We suffer, therefore I am. — 180 Proof

Is there any significance to your use of 'we' rather than 'I'? You may have just been careless, or it may have been deliberate.

I doubt Nagel was implying that there is nothing it is like to be a bat. — Harry Hindu

Oh indeed. I was just trying to bring out different usages of 'like', one as a way to compare, and one to indicate phenomenality.

2. Energy is the only life, and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of Energy. — William Blake - The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

I find this a very interesting one. I interpret this as "You only start to think when you meet an obstacle to your expansion."

It is perhaps the idea that we are primarily appetival, gratification-seeking, acquisitive of power and matter. We expand our circle of influence until we meet an obstacle of some kind, as we inevitably do - we meet another centre of appetite doing the same thing as us, or we encounter a paradox that must be solved, e.g. too many cakes reduces your ability to acquire more cakes, etc, we start to think "Oh! Something has gone wrong. What is it? What is the shape of this obstacle? Can I go around it? Can I destroy it? To do that I need to know its construction." etc. A philosopher/scientist is born from a hedonist. We are all frustrated hedonists on this forum, no?

Perhaps hedonist is the wrong word. Perhaps primary appetite does not distinguish pleasure from pain straight away.

Nice idea for a thread. I've always loved the Marriage of Heaven and Hell. The proverbs are cool.

Means either: you must gratify your desires regardless of the harm you cause to other people.

Or: kill off your evil desires and do not encourage them, however attached you are to them. — Cuthbert

That's really interesting, I never though of that proverb meaning either of those, although I can see why you do. For me it's a statement of psychology, which might be translated as:

"Nursing unacted desires breeds a kind of pestilential soul that, long term, en masse, causes far more harm and creates the conditions whereby people kill babies in cradles. If we live simply and honestly, expressing openly our desires, even if it involves clashes and unpleasantness, it is fundamentally healthy way to live. When we keep our desires secret and nurture them without allowing their expression they can madden us, creating the conditions of abominable actions."

Something like that anyway. The way I've put it there is very consequentialist, but you could make a similar interpretation focusing on the health of a soul or moral virtue or something.

There is an ambiguity. Consider the conversation:

"What is it like to visit Vegas?"
"It's not like anything at all."

The reply is ambiguous, and that ambiguity brings out the disagreements in this thread I think. One thing the reply could mean is that there is nothing to compare it with, it's so unique there is nothing that is like it. Another thing it could mean is that if you go to Vegas you cease to feel anything at all. It is impossible to have an experience there. If that seems like an odd interpretation, consider:

"What is it like to be dead?"
"It's not like anything at all."

Again, this is ambiguous in the same way. It could mean that the experience of death is so unique there is no apt comparison. Or it could mean that when you are dead you can't experience anything.

In both examples the second interpretation is not about comparison. That's the sense that Nagel means.

Privacy is certainly an issue yes. When I burn my hand, you don't feel anything. There is something private about experience.

It's not important. Maybe the point to make is that the question:

"What is it like to be a bat?"

means the same thing as:

"How does it feel to be a bat?"

No comparison is invited.

Similarly "Is there something it is like to be a bacterium?" just means "Do bacteria have experiences?"

It's just another way of expressing a concept. If you have any sentences you find problematic I could try and translate them into equivalent ones that don't use the word 'like'. Would that be helpful?

Says Nagel. But what else does the word "like" mean? — Jackson

I'm not sure it has a meaning abstracted from the sentence. Consider the northern expression "Does it heck as like". You can't really abstract the meaning from how the individual words are normally used.

Not until six pages in does Nagel even define what "like" means. Footnote 6, "Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is like" is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," but rather "how it is for the subject himself."

This always troubled me. It seems his whole idea of "like" is vague or inchoherent. — Jackson

The expression is just one way of approaching the concept. For some it works. For others it's confusing. It's not supposed to imply any comparison.

One way is perhaps to ask "Why can't the whole of evolution happen without anything feeling anything, without anything having an experience? Why doesn't it all go on in the dark?"

Another way is perhaps to focus on the how. Evolution might explain why consciousness evolved, presumably because it confers some functional benefit. Evolutionists about consciousness (emergentists) must start with something they think isn't conscious, say simple organic chemistry sloshing about in a puddle to something they think is conscious, say human beings, and get them to talk about how that transition is accomplished, is it sudden, gradual, exactly what physical systems are relevant, what do those systems have to do to be conscious. When they've answered those questions, ask, "OK, but why can't all that happen anyway without any experiences?"

