You mean, science knows all there is to know about the brain. — Wayfarer

No. But are you suggesting that we will find such a case? Since they've been proposed the laws of conservation have worked flawlessly. Nowhere have they broken down. Are you suggesting they break down within our brains every minute of the day this whole time?

And I'll just repeat the question again for the 100th time knowing you won't answer:

Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? — khaled

Sorry to interject, but you guys should really consider quantum consciousness theory. — Enrique

I mentioned it in my first comment on this thread (though not by name). But it's weird. It doesn't seem to be what idealist (or anyone) wants. It's not clear at all how much quantum mechanics plays a role in the neurology so you'll likely end up with a useless mind anyways, because the brain is too big to be treated as a quantum system. And it's panpsychist to a weird degree. You'll end up with electrons being more free than us (since they're much more affected by quantum mechanics than a macro body like us would be).

Like you having a drink of water. — Wayfarer

Well as far as I can tell, we have never found cases of a neurological event that wasn't entirely explained by the previous neurological event. So it seems to me like the mental substance isn't doing anything.

Programmed by humans. Without humans, no algorithms. Humans interface between the domain of ideas and those of matter. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Dualism again. — Wayfarer

Non sequitor.

Again, you don't need to pose a new kind of substance. There is nothing so far that you've given that you can't explain with just the matter and its structures. And structures are not a substance.

You’re a great sport, Khaled. It’s helped me a lot having this conversation, and I thank you for it. — Wayfarer

I don't wanna sound like a dick but I wish I could say the same. You just keep dodging the problem. Maybe the SEP will get through:

A fourth version of the Problem of Interaction is related to the third, but, because it is more prominent in the contemporary literature, especially in some of the “property-based” problems we examine below, we will develop this last version at greater length. The first premise is:

The Completeness of the Physical: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.

When you trace the causal history of any physical effect—that is, of anything physical that has a cause—you will never need to appeal to anything non-physical. The physical universe contains within itself the resources for a full causal explanation of any of its (caused) elements, and in this sense is “complete”. The point applies, then, to whatever might occur to or within our bodies. Any instance of bodily behavior has a sufficient physical cause, which itself has a sufficient physical cause, and so on. In tracing the causal history of what we do, we need never appeal to anything non-physical.

Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? Because it's that or epiphenomenalism. And I think both are wrong. Or is there some alternative I'm not thinking of here?

And I'm telling you why that couldn't happen. You can't infer the nature of intentionality from looking at neurological data. — Wayfarer

That's not what I'm asking you for though. I'm not asking you to reduce intentionality to a single physical process. I get you can't do that. What I'm asking is: What will it look like when the mental substance affects matter?

Say we call you drinking the cup of water Neurological State 1 (NS1). We can find out what caused NS1, let's call that NS2. And NS3 is what caused NS2. And so on.

Do you expect that at some point we'll find a NSX that was NOT caused by a previous NSY? A neurological state that was brought about by the mental substance doing something?

A physical blow can obviously affect the physical capacity to be conscious. — Wayfarer

So consciousness is a physical capacity now? Come on.....

How can the physical affect the mental substance and vice versa? Explain in terms of what the physical would look like as it is being affected. What do you expect we will see, when intentionality causes a movement? Or is intentionality incapable of moving anything (epiphenomenology)?

I've already showed why this is implausible. An idea can be represented in all different kinds of neural configurations, not to mention many different languages or types of media. — Wayfarer

This does not make it so that the idea is not a structure that is shared accross them. Exactly like the same algorithm can be implemented on any number of computers, and non computers. And yet, the algorithm is no more than the structure of physical stuff in every case.

But on the other hand, what if I tell you something, convey something to you, that makes you sick or fills you with dread? Then nothing physical has passed between us — Wayfarer

Really? Nothing physical? Not even sounds? Or lights on a screen?

Doubtful. I'll immediately become an idealist if you manage to convey something to me telepathically without any physical means, as you claim you can do...

So there's no way to even deal with a 'non-physical' object in that framework. There are, as I understand it, spookily not-quite-physical things in quantum physics, like virtual particles that go in and out existence. But that's not what I'm getting at. In that formulaic picture of how science works, the mind is excluded as a matter of principle. It attempts to derive a view of what is objectively there, same for all observers, measurable and quantifiable. Physicalism is the view that whatever is measurable and observable in that sense, is the basis of all-there-is. Whenever you tallk about 'objects' or whether 'mind is a substance', then you're adopting that framework. And I suggest you're adopting it unconsciously, i.e. without thinking about it. That is why when I say that the mind is not an object, then you can't understand that, you think that I'm talking 'word salad'. What I'm actually doing, is analysing the question from a different perspective - I'm looking at it philosophically, in terms of the relationship of subject and object, not viewing it through the perspective of science. — Wayfarer

None of this has answered my question.

Incidently I don't disagree with any of the above. I disagree with your use of words such as "thing" and "object" but at least I know that you think mental substances exist. And that's all I need to formulate my question. Which you keep not answering.

You admit there exists mental substances yes? And you claim those mental substances can affect, and are affected by the physical world. We can observe the physical world. When a mental substance affects the physical world, what do you expect we will see?

Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that. — Wayfarer

I'm asking you what this would look like under a microscope.

Let's again think about the example where you drink water because you're thirsty. There is a substance, called "you" or "your mind" that you think causes some physical change resulting in you drinking water. If we were to trace the causal chain that led to you drinking water (so we would record what every single atom and particle was doing and what caused that movement, and what caused that movement.....etc) what do you expect to find? Do you expect that we would find some neuron activation or other that seemingly has no physical cause? Since it was caused by the mind? Note that would directly violate the laws of conservation, and there hasn't been a case that those were violated since they were conceived of. Are you suggesting that all we have to do is do a very accurate brain scan, and we would find that we violate the laws all the time by impacting physical systems with our minds?

