I thought you meant a word referring to nonword stuff. — plaque flag

The opposite. A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a pet, but not a building. It's not true that a dog is a building, it's an incorrect reference. Even if dogs went extinct, it changes nothing, the rules are all made up, and they only change if we change them.

Our understanding of the word would, I claim, be an understanding of part of the world. — plaque flag

I agree, the concept of fairness certainly is part of anyone's understanding of the world.

To me it seems like you are wavering between trying to explain what makes a true statement true and how 'true' is used. But I don't think the first mission is possible.

It does not work to talk about prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true. It gets paradoxical, because 'prelinguistic stuff' is linguistic stuff. — plaque flag

I don't understand the criticism of "prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true". What is prelinguistic stuff?

To clarify, rain is a created category, as we agreed, it doesn't exist in reality, and there is no "actual raining". I understand truth as a correct reference, in other words, it can't be disentangled from language. Truth is a function of logic, but that isn't the "logic of reality", it's the logic of our language and concepts.

All we ever have is belief. But we use 'true' and 'false' to endorse or dispute beliefs. Establishing which beliefs are warranted/ justified is where the real work happens, except that our discussion is valuable for making all of this clear to ourselves, getting the power cord untangled.

How does that sound ? — plaque flag

I agree that all we ever have is belief, but truth is technically a function of logic, the term does not endorse or dispute but affirms or denies the conditions as being met. This allows us to talk about truth conceptually, as that which would meet the conditions, regardless of whether we know of it. Context helps us to guess what conditions are being employed, should be employed or are being referred to. "True" might not be an endorsement of a belief, but an assertion that the conditions were indeed met, and that one is sure of this.

To say that something can be correctly referenced as something is to say something about it, and the logic of what one should do if something is something is also part of the idea of truth.

A central idea in philosophy is fairness, but arguably, this term tells us absolutely nothing about the world. Also arguably, what matters more about the word fairness, isn't what it describes, but what it means must be done. If something is unfair, it's wrong, so it shouldn't be done. To me, this part of unfairness is entangled with the concept, as if I can provide a compelling justification for why something is beneficial or practical, we mightn't want to call it unfair, as it would mean we'd have to stop.

We could point out how unfair the capitalist business structure is, practically a dictatorship, characterised by an immense imbalance of power. Yet, the merits of the system would get brought up against this argument, the productivity, the efficiency and so on. This doesn't seem to make sense, until noting that pointing out how unfair and immoral it is would demand condemnation and cessation of the practice. If you can point out a good alternative, suddenly, people are happy to condemn it as unfair. I'd argue the same thing happened with the ramping up of industrialisation and the end of slavery.

The philosopher has their tools, for example, "rationality, "responsibility", "free will", "morality", and so on. How is a critique of these tools handled? What is the usual response? Your experience might be different, but for me, they start talking about consequence and utility. These ideas, and their truth, are as contingent upon their usefulness as anything else. A compelling argument against the utility of their understanding would suffice to convince them to change, and it's this I meant, though truth is not usefulness, usefulness is truth or a prerequisite to truth.

Essentially, it's important to note that the conditions for establishing truth are often selected for pragmatic reasons, the reference is made for pragmatic reasons and the term is defined pragmatically. On top of that, we may assert a reference as true or false for its implications, as a reason for doing something. Even in our summary of truth, you may resist mine and I may resist yours, not because of a flaw in the other's understanding but because we're paying attention to what serves our own ends best.

If we have a community that cares about God and believe in God, then someone saying 'God is love' is sharing their own conceptual view of this entity. — plaque flag

I think "God is love" is a good example of how truth is pragmatic, and I don't for a second believe such a vague claim inspires belief for any non-practical reason. The subtext of the claim is more important, what are they trying to get you to do because God is love? What are they trying to get you to think? Why is it important to them that God is love? Probably, the argument can be whatever suffices to convince belief, and if their objective was better served by some other argument then they'd use that instead. Well, I'm undoubtedly a cynic, but what's useful too often coincides with what's true, the two go hand-in-hand.

Contrasting capitalism to socialism is folly, instead, we should assume private ownership, and ask what level of government interventionism there is. Neoliberal capitalism is largely responsible for most of the issues people associate with capitalism, but really, we've been told a bunch of lies about what's needed for capitalism. Let's not underestimate human greed, even under very unfavourable and unfair conditions with high levels of government oversight, companies would retain their drive for profit and innovation.

The second question is the structure of the private ownership, contrasting what we have to co-ops etc.

If you clarify this I might agree.

But let me offer this:

Does
The assertion that it is raining is warranted.
mean
It is raining. — plaque flag

This question really shows a significant problem with truth in my opinion. The answer is, of course, yes. A correct reference is correct because it's correct or in other words because the conditions were met for the reference to be correct. If it's correct to say it's raining, then it's correct to say it's raining, which is what your question is asking.

This might also explain some of your usage of the words truth and the truth that I can't make any sense of. You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining". Let's explore some of the nuances here.

To borrow ChatGPT, I asked it : What must be true in order for us to say it's raining? It's reply:

For us to confidently say that "it's raining," certain conditions must be met:

Precipitation: Rain is a type of precipitation where water droplets fall from the atmosphere. So, for it to be raining, there must be a significant presence of falling water droplets.

Observation: Someone (or something) must have observed or detected the falling water droplets. This could be a person visually seeing and feeling the raindrops or a rain gauge measuring the amount of precipitation.

Consistency: The presence of falling water droplets must be consistent over a certain period of time. A brief drizzle or a few isolated drops might not qualify as "it's raining."

Not Other Forms of Precipitation: To distinguish rain from other forms of precipitation like snow, sleet, or hail, it's important to confirm that the falling precipitation is indeed liquid water droplets.

Corroborating Evidence: It's helpful to have corroborating evidence such as wet surfaces, the sound of rain hitting roofs or windows, or changes in visibility due to the falling precipitation.

Meteorological Criteria: In meteorology, there are specific criteria and instruments used to officially measure and record rainfall. These criteria might include a certain amount of water collected over a specific time period, which is often measured in millimeters or inches.

In essence, for us to confidently declare that "it's raining," we need to observe a consistent, significant presence of falling liquid water droplets that align with meteorological and observational standards. — ChatGPT

Without bothering to ask whether I agree with this or not, it's illustrative of a set of conditions that must be met for it to be correct to reference the weather as raining. We can assume these were met if it's correct to say it's raining.

We can also contrast, where although the conditions for saying it's "raining" were met, it could still be incorrect because "drizzling" better captures the kind of rainfall we're referring to. "it's incorrect to say it's raining because it's drizzling" and I'm sure the distinction between raining and drizzling has been made. What's reasonable to do or not do because it's raining isn't the same as what's reasonable to do or not because it's drizzling, and it's different again for "pouring" which implies heavy rain.

Thus, there are many arguments I can make for why "raining" is an incorrect reference, even if it's technically true. "Rain" is a straightforward concept, it obscures most of the subjectivity at play in language and truth, which is why it's wrong to extrapolate from them.

The effect isn't just produced because "rain" is closer to sense data, it's that examples using sense data are typically very straightforward. Is it correct to reference "rain" as a word that starts with the letter R? Is it correct to reference "rain" as a noun? They're just as obvious - because they're straightforward, simple and use stable concepts. The truth of the correct reference is so compelling, it's so inconceivable that anyone could disagree, but that's not what truth is. It's just an extreme on a spectrum, nothing more, unfortunately, I think it's a nameless spectrum, but maybe "objectiveness" is close.

So prejudice is simultaneously enabling and limiting. — plaque flag

I prefer the word bias to prejudice, though for some shitty reason, both words have negative connotations but nonetheless, I agree. Selecting good biases is essential, one of the most important aspects of thinking. Philosophy is its own pair of glasses, each pair has its own pros and cons.

