when I stipulate that the two acts are identical in all respects apart from spatially and/or temporally I am not stipulating that they are morally identical. — Bartricks

So two acts must be spatially and/or temporally identical in order to be morally identical?

They are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences. — Bartricks

In order to claim that two acts are not morally identical, even though they are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences, one must presuppose that intentions and consequences are non-moral respects--as I said before.

Two acts that are non-morally identical will be morally identical too. — Bartricks

Because you say so? According to your own rules, you need to provide a valid syllogism with this as its conclusion and premisses that are confirmed by rational intuitions.

Like I say, I can't argue with someone like you. — Bartricks

Right back at you one more time.

You change your position in every post. — Bartricks

Laughably false, as I have demonstrated over and over. I will not bother to go back and quote myself again; as someone once said:

It isn't worth the keystrokes. — Bartricks

Anyway, if you think that premise 2 has no support from our rational intuitions then, as far as you're concerned, 2 has nothing to be said for it. — Bartricks

Here is what I actually said:

my rational intuition finds my #2 vastly more plausible than your #1, while your rational intuition apparently indicates exactly the opposite. — aletheist

Arguments cannot be settled solely on the basis of rational intuitions, because they are not uniform; different people have different rational intuitions.

Can you see why I am confused by you? No, probably not. Silly question. Look, l don't think you're in good faith. — Bartricks

Right back at you.

You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work ... And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong. — Bartricks

Right back at you again.

In other words what's desired is a foundation for applicable mathematics, and not just pure platonic mathematics. — Zuhair

Mathematics in general does not require a "foundation" at all, and certainly need not be treated as Platonic, as if its objects "exist" in some immaterial realm. That was my point in giving Peirce's definition of it as the science of drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs. The key to its practical applications is formulating those hypotheses in a way that captures the significant relations among the real phenomena of interest.

That is not the business of pure mathematics, but of applied mathematics within all the other sciences--including philosophy.

You yourself say that he is "unfit for the office" and being unfit to serve is right there in the description of what counts as high crimes and misdemeanors. — Michael

Fitness for the office is up to the judgment of the voters. Evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemanors" is up to the judgment of a simple majority of the House (for formal charges) and a two-thirds majority of the Senate (for conviction and removal).

And the reason why it can be construed as such is because the statute is 'high crimes misdemeanors and other...' Abuse of power is 'the other' — 3017amen

The relevant language is not in a mere statute, it is in the Constitution itself; and it does not say "high crimes, misdemeanors, and other," it says "Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Whether alleged abuse of power rises to that level, and whether there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a president is guilty of it--thus warranting removal from office--is for a simple majority of the House of Representatives (as grand jury) and then a two-thirds majority of the Senate (as trial jury) to decide.

Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs. Pure mathematics does not concern itself at all with whether those hypotheses have any resemblance whatsoever to "the real world," because it studies the logically possible, not the actual. As such, the selection of a "foundation" is arbitrary, and set theory is only one option--the dominant one currently, but there are other promising candidates, such as category theory.

Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses?

Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything. — Bartricks

This presupposes that intentions and consequences are "non-moral respects." Does anyone actually believe that?

You needed to make an argument - not just state something time and time again - and show how that statement, in conjunction with another, entails the negation of my conclusion. — Bartricks

It was quite obvious all along that my statement entailed the negation of your #1, and therefore the negation of your conclusion--i.e., the unsoundness of your argument, even though it was valid--but apparently you were unable to see it until I presented it as a formal deductive syllogism.

Premises need to be supported by reason - that is, they either need to be self-evident truths of reason or they need to be entailed by self-evident truths of reason. — Bartricks

In my experience, there are very few (if any) "self-evident truths of reason" other than the laws of identity and non-contradiction. There are certainly no "self-evident truths of reason" that pertain to moral values, which is why there is still so much disagreement about them after millennia of debates. Seriously believing that one can settle them in favor of subjectivism with a simple deductive argument reflects either hubris or delusion (or both).