But consider concepts - like natural numbers. They are real, in that they are the same for anyone who is able to count. But they're not things, at any rate, not material objects. — Wayfarer

Agreed. But they are structures of material objects. No more than that.

There is no need to pose two different substances, physical and material. All that is needed is the material, and its structure. The structure is not a substance, it's not a bearer of properties. I struggle to even call it a property.

But, structures of what? — Wayfarer

Matter. That is the point. Structures of matter. And not a separate substance.

It is not 'a thing'. — Wayfarer

I think the expression 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoron. — Wayfarer

You seem to not use the word "thing" properly. "Thing" can stand in for any noun.

But ok, you at least commit to a mental substance right? Since you don't like "thing".

Within the causal chain that led to you drinking the glass of water, where does that substance interfere?

I can see how to make sense of that, provided that you understand that the immaterial mind is never an object of perception, it's not a thing among other things. — Wayfarer

"Thing" does not mean an object of perception. Again, "thing" is even more general than "substance" so if something is a substance, it's gotta be a thing (note the use of "something" in that sentence). But let's not debate the meaning of the word "thing". Whatever it is, we can agree that you commit to the existence of a mental substance correct? This mental substance would be undetectable by any physical means correct (since it's non-physical and all that)?

Actually, let me ask a slighly different question this time. When you get hit really hard at the back of the head, the mental substance seems to disappear doesn't it? You go unconscious. Or at any rate, you have to concede that material changes affect the mental substance. How did the physical impact affect the mental substance?

There is no 'mind stuff' in any literal or objective sense. — Wayfarer

So then where is the idealism in your idealism?

It needs to said that the philosophical term 'substance' does not mean 'a material with uniform properties', — Wayfarer

I didn't say that. A substance is a bearer of properties.

But in the original context, 'ouisia' was a 'type of being' or 'bearer of attributes'. — Wayfarer

That's all that's needed for my question to make sense.

You think there is a bearer of mental properties. I ask you how this bearer can actually cause a physical change, given it's not physical. Or is it incapable of causing physical changes? It's a simple question.

it lead to idea of the separateness of mind and matter as literal substances, which I think is a radical conceptual problem. That is what is behind your question: — Wayfarer

That is.... precisely what substance dualism is. From SEP:

There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves.

The SEP sticks to your definition of substance, that is, a bearer of properties (which is not something I disputed in the first place). And substance dualism is a belief that there is a bearer of mental properties over and above the physical stuff itself. So again I ask you, can this bearer of mental properties cause a physical change? If so how?

But that doesn’t say that the mind doesn’t exist - it’s just that the manner of its existence is not something which can be conceived objectively. — Wayfarer

What is this supposed to mean? It literally just reads like word salad to me. It exists, but not objectively? What other mode of existence is there? "Subjective existence"? I have no clue what you're saying here.

There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years! — Wayfarer

Fossils store information with a history of three thousand million years.....

Because they belong to different orders of explanation. — Wayfarer

That does not answer why one can't be reduced to the other. Physics and chemistry belong to different orders of explanation, yet one can be reduced to the other.

It will agree that even though you can't directly explain logic in terms of physics, physical laws give rise to the kinds of beings that can, namely, humans. Looked at from the other end, logic, and everything else humans do, can be traced back to physics. That is what physicalism means - that 'everything is physical', that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. (wiki). — Wayfarer

Great. Seems exactly like what I think.

Curious to me that you don't count accounting for the evolutionary history of humans as "explaining logic". What exactly do you expect "explaining logic" to look like then? If someone were to explain how we evolved eyes, have they not explained sight? Anyways.

What I'm arguing is that you can't perform this reduction, that there is no plausible means to reduce logic to physics because they belong to different ontological levels. So that probably means that I'm obliged to defend substance dualism. — Wayfarer

Finally you commit to something.

So then, to you, logic is different ontologically from physics? There is "mind stuff" and "physical stuff", the laws of physics merely describe the physical stuff, with nothing to say about the mind stuff.

I find that really weird for multiple reasons. Firstly, on my thread, you kept insisting how mind is not a "new sort of thing" at all, and now you're saying you're a substance dualist, which means precisely that mind is a new sort of thing different from the physical. But I'll just take what you say now, that is substance dualism.

So, when you're thirsty, and go get a glass of water, how did your thirst, a "mental object" cause a physical movement? Or did it not?

If it did, how do you square that with the conservation laws? Here we would have a case where the "physical stuff", your body, moved in a particular manner, and supposedly this movement was not started by something physical but by "mind stuff", in this case your thirst. In other words, your mind caused a particular physical movement, it added momentum to some particle or other, and that resulted in you getting the drink. But that clearly violates the conservation laws, although it is a testable hypothesis (fundamentally, probably not practically). We can trace the causal chain that ended in you drinking the water, and your hypothesis is that within this chain, we'd find a seemingly uncaused movement. That there will be some unexplained movement we can point to and say: "Aha, that's where the mind came in". Do you expect that we'll find such a movement?

The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic — Wayfarer

And why is that? What exactly woud it mean for the laws of physics to "account for" something. If you mean that by looking at the laws of physics we can deduce the laws of logic, obviously not. I don't think anyone would disagree there. Then again, you can't deduce much of anything by just looking at the laws of physics.

Can the laws of physics account for the capacity of sight?