'Oppression' has a role as a token in a 'game.' It's like a virtual object in conceptual space. People see this object differently. The word has different meanings for people. The argument is about how the token/word ought to be understood and used. It's my private perspective on this 'object' that I want foisted on everyone else. I want 'them' to see oppression as I do ('correctly.') — plaque flag

I see. I mostly agree with your characterisation, but for the sake of clarity, I'll explain that the word "oppression' is still true when it's correct as a reference. The difference between it and a word like "rain" is in the conditions. For it to be correct to reference something as oppression, it must be unfair, and that's why the word is so contentious. That the conditions for something to be "fair" are so vague and open to interpretation is part of why the word oppression is so contentious.

The conditions for a reference to be correct exist for all words, and truth is created when they're met. That tells us all we need to know about truth, it has only a single quality, that of correct reference. Which is my point, why should anyone care about a disorganised list of correct references?

It's trivially true that truth matters, it's so abundant, and self-asserting, just like logic. That's what makes truth & logic so fickle and worthless. The questions to which we want truth are value-laden, it's all about the conditions. I ask a question I want an answer to, "How can I get the best results in X" or "How can I most efficiently accomplish Y". My question and the conditions for knowing truth are what matters, the value of truth is entirely dependent upon their good qualities. To talk of my search for answers as a search for truth is asinine, it's misleading, my questions are pragmatic, they're about doing, about use. My conditions for truth aim to ensure its usefulness.

Truth and logic have as their primary qualities abundance and mixed and unreliable relevance and quality. I assume any thinker, and especially one as advanced as yourself understands this problem, the need for good questions, good truth conditions, good biases and objectives. Yet, I think it's wrong to only talk about truth & logic, assuming these things were done well, we're attributing our successes to the wrong things.

Your response covers a lot of ground, and I am starting to lose track of what we're arguing for/against. I'll focus on debating what truth is for now, but I'm a bit unsure as to what your motivations are. To clarify, I am unhappy with philosophy being understood as an impractical interest in truth, or thinking of logic in philosophy as exemplary of what's "truly logical". I see it as having its particular biases and objectives, and I believe that's how it should be understood. There are advantages and disadvantages to its approach, and a philosopher can be understood as someone who believes in the project and its merits.

I think what I can offer in discussions can be rapidly diminished as I'm overwhelmed by different topics, contexts and objectives, and maybe I'm already overcapacity, so apologies in advance.

How does one hold up a meaning (the meaning of an assertion) against the world to compare that meaning with a state of affairs right ? — plaque flag

I'll just stick with what I've been saying, that truth is a correct reference. What that actually means is ambiguous, it depends on the word or claim. All of the rules for language use are invented, including for words such as "rain". The reference is correct when the conditions for it to be correct are met, and that's what truth is.

Words reference and nothing more, and what they're referencing is tied to the conditions of the reference being correct.

When I call an assertion true, I am basically endorsing or repeating that assertion. — plaque flag

You're agreeing the reference is correct in a linguistic sense.

It's only correct to reference the weather as raining under such strict conditions, the claim is very testable, and the meaning is quite specific. So, there are very few cases where one person would think it's correct to say it's raining, and another would disagree. Such simple examples can obscure the subjective nature of truth.

Just as with "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", you can agree it's correct to say this, but the assertion probably isn't the same. It's just too vague, who qualifies as powerful? What does it mean for a system to rely on the goodwill of the powerful? We can say the same words, but what we mean isn't the same, and I think the assertion is in what we mean, but let me stress, my reasons for saying this are definitely pragmatic.

To give an example close to the heart of philosophy, I criticise the way we agree to condemn moral terms such as oppression, racism, theft and so on. Since, generally the thing we're referring to needs to be immoral for it to be correct to reference that thing using one of these moral terms, the consensus is hollow. We can both agree that oppression is immoral, but it's a rather superficial agreement, especially if we refuse to reference the same conditions as "oppression".

I agree we don't "intend" to find things to be something like oppression, but I worry that you're trying to extrapolate from simple examples such as rain. I'm sure you're not extrapolating as though there's zero difference, but I'm unsure about the differences you do perceive.

The next issue is whether it is raining. — plaque flag

Just to clarify specifically, I disagree with this, it's just a matter of whether it's correct to reference the weather as raining. The nuances of this are far more apparent when dealing with a word such as oppression.

It has to be an explication of a logic we mostly use transparently. — plaque flag

Can you clarify what you mean? What & why?

I think that phrase of mine was awkward. I meant describing the world [accurately.] I 'intend a state of affairs' as 'actual.' — plaque flag

I don't think truth is a word about describing the world accurately. When you attempt to describe the world, it's only correct to reference that description as true when it's accurate, which is what creates this meaning of the word. So, it depends on the context. "God is love" is almost certainly not trying to accurately describe the world, if that's what you had meant, I thoroughly disagree. This claim is about interpretation and understanding, it's sophisticated thought.

For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. We think they are the world, but they are glasses we can take off. — plaque flag

I'd be interested to hear more about this, as I'm not quite sure what you're referring to here, but perhaps this represents our disagreement. What do you mean by "glasses we can take off"? How would "glasses we can take off and exchange for other pairs" work as an alternative?

A big part of philosophy is converting false necessity into optional contingency ---a journey toward greater freedom and a wider view. — plaque flag

Could you clarify what you mean?

You might like this essay on the topic. I do think Brandom is great in general. — plaque flag

I am ADHD and thus struggle to follow even small essays, but I am going through it. How much of this paper coincides with your understanding? Anywhere you notably disagree with it?

For what it's worth, I think your views are quite reasonable on an existential level. So I'm just being a stickler on a few technical issues that interest me. — plaque flag

Glad to hear it. It's clear that some miscommunication occurred, I delayed my response so we'd have a chance to collect ourselves. Unlike in most conversations, our need for a precise understanding in discussing philosophy makes miscommunication easier, but also more problematic. On top of that, we lack the precise language other disciplines may have, so, I take it as part of the game, we try to avoid it, but alas, it's unavoidable. I'd like to not worry about who is responsible for the miscommunication, though if you want to address that, I'm okay with it, but I'll just cover some areas where I think it happened and hopefully, we can resolve it.

Habermas now proposes instead a “pragmatic epistemological realism” (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources. — plaque flag

This is at minimum, very close to my view, and has the possibility of being the exact same. I'll address some possible differences, but first, I'll address this:

It's not a fiction. A fiction is a claim, a story. It's just a created category or status. It exists in the world like being-married and being-baptized. — plaque flag

Marriage is a good example of something I was referring to as a "useful fiction", but from now on, I'll call it a "created category", as I like that. Although I thought calling marriage a useful fiction was normal use, I can see how it could include more than just "created categories", so this term is much better for me. You could re-read whenever I said "useful fiction" as "created category" instead, as that's what I was talking about.

Hopefully, that alone clears most things up.

I'd like to hear what you consider "useful fiction". Would "useful falsehood" work as an alternative? Perhaps give me some alternative names, that might help.

Returning to Habermas. If we're including any created category or concept, such as marriage or justice, then, while he's maybe not saying the exact same thing as me, I do 100% agree with him. This quote says "proposition/statement for which we claim truth", which could imply that we have to be intending to make a statement about what is true, and if that were the case, then I wouldn't go that far.

For me, a single word works just as well as a proposition/statement. I've made the example of "dog" which I consider a created category, if it's correct to refer to an animal as a dog, then it's true that it's a dog. This is what I meant by "useful fictions create truth", now replacing that to be "created categories create truth".

I include typically subjective categories such as "beautiful" or "just". If it's correct to refer to a thing as beautiful, then it's true that thing is beautiful. To clarify, by "correct" I mean, one agrees it's beautiful, not just agrees it's a correct use of the word grammatically.