Or you can take a Jordan Peterson approach, which is interesting but also cheating.

I think there can, but they have to involve a bit of cheating. You start with something you know exists. Then you interpret some concept of God is such a way that it is identical to that thing.

If you start with the concept it's much harder. If you start with a relatively naive, literal or prima facie god-concept that one might find in a religious text, or an encyclopaedia, or even a theology book, you'll have a tough job proving it exists.

I agree with your argument. It's an oldie and a goodie. Most famously made by Spinoza I suppose.

The issue of advance directives does give a practical application to questions of identity. Would my future demented self appreciate my current self making decisions about my future demented self's welfare? By making an advance directives, am I helping myself or oppressing another?

The brake shoes on your car cannot be worn at all. — Cuthbert

The brake shoes on my car are very worn. But that is grist to your mill.

I would like to know because my writing tends to come across that way. — Joseph Walsh

This is a good start. You're accepting responsibility for communication, and not blaming your reader for not understanding you. :)

OK, thanks. The article wasn't clear to me. I got that he was right wing, but I couldn't find a clear point.

Sorry, I don't understand. Was the journalist in the OP article saying maths teaching isn't racist? And who is saying it is? Critical Race Theory isn't a particular view is it? Are some Critical Race Theorists (if they exist - I don't know anything about it) saying the Maths curriculum is racist? If so, is it because, for example, we call it Pythagoras's theorem when it in fact wasn't pythagoras who first came up with it? (Thanks Street for doing some looking up). If the idea was around before pythagoras, it makes sense to acknowledge that doesn't it?

Sorry, I could probably answer all my own questions with some googling, it'll just take me ages.

The article is reactionary shite.

Why do philosophers talk about life when we have already answered that question. Why philosophers talk about the universe being a simulation when we have disproved that claim since 2017? — Nickolasgaspar

Philosophers don't actually talk about life all that much. They've let biologists have that concept.

Why philosophers still talk about god or the supernatural when we have proven unnecessary and insufficient for more than 400 years?

Again, professional philosophers don't all that much. Some do, but then some scientists are also religious too.

There is plenty of scientific and philosophical work to be done on the brain and mind, but it doesn't have to do with the questions you may assume. Anil Seth has a great essay on AEON on why the hard questions in neuroscience have nothing to do with the pseudo "why" questions of the Hard problem of consciousness.

OK, I may have a look at that, thanks. You do know that some neuroscientists are panpsychists don't you? Christof Koch and Guilio Tononi for example.

yes, they are like there different stages of baldness.

-"[in-between states...????]"
-Why is it so difficult for you? You just listed the in between states ( half awaken, fully awaken, lethargic, distrusted,in a defuse state, in a focused state) and now you ask for those different states? Maybe you don't understand that a fully alerted state resemble a head full with hair and a lethargic a head with a few hair near its ears.....

-"[non-conscious state: knocked out(?), dreamless sleep(?), dead, being a rock, being a blastocyst] "
-....being completely bald...being conscious is not an option for rocks or blastocysts. Those do not have the capacity. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm sorry I'm not getting the point across properly. If you are interested, this article probably explains it much better than I have:

https://philpapers.org/rec/ANTAOC-2

The states you identified and I listed are not in-between states. They are all, fully, 100% states of consciousness. They all meet the definition. They are all experienced, it feels like something to be in those states. That means they are conscious states.

There are Moocs (Neuroscience) that explain how specific mechanisms give rise to our affections and emotions and we reason them in to feelings. — Nickolasgaspar

Really?! Then that is the end of the philosophy of consciousness. Yet why are neuroscientists and professional philosophers still talking about this as if they don't know the answer?

This is not as straightforward as you think it is.

our conscious states come display many levels. You can be asleep,half awaken, fully awaken, lethargic, distrusted,in a defuse state, in afocus state etc etc etc etc etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar

These are all conscious states though. Here:

[conscious states: half awaken, fully awaken, lethargic, distrusted,in a defuse state, in afocus state]

[in-between states...????]

[non-conscious state: knocked out(?), dreamless sleep(?), dead, being a rock, being a blastocyst]

I see, but still. Why should psyche, according to functionalists, be absent if the brain is in sleep mode? How can a material process, which according to them contains no psyche in it's base (dead, psycheless particles interacting), give rise to, say, consciousness of heat or cold? Say you know the complete pattern of material processes involved, and the environment they are situated in, how would this constitute an explanation? — Haglund

Well, that's the question. There are a couple of suggestions:

1) These processes are just what we mean by consciousness. We should ditch the old unscientific folk concepts, and redefine words so they make more sense in a modern context.