And therefore do you accept that one must entertain the possibility that it is true - not false, but true - and then see, on that assumption, how well it comports with our rational intuitions? — Bartricks

Of course we must "entertain the possibility" that a premiss is true in order to evaluate it fairly, but "how well it comports with our rational intuitions" is a contentious and highly fallible basis for doing so, since different people have different "rational intuitions." For example, my rational intuition finds my #2 vastly more plausible than your #1, while your rational intuition apparently indicates exactly the opposite.

2. That which is morally valuable is morally valuable even if no subject values it. — Bartricks

This is not equivalent to my #2. In order to refute your #1, it is sufficient to argue that some things are morally valuable even if no subject values it--a particular proposition, not a universal proposition. Even just one such thing is enough. In other words, the objectivist does not claim that all moral values are objective, only that some moral values are objective.

Again look at history: Nixon, Clinton, et. al. — 3017amen

Nixon resigned before he could be impeached. Clinton was impeached for perjury--lying under oath, which most people agree qualifies under "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"--but was acquitted by the Senate.

And I will cover more stringent criteria that relates to the president putting his personal gain over national security interests — 3017amen

Again, there would have to be sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Trump did something amounting to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for there to be a constitutional basis to remove him from office. Anything below that intentionally high bar is irrelevant. The voters will have the opportunity to deny him a second term on that basis in just 13 months.

Ah, well done for changing what you're saying and then thinking I won't notice! — Bartricks

On the contrary, my #2 is not substantively different from what I have been repeatedly saying all along:

being morally valuable is a quality that is external to any subject ... regardless of whether anyone properly recognizes it. — aletheist

there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

"being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

some things are morally valuable ... regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone. — aletheist

Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. — aletheist

some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them ... being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. — aletheist

In other words ...

2. Some things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued. — aletheist

There are many powerful Republicans not in the House who detest him. — Wayfarer

The only Republicans who matter are those in the Senate, and how they personally feel about Donald Trump is a relatively small part of the equation. Unless sufficient evidence is presented to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he is truly guilty of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"--a bar that @3017amen has not even come close to meeting yet--their main consideration would be whether voting to remove him from office is more likely to help or harm their own reelection prospects.

And before anyone bemoans that strictly political calculus, recognize that the Democrats in the House who are now contemplating impeachment are no different in that regard. As we have already established ...

Impeachment is a political process not a legal one — 3017amen

He has to be convicted in the Senate of the crimes on which the House found him guilty. — Bitter Crank

And also - imagine if the House convicts, and the Senate acquits, what the atmosphere would be like for next year’s poll. — Wayfarer

Impeachment is not a finding of guilty nor a conviction, it is merely a formal accusation. The House is the equivalent of a grand jury, ascertaining whether a simple majority of its members believes that there is enough evidence to move forward with a trial. Only the Senate can vote to convict (guilty) or acquit (not guilty), and it would take all 47 Democrats plus 20 Republicans to reach the required two-thirds majority for removal from office.

If you want to deny a premise, do so - but say which one you are denying and then provide a deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion. — Bartricks

How many times do I have to repeat that I deny your #1 because I reject the definitions of terms that it presupposes? Here is my deductively valid argument, since you seem to think that providing one makes a difference.

1. If being morally valuable entails being valued, then no things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued.
2. Some things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued.
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not entail being valued.

This is perfectly valid, but you will likely reject my #2 as question-begging, just as I reject your #1 as question-begging. The bottom line is that we disagree about the definition of "morally valuable," and no deductive argument is going to change either of our minds.

I agree, there is a sense in which the House has the power of impeachment for any reason. However, the OP calls for "removal of a government official," and the constitution explicitly authorizes the Senate to take that step only for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

That seems like a response prompted by emotion, not logic. I am simply pointing out the constitutional requirement for removal from office. Unless there is evidence of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," there is no case for impeachment.

I agree that Donald Trump is an immoral, dishonest, and obnoxious person. However, none of the items that you mentioned--even taken together--qualify as a constitutional basis for removal from office. That requires "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. — Bartricks

No more so than your definition of "valuable" as "being valued." As I keep pointing out, the debate is not about the arguments, but the premisses--in this case, the definitions of key terms in the first place.

