I think you are not giving due attention to the language angle that was proposed in some of the answers. The very meaning of equality and identity in ordinary language already implies self-identity. To question self-identity is not even a metaphysical move - it is meaningless, like questioning the marital status of bachelors. (In math and logic this has to be set out explicitly though - and indeed it is.)

Ulysses I found a bit of a mountain to climb. — Pantagruel

Yeah, that's why I am looking for a helping hand :) I might just end up plowing through it unassisted, but from what I have heard about this book, I fear I'll miss too much this way.

Proust has been on my to do list forever, but I fear it will be even steeper than Ulysses... — Pantagruel

Proust may be a stretch in terms of shear length (of everything, down to individual sentences that can run for pages), but in form and style the books are not a long stretch from the classic 19th century Bildungsroman. It is the subject, which alternates minutely detailed observations of the outside and the inner world, and ruminations on the nature of memory and (at long last) art, that may present a challenge if you are not receptive to it. (It does not help that his self-absorbed alter ego is not all that sympathetic.)

Just to elaborate on one aspect of the question, in mathematics and logic equality is introduced axiomatically, and self-identity is (usually) part of the definition. See for instance equality in first order logic.

As others have noted, you need to first make clear to yourself what question you are actually asking. Once you do that, the answer may become apparent.

Imagine your consciousness disassociating with your body, so that you can observe your body from a distance. — Yohan

This is too convoluted.

Imagine that your consciousness is eternal. Done!

The thing is, you can imagine many things, including things that are counterfactual and even incoherent. There are ways to deploy the mere fact that we can imagine something in a philosophical argument, but they usually hinge on self-reference: the ability to imagine itself must be of some inferential significance (as in Anselm's Ontological argument, for example). In your case this is not obvious. Just because you can imagine your consciousness being separate from your body doesn't mean that this really can be the case.

The sum of any two integers is zero. — John Gill

What are 'integers' in your game? The way integers are usually defined/constructed, they come with addition already baked in.

All I said that what one could easily see even from this forum is that we do not understand infinity yet. — ssu

You said more than that; this is just your go-to defense: to invoke the mysteriousness of infinity, like some invoke the mysteriousness of God. And yet even this seemingly innocuous banality says more than you think it does. It implies that there is some extra-mathematical Infinity that mathematics is trying to grapple with. But mathematics as such doesn't contain anything extra-mathematical. Everything in mathematics exists only to the extent to which it is defined. The Axiom of Infinity is just a name for an axiom (a family of axioms in various systems); it plays by the same rules as every other axiom and doesn't purport to refer to something extra-mathematical - unless you want it to; but that would be an extra-mathematical choice on your part, as would be any use of mathematics to model something extra-mathematical. "Infinity" in mathematics is just a name, a symbol that could be replaced with any other symbol salva veritate. There is nothing inherently pathological about it.

Capping off the year with Time Regained. Took me most of the year to get through all of A la recherche... (though I read other things in between).

Thinking of tackling Ulysses at last. I've read Dubliners and Portrait, but for this one I'd like to find a good annotated edition. Problem is that the text is in the public domain, which means that the ebook market is flooded by cheap crappy editions that often can't even get typesetting right, let alone supporting material. One of Amazon's pricier offerings (among dozens) boasts a "functioning table of contents!" and "annotations" in the form of a short New York Times review (from the same year, and presumably also in the public domain). One proudly lists the title in all caps as "ULYSSES - BY JANE AUSTEN."

But what are we going to do, just sit back and enjoy the ride? — Punshhh

In the first precedent of its kind, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (where, as our reliable sources tell us, no one takes global warming seriously) mandated that the country cut emissions by 25 percent from 1990 levels by the end of 2020. (The first ruling was actually passed in 2015, and now the Supreme Court made it final.)

Sorry, I was rude. Let me give it another try.

An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without proof. — ssu

This is an antiquated definition, suitable perhaps as an informal introduction to the topic, but not suitable for today's mathematics. And it's not about formalism vs. intuitionism or whatnot. For one thing, this formulation just isn't accurate and doesn't capture the role of axioms, even in Euclid's original books. For example, the fact that a square with the side equal to 1 cannot be inscribed inside a circle with the radius equal to 1 may be self-evidently true, but Euclid did not make it an axiom. Axioms are those propositions that are specifically chosen as the primitive building blocks of a mathematical theory.

