpolis

This makes no sense. Something cannot have a property in and of itself if that property depends on other properties of other things. If the ball is objectively red, it is so independent of the state of any observer. To say it is red because people with red-green colour blindness see it as such is not a statement of its objective properties. — Kenosha Kid

Good and evil are relational. It is the relation between what is and what is adequate that makes things good or bad. There is nothing bad about cancer cells growing in a petri dish, only cancer cells interfering with health are a physical evil.

We are designed to breathe molecular oxygen which is a mild carcinogen. — Kenosha Kid

I am surprised to find that you think we are designed at all.

We are not designed to live forever, we are designed to be born, flourish for a while, and die. In the course of dying, our health will decline, and that is a physical, but not a moral, evil. So, what point are you making?

Second, the very fact that you call it a "deterioration," means that it is a lesser state. i.e. one in which some perfection is no longer present. — Dfpolis

That can't seriously be your argument. So if I say "There is no God," do you then think there must be a God in order for him to not exist? — Kenosha Kid

I can make no sense of your objection. If God did not exist, we would not say His existence "deteriorated." To deteriorate is to become worse. In other words, something was better and has now lost its previous perfection.

The halfhearted proper-functionalism with which you attempt to justify this position doesn't actually do any work, because as you yourself admit, what constitutes proper function is itself a normative stance, so this is just like trying to pull yourself out of the swamp by pulling on your own hair. — SophistiCat

Not quite. We can understand, scientifically, the purposes of many things, aka teleology. We know that if you have a defective heart, your blood will not circulation will be in adequate. It is on this basis, that we decide on norms for heart function. There is no circularity here, just openness to reality

I substantially agree with what you said, because I think that humans can grasp teleology, and so what "should" be. We may have some differences as to detail, perhaps on foundationalism, and perhaps not.