All of this means that "truth" doesn't tell us how the world actually is, and one's interpretation, one's logic, and one's concepts, all matter in determining what's true and what isn't. In scientific disciplines, norms and rules attempt to limit the flexibility of interpretation, there's a specific and carefully selected logic that must be used, and concepts have a clear and specific meaning. In those contexts, "truth" has a specific meaning and weight to it, but in other contexts, the truth could just reflect a single person's whimsically formed opinion.

The point is your intention to articulate the truth. God is love is also vague, but people who say it are trying to tell me about the world — plaque flag

Where I've been struggling is in your usage of "truth" or "the truth". Truth is a correct reference, it requires two parts, the thing we're referring to, and the thing we're calling it - or the claim.

It doesn't make sense to me to talk about "articulating the truth", I don't know what that means, especially in the way you're using it. Here, if you think that God isn't love, then you assert it's untrue, if you agree that God is love, then you agree it's true. The reason you change your mind could be anything. A different perspective, a new argument, a revision in your understanding of God or love, or whatever else. Truth isn't just about the world, it's a function of logic, and without pointing out a single new thing about the world, one can change their logic, concepts or created categories and reach a different conclusion.

If I argue "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", for this to be true, only one thing needs to happen, you need to agree. You can pick any reason, any argument, it doesn't matter. Regardless of if you agree because of reason A or B or Z, all that matters is that your reason shows that systems shouldn't rely on the goodwill of the powerful, and then the statement is true.

But if the claim is specific and measurable such as "The population of Sweden is less than 5 million", then it's a completely different story.

Every example you've worked with while explaining truth has been extremely specific and measurable, such as whether plums are in a box or not. They're the most straightforward, clear-cut, specific and measurable claims we can talk about. They're not representative of the types of claims made in philosophy, which deal with complex concepts and objectives, and require sophisticated interpretation and thinking.

You might agree with a philosophical argument because "It's true that it represents the best option I've heard of". That would be perfectly reasonable. Philosophy is a set of biases, of things that must be true. There's a competition, where "It's true that this approach is likely to succeed at maximising the outcomes I care about" might decide which ideas are best. The "truth" part can be forcibly added, but it's trivial.

Let me know where you agree or disagree, or where more clarity is needed.

To me it's like you are saying the world makes statements true (true statements 'refer' correctly to states of the world? ) and then that truth is just useful fiction. — plaque flag

Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. If I make up some crap, for example, "If a human being has less than 10 fingers then they're a 0d0f0fj, and all 0d0f0fj should receive 1000 dollars from the government every week", then whether you're a 0d0f0fj or not is simple, we check how many fingers you've got. It wouldn't be true that I'm a 0d0f0fj, there's no arguing about it, I don't meet the prerequisites, since I've got 10 fingers. It's part of "truth" now, but it's also a useful (or not very useful) fiction.

I would love to hear an example that doesn't involve sense data, you keep giving me simple examples, which I don't want. How do we know when something is useful? Is it true that things can be useful? Give me an example like that, I'm uninterested in universally accepted statements like the sky is blue, such examples obscure the subjectivity of truth claims. It comes from the concepts and their application, so don't pick the most stable concepts with the most stable methods of verifying them.

I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory. — plaque flag

Truth is primarily a function of logic for me, it's not "that which is in accordance with reality", we're on the same page about that, right? I am feeling misunderstood.

It's one thing to point out the historical contingency of concepts, but I think you are assuming a radical split between human concepts and some 'pure' preconceptualized world. But that itself is 'just made up,' in my view, a mere philosophers fiction. Just look around the room your in. You see familiar objects, the tools of life. This is what's truly given, not sense-data, etc. The concept of the dog is just part of our recognition of a dog as such. — plaque flag

I'm not aiming to contrast human concepts and a pure pre-conceptualised world whatsoever.

That statement would be true if indeed systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — plaque flag

"Indeed"? As in, there's some objective truth on the matter? There are a hundred reasons why systems must not rely on them and hundred reasons why it might be fine for systems to rely on them. If I believe one of the hundred reasons that says we shouldn't or if I believe one of the hundred reasons that said it's fine, isn't that what matters? Also, you could just reject the claim as vague, since without guessing what I'm referring to, there's not enough information to go on. I don't know what "indeed" refers to here.

That's what Trump believes too. If you are so smart, why aren't you a billionaire ? But I think this is an insincere pose, at least for those who aren't sociopaths. — plaque flag

As I argued previously, philosophy is thought funnelled through biases of justice, morality, group benefit, logic, rationality and so on. To me, it's absurd to call it impractical interest in truth, our biases show what we're aiming to do, and I call that utility. I look at a concept such as rationality and don't for a second bother to ask if it's true - a senseless question, I ask what it does, whether is it useful, useful to whom and under what conditions. Utility is defined by our ambitions and values, it's present for the noblest goals and the most self-serving, not just the latter.

But it's not only an insincere pose in my opinion: it's also self-cancelling. If we are all just rationalizing monkeys, then the claim that we are such rationalizers is itself a rationalization --- flattering the 'sophistication' of its confused or (best case) ironic purveyors. — plaque flag

Rationalising? We're talking about literal truth here, that's all it is. A correct reference. I don't understand your argument.

I'm not a pragmatist. P is not true because it's useful to believe P. Though it is often useful to believe the truth. To say that P is true is primarily (ignoring the metacognitive extras) just asserting P. — plaque flag

I don't think P is true because it's useful to believe P either. I think whether P is true depends on whether it's correct to reference it as true, which depends on what it's being referenced as, and the rules of the reference. It's these two latter things which are useful to believe, not P itself. A dog is a dog, that's true, I don't believe it's true because it's useful, it's merely true. But what's a dog? That's just made up, a useful fiction.

You haven't addressed my Husserlian approach yet. — plaque flag

It's the same as mine, except, much less. It's not dealing with the concepts themselves, or where their correct use requires more than just sense data. Tell me when it's true that something is useful, or when it's true that something is funny, something like that, or alternatively, something more vague, a question which might have an answer but testing it would be difficult. For example, my claim about "systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", what would make that true? Explain it.

Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth. — plaque flag

I told you useful fictions and truth are one and the same, you must be misunderstanding me, though, that might be my fault. Usefulness is truth because it's true that it's useful.

You are blunt, so I'm being blunt, but not out of a lack of respect. This is good conversation on a crucial topic. — plaque flag

I enjoy the discussions and I don't mind bluntness.

I wasn't speaking in my own voice, but from within the perspective that I am indeed criticizing. My use of 'I' was rhetorical, in other words. — plaque flag

:groan:

Yes, and that of course is part of the ideal of rationality --- autonomy of the individual and of the community at large. So we work together to decide what to believe and do as a whole ---without dissolving completely into the crowd. — plaque flag

I see this as largely tangential so I'll resist going into any more detail on it.

That is the question. But if you say that nothing makes them true, where does that leave your claims ? Are sentences 'really' as meaningless but somehow as useful as teeth ? — plaque flag

I'll tell you one thing for sure, whatever does make them true, it's certainly a relatively narrow perspective, and hardly stringent, well-thought-out rules. Just a sense of "Yeah, that makes sense" would suffice for most.

I think you are seeing the community from the outside in Darwinian terms and forgetting your own position as a speaker about the world interpreted through this vision. The issue is whether you believe what you say, whether you really think the world is one way or another way. — plaque flag

You've brought up the truth a lot, so I respond, as befits my understanding, I don't really care about it. Truth is abundant, overwhelmingly so, I don't seek it, I'm interested in power, useful knowledge, and useful understanding. I think "seeking truth" is asinine, and anyone who says they are, always remains guided by biases that end up resulting in the search for power and utility. Much of my interest falls outside the spectrum of philosophy, as I said, here, I play by those rules, but that doesn't mean my philosophical views represent me. But if that isn't a good answer, try explaining your point in greater detail and I'll try for a better response.