You can’t tell after a seemingly random decision has been made whether or not it was truly random or if there were some hidden variables. Generally. Apparently scientists have disproven the existence of hidden variables when it comes to QM. I still don’t know how that’s possible, fundamentally. Maybe someone more knowledgeable than me can explain.

But to answer your question: Maybe, we can’t tell.

Your problem is you’re too busy arguing to really think about what you’re saying — Wayfarer

Doubtful. I'm just tyring to understand idealists. But to me you just seem to be failing to commit to anything.

but at least it shows proper respect for the very faculty which makes humans human. — Wayfarer

And your problem is that you think any materialistic explanation is "reducing" or "demeaning" reason. You want to exalt it so badly you end up making it a new separate sort of thing, which in turn makes it useless. It's ironic.

reason is the source of explanation, not something like a beak or a tooth or a claw which enables us to catch more prey. — Wayfarer

The two views are not mutually contradictory. And both are true.

We can’t ‘explain reason’ - reason is the source of explanation — Wayfarer

Even so, all I'm saying is that reason isn't a separate entity. You haven't agreed or disagreed so idk what you're trying to do here exactly.

It’s not a pattern, or a structure, or some other facile explanation. — Wayfarer

Calling it a pattern or structure is not being too simple. You underestimate how complicated and beautiful those can get.

I don’t want an answer to that, or a counter-argument, but for you to think about what it is I’m trying to share with you. — Wayfarer

And you should reexamine your own "bias against matter" that litters your reply. The idea that matter is this dumb crude thing that can never rise to the exalted status of things like reason and thought, so reason and thought must be their own separate entities! Maybe it's because I have a background in computer science that I don't have that urge to exalt. Patterns of matter are exalted enough as they are.

In the first place I fail to understand how not being able to find a pattern for prime numbers is a challenge for materialism.

DNA does not form a pattern - it’s too complex to be reduced to a pattern. English syntax likewise does not form a pattern, as it’s irregular, even if there are some ‘patterns of use’ such as conjugation — Wayfarer

Right so there is no hard pattern for everything.

Still, there is something that sets primary numbers apart from regular numbers. And something that sets DNA apart from other polynucleutides. Maybe not a hard and fast pattern, but something. And the only point I'm trying to make is that this "something" is not a new kind of object called "mind stuff". It is no more than the structure of the thing itself.

There is a structure to prime numbers: They are numbers that are divisible by only themselves and one.
There is similarly a structure to DNA and RNA. And English. And German. Even if it gets hazy at the corners.

And this Structure is not a new type of object, all that exists is structures of the physical. Meaning is not a new type of object added to physical stuff. It is simply the structure of physical stuff.

Maybe structure is a better word. I'll use that from now.

Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory accounts for the biological origin of species - there’s nothing in it specifically to account for the nature of reason as such. — Wayfarer

But you just said:

Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer

So if we can account for other features of h.sapiens like sight and hearing by accounting for the biological origin, why not reason?

what's the pattern of prime numbers? — Wayfarer

Numbers that are only divisible by themselves and one.

the laws of motion? — Wayfarer

You can easily look them up. They're simply differential equations.

English syntax? — Wayfarer

https://www.ego4u.com/

German syntax? — Wayfarer

https://www.learngermanonline.org/free-grammar-exercises/

The fact that any of these concepts were even deemed worthy to distinguish (so for example, prime numbers as opposed to the rest of the numbers) means they have a pattern.

Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer

Weren't you the one talking about "the reason of the world" in other threads, and I was the one saying that reasoning is a developed capacity specific to h.sapiens?

It is the ability to perceive meaning for which there isn’t a satisfactory physicalist account, other than in the vague sense that it evolved. — Wayfarer

So there is a physicalist account for it....

And what about "it evolved" is vague? What more do you want? What's missing?

OK, so the only difference between Plato's Republic and Lady Chatterly's Lover is the way the matter is arranged? Really? — RogueAI

Yes. If you think there is another difference please point me to it. It seems clear to me that if you change the way the letters are arranged, and the number of each letter used, that you can turn Plato's republic to Lady Chatterly's Lover. You don't need to "add anything" else to do so. So that tells me it's the only variable.

If I did change the arrangement and number of letters turning a copy of Plato's republic into Lady Chatterly's Lover by physically using glue and scissors, did I miss anything? Is it "really" still plato's republic. I mean... I didn't add or remove any non physical meaning in the process, but it seems in the end that I got Lady Chatterly's lover. Or, again, do you maintain that if I maim a copy of Plato's republic in this manner that after the operation the book is still "really" plato's republic and not Lady Chatterly's love letter? That's the conclusion you'd have to reach if you want to separate the meaning from the pattern. And I think that's a clearly absurd conclusion.

I bet you wouldn't talk about computer code. You would say it's a website where people discuss philosophy. Because that's what it is! — RogueAI

Those two things aren't mutually exclusive......

So, if I made a website with identical code to this one, with all the same post history and everything, and then switched the link between the new website and the original website, such that anyone going to the link is actually going to the new, cloned website, would I have missed anything? I don't remember adding "meaning" at any point in this operation. Yet it seems like I haven't missed anything.

This isn't to say that meaning doesn't exist, but that it is no more than the pattern. If you think "meaning" has its own existence, then tell me, if I did the procedure above, at what step do I add the "meaning" and the "philosphy" to the new philosophy forum clone site?

Answer: You don't "add meaning". Meaning is the pattern, not an object or substance to be added.

The position you take is extremely counterintuitive and certainly does not map on to the way people talk. — RogueAI

Example to back up this statement? The prevailing paradigm today is materialism. So this can't be true. Give me an example so I know what you mean.