More importantly, if axioms were a matter of self-evident truths, then there would be just the one mathematics, because there is only one truth (at least that's how most people see it). But this hasn't been the case with mathematics since long before people even started contemplating foundational philosophical questions like formalism, logicism, etc. The notion that mathematical axioms are some extra-mathematical truths (truths about what?) has been abandoned.

Seems like then you have your your own definition — ssu

No, seems like you are only interested in playing dictionary games. You can join the other idiot then, I am not interested.

My specific contention is that once the set of acceptable answers is determined, the metaphysical and logical questions are mostly settled and usually irrelevant. The "phenomenology" and "intuitions" are mostly determined by asking someone what they're looking for in an answer. — quickly

I guess this turns on the question of what sort of an answer we are looking for: descriptive, explanatory or prescriptive. If descriptive, then reducing the subject to a formal modal logic provides a rough sketch of an answer, but it loses much of the meat in the process of reduction, and the result is only approximate at best, because in reality our modal talk/thinking does not perfectly conform to this system.

If we want an explanatory or a prescriptive answer, then the issues mentioned above really stick out. We need a good reason for concluding that a particular formal system drives our modal talk, or that it's what we ought to aspire to - other than that it's simple and convenient and something that we know how to describe.

The definition of an axiom is "A self evident proposition requiring no formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented
to as soon as mentioned" — ssu

That's not the definition of an axiom, as you ought to have learned by now if you were paying attention.

My point was that axioms can be possibly false. Our understanding can change. Best example of this was that until some Greeks found it not to be true, people earlier thought that all numbers are rational. Yet once when you prove there are irrational numbers, then the 'axiom' of all numbers being rational is shown not to be true. — ssu

You put 'axiom' in inverted commas for good reason, even if you didn't understand it. That all numbers are rational wasn't an axiom - it was a definition, an informal intuition, or a conjecture, depending on how they approached numbers in their thinking. And accepting or rejecting an axiom does not amount to judging it to be true or false; as has been repeatedly explained to you, that doesn't even make any sense.

Are atoms, photons, particles, mass, even solids, liquids and gases, essentially instinctive analogies with our own biological cellularity, conceptually embodied as a physical world in deeply erroneous ways? — Enrique

Atomic theory in its recognizable form is pretty recent (I don't count ancient atomists who were speculating in a vacuum). It was shaped and critically investigated through a lot of empirical probing. There were other contenders that fell by the wayside in the process. So no, I don't think it's just an artifact of a prescientific archetype. That's not to say that it is unassailable, and already in more fundamental physical models those atoms and particles have dissolved into quantum fields.

Where we have an understandable blind spot is with weakly-interacting entities, such as hypothetical WIMPs. Possibly other things as well, which we can't easily capture with our instruments in Earth conditions. But with all the wild variety of theoretical models that we have developed in various areas, I don't think that there is much chance that we are missing something obvious that is right in front of us just because we are stuck in some erroneous conceptual pit. Whatever it is that we are missing, we are probably missing for good reason.

I think I disagree. The best analysis of modal language we possess is possible worlds semantics. By systematically translating modal talk into talk about possible worlds, questions about counterfactuals can be made precise. — quickly

I think this is a mistake. In order to make sense of a phenomenon - modal talk - you pick a simple formal model that captures some of its structure, and then you try to make sense of your model by studying more of its structure and trying to relate it back to phenomenology. This is what's backwards. You shouldn't lose sight of the phenomenology, and don't expect to find in your model any insight that you didn't front-load there.

On the flip side, as @fdrake points out, modal logic is too impoverished a model to capture the varieties and ambiguities of meaning and function of modal talk.

Agree, nodding in the direction of modal logic by rephrasing the problem statement using possible world semantics is ass-backwards when answering someone who asks about the meaning of modal talk outside the context of formal logic. We should rather start by analyzing the modal language, and from there, since language games are usually more than just an abstract exercise, we can proceed to grounding modal talk in some explanatory framework - naturalizing it, for example.

As for human nature in general, I view it as dynamic and historical. We are radically cultural and historical animals. Our nature is to have no nature, or our nature is to always be developing our nature. — softwhere

There is no denying that human psyche is variable and mutable, both on the historical and the individual human scale, but that doesn't make us blank states and empty vessels at birth, to be filled and shaped entirely by culture. As @Bitter Crank rightly notes, we cannot escape our biological substrate, our animal nature, and why would we need to?