There's enough consensus for you to say so. 'Communication is impossible' is a performative contradiction. One can also not prove the untrustworthiness of logic. — plaque flag

Language is just a bunch of claims as words, there's sufficient freedom left for my claims. Of course, I can prove the untrustworthiness of logic, it is easy. If you hide behind "truly logical", I'm left stumped as to what you consider truly logical, and if you then say "Logic can be critiqued and improved upon as it's proven wrong", then I'm unable to critique any logic to prove my point, since even if I could find bad logic that was yet "truly logical", it'd just be part of the process of logic being improved. Give me something real, rather than a concept with "good" in it, and I'll show you how untrustworthy logic is, and how weak it is. If logic implies it is good logic, well, that's cheating.

The world is conceptually articulated. So I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag

What about a claim that can't be verified by perception alone?

I think pragmatic versions of truth are inspired by a questionable imaginary perspective on communities from above. We look down on them and see their beliefs as tools. But we gaze on this vision and describe it in a 'naive' way, forgetting to apply the insight to ourselves. — plaque flag

I'm struggling when you start talking about "pragmatic versions of truth" because I still have no idea where we disagree on the topic of it.

A consistent pragmatist is a potentially dangerous character. Judge Holden from Blood Meridian, who takes War for his deciding god, is happy to 'argue' the finer points with you. — plaque flag

I'm a nihilist and a pragmatist, I know very well. Had I sufficient power, so much of my philosophical ideals would lose their usefulness to me, and I would abandon them for that. I think it's a big part of why power corrupts, it invalidates the usefulness of the group logic of philosophy, to the powerful, they're a hindrance. I believe philosophers should take this to heart, systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful.

The ethnocentric point is that we can't see around our own culture. But Rorty can't present this as a truth about human beings. Instead (for him anyway) it's only a useful tool, a speech act better understood as scratching an itch or opening a can of beans. — plaque flag

Language meaning is changing all the time, culture is changing all the time, and it's possible to understand words and ideas differently despite the culture you're living in. We see this in different political affiliations within the same country, as they are sure to understand words and concepts differently, in ways that reflect their political views. Culture does have an impact though, sure.

If you mean it's not perfectly critical thought, then I agree — plaque flag

It is critical thought, with a particular set of biases and goals attached. It's just how it is, but I'm unsure on what "not perfectly' refers to.

As Habermas puts it, the ideal communication community is, well, ideal. It's the perfect circle we never achieve. — plaque flag

I think language needs to allow for expression of differences in perspective, I'll defend this against motivation. Philosophy as overriding must have its limits.

So I earnestly assert epistemological limits and violate those limits as I assert them. — plaque flag

Yeah, I agree, though I'm surprised to hear you say this. Isn't this the very performative contradiction you're so damning of? Why aren't you defending your infinite consensus argument? I always aim to strike where I think our disagreements lie, just to always find thin air.

To what does this truth relate ? — plaque flag

It relates to my argument, which I established earlier on.

To be sure, things get messier when concepts refer to concepts, but is our intention still transcendent ? Beyond utility ? — plaque flag

Motivations might involve values and ideas with intrinsic value - as opposed to utility, and we make a lot of compromises, there's also some implicit intention that could be argued against. An unthinking person might just accept the concepts they're given, and apply them without question. Not quite sure what you're asking though, usefulness can be more or less directly involved, and our motivation is almost certainly accompanied by other concepts, interpretation is subjective.

I see why this view is tempting. It looks like a form of relativism. Is your own statement here trying to be true ? Or as you yourself trying to create a particular moral condition ? — plaque flag

There's no difference between the two. I would like to hear how you understand the idea of "truth" since you've heard mine and offered no counterargument, and yet you don't use the term the same as I do. We seem to have a fundamentally different interpretation of what a "useful fiction" is as well.

My views further my goals, certainly, why would anyone knowingly argue for unfavourable conditions? We can go into my ulterior motives at some point, but I'll leave it for later.

When I say truth is a correct reference, I mean that it's a quality given to a reference when considered appropriate or warranted, it's a product of logic. If the conditions are met for it to be okay to reference something as something, that creates truth. Without telling me what this other something is, or without the context making it clear, the statement is meaningless. There are many ways in which any single thing can be true, depending on the reference.

A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a sentient being, and man's best friend, and so on. What's the prerequisite that must be met for an animal to be a loyal companion? Well, it's pretty loose, especially compared to some of the other terms, but I can still argue that it's true that a dog is a loyal companion, using my understanding of the concept of loyalty.

My statement is general and vague, and it makes claims based on creative interpretations. Are my creative interpretations true? What would make them true?

Is it relevant to ask whether my statement is a fair characterisation of philosophy? If so, when is it correct to reference a statement as being a "fair characterisation"? It's very nuanced, complicated, and there are no clear rules, but I'd say it does matter. If my statement is not a fair characterisation of philosophy, my entire argument could be dismissed.

The idea of a "fair characterisation" is a useful fiction, since the idea of fairness is abstract, the rules for determining it are vague and can vary greatly. That doesn't stop it from being true whatsoever. Useful fictions are far more tenacious than you're making it out, and they're tied to things that matter to people. They're practically inseparable from each other, truth and useful fiction, they're one and the same. There's no truth without useful fictions and no useful fictions without truth.

To address this "infinite consensus" argument, to be frank, it's silly. To begin with, what we call consensus isn't actually consensus at all, rules are created and people abide by them. I abide by the norms of language non-consensually, I have no choice, the alternative is too impractical. I can establish a useful fiction and have you accept it in no time at all, just the basic courtesy of allowing me to define a new term and we've done it.

I permit you some rope to use terms in ways that I don't agree with, to think in ways I don't, to have opinions that I don't and to engage in the use of many useful fictions without feeling a need to ask for a vote. Language allows me a lot of leeway with when I use terms, why I use them, how I use them, what I mean by them, and the rules for using them, I don't need to ask for your permission, nor you for mine.

People disagree immensely on all the above factors, there's no consensus whatsoever. Truth doesn't require consensus, useful fictions don't require consensus, and although words may appear like they are a consensus, they're not. There are substantial differences, truly massive differences in how we use and think about our various words, ideas and concepts. We counter these differences often in philosophy.

To me this is where your view shows some tension. Truths are correct references sounds like the assertion of truth's transcendence. — plaque flag

So what I mean here, is that we're to ask whether it's true that a proposition is just, logical, rational and so on. There is no "truth that exists in relation to nothing". However, what makes it correct to call a proposition any of those things can differ from person to person. Both in understanding the concept "justice" and then interpreting a correct reference "this thing is just". Can you see how truth & useful fictions are literally the same thing? To call something true without anyone having any clue what you're referring to has little meaning.

Or can we really take seriously the idea that a philosopher is essentially “scientific” in some radical, foundational sense ? Is the philosopher a kind of “pure mathematician” of existence as a whole ? I say “pure” because I want to highlight an impractical interest in truth for its own sake. Even an unpleasant truth is still good, because it is possessed as truth, because it’s worse to be confused or deceived — plaque flag

Note: Philosophy is very broad and I'll be making some generalisations, I can acknowledge exceptions.

Philosophy does not have an impractical interest in truth, it's thought funnelled through a particular set of selection biases and rules which aim at creating particular moral conditions. Some of these include:

1. Philosophy is thought for the group, logic must succeed at providing desirable conditions for the group, and arguments compete in being the best at doing this.