2) Reverse the burden of proof. Ask not "Why would it feel like something to perform these functions?" Instead, ask "Why wouldn't it feel like something to, say, enter into a modelling relationship with the environment?"

3) Keep pointing out, over and over again, how particular experiences are correlated with brain function, and how changes in experience are always and only accompanied by changes in brain function. And the obvious explanation here, is that experience just is the brain function, right? Surely you must, at some point, admit they are the same thing no? How stubborn or stupid are you? It's modern science. Wake up. This has been shown over and over. Your old superstitious wishful thinking has had its day.

What do you think of those?

Isn't it just the convergence between mathematical logic and physical necessity that he's talking about? — Wayfarer

I'm always faintly surprised that when I use a tape measure to measure a gap, divide that figure in two, then cut two bits of wood according to the halved figure, the two bits then fit in the gap. Amazes me every time. Why the hell does reality correspond to maths?

Thank you, that's very interesting, and clearly put.

My own position on causal closure is that physical explanations must be reducible to psychological ones.

What you have said is consistent with both epiphenomenalism and eliminativism. So what do you think of experiences then? Do we have them at all?

Browsing TPF? — bongo fury

Could be! :)

Er, semi-conscious? — bongo fury

That might be it! Depending on what you mean exactly. Can you give an example of a semi-conscious state?

Yes, but you don't say "ouch" because of the experience. You say "ouch" because of a completely physical and traceable series of neural molecular and electrical reactions. You would say "ouch" even if you were a robot programmed to say "ouch" every time you stub your toe. — Isaac

This is helpful and clearly expressed. I think I do say 'ouch' because of the experience, although this is questionable as there may be times when I say 'ouch' in a sort of reflexive, automatic way, before I actually experience any pain. In fact, I think I've sometimes said 'ouch' and the pain never actually arrived, I was just expecting it. Anyway, maybe hunger would be a better example as reflex plays less of a role. I believe I eat because I feel hungry. Intuitively, experiences do generally seem to play a causal role in what we do. But maybe you don't agree with me. Perhaps you are an epiphenomenalist, or even an eliminativist, as your use of scare quotes around 'experience' might suggest?

The 'experience' you claim is private is not physically connected to saying "ouch" in any way (if it was, it would be a physical phenomenon). So the fact that your friend doesn't say "ouch" can't possibly stand as evidence either for or against the type of experience he's having - if experiences are private. He might have exactly the same experience as you do when you say "ouch" alongside watching someone say "ouch"... Or not...

Yes, I think your logic makes sense. I just think that experiences, feelings, etc, do play a causal role in what physically happens. That's what one would expect of a panpsychist.

So presumably your next query would be about the causal closure of the physical - there's no need, nor indeed room, for psychological explanations when the physical explanations are both necessary and sufficient? Would that be right?

Thank you. :) EDIT: I infer from your response that you think we just keep going until we have a good theory that you don't perceive as a tautology.

'Giving up' does not constitute a position but a lack of one. — StreetlightX

Indeed. I don't regard panpsychism as giving up, but you do. And giving up on explaining consciousness in terms of brain function may not necessarily entail becoming a panpsychist anyway.

So, my question remains.

I don't see them as distinguishable, in the case of panpsychcism. — StreetlightX

Just out of interest, at what point, in the attempt to explain consciousness in terms of brain function, would giving up be justified, and not be lazy?

Can you tell me what's false about that? — Daemon

Most starkly, I think that's impossible because the formation of an identity is always a vague matter, there is no absolutely sharp cut-off point between being non-individuated and being individuated. Indeed a cell may never be totally individuated, as it is always in a transactional relationship with its environment, exchanging material etc. And as consciousness is not a vague concept, it seems impossible to get it to plausibly fit anywhere.

Also, whatever stage you want to put the emergence of consciousness, the question remains, "OK, but why can't all that happen without consciousness?" What that question indicates is the conceptual gulf between our concept of consciousness and our other concepts based on structure and function. I think this is what Chalmers was probably getting at with his conceivability argument.