It also entails that a physicalist account of pain is a necessary AND sufficient definition for pain. I think that's preposterous. Any definition of pain has to include that it hurts. It feels bad. — RogueAI

It does. A physicalist account of pain includes that it hurts. Because "it hurts" is a description of a physical pattern.

The physicalist account of pain doesn't mention the mental component of pain — RogueAI

Again, let's examine this idea. Now, first off, I'll disagree with the statement. The physicalist account of pain does mention the mental component of pain. Because the mental component is the pattern.

But going by your definition, you think the mental component is another sort of object. You first take the neurological state, and then add to it the mental component. You think that something like a philosophical zombie is conceivable, as in, a physically identical clone that has no "mental component"

Let me then ask you, when you're in pain and so yell "Ouch", how did pain, a non material thing, cause the movement of you mouth, a material thing? That is telepathy. And if our minds can cause physical changes inside our bodies somehow, then why are they limited to inside our bodies? Why can't I lift a water bottle with my mind the same way I can lift my arm with my mind?

Now if pain, and mind, are patterns of a physical state, it is very straightforward to explain how they bring about the effects. But if you want to divorce mind from matter like that, you're either stuck with violating the conservation laws, or admitting that mind is useless. You didn't yell "Ouch" beacuse you're in pain, how could you! Pain is just a non material thing, it can't move your mouth!

I mean, if an alien asked you "what's pain?", you wouldn't talk about it hurting and feeling bad? — RogueAI

No of course not. What the heck does saying "Pain is what hurts" accomplish. Doesn't seem helpful at all.

This is a good exercise actually. Supposedly a materialist would fail at describing pain to an alien and this is a problem exclusive to materialism. Ok. Imagine I'm an alien. Describe pain to me. Supposedly idealists/dualists have no problem doing this.

Except y'all also hold that it's private and ineffable. So......

Are you sure you want to argue in favor of the existence of experiential knowledge? I certainly think it's a thing, but you're going to have trouble reconciling the existence of experiential knowledge in a purely physical world. — RogueAI

I won't. You think it's a thing, as in an actual object. Some "mental stuff" that you add. THAT I can't reconcile sure.

I think it's a neurological pattern. If you concede that I don't have trouble reconciling the existence of knowledge in general why would I have trouble with "experiental knowledge"?

To have experiental knowledge of X (the color red in this case) would mean to have a certain memory. To have a memory is to have a certain neurological pattern.

After reading ahead, I see we're too far apart on basic principles. You're willing to sacrifice meaning. I'm not. — RogueAI

No, we just have different definitions of what meaning is. You think meaning is its own kind of "mental object". I think it's a pattern. And I've highlighted how useless and problematic posing such a "mental object" is, especially since it literally cannot do anything. You'd be stuck with meaning, philosophy, Qualia, and all this other mental stuff you want to exalt, ironically being useless. I mean, there IS a way out that I mentioned on my first post in the thread that would allow you to have a non material mind that can actually make physical changes without violating the laws of conservation, but it's not without its problems and quirks either.

For anyone still on here. Take this on your way out of the troll's cave:

https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/thephilosophyforum-ignore/makbinojcaolplmpbneielaccnondnko

Credits to @SophistiCat.

Material objects exist but they have no inherent reality. — Wayfarer

I'm reading this as: Material objects are actually just ideas in the mind of an observer.

Regardless though, this doesn't answer my question. What are "perceivers" for Berkeley? Are they also ideas in the mind of an observer? If not, what are they?

I guess that's true, but again, the ambiguous nature of sub-atomic phenomena really undermines the idea of the mind-independent reality of fundamental objects. — Wayfarer

You use the word "reality" weirdly so I can't tell what you're saying here exactly. And, again, QM has epistemological interpretations that don't touch the mind-independent reality of matter.

Regardless though, can we agree that matter has a mind-independent existence of some sort? That if we take out all the minds in the world that there would still exist something (called matter)?

Berkeley believed that objects are ideas, or collections of ideas, in the minds of perceivers. That is why he said esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. There are no material substances ('substance' in the philosophical sense as 'bearer of attributes' not as a type of material) - only finite mental substances - humans - and the infinite mental substance - God. — Wayfarer

What's the difference between saying this and just sticking with material bodies being real in their own right.

On the one hand you have objects as ideas, except there is an omnipresent "idea maintainer" called God that makes sure rocks don't go anywhere by looking at them all the time. On the other hand you have objects always being real in their own right, the rocks don't go anywhere at all. It seems to me like there is not much actual difference here. What are the advantages or disadvantages of both? What does having the combination of impermanent ideas, with an omnipresent "idea maintainer" allow you to say that that just having permanent objects doesn't, or vice versa?

For Berkeley, what exactly are the "perceivers" that are having the ideas? Are those ideas in the mind of God too?

My view of materialism is that it claims that material bodies are real in their own right, irrespective of whether perceived or not, and that furthermore, material bodies, or nowadays what is understood to be matter-energy, is the only real subject, and that the mind is a product of that, via evolution. — Wayfarer

I don't see how this is incompatible with Kant:

Kant also said that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us. The gist of it is, objects of perception are interpreted by us according to the categories of the understanding, by which we perceive phenomena - phenomena literally means 'what appears' - but we don't see them as they really are in themselves. — Wayfarer

The first is an ontological statement. The second an epistemological statement. It can be the case that material bodies are real in their own right and that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us.

When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions. — RogueAI

Which are no more than a pattern of of letters. Which are no more than than a pattern of lights on your screen lighting up. Etc.