Thus, to insist that intrinsic moral value is 'objective' - to build that into the definition, when clearly we od not need to as we can distinguish between our own intrinsic and extrinsic valuings - is to beg the question. — Bartricks

No, to insist that being valued by something/someone is a strict prerequisite for anything to be valuable is to beg the question. The subjectivist must maintain that all moral values are subjective in that way. By contrast, the objectivist need only maintain that some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not a matter of why something is valued, but of whether it has to be valued at all in order to be morally valuable.

And you have yet to point to any one of those numbers that does not correspond to something reason clearly says. — Bartricks

Other than the multiple times I have explained that being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. Your whole argument hinges on this contested definition.

So at this point I think you're very unreasonable. — Bartricks

Right back at you.

Committing criminal acts, failing to discharge the duties of the President, and violating the constitution, however, are. — Wayfarer

Sure, but the OP did not offer any of those allegations; just that "the public is overwhelmingly dissatisfied with his/her performance."

Our wonderful Democratic process allows for removal of a government official Comander in Chief, if the public is overwhelmingly dissatisfied with his/her performance. — 3017amen

Yes, and we call that process an election, which will take place in just over 13 months.

Public dissatisfaction with the President's performance, no matter how overwhelming, is not a constitutional basis for impeachment. That requires sufficient evidence of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for the House of Representatives to adopt formal charges by a simple majority vote. Of course, this would not yet result in removal from office--that requires a subsequent two-thirds majority vote by the Senate, after a trial presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

I did not and will not vote for Donald Trump, because I consider him unfit for the office, temperamentally and otherwise. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that all this impeachment talk is pure political theater, predicated on flimsy pretense. The only viable strategy for getting rid of Trump is to offer voters a better alternative next November.

For something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to be being valued for its own sake. — Bartricks

No, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to have that property regardless of whether anyone actually values it at all.

There still needs to be a valuer. — Bartricks

No, there does not; that is what "intrinsic" means. Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. Likewise, the earth is round(ish) even if no one actually ascribes the property of roundness to it. In other words, the objectivist holds that there are real moral facts, much like real physical facts.

I used to be an objectivist about moral value. Then I discovered the arguments I have presented above. I could not refute them. — Bartricks

That indicates a lot more about you than about the arguments.

Which premise do you deny? — Bartricks

I have told you repeatedly--#1, since the intrinsic property of being morally valuable does not require actually being valued by anyone. When you begin by defining the terms in accordance with subjectivism, of course you wind up with a conclusion that affirms subjectivism.

I have established that moral values must be the values of a subject. That is, to be morally valuable is to be being valued by someone. — Bartricks

No, as I have pointed out repeatedly, you have presupposed that by defining the terms accordingly. An objectivist maintains instead that some things are morally valuable by virtue of possessing intrinsic value, regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone.

You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — Bartricks

No, I think that anyone who claims to have accomplished this is either joking or delusional.

There is a difference between real and existing: Being real is defined as "actually existing as a thing or occurring in fact; not imagined or supposed" while existing, does not mean that whatever is being discussed needs to be physically present. — Bay3z

There is indeed a difference between "real" and "existing" in metaphysics, but this is not it. I find Charles Sanders Peirce's definitions especially helpful: the real is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, while existing is reacting with other things in the environment. Accordingly, everything that exists is real, but not everything that is real exists; and purely imaginary creatures like dragons are neither real nor existing, they are fictions.

That said, I acknowledge that "existing" is also employed in logic for anything that is in the universe of discourse. In that sense, Hamlet exists in the play by Shakespeare, and dragons exist in certain fairy tales. Moreover, there is a real play by Shakespeare about a Prince of Denmark named Hamlet; but all of his attributes depend entirely on what Shakespeare's mind thought about him, so Hamlet himself is not real. Likewise, there are real fairy tales about dragons; but all of their attributes depend entirely on what various people's minds have thought about them over the centuries, so dragons themselves are not real. In the metaphysical sense, the play and the fairy tales exist in different physical forms--books, performances, recordings, etc.--but Hamlet and dragons themselves do not exist.