2. Philosophy is thought-overriding, the logics of philosophy represents a commitment to the well-being of the group, and this objective is sacrosanct. Alternative objectives aren't accepted.

3. Truths are correct references, philosophy excludes the relevancy of most relevances, and the relevant ones have moral importance. Philosophical concepts tie back to point 1, they must be beneficial to the group.

4. While science and scientific endeavours can represent a concept that is good for the group, that's the extent of its relationship with philosophy. Where science wouldn't be considered best for the group, philosophy would reject it.

While philosophy is a broad term, I think there's a substantial difference between solitary thinking and discussing philosophy. However, so long as philosophy, refers to the use of these biases, it's not just critical thought. If we're preaching to the group, we need to offer something the group would be interested in, and that's what philosophy is.

To me, an important part of philosophy is the combining of the overriding quality of morality and the nature of group thinking with rationality. I have issues with the idea of rationality, but I mostly see it as useful in this way. Its role is in compelling us to act in the best interests of the group.

I do think it's generally true that what's best for oneself, is what's best for oneself and the group, and by agreeing to conditions that would work for the group, we're all served. Philosophy strives to argue for the benefits of this group-orientated thinking, that we should sacrifice some of our own personal goals because if we all did that, we'd all be much better off. Philosophy also provides us with a reason to hold others accountable for their actions, and fight for the benefit of others based on blind principles.

I'd argue that's what philosophy tries to offer to the world. Holding others accountable to do what's in the best interests of the group and figuring out the best conditions for the group to exist in.

The semantic issue is that we can't give any meaning to the world-in-itself that isn't stolen from the world-for-us. — plaque flag

I'll give that there's some faith involved in thinking of a mind-independent world, I don't experience it, but I believe it's there. On the other hand, I live as a consciousness, and that's my reality, the world began when I was born, and will end when I die. I'd need a reason to care, and some pros and cons before I could begin thinking about it. Not that I expect you to provide me with that, by the way.

Anything that makes 'tennis' possible cannot be doubted or challenged with this game of 'tennis.' — plaque flag

I can agree with that.

The defining feature of philosophy for me is the universality of logic. We need to consider the greater repercussions beyond ourselves and beyond any single case. If I wouldn't be okay with my self-serving logic being used by others, then I must admit that I was wrong, stuff like that. If my logic doesn't best serve the group then it fails within the context of philosophy.

Normativity is what matters here. — plaque flag

Is your thread basically just saying that to play tennis we need to abide by the rules of tennis?

One must subjugate themselves to the rules of philosophy to participate, I agree with that in principle.

What are the significant characteristics involved with being reliant on the human nervous system?

To tell you what you already know, we have a lot of corroborating factors involved, for example, I see a table in front of me, I then reach out and I can touch it in the place I saw it, and then I put my water bottle on top of it. All of that seemingly validates my vision. Hence our ability to know about hallucinations and illusions, where corroborating factors are scarce or contradictory.

Can you provide an example of an issue that convinced you to reject scientific realism? Or do you just take it to be semantically inaccurate?

What are you referring to when you talk about "rationality" and "logic"?

You said in another thread:

I think we 'have' to separate logic in its ideal / normative sense from logic as a mere description of our fallible often illogical (in a normative sense) thinking process. I'd say that truly logical thinking ought to compel us. — plaque flag

So, I'll add, can you explain what "truly logical thinking" refers to?

But I do reject scientific realism ('mind-independent objects'), and that part probably goes against commonsense. — plaque flag

What do you reject about scientific realism?

Ideologies and religions are things with "specific, shared characteristics," are they not? — Leontiskos

Yes, the problem is that any analysis of an ideology or religion will go beyond those specific, shared characteristics, and that's the problem. We stop comparing like with like very quickly.

Sure, but one way to practice religion is Islam, and we are fairly clear on how this is different from the practice of Christianity or Buddhism. — Leontiskos

A comparison of Islam to Christianity will probably limit analysis in its scope, to keep it closer to the specific, shared characteristics that define Islam and Christianity. Therefore, such a comparison might not be quite so problematic and might represent a case where using the terms isn't so silly.

I think the nature of Islam will determine which new interpretations are possible and which are not, and these possibilities will be different than those of other religions. — Leontiskos

I agree, but focusing on where we can't go might be misleading since where we can go is so vast, it could be considered infinite. Comparing different versions of Islam that exist today reveals how different they can be.

But at the same time, scholars are not altogether precluded from talking about Islam in itself. — Leontiskos

Sure, scholars may talk about Islam with no qualifications, though, that's not a convincing defence of it, especially when one actually stops to listen to a "scholar on Islam". Not exactly a standard to aim for.

I guess I agree with your central claim that umbrella terms are unwieldy and difficult, but I would not go so far as to say that they are impossible or meaningless. — Leontiskos

I wouldn't go that far either, it depends on the context, and there are many angles to consider. From a cultural & political perspective, using umbrella terms can make sense, and sometimes it may be necessary, no matter how undesirable. It's too nuanced a topic to make any definitive claims, and I need time to process this topic.

Ah, I see. I was trying to explain how some ordinary situations inspired some philosophers to think that we don't see real objects at all but only representations of them. — plaque flag

Ah, I see, so I guess I was right when I thought your OP was talking about something I'd consider common sense. As our discussion progressed, my criticism of the OP was quickly resolved, but I still didn't fully understand it, I have a better understanding now, but yeah, I've got nothing to add.

If you feel like it, what do you make of the OP ? — plaque flag

I'm not sure. My main criticism was that it seems like you're conflating perception and understanding. You talk about the reports of your acquaintance being biased to set up "subjectivity", but then start talking about the perceiving of apples. So, I don't really get it, but I do find it hard to understand, so maybe that's the issue.

Of course. That's so obvious that I'm surprised you'd misunderstand me like that. The point I was making is that calling P true is different than calling P useful. — plaque flag

Fair enough, I suppose I don't understand your point. I don't think we can just use the word "true" by itself without context. I want to know what is true, and depending on what is true and why, I'd compare that to calling something useful. Otherwise, I don't think any comparison could be made.

I think I've lost track of what we're talking about, I'm just responding to comments at this point, sorry. I don't have a clear picture of what I'm currently arguing against or what I'm arguing for.

I really did mean in all in a friendly tone. I paraphrased part of an argument I found in a book that changed my mind about certain relativistic positions I once found convincing. — plaque flag

No worries.

I think we 'have' to separate logic in its ideal / normative sense from logic as a mere description of our fallible often illogical (in a normative sense) thinking process. I'd say that truly logical thinking ought to compel us. — plaque flag

English is cunning, the way logical refers to logic-based thinking but also just "clear and good" thinking I find intentionally deceptive. By "logical" thinking, you mean "good", including where logical implies good because it must be good, right? We refer to thinking as good thinking to call it good. If you'd never refer to bad thinking as "truly logical", why is it wrong to think of "truly logical thinking" as just "good thinking"? If "truly logical thinking" includes bad thinking, then give me an example.

You call it a strawman, but I don't see why it's a strawman. Pragmatism is close to instrumentalism and the idea of useful fictions. In some version of prag/inst, the claims/beliefs are more like shovels, neither truth nor false, — plaque flag

I'll reiterate that my view is that truth is created when it is correct to reference something as something. Which includes things that are subjective, such as that something is "overpriced". That's just how language and thought work, I don't know of an alternative.

The issue is that psychological claims are only authoritative if logic is. In our context, I tried to use logic to show that pragmatism has serious issues. We seem to agree that truth is about assertion. But this means truth transcends utility. — plaque flag

I don't find the involvement of these terms helpful, but I do find your critique of pragmatism to be a straw man. Logic and truth are necessary for language, and just thinking, that's part of why they're fickle, they have to be, otherwise, people wouldn't be able to express themselves. I would disagree with you also by saying that truth isn't "about" assertion, while there's an implicit assertion, it's about a correct reference, and the intention is in that.