Let's use cars, maybe that's easier:

Maybe a car is a better analogy. We can say "This car can move at X km/h", without knowing anything about the engine or how cars are built. You can know things about the pattern without knowing the specifics. — khaled

Why is Mary surprised? She already knows everything there is to know about seeing red. — RogueAI

Because she's never seen red before. No new knowledge was gained in the usual sense. Because again, in this case "know" has 2 meanings. There is the know in "know pythagorean's theorem" and the know in "know red". The latter simply means seeing something red. By the latter meaning, mary doesn't know red. Even if she knows everything about seeing red in the former meaning. No new knowledge in the former meaning is gained. The surprise comes from seeing red for the first time.

Yes, but you're not claiming the car is identical to "moving at X km/h". I think what you're trying to say is that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, so talk of Phosphorus is talk of Hesperus even if the person has never heard of Hesperus. — RogueAI

No. I'm pointing out that we can talk about Phosphorus despite not knowing what electrons and protons are, even though phsophorous is no more than electrons and protons.

Similarly, ancients could talk about their mental states, which are no more than brain states, without knowing what neurons are. Just like you can talk about Phosphorus despite not knowing what electrons and protons are. Does that make sense finally?

You don't need all the details to discuss the pattern as a whole. Another example is computer scientists who talk about algorithms without talking about hardware design. Even though the program in the end is no more than a pattern of electrical signals on a motherboard.

But you're not sure. — RogueAI

No, I'm sure. It's not substrate dependent. I'm sure about my definition. Also there are people who define it differently.

So how would you go about verifying whether anything other than neurons can be conscious? — RogueAI

By seeing whether or not it meets the pattern that I defined.

How do you THINK we actually verify consciousness? Brain scans can tell you if someone's conscious or sleeping or dead. That alone should tell you that conscoiusness is not an "immaterial mind" because if it was, then brain scans should tell us nothing.

I think I addressed this with the Hesperus/Phosph — RogueAI

No you haven't. Because you still don't get what I mean there. It has nothing to do with labeling errors, and everything to do with the fact that you can discuss a pattern without knowing the specifics. Ancients can say "I am sad" which is a description of a physical pattern, despite having no clue what neurology is. Just like we can say "Phosphorous is a chemical element with symbol P" without having any clue what electrons or protons are, even though phosphorous is no more than electrons and protons.

But now you have to prove whether brains alone are conscious. And of course you can't. There's no way in principle to verify the consciousness of anything outside yourself. — RogueAI

Ugh. Again with the implied dualism that makes the question meaningless. No, consciousness, is a particular pattern. That pattern is defined by us. It is not an object with its own existence that we detect. How do you identify a car? By seeing whether or not it meets the definition that we set for cars. How do you identify a conscious person? By seeing whether or not they meet the definiton that we set for conscious people. Not by looking for ghosts (immaterial minds).

Not only can she not disprove solipsism — RogueAI

Materialists have as much trouble disproving solipsism as they have disporiving the theory that "I possess a car, and I'm not sure of the existence of any other cars". It is simple pattern recognition. Give a materialist an object, and he can check whether or not it's conscious very easily, just as easily as he can check whether or not it's a car. Because both "car" and "consciousness" are patterns of physical stuff.

It's idealists that generally struggle to tell whether or not anything is conscious, given that to be conscious for them is to posses some "non material secret sauce" that cannot be detected by any means.

Unlike matter, we know that mind and thought and consciousness exist. — RogueAI

Sure. And materialism is the further proposition that matter is fundamental, and that mind and consciousness are patterns of matter. The reason for this move is the fact that you can easily have the matter stay behind while the mind goes away, for isntance when you get knocked out. If consciousness was an immaterial mind, why do physical things impact it so much? Therefore something else must be fundamental, preceding mind, which mind is made of. We call that matter.

Seeing as they're patterns of matter, there is absolutely no issue when it comes to recognizing whether or not something possesses them. We have no problems with pattern recognition.

My only problem is whether solipsism is true or not. — RogueAI

Not just that. Your problem is detecting any other mind other than your own. You have 0 reason to believe any other minds exists or any way to detect them if they do (since you defined them to be undetectable). Now, you'll note that this is the exact same problem you think is present in materialism. No more and no less:

Not only can she not disprove solipsism, she can't prove the material stuff she thinks brains are made of even exists (it's a non-verifiable belief), and she also can't prove whether a machine duplicate of a brain is conscious or not. — RogueAI

Literally everything in that quote would apply to you as well. Can't disporve solipsism, can't be sure matter exists, and can't prove whether a machine duplicate is conscious. Additionally, your version of dualism/idealism whichever it is comes with the problem that you must conclude that concsiousness is useless. After all, it's immaterial, it can't move atoms, or do much of anything. You’re right you’re not in the same boat, you’re in a worse boat!

But for some reason it's fine for an idealist/dualist not to be able to do this but for a materialist it's a fatal flaw and reason to reject the theory. Additionally, as I've stated above, most of these are not problems in materialism. Being able to define precisely what consciousness is and isn't, and easily being able to detect it, is one of the big advantages to Identity Theory.

I'm done for the night! Great discussion, Khaled. I'll reply tomorrow. — RogueAI

I'm having fun too. Finally someone that doesn't just bow out after 2 comments of disagreement. Looking forward to it.

A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple — RogueAI

First time I see this one. My initial thoughts are that it's not a serious objection. After images themselves are not green or purple. Experiences don't have colors (and yes, experiences are patterns of physical stuff. Patterns don't have colors). Just seems like misuse of language.

I can say an apple is red, I can't say the sight of the apple is red. I can say "I am seeing a red after-image" but I can't say the sight of a red after-image is red. So yes, no one can claim that the state of my brain while seeing a red after image is red, and neither can they claim that the sight of a red after image is red. I don't see a problem.