We understandably tend to focus on our differences, but I think our commonality far exceed our differences - we just take them for granted.

None of this has much to do with metaphysical essentialism, by the way, but rather with the nature/nurture dichotomy, which shouldn't really be a dichotomy, since it is quite clear that neither exists in a pure form, and I don't think there's much serious debate about that left.

Welcome, David.

Oh, so you've had the time to google null hypothesis in the meanwhile. Good for you, maybe you won't be making such a fool of yourself the next time around.

If one is committed to science being an empirical discipline, rather than an ideological one, one had better take it seriously. Alternatively, you're welcome to set up your altar in the corner and join the rest of the fanatics. — StreetlightX

Oh brother :roll: I suppose the null hypothesis for an entomologist that discovers a new fly species is that these flies are spontaneously generated by rotten meat. Because science!

If one understands IR as simply a negative thesis ('X cannot be explained by means of Y') then it amounts to nothing but a base statement of fallibilism. — StreetlightX

But no one takes seriously the possibility that some biological feature is not evolved, let alone the stronger proposition that it could not have evolved in principle. IR is useless as a null hypothesis (if null hypothesis testing is what you had in mind).

My question is - can the idea of irreducible complexity be interesting philosophically?

And also, philosophically speaking, can there be anything that is truly irreducibly complex? — Wheatley

Your question is unclear. There are any number of hypothetical features about which we could say with a high degree of confidence that they could not have evolved in an Earth organism - tempered steel claws, for example. Or, in a more abstract sense, given some processes operating in some environment, there are any number of outcomes that are outside the range of possible outcomes of those processes. For example, gravitational accretion will not result in an object shaped like Taj Mahal.

There seems to be more to the idea of irreducible complexity than just being outside the range of possible evolutionary outcomes - the word "complexity" provides a hint, but it is difficult to elucidate what it is exactly that creationist proponents of the idea are trying to get at (not for the lack of trying on their their part, but they aren't a terribly competent bunch, nor are they particularly concerned with intellectual rigor). That's one problem with the idea, and one reason why it is difficult to treat philosophically.

If you take a particular biological feature of unknown evolutionary origin and ask whether it perhaps could not have evolved, you will have a tough job in trying to prove the negative. What you see is just the end result, which often reveals little about its own origin. Take something as simple and paradigmatically irreducible as an arch: if you try to build it bit by bit without the use of auxiliary structures like centers, it would be unstable, not to mention non-functional during its intermediate stages.



But then an arch could also start as a solid formation, from which material was gradually removed.



With biological evolution the possible paths are so numerous and at times so circuitous that the challenge before an irreducible complexity proponent becomes insurmountable.

Perhaps ironically, 'irreducible complexity' is - or ought to be - the null hypothesis of all evolutionary science. That is, it ought to be the methodological starting point from which any empirical investigation ought to take it's lead - the idea that such and such a feature cannot be accounted for by evolutionary means just is the base hypothesis from which scientific evidence is marshalled to counter. So 'irreducible complexity' should not be seen as something extra-scientific. It lies at the heart of the scientific method without which science would simply become dogma. — StreetlightX

This is a pretty bizarre statement on its face. Is this some kind of misguided Popperianism? I don't think that any evolutionary scientists ever start from the assumption that something is irreducibly complex - not as a formal methodological move, nor in any other sense that I can think of.

Frege has this model of Designation/Sense/Reference.
The designation is the word itself, i.e “chair”.
The Reference is the actual thing which the Designation(word) refers to, i.e an actual chair.
The sense is the Way in which the Reference is presented to us/given to us, i.e we Think of a chair as something to sit on.

This model is pretty straight forward regarding actual physical objects... but what about “concept words”? — marcolobo8

This is only a part of Frege's sentence model. He specifically excludes "concept words" from this part.

Im particular interested in the word “God” since im writing a text about it.
How do i apply Freges model on the word “God”? Is there even a definite reference to the word “God”? If so, is it as an object or a concept? — marcolobo8

God (capitalized) is, obviously, a proper name, both in the ordinary sense and in Frege's technical sense - i.e. the word "God" is a sign that can, at least in principle, refer to a concrete object. Whether the reference exists in reality is another question, but even if the word fails to refer, that doesn't make it a "concept word." This would be a case of "sense without reference" (assuming you do have some sense of what "God" is).