The reason why P is true isn't because I "assert it", it's true because the necessary prerequisites to be true have been met, whatever they may be. This is to say, things aren't "overpriced" just whenever I feel like it, I have an understanding of what it means for something to be overpriced that must be qualified for, my understanding is influenced by a myriad of factors, cultural, social, and economic. It can be contested, and you could show my thinking to be unreasonable using a variety of tools and arguments.

Therefore, truth isn't influenced by "consensus", ironically, it's instead your precious concepts that are influenced by consensus. The very idea of rationality is a useful fiction, and the idea of logic is a useful fiction. I could take your critiques of pragmatism, and apply them to your concepts, though, it's not a critique I want to make. As surely, any pragmatist would defend the ideas of logic and rationality using the merits of their usefulness, I wonder if that doesn't describe you as well.

I suggested that 'P is true' is (roughly) the assertion of P.
Then I said that assertion was possibly irreducible. — plaque flag

Does that represent a substantial disagreement?

I'm not opposed to the idea that saying "P is true" is roughly an assertion of P. If I say, it's true that an item is overpriced, I am asserting that it's overpriced. Is that claim irreducible? Sure, generally speaking.

I'm just showing some classic problems with attempts to reduce truth to something else. — plaque flag

The classic problem of requiring an infinite series of consensuses?

Sorry if I offended you somehow. I felt quite calm and friendly and when I wrote all that — plaque flag

I have no idea what you're even criticising so searingly in your response, but it's in a response to me, with a bunch of straw-mans, and talk of shit-throwing superstitious monkeys. I am annoyed, but I won't hold a grudge about it, and I appreciate that I've interpreted you in ways that weren't intended.

I don't mention ethics for sentimental reasons. Rationality is fundamentally ethical (implicitly about autonomy and freedom), though psychologism tends to try to reduce evade the normative dimension. — plaque flag

What's the relevance of psychologism? I feel like you've made a lot of implicit assertions, but I want them to be spelled out.

Also the passages quoted on language, about its protean character, don't destroy [ paradoxically ] a 'faith ' (trust) in conceptuality but inspire a respect for the complexity of the situation. — plaque flag

As opposed to what? Am I arguing against the concept of something being overpriced? Or any other concept? Concepts are fundamental to language, the relevance of your comment is lost on me.

Is my recollection of our discussion wrong? I thought you agreed with most of what I've said, quite abruptly, it seems as though it must've been the opposite.

If there's no truth but only useful fictions, then that itself is just a useful fiction. There's also no fact of the matter about whether or not a fiction is useful. So we'll have to decide if it's useful to believe that it's useful to believe that it's useful to believe. — plaque flag

Okay... but I thought you had agreed with my views on truth, I'm puzzled.

Another version: truth is 'just' consensus. But how do we find out if we have a consensus ? We need a consensus to determine whether there's a consensus to determine whether there's a consensus and so on. — plaque flag

Huh... This is a straw man, but I won't correct it.

To some degree, we can't help but model one another as unfree objects determined by their environment. Hence the constant temptation toward psychologism. But too much psychologism is a performative contradiction, a denial of our own 'freedom' (responsibility),dignity, and our rationality itself --- hence of the trustworthiness of self-subverting psychologizing claims. — plaque flag

This seems like more straw-manning, at least, I can't see anything I've said in this.

Do we aspire to be more than shit throwing superstitious monkeys ? The dignity and the freedom of the individual are entangled with the concept (ideal on the horizon?) of a universal rationality. — plaque flag

First time hearing about this, and it's not an argument, just telling me this is not a great start.

I asked for an explanation on why you thought I was wrong and you haven't provided one. But if you want to finish things up here, that's fine as well.

You claim there is no right answer. That's the whole truth in essence, no ? — plaque flag

It's a definitive answer to the question of the whole truth, at least.

A massive ontological claim that not just you but all of us are doomed to quest in vain for more than pragmatic delusions — plaque flag

I wouldn't have called them "pragmatic delusions", so long as we're aware they're pragmatic, it seems unfair to call them delusions.

but why wouldn't that be a pragmatic delusion that serves your personally ? — plaque flag

I'd prefer to hear your answer to it actually. You've agreed with every premise in my argument, what exactly do you disagree with? Thinking requires arranging truth, and truth is created by correct references. My arguments are my creative effort, produced by my choices, my biases, and my goals. Why aren't these conditions leading you to conclude as I do?

When I say 'structure of reality,' I mean the whole truth in essence, because there's an infinity of facts. I also emphasize what's atemporal in reality, as is typical with philosophical knowledge (we want our truths to stay true.) Does that help ? — plaque flag

Sadly no, what is "the whole truth in essence"? Well, I doubt it matters, it's clearly a creative endeavour using language, an undertaking that will involve making choices by necessity, and not because there's a right answer.

Ah, but if logic was indeed too fickle, I don't think it would be easy, because whether you avoided the performative contradiction wouldn't be definite or stable. You are even using the proposed 'fickle nature of logic and reason' to support a claim, right ? Let me reiterate that I intend no rudeness. I'm just interested in only apparently skeptical performative contradictions that function by making grand ontological claims . — plaque flag

Logic is just thought, it's present in every opinion, from the most foolish to the most clever.

We need "good" logic. Though that's not good enough either, we need good selection biases, good understanding, good interpretation, good emphasis, and good clear thinking. Having all of these and whatever else be "good" is no guarantee of a "good" result, but that's what trial and error is for, right?

Can't the performative contradiction you talking about be resolved by the word "good"? If not "good" then just the same thing by some other clever name. Isn't this word or set of words we use nuanced, complex and reliant on interpretation? I don't like my logic because it's logic, there's some "good" thrown in there, somewhere, right? Doesn't logic need to be compelling? Isn't logic so easily wrong? I know you know that, so, help me understand the performative contradiction.

My point is that you were doing what I'd call articulating the structure of reality in that very statement. Can we help but articulate the structure of reality ? — plaque flag

I didn't take myself to be articulating the structure of reality there... I had imagined something broader, something closer to the "whole truth", as you say. Something overarching. Was I wrong?

I realize that they are your words. I think you mostly had to conform to semantic norms that transcend you, because I understand you all too well otherwise. But surely those particular words are a function of you in particular as well. — plaque flag

Although I don't have to, I generally add words that qualify that demonstrate that my words reflect my point of view. I had said I was talking about my view, and I provided an explanation of the problem earlier in my comment. Nonetheless, if I wanted to find a nuance that allowed me to avoid the performative contradiction, it would be doubtless easy. Such is the fickle nature of logic and reason, after all.

Your comments on language all seem quite reasonable to me. You might like these passages. — plaque flag

I'm glad you feel that way. The passage is nice, I too value a pragmatic understanding of language, and I share the dislike of semantic theorising.

That is of course an articulation of the structure of reality, which by its own testimony is subjective (biased, unjustified, etc.) — plaque flag

Do you associate subjective with unjustified? That would be unfortunate, it's sad how this word has been butchered.

As I've already explained, and you seemingly agreed with, my argument is the result of my creative effort, it's got my biases, my choices, my views attached. "Articulation is inherently subjective", that's my understanding of articulation, my understanding of "inherently", my rules for applying "inherently", my understanding of "subjective" my rules for applying "subjective". I chose the words and not some other words. I sequenced them as they are. It's my creation, and its construction is tied to my thinking.

Isn't that sufficient to say that my words and reasonings are subjective? The view is mine to its very core.

How much can we say about the blueness of blue ? Blue is just blue. In the same way, assertion might be something so fundamental that assertions about assertions just muddy the water. — plaque flag

I don't understand what you mean by "muddy the water", and I remain just as confused, sorry.