Is Mary surprised when she sees red? — RogueAI

Yes.

Are you saying the philosophy forum is identical to a computer code? I don't agree with that. The forum is computer code and a community of people talking about philosophy. Don't you agree that defining the forum as purely computer code is an incomplete definition? — RogueAI

I'm talking about the website itself. Is the website more than the code? No. Can we still talk about it without knowing the code? Such as saying "thephilosophyforum is awesome"? Yes.

Maybe a car is a better analogy. We can say "This car can move at X km/h", without knowing anything about the engine or how cars are built. You can know things about the pattern without knowing the specifics.

OK, consciousness is an immaterial mind. — RogueAI

So it must be useless then? That's what you want to commit to? If it's immaterial then it can't interact with the material yes? Otherwise we'd just call it material.

YOU are saying the taste of vanilla ice cream is actually pattern of matter A,B,C. YOU must then provide an explanation for why pattern of matter A,B,C is the taste of vanilla ice cream and not pattern of matter X,Y,Z or E,F,G. — RogueAI

Me: A car is actually this specific combination of parts

You: So why is a car not this other specific combination of parts?

Does that make sense to you? How would you begin to answer that question? We can agree that a car is a combination of parts and no more yes? Engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc. Now if someone asks you "Ok but why is a car not a combination of biscuits, chocolate, and cream" how do you respond to them?

Explain to me why a car is a combination of parts (engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc) and not (biscuits, chocolate and cream), then I'll explain to you why stubbing your toe is pattern ABC not XYZ ok?

I'm not a materialist. I'm not claiming the taste of vanilla ice cream is anything other than the taste of vanilla ice cream. — RogueAI

Ah but you're claiming that the taste of vanilla ice cream IS IN FACT the taste of vanilla ice cream! I now ask you this: Why is the taste of vanilla ice cream not the taste of chocolate ice cream!!!!!!!!!!

Are these pattenrs substrate dependent — khaled

No I don't think so, but some define them as such. That's what I meant.

There is no real property called consciousness? — RogueAI

Ok I misspoke. There is no real object called consciousness, material or immaterial. Consciousness is a pattern, not an object.

If yes, how would you prove it? — RogueAI

By scanning his brain and finding that he displays the pattern required for consciousness. In the same way that we can distinguish a car from a bus or an ice cream cone, by looking at whether or not it conforms to the structure of "car".

Let me ask you on the other hand, supposedly consciousness is an immaterial mind. How can you tell that your duplicate possesses an immaterial mind? You can't make a detector for it, because it's immaterial. So how could you tell? Or can you not tell?

You're committed to saying that Mary can know what it's like to see red without having the mental experience "seeing red". — RogueAI

No because the meaning of "know" in both instances is different. When we tell someone "You don't know X emotion" or X color we mean "You haven't had X emotion" or seen X color, not "You don't know the neurological basis for X emotion". If the latter was what we meant we woudn't be able to talk about emotions or colors without knowing the neurology, yet we do so all the time. In the same way that you can use this site without knowing the code, so can we talk about emotions without knowing the neurology, and vice versa, EVEN THOUGH the emotion is no more than a neurological pattern (and the site is no more than the code). So no, Mary doesn't know red, even though she knows everything physical about seeing red.

You're committed to saying that two people meaningfully talking about their mental states are also meaningfully talking about configurations of brain matter, since mental state = certain configuration of brain matter — RogueAI

Same as above. Two people talking about thephilosophyforum need not know about the code that comprises the site. Even though the site is no more than the code, or do we disagree there? Is there something more to this site than its code? Something that you need to add to the code to get thephilosophyforum? I've already mentioned this previously:

No I'm claiming that people can have knowledge of their minds but not their brains. Knowledge of the pattern without knowledge of the specifics. Like how you know how to use this site without knowing the code that comprises it. — khaled

In other words: Yes two people talking about their mental states are talking about brain states, without knowing about the brain states. Just like programmers can discuss algorithms without knowing about hardware development.

You have no explanation for why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe — RogueAI

Do you have an explanation for why vanilla ice cream is vanilla ice cream?

No this question doesn't make sense for identity theory. The only reason you're able to ask it is, again, you're coming from a dualistic framework where there is a difference between the pain and the patterns of matter. There is no difference. Once you can explain to me why vanilla ice cream is identical to vanilla ice cream, and not chocolate ice cream, then I'll explain to you why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe and not to the pain of breaking a finger or feeling nothing.

Again, you've asked this "why is this state of matter corresponding to this state of mind and not that one" question before to me multiple times and each time I ask you to answer it and you provide no response. Why is that? Maybe because the question is nonsensical.

In your framework, why does this pattern of matter cause the pain of stubbing a toe, rather than the pain of breaking a finger? You have a problem with my framework not being to explain this so I assume yours can yes?

Are these pattenrs substrate dependent — RogueAI

Definitional.

and how would you verify whether a non-organic pattern of matter that you conclude is conscious is actually conscious? — RogueAI

Again with the dualist view, suggesting there is a real object or property called "consciousness" that is added to physical stuff, that we can detect. There is no such thing.

Actually, again, let me return that question to you along with the last one. You believe there is a non material thing called consciousness right? How do you determine whether a given object possesses it? I hear qualia are private and ineffable so supposedly you're not able to either. So why is it a problem when I'm not able to but not a problem when you're not able to?

"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain." — RogueAI

This is not the same sentence as "the mind is identical to the brain" which you falsely attributed to me. Mental states are brain states.

Now you would very easily know this if you were not in the habit of purposefully taking things out of context:

"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain."