The problem with your argument is that you define what is 'rational' — Tim3003

That's not a problem, that's a feature. Of course I define what is 'rational', as does everyone else.

I don't think voters act irrational actually. We don't see it because we're to removed from them. — Benkei

You mean they don't see themselves acting irrationally. Of course. If they did, would they act that way? When I say that people act irrationally, that's my judgment, not theirs. (Actually, sometimes we do realize on some level that we are acting irrationally and self-destructively, but just can't help it. But most of the time the realization comes afterwards.)

Voters are cynical. Why else vote into power a party that has a documented, total disregard for the truth since 2016? — Benkei

What this and other recent and not-so-recent events show, I think, is that in times of stress people often act irrationally; self-destructive forces prevail, and when it comes to voting, people end up voting against their self-interest. In this, collectives act not unlike individuals: they lash out, become dysfunctional, and end up digging themselves even deeper.

The following Wittgenstein anecdote seems apt here. — Andrew M

It's an eye-opener, isn't it? Keeping the phenomenological perspective in mind helps to not get oneself confused with language and clever abstractions and remember what really matters.

OK, though SEP notes that "The debate about conventionality of simultaneity seems far from settled". It seems that what is important here, as with any thought experiment, is to be clear and upfront about the assumptions made. — Andrew M

I take your point. It is arguable whether in SR one can find a synchrony that is in some sense objective (though GR throws a monkey wrench into that scheme and makes things much messier). But I don't think it helps much with the personal perspective, because any such objective synchronization procedure (such as the Einstein synchronization, which they say is considered to be the best candidate in SR) is still going to differ from your personal clock, which governs everything that happens to you, including your observations and your aging processes. Nor does it enable us to subvert the speed limit on communication (and thereby conventional causality), which is what usually restores intuitive sanity to abstract paradoxes of this sort.

As you noted, these what-if questions pop up in different contexts. In the 1980s paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould raised this question with respect to the history of life on Earth. He supported the "butterfly effect" view: replay the tape of evolution, and due to the accumulation of contingencies, life would most likely go on a different path, and there would probably not be anything like the human species. Others, including another eminent paleontologist Simon Conway Morris, took the opposing "ergodic" view: convergent evolution would lead to similar, if not exactly the same forms developing, assuming the environment is roughly the same.

As you might imagine, neither side could offer much in the way of hard evidence for their position. However, since then other paleontologists and evolutionary biologists have weighed in. There is some limited empirical support building for convergence (ergodicity), but generalizing and scaling these results is difficult (see for instance a recent Science paper Contingency and determinism in evolution: Replaying life’s tape).

I think that part of the difficulty here, in addition to the scale and complexity of the problem, is that we use different models for different scales and granularities, and these models are neither practically, nor in most cases theoretically reducible to each other. When we go up the scale and coarse-grain our analysis, what was deterministic at a smaller scale becomes random or altogether invisible. Thus the butterfly may flap its wings, but we wouldn't know it or wouldn't have the means to factor it into our analysis. Of course, the very existence of coarse-grained models implies some degree of robustness: if the world really did go askew every time some damned butterfly did something in China, then what would be the point of trying to predict anything on a larger scale? We would all be reduced to butterfly-watching.

The philosophical point here, I think, is that we make a simplifying assumption regarding the present moment because of our everyday experience on Earth. But if that assumption is false (as SR would seem to indicate), then that has consequences for other concepts that depend on that assumption. Such as, for example, what it means for distant objects or events to exist right now. This idea is explored further with the Andromeda paradox. — Andrew M

I think the way Penrose explains the situation makes it clear that it is only superficially paradoxical:

Two people pass each other on the street; and according to one of the two people, an Andromedean space fleet has already set off on its journey, while to the other, the decision as to whether or not the journey will actually take place has not yet been made. How can there still be some uncertainty as to the outcome of that decision? If to either person the decision has already been made, then surely there cannot be any uncertainty. The launching of the space fleet is an inevitability. In fact neither of the people can yet know of the launching of the space fleet. They can know only later, when telescopic observations from Earth reveal that the fleet is indeed on its way. Then they can hark back to that chance encounter, and come to the conclusion that at that time, according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past. Was there then any uncertainty about that future? Or was the future of both people already "fixed"? —  Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind

There is no "difference that makes a difference" here, and I think this is the important lesson, which also shows the silliness of those who bitch and moan about how counterintuitive and just wrong relativity is. The fact is that relativity does not contradict our everyday experience. Ask yourself, what would have been different from your point of view if simultaneity was absolute rather than relative?