Don't you think culture is somewhat constrained by biology ? Translation seems to be common and relatively successful. — plaque flag

We've got words to reference things such as colours, animals, objects, and words to reference concepts such as culture, biology and constrained. It should translate well.

This sounds like the default 'nomenclature' theory effectively criticized by Saussure and Wittgenstein. — plaque flag

Fair enough. I'll provide a brief explanation of my view of language.

We use words to refer to things, but by referring to something as something, we're saying something about it. The word "dog" isn't representative of dogs, it's a type of animal, and when you refer to an animal as a dog, you're calling it a dog. What it means to refer to something as a "dog" depends on the context, and the meaning can vary greatly. Let's say someone is telling me how loyal their dog is, and I say "Yep, well, she is a dog after all", what does that mean? My meaning is something like "A dog is a loyal animal, so it makes sense that the dog is loyal". The logic of what it means to refer to something as something is complex, influenced by culture, context, tone and interpretation.

There's a lot of subtext to the logic of reference that can convey meaning as well. For example, referring to something as overpriced might indicate that you think the price should be lowered or that you're not going to buy it. We need the context to understand it, why is this person calling this thing overpriced? But the context may make it quite obvious, along with tone and emphasis, what this person means.

The logic that makes something overpriced is omitted, it's made up, and we'd need to hear the reason. The context matters greatly for determining the rules involved in whether it's acceptable to refer to something as something.

So even a word like "truth", I don't think a dictionary definition helps that much, we need to ask, what does it mean to refer to something as truth, and what are the rules for it? What does it mean for something to be truth and how should we treat something upon knowing that it's the truth? All of these questions are relevant to understanding the word, though context can influence this greatly.

That's far from a comprehensive explanation, and I could've written this much better but it should be enough that you understand my perspective, maybe.

I use 'ontology' as a synonym of 'philosophy' in its more 'scientific' ambition to articulate the structure of reality. — plaque flag

I see... I think once we begin to articulate an understanding, we've necessarily entered into the realm of subjectivity. It's too free, too many choices are being made.

I think you are making the point that assertions are true or false. — plaque flag

Not if that still leaves us with understanding truth as "that which is in accordance with reality" and thinking of an assertion as about reality. I understand the logic allowing us to refer to something as true or false as manmade. You might've understood that already, but maybe not.

Along these lines, talk of a world independent of human experience is confused or absurd. So I reject scientific realism as nonempirical -- basically a useful fiction that ignores the normatively subjectivity it nevertheless depends on without being forced to notice it. Bad ontology doesn't necessarily prevent technology from improving. — plaque flag

I am not making an ontological argument in my critique of "truth", it's just a word to me, a poorly constructed one, one largely misunderstood. There's subjectivity in describing things. If you want to articulate the structure of reality, my view is that your aspiration is doomed from the start. Articulation is inherently subjective.

Being able to call a statement true has certain metacognitive uses, but mostly 'P is true' doesn't add anything to 'P.' — plaque flag

Its meaning is contextual, maybe it means something, maybe it doesn't, we'd need to look at the logic involved.

But what is it to assert P ? Is there something irreducible here ? Is there a raw bottom-most essence of language that just 'is' the conceptual aspect of the real ? — plaque flag

The logic for P being true is invented. What does irreducible mean?

The logic of language is invented, all of it.

In language, we refer to things with words, and there is a meaning to referring to something as something. That's all language is really. So, I don't really understand what you're talking about. What is the "raw bottom-most essence"? Do you understand language differently?

I applaud the insistence of relevance. I agree with your cynicism (hence my thread on the foolishness of ontology). But you seem to be on the edge of performative contradiction. What's the truth about the goal you have in making that very claim ? Let's assume you want to convince me. Then the statement is true because I believe it ? — plaque flag

My point about what makes it true that a dog is a dog, wasn't primarily a critique of language, but of truth. That truth is a function of logic, and language is an example, it has set up a system of linguistic references. When a thing is referred to correctly, that creates "truth". In other words, truth is not a reflection of reality, it's a quality given to a reference.

The statement isn't true because you believe it, but if it's correct to reference it as true. The reason why a reference is correct isn't differentiated between, just as it isn't in logic.

The word "truth" doesn't carry the weight many seem to think it does, it really needs to be contextualised. Maybe we generally only bother to ask whether something is true, in contexts where we think it matters if it is or not. Perhaps that's why the word's trivial reference isn't reflected in our perception of it.

So this is more of what I'd call us realizing our ontological centrality. This entangles the conceptual aspect of the world with the human community's inferential standards. — plaque flag

Ontology confuses me, I'm not sure I understand your claims. I may not be a great discussion partner for discussing ontology.

I take you to be articulating a valuable pragmatist insight. I read the neopragmatist Rorty very intensely and closely, and I was strongly influenced by his anarchism. — plaque flag

I'm not familiar but after reading a summary, perhaps that's a mistake I ought to correct, the thinking is surely similar to mine.

You say that : what is "right" is what accomplishes the goal. I see the value in this, but I maintain that you are still trying to tell me a truth here. It's not just instrumental. If it is, it has no authority. It's only true if I believe it, in other words, given that your desire is presumably to persuade. — plaque flag

Sure, I am trying to tell you a truth, several in fact, bundled up neatly together and presented for you. My point is that this argument of mine is the product of my creative effort, it involves my biases, and my intentions and serves my goals. It is not mere truth. However, I think it's important since we are talking about truth, for me to critique the word.

In this context, I imagine you are using the word "truth" to roughly reference "being in accordance with reality". The other common use is through logic. The two combine to create a significant grey area for me. Let me ask a simple question, is a dog a dog? I think most people would agree, that it's objectively true, that a dog is a dog. But why? I think it's fair to say that language isn't part of reality, and the categorisation of a dog as a dog isn't either. So, it must be logic that makes it true.

Long story short, I think it's clear that truth is working in reverse here, it's not that "a dog is a dog in reality". It's "When a thing, in reality, meets all the prerequisites to be a dog, then it is a dog". So, if an animal meets all the prerequisites to be a dog, then it's objectively true that it's a dog.

Equally, the "truth" of my argument, involves interpreting reality as meeting the prerequisites of something like "useful". It's true that my argument seems correct, or it's true that my argument seems accurate, or something like that.

In the simplest terms, if a method achieves its goal then that is a truth, and it's this kind of truth we seek, not "that which is in accordance with reality", barely anyone gives a shit about that. In a very real sense, anything useful is truth, specifically in its use.

We agree very much on this. — plaque flag

Glad to hear it.

I suggest that you've wandered into performative contradiction. You tell me to understand the 'limitations of rationality and logic.' Wouldn't this understanding be through rationality and logic ?
Or is the 'understanding' you have in mind mystical ? Does it wait in the arms of Jesus ? Or in a dose of DMT ? — plaque flag

Nothing supernatural at play. The understanding is achieved through logic, yes. The limitation isn't in what logic can do, it's the same as truth, it's the abundance of logic, the overwhelming amount of options, and that we are forced to select a tiny portion of it. The limitation is in its inability to capture everything. Our goal as thinkers isn't to be guided by truth or logic or even to be rational.

We have a goal, an aim, and to accomplish it, one must have the right understanding, using the right logic. What is "right" is what accomplishes the goal. You're demonstrating that you're doing this in every response to me. You know so much truth, and you share but a fraction of all that you know with me. You've got so many ways you could respond to me, different arguments that you aren't bringing up but could.

I'm not talking about the things you don't know, your finite knowledge. I'm talking about the limitations of using the vast knowledge you already have. As I said earlier, our selecting the "relevant" knowledge as a process, shouldn't be trivialised. It's so commonplace, such an obvious thing to do, that it's easy to overlook but think about the implications of it. How do you select what is "relevant"? Relevant to what? You've got to make decisions, and your decisions aim to accomplish something, and what you aim to accomplish and how you go about it is an important part of subjectivity.