The infinity of the continuum would suggest that all objects have the same infinity, Thus thought Cantor. — Gregory

Cantor wrongly thought that the real numbers constitute a continuum, but as I noted previously, they can only constitute an infinite collection--one whose multitude is greater than that of the rational numbers. His own theorem proves that there is another collection of even greater multitude, and another greater than that, and so on endlessly. Consequently, a true continuum cannot consist of discrete subjects (like numbers or points) at all.

But Banach and Tarski essentially pointed out that this would mean you could take a mountain out of a pea. — Gregory

Right, but that paradox stems from the same mistake of treating discrete points as if they were somehow continuous. It reflects a limitation of such standard models of continuity, which are adequate for most mathematical and practical purposes. Banach-Tarski does not arise in a better model of true continuity, such as synthetic differential geometry (also called smooth infinitesimal analysis).

Induction is a weaker system than deduction and what is justification in the former is proof in the latter. — TheMadFool

There is no "proof" in induction, only evidence.

However note that the utility of inductiom lies in deduction being applicable to knowledge so gained. — TheMadFool

Induction is really the last step in inquiry, although it is ultimately cyclical. First is retroduction, the formulation of a plausible hypothesis. Next is deduction, the explication of what follows necessarily from that hypothesis in order to make predictions. Then comes induction, the testing of the hypothesis to see whether the resulting predictions are corroborated or falsified.

Can you name one unjustified truth? — TheMadFool

Lots of people believe things without justification that happen to be true. That is why the standard modern definition of knowledge is justified true belief, not merely true belief.

I agree with , in the sense that a deductive proof can only ever provide certainty about a hypothetical state of affairs. Whether any given hypothesis matches up with reality can only be evaluated inductively, which means that we can never achieve certainty. Instead, the validity of the method stems from its self-correcting nature, such that the falsity of a hypothesis would become apparent in the long run. Most of our current beliefs are true, which is why we are generally able to get around successfully in the world, but we cannot know for sure that any one in particular is true.

Do you think justification is necessary for truth? — TheMadFool

No, justification is about why someone believes a proposition, while truth is about whether that proposition represents reality. Besides, if justification were necessary for truth, then only justified beliefs could be true, which is not the case.

You say that if a claim doesn't have a counterexample it can be taken as proof. — TheMadFool

No, he did not say that, either. He said that an absence of counterexamples can be taken as justification for a belief; proof is a stronger form of justification.

Make sense of it. I can't. — Bartricks

If I rejected your argument by simply claiming that I could not make sense of it, what would be your response?

So, construct an argument in which the negation of one of my premises is the conclusion and then let's look at the assumptions you need to make to get to it. — Bartricks

I am confident that if I were to construct such an argument, you would immediately reject it by denying one or both of the premisses. As I keep saying, the disagreement is about the premisses, not the arguments.

Question begging. — Bartricks

Question begging. — Bartricks

Question begging. — Bartricks

To which I respond ...

But just saying something doesn't make it so. — Bartricks

Stop being tedious. — Bartricks

Either explain why being morally valuable does not involve being the object of a valusing relation or explain how something objectivery can value something. — Bartricks

An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

An objectivist can, in principle, accept premise 1 and reject 2. They can identify the valuer with an object. — Bartricks

Nonsense, that is not what it means to be an objectivist. Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." On the other hand, "being valued" does entail "being valued by something," and what we call that something--subject, object, Reason, God, whatever--has no bearing on the argument itself.

Is there nothing - no form of argument whatever - that you would accept has demonstrated objectivism to be false? — Bartricks

How should I know? If I were aware of any such argument, then I already would have been persuaded by it! Again, in my experience it always comes down to the premisses, rather than the arguments.

No, now you've made all syllogisms question begging just by dint of their nature, which is absurd. — Bartricks

Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion.

The first premise says only that to be valuable is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. It says nothing about the nature of that relation. — Bartricks

The nature of every relation is that it requires at least two correlates. An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject.

I mean, if moral objectivism is false, how would you find out? What do you think a refutation of it would look like? The above? — Bartricks

No, for the reasons that I have already provided. Again, in my view these debates almost always come down to the premisses, not the reasoning. No objectivist would accept your #1, because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable.