Another thing to note is that this and other such thought experiments rather cavalierly assume that there is some specific surface of simultaneity associated with each observer. It may be argued that the assumption is natural, but there is no physical significance to it. The standard theory of relativity says that simultaneity is conventional; there is no fact of the matter about simultaneity of distant events.

This system is not about straight up solving the is-ought gap since I think that it is unsolvable. This system is about bypassing it by giving a functional equivalent to an objective moral system with a system that gives a necessary personal goal for everyone the choice of which doesn't need to be justified since it's not a choice. It is all about whether this goal of "stability" is choosable. — Qmeri

You keep saying this, but three pages into the discussion it makes no more sense than in the beginning. I think we may as well leave it here.

I think that your main worry here is the relativity of simultaneity, the conventionality of clock synchronization protocols in SR. The only time when one can unambiguously match the chronology of the twins is when they are collocated, i.e. before or after the journey. The rest of the time the question "How long has my twin been in traveling?" does not have an unambiguous answer: it depends on the reference frame from which the length of the timeline is measured.

There is only one frame that has a special significance here: the comoving frame, the frame associated with one of the twins. Since all of the aging processes will be synchronous with this frame, this is the frame that you want to use if you want to know how much a twin has aged over time. However, that answer will only be useful to the other twin at the end of the journey, when the two twins meet, because at any other time there is no non-arbitrary way for the one twin to tell how much time has elapsed in the other twin's comoving clock as of this momement.

BUT many physicists DO believe that she doesn't have a well-defined current AGE when he is separated from her (at least if he has accelerated recently). THAT'S the conclusion that I can't accept philosophically: it seems to me that if she currently EXISTS right now, she must be DOING something right now, and if she is DOING something right now, she must be some specific AGE right now. So I conclude that her current age, according to him, can't be a meaningless concept. — Mike Fontenot

Her current age is not a meaningless concept, just under-defined. Pick a reference frame - any reference frame - and the ambiguity will disappear. The problem is that there is no absolute reference frame, so that you could say that her age is this many years, without any further qualifications, as you would in Newtonian world. In the relativistic world you must specify the reference frame to go with the age figure, and there is no right or wrong answer.

In the very same responte, khaled says that my system prescribes a course of action for every circumstance - just that it does not give simple universal courses of action like "be charitable" irregardless of circumstance. — Qmeri

I don't know which part of what you wrote he had in mind. As I already pointed out, you equivocate between a trivial (but wrong) descriptive statement about decision-making and a bare-bones prescriptive theory. To recap, the descriptive bit is that wish fulfillment necessarily leads towards a permanent state of satisfaction ("stability"). This just tell us what is, but this doesn't say anything about what ought to be. This is not a prescriptive system of ethics.

And then there is the prescriptive part, which says that you ought to make decisions so as to achieve this putative state of stability-nirvana in the most optimal way. This does not follow from the above, for all the usual reasons. You fail to bridge the is-ought gap.

Sorry, k_i ∈ (0, 1) was supposed to mean that k_i is in a set consisting of 0 and 1. Not sure what the correct notation should be.

ETA: Corrected the formula:

$\frac{1}{2}+\sum_{i=2}^{\infty}(-1)^{k_i}(\frac{1}{2})^i$, where $k_i$ is 0 or 1

We should be able to prove a stronger claim that a series composed of only positive fractions can converge to any real number between 0 and 1:

$\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}g_i(\frac{1}{2})^i$, where $g_i$ is 0 or 1

We can demonstrate this by a variant of the interval halving method. Let r be a real number between 0 and 1. If r < 1/2, then g₁ = 0, otherwise g₁ = 1. Take the next bracketing interval - [0, 1/2) or [1/2, 1] - and repeat the procedure to find the next g_i. Since each consecutive bracketing interval is half as wide as the previous one, then for any ϵ we can find n such that

$\sum_{i=1}^{n}g_i(\frac{1}{2})^i \in (r-\epsilon, r+\epsilon)$

(I beg your indulgence. It pleases me that I can still solve an elementary calculus problem decades after I took the class :) This thread should probably be moved, since it doesn't really contain any philosophy.)