It's trivial, I know. Your hand is forced, it's necessary, I know. But I think it's key to understand that it's necessary. We need a framework, we need goals, we need selection biases, and philosophy provides these, these and not the "whole truth". I say it's a limitation, but that may have been misleading, my intention is to say it can't be the whole truth. Having to "arrange truth" isn't a flaw, it's just necessary.

Only in the sense that all critical rationality is. My OP is a fairly ambitious ontological thesis that explains the relationship of what's called 'mind' and 'matter'. My direct realism is easier to understand once one grasps our shared situation as discursive rational/normative subjects. This is the condition of possibility for science and philosophy. To deny this condition is to engage in performative contradiction. — plaque flag

I'm with you in a general sense, as I think we've established. I take you to be saying something nobody in their right mind would disagree with, so long as you think of it that way, then we're probably on the same page.

Of course you don't rule the world. — plaque flag

Such a shame :cry: .

The topic is the quest for or toward greater autonomy. What ideal does critical rationality depend on or aim at ? — plaque flag

I subscribe to a pragmatic and context-dependent approach to evaluating ideas and information. I value the skill of critical analysis for specific purposes, without embracing a broader philosophical or systematic framework of critical rationality. Philosophy is one particular context, with its own biases, and here I play by those rules, but I won't have these biases present in all my endeavours in life. I admit, within the context of philosophy, this is essentially treason, but alas.

How about you let me do your thinking for you ?

This joke is to wake you up maybe to what autonomy really means in this context. A philosopher who thinks for his fucking self and doesn't believe whatever he's told is exactly what I'm talking about. Autonomy means you must be convinced. You sit on judgment on the claims of strangers. — plaque flag

This all-or-nothing "joke" misses the point completely, and represents the entire problem with the conceptualisation of "free will". I have the power to legislate my own norms in a technical sense only, if I abandoned any sense of pragmatism, any desire for compromise, or any concern for consequence, then I can legislate my own norms. So long as I have some sense, there's a significant limit to it.

Responsibility & free will, are two ideas I have many issues with, but it seems quite a tangential topic from the OP. It seems we, maybe agree on the topic of subjectivity, but I'm having trouble tracking some of these tangential topics. Is this about what we "ought" to believe?

As I understand philosophy, it is an intellectual exercise from the perspective of the group, the "we". An understanding that benefits me, at the expense of society, is a logic that is antithetical to philosophy. This is its bias. Sometimes I see the value in that, and at other times, I don't.

Understand the limitations of rationality and logic, that most philosophers seem blind to. There is no "whole truth", we are forced to select truths and logic, one must. If you understand this, you can put to rest any notion of "whole truth". All philosophy does is dictate the goal, the species-wide level goal, as a bias that serves as a template for "arranging truth".

We are bound to no norms we do not willingly embrace -- to nothing 'alien' to us (like an inscrutable god who just gives commands, or a tyrant with more guns than reasons.) — plaque flag

I characterise choice by the quality of the choices available. If I can select between ten options, but nine of them are unthinkable to select, then I may as well just have one. Do I abide by the norms of language because I prefer them over the alternative? Yes. Are there any alternatives I can reasonably accept? No. Okay, then, I do not have a choice.

Autonomy allows me to control myself, and it makes sense for me to adapt to my environment. That doesn't mean I think highly of it.

In philosophy, we think in "we", the group that is not a group, this "we" exists more in a technical sense than in a real one. I am but one person, I was born into this world, and I act as is sensible for me to act. It sits between willing and unwilling.

It's difficult to understand subjectivity in the context of philosophy since it often violates this "we" notion, it breaks those rules. I think this is a weakness of philosophy. We're all on the same ship, so we should work together, but it doesn't always work out that way in reality. It's not a criticism of you, but I understand subjectivity through the lens of one's objectives not necessarily coinciding with what would be good for the group, or in general. Though we might explain ourselves in ways that obfuscate this intention.

I don't know what you mean by "transcend". I agree that we are following norms, of language, of conversation and of thinking. We follow them because they're useful, and partially because we're compelled. I take there to be no higher meaning than that, do you?

Respectfully, is this statement itself a lie then ? Or should I at least be careful not to assume your intention to be honest with me ? Are you not telling me how things are ? — plaque flag

When one knowingly states falsehood it is a lie, but a report of truth, yet not the whole truth, can be a lie when it is intentionally misrepresentative. As I haven't knowingly stated any falsehood and I am not being intentionally misrepresentative, the statement is not a lie.

It's truth arranged, curated as you say, as I write to you, I am overburdened by how much I could say, how many points I could make, but I can't share everything. I have to choose my words carefully, to convey what I want to convey and to succeed in my objectives.

I wouldn't take for granted our need for relevance, it's a crucial part of subjectivity. Once I've selected the relevant truths, interpreted them, and made my argument or my account, don't disregard that. Even if my statement is true, it wasn't made to convey mere truth, it has a purpose, it was made.

I agree that some serious organization is going on. 'Choices' seems correct, but I think we need to add a temporal dimension. — plaque flag

Why do we need to add a temporal dimension? Many factors go into why we choose as we do, beyond ourselves. Culture, environment, context, biology and so on. We can agree that many factors are involved, but I'm unaware of the purpose you believe would be served by going into detail about them.

And what of this activity we're engaged in right now ? Critical rationality. You can disagree with me but not with yourself. Same for me. We both appeal to norms that transcend us both, finding our better self in a 'projected' 'ideal' perfected rational subject. — plaque flag

We're in a philosophical discussion, if I would ignore the rules of that, others won't participate in them with me. If you're going to highlight my choice, let me ask, how much of a choice do I even have? How would it serve me to ignore the established norms?

The norms don't "transcend" me, my compliance is useful to me, and in some ways, coerced.

The factors involved in my choices are complex. My circumstances in many ways, are different than yours, but are also in many ways very similar, I hope you find that answer satisfying, but perhaps not.

In the context of vengeance, I don't think justice is an umbrella term either. When vengeance is fair and right, we call it justice, but if it isn't fair and right, then it isn't justice. We reference things as justice when they are fair and right, to assert that they are fair and right, but that doesn't make it an umbrella term. That being said, I am using the term umbrella term rather liberally in my OP, so I'm not one to talk.

The same word can be interpreted differently from the speaker's and hearer's perspective. Don't you agree? — Gnomon

Sure, but what matters is why it's being interpreted differently. I see you interpret the word "dispute" as emotive while I do not, but I wouldn't mind using a different word to avoid confusion. I have many synonyms at my disposal and no reason to care which I use.

If our difference in interpretation represents something more substantial, it may not be in either of our best interests to let the other define the term for the debate. Disambiguation, in my view, is best served by expressing ourselves without using the contested term. Ideally, we use terms where agreement exists, rather than establishing agreement by defining terms, I think. Though the context matters, and sometimes defining one's terms can be necessary. I'm not sure that there's any disagreement between us, we might agree if the context was made clear.

One's report reflects how one interprets and characterises truth, the truths one deems relevant and which are emphasised. Perceiving what is, is thoughtless, it shouldn't be lumped in with any process that requires the making of choices, such as understanding.

Understanding can be validated, but what it accomplishes isn't necessarily truth, nor must it aim for that. For example, a report might aim at conveying to its reader important bits of information, so they can quickly and easily understand all that they need to know. Taking a view of what the reader needs to know, or what the report needs to convey is necessary, but demonstrates how the goal is not truth.

I think we can better understand subjectivity by perceiving individuals as being overburdened with truths and being required to organise them. In organising them, we must make choices, that is subjectivity.