Why not? You being unconscious doesn't mean the psyche has left the material. — Haglund

I'm talking about functionalist theories of consciousness that say that consciousness just is brain function. If consciousness brain function, and that ceases, then psyche (consciousness) has indeed left the material. I don't think that, I'm just characterising the functionalist view.

There is no sharp cut-off point between being bald and non-bald
— bert1
of course there is. You just choose not to admit it. Here are the extremes for both cases(Again)
A. a head without hair b. a head with hair.
A a unconscious state b. a conscious state.
Both extremes in both cases display many stages in between. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, lets write it out:

[bald] .... [1 hair, 2 hairs.....501 hairs....100,001 hairs]... [not bald]
[seven] ... [???] ... [not-seven]
[spatial] ... [???] ... [not spatial]
[unconscious] .... [what do we write here???]... [conscious]

Please tell me what goes in between unconscious and conscious?

I have included the concepts of seven and space as these are arguably binary as well, with no middle ground, just to illustrate the point. I'm suggesting consciousness is like that.

Has anyone said laziness yet? — StreetlightX

I suspect the OP was asking for theoretical motivations, not psychological ones. I say this because this is a philosophy forum, not a psychology forum.

When you're unconscious Bert1, is it like anything? It isn't for me. I'm pretty sure that's the same for everybody.

I have been unconscious when asleep, when I hit myself on the head with a pickaxe, and when I had a general anaesthetic. I am confidently expecting to be unconscious when I'm dead.

We've got all this complex machinery in our heads, the most complex thing we know about, and it can be switched off with a pickaxe or anaesthetic.

If it isn't like anything to be you, when you're unconscious, so you understand what unconsciousness is, and you understand the effects of anaesthetics and suchlike, and their relationship to the complex mechanisms, then why would you think that consciousness would be found in the absence of those mechanisms? — Daemon

When I'm unconscious, say from an anaesthetic, of being knocked out, or in a very deep sleep, I guess there are few possibilities as to what is going on:

1) I have moved from being in a conscious condition to being in an unconscious condition. The structure hasn't changed, but the function has. My brain isn't doing the things that constitute consciousness, so it is no longer modelling its environment, or no longer integrating as much information, or whatever your particular functionalist theory of consciousness is. This is not consistent with panpsychism.

2) I, as a functional unity, cease to exist. This is subtly different from (1), and is consistent with panpsychism. In this case, modelling my environment, or integrating information is not what makes me conscious, it's what makes me me. Identity is a function, not a property, I suggest. Things are what they are because of what they do. Whereas consciousess is a property, not a function. So when an anaesthetic stops some of my brain function, it disrupts that functional unity that makes me me. Everything that composes my brain is still conscious (just as it still has mass) but there is no overarching identity that unifies them. This leaves the big problem for panpsychism: the combination problem.

3) Another possibility that my consciousness actually remains, but I'm not really aware of anything much except perhaps the vaguest of fuzzy experiences, and I don't remember it anyway, so it seems as if I haven't experienced anything at all.

4) Another possibility is that I'm still conscious, just not conscious of anything. And this would perhaps be indistinguishable (not conceptually but practically) from not being conscious at all, as there is no difference in terms of content of consciousness. Some on this forum think this is a logical absurdity - they say that it is necessarily part f the concept of consciousness that we are aware of something. Consciousness must have content to be consciousness. I'm not convinced of that. Consider an ocean with waves, and consider the ocean to be consciousness and the waves to be the content. It is not a contradiction to suppose that the ocean is still, with no waves on it. And it is not a contradiction to suppose that there can be consciousness, just nothing in it. Like an empty box. Boxes don't necessarily have to have anything in them. Whether this state actually ever obtains is doubtful, but that's a matter of empirical possibility, not of logical, or conceptual possibility.

The only one of these I think is definitely false is (1). The other three are consistent with panpsychism, and I'm not totally sure which I prefer. Maybe all of them have some truth. All of them allow functional theories a role to play.
(1) Consciousness is a function
(2) Identity is a function
(3) and (4) Content is determined by function

Well what it matter is what it tells to experts, not to us. Our brain has the hardware that allows it to be conscious, it is hooked on a sensory system that provides information about the world and the organism, it has centers that process meaning,memory, symbolic language, pattern recognition. — Nickolasgaspar

But how does all of that result in consciousness? Why can't all of that happen without consciousness?

To be aware of what exist to be aware of stimuli environmental or organic. — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you. To be clear, would you consider a thermostat to be aware of temperature in this sense?