His sum, the one he claims can only converge to a rational number, is something like this:

$1/2+\sum_{i=2}^{\infty}(-1)^{k_i}(\frac{1}{2})^i$, where $k_i \in \{0, 1\}$

ETA: Corrected the formula. Thanks

It can be easily shown that the series is convergent by Cauchy's criterion (yes, I just looked up the name - hey, I am three decades out of practice, you guys should be doing this :)). I suspect that it is also order-invariant (if that's the right term), but I won't attempt a proof.

The series can converge to any real number in the interval [0, 1]. There is a simple root-finding numerical method - interval halving, or bisection method - that can be used to demonstrate this. Take the function f(x) = x - r, where r is any real number between 0 and 1. Finding its root in the interval [0, 1] using the interval halving method will produce a series of the above form.

Except your willful actions can still be wrong. If you make an action that makes you temporarily more stable, but that decreases your stability in the long run, you have objectively made an error according to this system. — Qmeri

How is this "objectively an error?" You have not shown this. Your argument is that a closed system will by necessity converge towards a stable (static) state. This is both wrong and irrelevant, but let's set that aside for now. I just want to emphasize that your argument doesn't say anything about right and wrong - it just says, in the more restricted case, that whatever choices you make, in the long run they will tend to converge towards a state of perfect satisfaction. That is all.

is absolutely right: your "system" doesn't help us make decisions, it just claims to make an objective statement about decision-making in general. It is not a system of ethics, because it cannot prescribe any course of action.

If instead you propose that we ought to optimize our decision-making in order to maximize satisfaction, as measured by some metric (which you will also supply), then there is nothing "logically necessary" about that - that is just another in a long line of ethical systems that will have to compete with the rest.

I will leave you with this admonition from the recently departed philosopher Jaegwon Kim (hat tip to ), because I feel that this is kind of a theme with your posts:

There are no free lunches in philosophy any more than in real life, and I believe the cheap ones aren’t worth the money. We might as well go for the real stuff and pay the price. — Jaegwon Kim

Actually, if two proofs prove contradictory things, then there is a problem with one or both of the proofs. To say I understand one, but not the other, and I accept the one that I understand, therefore the other is wrong, as SophistiCat did, is illogical because the acceptance of the one may be based in a failure to see that its unsound, a mistaken understanding. Until you can exclude the possibility of mistake from your understanding, it is illogical to reject demonstrations which would show that your understanding is mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the same token, my hypothetical acceptance of the contrary proof could be "based in a failure to see that its unsound, a mistaken understanding." If that's the standard by which you propose to decide between the two proofs, then it cannot resolve anything. Examining the other proof wouldn't tell me anything that I didn't already know: that whatever opinion I form about the soundness of each proof, it might be mistaken.

How odd, you dismiss an argument you don't understand and don't even try to. That sounds like some sort of dogma to me. — Umonsarmon

It's not odd and it's not dogma. It's just straightforward logic: If Cantor's proof is correct, then his result is a theorem and therefore it is right. Cantor's proof is demonstrably correct, therefore his result is a theorem. You do understand that your result cannot be right if a theorem exists, according to which it is wrong, do you? If you are so confident about your result, then show us how Cantor's proof is wrong. It's as simple as that.

Have you understood the proof? — Umonsarmon

No, I haven't read your proof. I don't need to, because I have read and understood Cantor's diagonal proof. That's all I need to know that Cantor is right. Unless you can show how the diagonal proof is wrong, Cantor's result stands.

Just so you know, there's a bazillion cranks out there doing just what you are trying to do: attempting to prove Cantor wrong by proving something contrary to his result. They've been at it for decades: even before the Internet they've been inundating mathematicians and mathematical journals with their proofs. It is something like a perpetuum mobile for mathematical cranks. But none of them have managed to invalidate Cantor's proof yet.

Also a tip, since you are new on the forum: if you reply by clicking what looks like a crooked arrow underneath a post, or select some section of text and click on the "quote" prompt, then the person to whom you reply will get a notification about a reply in this thread.

This is a post on an idea I've had for awhile as to how time could exist before the big bang. Now the nearest that I can imagine to a state of pure nothingness is a state of pure homogeneity — Umonsarmon

That's a far cry from "nothing," especially when you add some sort of periodic state change, as you do further on. And it isn't anything that any cosmological theories postulate or even speculate. As a purely fictional scenario though, sure, this (with a periodic state change of some kind) would constitute a physical clock. But it wouldn't be time out of "nothing" - it would be time out of a structure that is just complex enough to support something like time.