Again, I am not begging the question. If you say otherwise then show me which premise asserts the truth of my thesis (not entails it - asserts it). — Bartricks

Anything that one premiss entails by itself, without the addition of a second premiss, is effectively asserted by it. With that in mind, consider the OP argument again.

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

The only difference between #1 (premiss) and #3 (conclusion) is the addition of "by a subject," which is already implied; #2 is superfluous. To me, that is begging the question.

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. Note that we could substitute just about any other verb here, and the same would be true--actually being "Xed" (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be "Xable."

Do you think my values are moral values? Do you think yours are? Just asking. — Bartricks

It depends on how we define "moral values." If we mean values that have a moral aspect, then certainly some of your values and my values are moral values, because everyone has moral values in that sense. If we mean values that are morally binding on everyone, then there is still a good chance that some of your values and my values are moral values--but not because they are your values or my values. Your argument seems to be--please correct me if I am wrong--that certain values are moral values only because some mind (a god?) holds them. Objectivists would argue that certain values are moral values for a different reason, such as them being inherent in things as suggested.

It is not question begging to refute a view with a deductively valid argument all the premises of which are extremely plausible. — Bartricks

It is question-begging to assume what you are trying to prove, which your argument does by presupposing that having value requires being valued (#1), which then requires a subject to do the valuing (#2). In fact, you just admitted as much, apparently without realizing it.

My argument assumes that for something to be valuable in any sense is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. — Bartricks

Since being the object of a valuing relation requires a subject to do the valuing, your argument begs the question. An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it.

Well, if all of that is true of 'values' when we use that word in relation to ourselves, what reason is there to think that the word 'value' in 'moral value' denotes something quite different? — Bartricks

This comes back to the same distinction between having value and being valued. My sense is that the alleged plausibility of premiss #1 in both the OP and your later argument relies heavily on the repetition of the same root word. With that in mind, it might helpfully clarify the issues to use different terminology; for example, replace "moral values" with "moral principles."

The problem is that premise 2 is self evidently true. — Bartricks

In that case, the entire argument seems unnecessary. Everyone presumably knows that you and I are not Superman, and I doubt that there are very many people who seriously think that their particular values are moral values binding on all, merely because they happen to hold them.

As for the argument in the OP, it is similarly question-begging by stipulating in #1 that being morally valuable (adjective) requires being valued (verb), which already implies a subject that does the valuing per #2. The OP even acknowledges that objectivists instead hold that being morally valuable is a quality that is external to any subject--for example, inherent in things themselves as just suggested--regardless of whether anyone properly recognizes it. They reject #1 accordingly.

As usual, the debate is not about the validity of the reasoning, but rather the truth of the premisses.

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery then I am not necessarily in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me. — Bartricks

The truth of #2, and thus the soundness of the entire argument, depends upon the (unstated) assumption that Superman's identity is contingent. Someone who insists that I am Superman can simply deny #2, since it then follows from #1 that if Superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

Likewise, the truth of #2, and thus the soundness of the entire argument, depends upon the (unstated) assumption that moral values are contingent. Someone who insists that moral values are my values can simply deny #2, since it then follows from #1 that if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable.

Excellent, and I agree with you that justification can be based on the absence of counterexamples. It is what Charles Sanders Peirce called "crude induction," describing it as the "weakest kind of inductive reasoning" and "the only kind of induction that is capable of inferring the truth of what, in logic, is termed a universal proposition." Its chief virtue is that it is readily self-correcting, because it only takes one counterexample. The paradigm case is "all swans are white," which was a justified belief of Europeans for centuries, but turned out not to be true.

What is justification if not proof? — TheMadFool

"Proof" has the connotation of rigorous demonstration. We believe all kinds of things for which we do not have "proof" in this strict sense, but we nevertheless are justified in believing them.

Why do we need justification if not to establish truth? — TheMadFool

There are reasons why the standard modern philosophical definition of knowledge is "justified true belief," rather than merely "true belief." Moreover, we are fallible knowers; some of our justified beliefs will turn out to be false.