Literally the next line in your own link..... I find it hard to give you the benefit of doubt and think you're doing this by mistake anymore. Just, what do you hope to gain by distorting my view and arguing against a distortion in your own head?

Is the brain state that corresponds to "stubbing your toe" identical to the mental state "stubbing your toe"? — RogueAI

Correct.

Yet the brain is not the mind.

Do you claim that the pain of stubbing your toe is identical to some configuration/pattern of matter? — RogueAI

Yes.

Then minds are not identical to brains. How are they different? — RogueAI

Minds are patterns of brains. They are not a separate sort of thing. No one said that minds are identical to brains, not even physicalists. Otherwise we wouldn't have 2 different words.

A mind to a brain is an algorithm to a running program. The algorithm is not a thing in itself. It's a pattern.

Point is, mind is not a new type of "mental stuff" that is distinct from "physical stuff" which is what idealism and dualism propose ontologically.

You're claiming ancient people did NOT have knowledge of their own minds? — RogueAI

What's up with people here and taking quotes blatantly out of context. No I'm claiming that people can have knowledge of their minds but not their brains. Knowledge of the pattern without knowledge of the specifics. Like how you know how to use this site without knowing the code that comprises it.

Actually read what I'm saying or it's a waste of time for everyone. If you're going to take something out of context at least bother to quote a sentence:

Firstly no, knowing that something is a pattern does not grant knowledge of that pattern in the first place. — khaled

Or would that make it too difficult to take things out of context?

Why do some patterns of brain activity result in conscious awareness while others (the vast majority of what the brain does) don't? — RogueAI

This again displays a bias in asking the question. Again, certain patterns of brain activities are consciousness. This would be like asking "Why is this vanilla ice cream while that is not vanilla ice cream"? Why, because one is the pattern of vanilla ice cream while the other isn't!

The only way for your question to even make sense is to conceive as consciousness as something that is "produced by" neurological states. Then it makes sense to ask why this neurological state produces it and that doesn't. But even then, it would be akin to asking "Why is pi equal to 3.14"? Or "Why does H2O boil at 100 degress not 70 degrees in standard conditions"? It just happens that this is the case, there was no necessary reason why it had to be this way.

Let me actually ask you the question. Why do you think some patterns of brain activity "produce" consciousness and others don't? Stupid question right?

Do you think computers will eventually become conscious (or already are)? — RogueAI

Well it's definitional. If you define consciousness as an animal or human capacity then obviously no. If you define it by having this or that pattern then I don't see why a similar pattern can't be reproduced in a computer. So yes, computers can eventually become conscious or already are according to your definition.

So, that being said, did ancient people who had knowledge of their minds also have knowledge of their brains? — RogueAI

Firstly no, knowing that something is a pattern does not grant knowledge of that pattern in the first place. I know the video game I'm playing is a pattern of code, however I do not know the code in any way. I know this site is a pattern of code, however I don't know the code in any way. We can conceive of something as a pattern of something else, and talk about what that pattern does once actualized (allows me to play games/allows me to talk to strangers), without knowing what the pattern itself is.

Secondly, those same ancient people believed that consciousness is a spirit of some sort in a dualistic fashion. To them, consciousness =/= neurological state, but moreso a spirit, a ghost in the machine. I'm talking here about Descartes, don't know if that's "ancient enough". And you see the remnants of that today.

It's important to note that most of ancient people didn't believe in this dualistic split until Descartes. As for what they actually believed, I'm not an authority on that. But I would venture it was some sort of monism that was not idealism, considering Berkeley was in the 1700s and Descartes in 1600s (and he wasn't even a monist!). But I don't know much about ancient philosophies.

So, what's wrong with having theories? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing. And they’re very useful.

Remember, you claimed that talking about "the reason that orders the world" is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I claimed we will never know we if have access to it.

You are claiming that because our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete, we ought not make any effort toward completion. — Metaphysician Undercover

False. Maybe I just suck at communicating. I’m saying that despite all our efforts we have no evidence by which to tell that we’re “done”. That we “got it”. Therefore it’s useless to aim at “getting it”. We can and should get as close as we can, where it’s useful to do so, but again:

the only thing separating one theory from any other theory is Occam's razor. — khaled

And we only have access to the minds of others through the medium which is the physical world. Therefore we must have access to the physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t say we don’t have access. I said we have no reason to believe we have full access, nor any way to tell that we do. That there could always be something we’re missing (heck, as far as we know there most likely is something missing). It’s a very modest claim.

Ergo, the brain state and consciousness correlation coefficient is ZERO. — TheMadFool

Yes this is precisely the non sequitor. First off, it’s clear that you don’t know what correlation coefficients are. Just because the 2 variables don’t change identically doesn’t mean the correlation coefficient is 0. It can still be anywhere from 1 to -1. 0 is when they’re completely unrelated and we don’t use correlation coefficients on binary data (on/off) anyways….

Consciousness is a certain brain pattern. This brain pattern disappears when you sleep. Even though your brain is still on. Does that make sense?

If I have a series of blue and red lights, and I call the sequence RBRB “enlightenment”, then change the sequence to RRBB, then “enlightenment” is not occurring despite the lights being on. Capiche?

If these limitations are truly the limitations of being human, as you believe, they are still not the limitations of being alive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. Sorry for assuming that we're talking about humans. Once we meet aliens or once we evolve to the point where we classify as a different species then yes, we may see more.

Nowhere have I seen the claim that a human being has no direct access to the independent ordering of the world justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is justified by definition. You have access to the reason in your mind. You don't have access to "the reason that orders the world". This is not to say that the reason in your mind is wrong, but that it could be incomplete. Any theory about "the reason that orders the world" is just that, a theory. As long as it accounts for own reasoning and perceptions the only thing separating it from any other theory is Occam's razor.

I remember Donald Hoffman claiming that whenever he tried to simulate evolution on a machine using some sort of "game system", the organisms that ended up surviving were ones that did not understand "the reason that orders the world" but who instead just managed to find a "reason internal to the mind" that specifically suits their survival needs and nothing more. — khaled

If you do believe in evolution then you ought to believe that it is more likely than not that our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete. Not only is this supported by experimental evidence (Hoffman) but also we can easily find scenarios where there are things we cannot detect that affect us, such as UV light.

Second, if physicalism is true and if the brain is always on whether one's awake, sleeping, daydreaming, dreaming, whathaveyou, then consciousness doesn't have physical correlates. — TheMadFool

Non sequitor. First off, I think consciousness is a neurological state. It's not an independent existence that "has neurological correlates", no it's a pattern of neurological states. Mind is to a brain what an algorithm is to a computer.

Of course I don't believe that! However,

1. NREM sleep -> Brain off — TheMadFool

If you don't believe that then brain not off. Brain always on.

I would be having trouble packing meaning into a carton yes, because you can't pack patterns into cartons. Now, we can agree you can't pack meaning into cartons. But you also think meaning is not a pattern. And also not anything else. So, again, what's left?

If you want to argue against strawmen feel free, just declare you intentions from the outset so you don't waste people's time.

Do you actually think there is no brain activity while you sleep? If so I can't very much help you.

Ok, what sort of thing is meaning? Is that better? Not material, not a structure of a material, and also not anything else. So what's left?

I would say it's a structure of a material. What's the issue with that? And what is it for you instead?

The latter (NREM sleep) is not problematic because the brain is off and the mind is off. — TheMadFool

The brain is very much on. Or you'd be dead. That's the point......

Let me get this straight, what you're saying is the Mu state is identical to sleeping? — TheMadFool

No I'm saying that your brain doesn't shut down when you're sleeping. Idk how you got that from what I said.

This is to imply that your idea about "mind off brain on" is not very difficult to a physicalist to deal with. Physicalism wouldn't have gotten off the ground if it couldn't explain what sleeping was. Even though in sleeping it's also "mind off brain on". Outside of dreams anyways.

There are patterns in nature - crystals, snowflakes and the like - but ‘meaning’ is not a pattern. — Wayfarer

So it's not a structure of a thing.

It’s not any kind of thing. — Wayfarer

Nor any kind of thing.

So what the heck is it? Because I think that exhausts your options.

Like, in language, the structure of grammar is not a pattern, because it’s irregular — Wayfarer

"Irregular" =/= "Not a pattern".

Language and grammar aren't random either. The only difference between a grammatically correct sentence and a grammatically incorrect sentence is whether or not they conform to a pattern.

Like seriously, "the structure of grammar is not a pattern"? Really? "Pattern" and "Structure" are synonyms.

Humans alone can do that - birds and other animals communicate through sounds, but only humans can perceive the relationship between symbols. — Wayfarer

Where do you get this? There is mountains of experimental evidence of animals reasoning. Even solving puzzles.

The physicalist answer to all of that is simply that it is an evolved ability - which is true, in some respects, but it begs many questions regarding what ‘physical’ means, again. — Wayfarer

Let's just first get agree "meaning" means. What is meaning? Not a pattern and not a new sort of thing. So what? I just can't understand what you're getting it.

My argument is that the ability to detect meaning and then to represent it in abstract terms via language, is something for which physicalism fails to account. — Wayfarer

Right and I'm asking what "meaning" is for you. Is it a pattern of physical things, or a new sort of thing entirely? Do you have a bunch of ink and then you "add meaning" to it like a chef adds ingredients to a stew or is meaning simply the pattern of ink? Or something else? I think meaning is the pattern of ink.

We have to make sure we're talking about the same thing here in the first place. Then we can start to ask whether or not the thing we're talking about is physical.

Sigh. Can't you just read to the end and respond?

So long as to you the meaning is a structure of physical things not a new separate sort of thing. Not something that you add to the physical. — khaled

Do you agree? Because I think our disagreement may be more about which words we use rather than what we mean by them.

So how then could the meaning be something physical? — Wayfarer

As I said to fool:

If I have a sorted series of red and blue boxes, RRRBBRBRRB for example, is the series physical? As in is the pattern itself, the structure physical? I frankly don't care about the answer to that question because it's definitional. But since you want to define whether or not something is physical by whether or not it possesses mass and volume, then for you probably the pattern is not physical (since the pattern does not possess mass).

For the record, since the pattern is a pattern of physical stuff (boxes) I would call the pattern itself physical, which is maybe why a lot of people on the site think I'm disagreeing with them when I'm not. Maybe my use of physical is weird. Anyways. — khaled

TLDR: I don't particularly care whether or not you want to call the meaning physical, for me if someone is a pattern of physical things then that pattern I call physical. So long as to you the meaning is a structure of physical things not a new separate sort of thing. Not something that you add to the physical.

The brain shuts down for the night or the day, if you're napping. — TheMadFool

.......Sorry, are you serious?

What's the difference between someone who is dead and someone who is sleeping do you think? When the brain shuts down what keeps the heart going? Cmon mate you could figure this one out with a bit of thinking or a quick google search.

There's no bridge between the laws of physics and those of logic. They function independently of one another. — Wayfarer

So?

But there is a bridge between neurology and the laws of logic no?

A Mu state is basically the brain on but the mind off - something impossible if the mind were physical, right? — TheMadFool

Guess physicalists can't explain sleep either :roll: