In Europe it's a bigger deal and holocaust deniers get much more coverage because they're doing something illegal and it gets blown up into this big thing. — BitconnectCarlos

And what's wrong with it being illegal in human made democratic laws if fascism is indeed something bad ... that inevitably leads into lands of the atrocious?

Tolerance for those who are intolerant can only lead to intolerance, period.

I get the need to talk to others. But this can only have any meaningful effect/affect when the other is of an open mind and is listening. Otherwise, it becomes an issue of fending off offensive violence with defensive violence.

What is the logical conclusion of anti-fascism? — Kenosha Kid

What is, democracy?

Its a jeopardy-like answer to a jeopardy-like question.

Shit may happen when you attack a federal building, I suppose. — Olivier5

Try to imagine the same attack being perpetuated by people of non-white skin ... or by those utterly evil "anti-fascists" (an attitude which blatantly specifies whom the good guys are: those who are not antagonistic to fascism but, instead, either endorse it or are indifferent to it).

The shit you've specified would have been a lot worse. More along the lines of a slaughter. "Why" we wonder (sarcasm here).

But then, those who are not anti-democracy wouldn't attack a democratic institution to begin with.

I’m curious to know how you would address the following scenario via the law of identity:

--The concept of tree is the same as (is equal to; i.e., is identical to) the concept of tree … and is different from (is not equal to; i.e., is not identical to) the concept of rock.

Here, I’m addressing conceptual forms (which are naturally devoid of perceivable shapes: for, as a concept, i.e. as a generalized idea, it can take on multiple concrete, perceivable shapes …. None of which individually specifies what the concept, a generality, itself consists of in full). This, to me, is very much in tune to how a triangle, a geometric concept, can take on innumerable perceivable shapes without any such concrete shape being in and of itself the universal, abstract form of triangle per se. Likewise to how any number, itself an abstract concept, is identical to itself as number but not to any other number.

But my main interest here is in how you'd address the concept of tree as having, or as not having, an identity (albeit an inter-subjective one) as a concept - this as per the example mentioned. To be explicit, an identity via which it as concept can be identified.

Do you disagree with the qualitative difference, or the out-dated notion of a god-given Soul? — Gnomon

Neither. I sharply disagree with the part about there being a metaphysical division between humans and all non-human life.

So how does this work? — apokrisis

I'll leave that for another day.

primacy of awareness — javra

How would you define this? — Olivier5

My own definition of awareness’s primacy: The tenet that everything which can and does exist (i.e., everything that can and does stand-out in any way) is either directly or indirectly contingent on the presence of awareness - with some existents (like the objectivity of space, time, and matter) being contingent on all cooccurring instantiations of awareness, some (like the intersubjectivity of cultures and languages) being contingent on certain limited cohorts of cooccurring instantiations of awareness, and some (like one’s personal REM dreams) being contingent on unique instantiations of awareness. This tenet of awareness’s primacy thereby results in a stance of idealism.

My post regarded a conditional partly constructed from “if primacy of awareness is true” and not an argument for awareness’s primacy. I currently don’t want to engage in any such argument.

I noticed once an item of dogma from one of the Hindu religious sects: 'life comes from life'. To my knowledge, this supposition has not yet been overturned by an empirical observation. — Wayfarer

I think I can very much understand and respect where you’re coming from. Abiogenesis is a big thorn in the side. As for myself, though, I do strongly believe in the universe having once existed in the absence of lifeforms - despite my idealist leanings.

That is where panpsychism becomes even more intellectually dishonest. People do argue that neural complexity somehow amplifies the dilute awareness that is already a property of the material realm. — apokrisis

People are sometimes also fond of arguing that ameba do not hold a first-person awareness of light and dark, not to again mention of what is relative to them predators and prey. They hold no "neural complexity" to speak of. But then, this can get boosted all the way up the to the supposed metaphysically unique status of humans - as divided from everything else in the cosmos.

Then we sharply disagree.

Most of the higher animals have some form of culture, including ants & bees. But I wouldn't put them in the same category with human culture. — Gnomon

Bees and ants do not have socially transmitted behaviors as far as I'm aware - hence, no culture. If you know otherwise, please provide a reference.

No, human culture is not chimpanzee culture, nor vice versa. The question isn't whether human culture should be placed into the same camp as the culture of some lesser animal species or another. The issue is one of whether humans are metaphysically divided from the rest of life, or, else, are a progressive aspect of life in general - this despite the massive punctuated-equilibrium leap which our species has undergone.

But it doesn't support panpsychism for the reason I gave. There is still a clear line to be drawn between the inorganic realm and the organic realm. Science also talks about that. — apokrisis

Other than via mischaracterization or willful strawmaning, panpsychism does not deny the (somewhat) clear line between the inorganic realm and the organic realm (unless we forget viruses, viroids, and prions - which are organic and replicate but are nonliving, or, at the very least, non-metabolizing).

Recall that, of itself, panpsychism "is a difference that makes no difference".

The "effete mind" quote is easy to misinterpret as one sentence picked out from a large corpus.

Peirce was clearly trying to move beyond Cartesian dualism in toto, not merely declare against materialism and for divine soul. His focus was on the semiotic relation between impersonal information and informed material being.

Either you critique that machinery - the thirdness of a modelling relation - or you are avoiding the point of his metaphysics. — apokrisis

I'd don't believe that I misinterpreted the notion of effete mind. Peirce, after all, was an objective idealist, not a materialist. And yes, the concept is vastly more complex than what can be conveyed by two words.

As to Peirce's point, agapeism was a part of it. Something your system appears to conveniently overlook.

Primacy itself is the problem here.

Whether you are an idealist or realist, theist or materialist, the problem with your scheme is the drive to declare one metaphysics right and its opposing metaphysics wrong. That is the faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind. — apokrisis

Misplaced words. The dichotomies offered are faulty. Plato, for instance, was a realist. Moreover, isn't it about truth and that which is real? As one example, if one rejects the notion that a first-person awareness can be reincarnated, is this not about one's belief in what is true? In what can and cannot be real? Or is this conclusion the "faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind"?

So that makes a hierarchy with a sharp division. The foundation is a brute material world of entropy flows and the structures and patterns that must produce. Then the further thing is the evolution of semiotic mechanisms - truly informational substrates like membranes, genes, neurons, words, numbers - to support a world of self-interestedly entropifying organisms. — apokrisis

How does that follow from the premise that the universe has been partly negentropic from the Big Bang get go? This being something you’ve previously stipulated in other threads.

Upholding a partly negentropic universe that is, and has always been, governed by teleological and formal principles is nothing short of a proposal for an Anima Mundi, i.e. for an animated cosmos with teleological strivings, this being a form of panpsychism. Only that, to the staunch materialist, this flavoring of “anima/psyche” can only be an object of ridicule. And this due to a deeply engrained materialistic dogma that needs to be safeguarded.

On the other hand, if there indeed is upheld a sharp division between the entropic and the negentropic, as you’ve here asserted, then how can a fully entropic system logically give rise to negentropy? The empirical fact that life (which is negentropic) emerged from nonlife (which you here specify as being sharply entropic) does not, in and of itself, provide a shred of explanation of how this could have come about.

Again, panpsychism is a theory that is "not even wrong" as whether it is the case or not, makes no difference. Panpsychists still explain atoms vs amoeba vs chimps vs humans in terms of genetic information, neural information and cultural information. — apokrisis

And so panpsychism is not something that, of itself, makes a difference. Granted. Notwithstanding, the primacy of awareness, from which the stance of panpsychim can be derived, does. A reading of C. S. Peirce's philosophy can illustrate how. With one example being that of the objective world being effete mind; another being the difference in where the cosmos is headed: a difference that is exceedingly substantial.

But I gather the primacy of awareness is a bit too theistic reeking for the materialistically minded. So, to avoid that slippery slope into monotheism or some such, it must be denied tout court.

A psychism limited to certain life forms. — Olivier5

Maybe this needs clarification: if primacy of awareness is true, and a universe that was once devoid of life-forms is also true ... then what other viable conclusion to reconcile these two truths?

But the categorical difference between our own and chimp/dolphin consciousness, is that human self-awareness has created a whole new form of Evolution : Culture. — Gnomon

Haven't read up on dolphins but, as a fun tidbit, chimpanzee cohorts have their own unique cultures (with a small "C").

For example: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2195890-unique-chimpanzee-cultures-are-disappearing-thanks-to-humans/

If one accepts both a) the primacy of awareness in one form of another, together will all that this entails (e.g., goal, and thereby telos, driven behaviors), this as an idealist would; and b) the logical necessity that life - and, thereby, the first-person awareness it can be deemed to necessitate - evolved from nonlife; what other conceivable, logically consistent inference could one arrive at other than that of panpsychism?

As you’ve alluded to, the “biggism” brand of panpsychism which bert1 refers to is a modern rebranding of the Stoic Anima Mundi. In such form of panpsychism, prior to the emergence of life in the cosmos, the cosmos would yet have been an animated given governed by Logos and its universal telos (the “universal end” the first quote in your post makes reference to). What awareness, or consciousness, or mind, or psyche/anima means in the context of a cosmos devoid of life is to me still a riddle. But, so far, the conclusion of panpsychism (in some variety or other) seems to me well enough justified - here claiming this as someone who upholds both (a) and (b) aforementioned.

I’m asking because I’ve gained the impression that you don’t find the panpsychism hypothesis appealing—while yet upholding both (a) and (b) as tenets.

I might be wrong in my presumptions regarding your outlook, however.

If my imaginations serve me right, when younger I once remembered a world of benevolent and wise Yahoos while reading Gulliver’s Travels.

Oh, wait, a faulty imagination: I got it backwards. It was a remembrance of the Houyhnhnms that gave me pause.

Yea, doesn't quite work.

Yea, false memories can occur. Whoop-de-do. So can illusions and hallucinations. What’s the big novelty here? How does one “know” that one isn’t suffering the same conundrum as that guy in the movie Beautiful Mind when seeing a stranger on the street? Confirmation? All those one confirms this with could be part of one’s hallucination as well. Too many doubts in search for infallible knowns, me thinks. One trusts till evidence indicates reason not to trust. And yes, this is coming from a die-hard fallibilist.

In essence, as a purely mental effort, we can't distinguish between imagination and memory. Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories or, what for me is the more implausible alternative, that memories are imaginations? — TheMadFool

Since I haven’t read anybody mention it yet, imaginations are willed at the time experienced, memories (be they false memories or not) are not willed at the time experienced. At most one wills to recall a memory, rather than having the memory enter one’s awareness on its own. But one never will’s the memory’s contents into psychological existence, else one knows oneself to be willfully imagining things.

[Un-willed imaginings that occur during awakened states, on the other hand, are often enough ascribed to various mental disorders - be these mild, transitive, and generally normal (like a brief hallucination of seeing an animal in a dark corner when it was just wind-blown leaves, which is still a hallucination) or, else, psychological conditions that can be more debilitating.]

In case one asks “how does one know what one wills and what one does not”: One knows this via immediate awareness of oneself as a first-person awareness that engages in volitions.

The problem is, it easily morphs into a form of fatalism and/or blame-placing. — Wayfarer

Yea, I acknowledge that. To my mind though, the same roundabout mind-games can occur with just about all other perspectives. Being or not being favored by God, as one example. Being or not being favored by natural selection as another. It doesn't seem to much matter what perspective is held, some will always find a way to use the given worldview for the purposes of fatalism and/or blame-placing; again, imo.

If you regard it as a regulative principle for action, rather than as a means of blaming or rationalising misfortune, I can't think of a more obvious moral principle than 'as you sow, so will you reap'. — Wayfarer

:up:

I’m probably gonna kick myself in the morning for asking this, still, why so harsh on the philosophical notion of karma?

I’m saying “philosophical notion” so as to differentiate the notion of karma from what, let’s say, ignorantly self-righteous folk seek to do with it: anything, any concept, can be corrupted by certain people, regardless of what the concept is, imo.

May @Wayfarer correct me to the extent that this is incorrect or incomplete: Karma at its root is the, what we westerners would call, natural law/principle of “action and consequence”. That’s all. No one is judging. Its just upheld that the action is the cause for the consequence as effect.

Since it applies to a non-materialist metaphysics, it can get complicated - especially since intentions are in themselves considered to be actions, hence causes, to consequences that result. Still, tmk, karma is basically the principle that for every act there is a consequent. Hence, to say that karma judges you is akin to saying that causation judges you, which to me is nonsense.

Just curious.

[...] The problem with this is it that it has no intellectual underpinnings [...] — Restitutor

It seems we have different metaphysical perspectives. That aside, do you find any way of avoiding some given that “just is”? To give example, historically three main candidates have been “matter/the-physical just is” (which leads to physicalism), “a creator deity of everything just is” (which leads to monotheistic creationism), and “being, when interpreted as the generalized notion of awareness—replete with correlates such those of truth and the good—just is” (which can lead, for example, to Neo-platonic notions of the “the One”).

I’m not asking for a metaphysical discussion of why one of these positions is more viable than the rest—although, in fairness, I believe I did present a somewhat mild logical argument against the viability of a creator deity.

What I’m asking is if you know of some way of avoiding the conundrum of there being some given that just is—and, therefore, some way of avoiding a given for which the principle of sufficient reason (by which givens gain their intellectual underpinnings) cannot apply?

Let me know what you think? — Restitutor

For me at least, the question can be posed in parallel to “what is truth in the context of atheism”.

For those who uphold an omnipotent creationist deity, this deity must logically be the creator of truth, and, hence, all instantiations of it. Otherwise, this specified deity isn’t omnipotent and is itself subservient to, a subject of, truth—which in this case is not of the deity’s creation.

The same issue can then be posed in relation to the good—without which all morality is meaningless: An omnipotent creationist deity is either the creator of the good, or the good is an uncreated aspect of the reality which all beings, including all deities (were they to occur), are embedded in.

I’ve addresses the parallel between truth and the good because they both seem to me to carry the same philosophical weight. If truth is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to any truth in so creating truth (be it of physical realities, of logical principles, or anything other)? Likewise, if good is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to doing what is good (for themselves or any other) in the creation of good?

As to morality being relative, I’d say that it is to a certain extent, varying from culture to culture, but that it is dependent upon the existential reality of the good which—though it may take many forms to many diverse beings—always remains unchanged in its property of being good. Just as truth remains unchanged despite its instantiations taking many different forms for many different beings.

While there are many different ways of addressing these two parallel issues of truth and the good, one such approach is then to uphold that both truth and the good simply are, this in the presence of beings—but are in no way the creation of any being. This presents, here loosely articulated, the uncreated and unchanging existential reality of both truth (thereby that which demarcates all instantiation of truth: all truths) and the good (thereby that upon which morals are dependent) within at least one possible atheistic framework—wherein no omniscient creator deity occurs.

Speaking of contradiction, note the following:

By the previous logic, cause and effect, being entirely distinct from one another, must therefore have entirely autonomous, separate existence already, prior to the confluence which is defined as “cause and effect” qua “cause and effect”.

[...]

The cause needs the effect to be defined as the cause; and the effect needs the cause to be defined as an effect.

But the effect cannot be a direct function of the cause without eliminating the distinction; and the cause cannot be given its absolute meaning and relevancy by the effect without likewise eliminating the distinction.

I fail to see any contradiction, contradictions as I understand them being "both X and not-X at the same time and in the same respect".

Cause and effect have a dyadic relation, so they do not occur independently/autonomously in respect to the other.

The same argument you've quoted in the OP (from whom, by the way) can, for instance, be made for "up" and "down": Up cannot occur without a down; down cannot occur without an up. The two can only have a dyadic relation. They do not occur independently/autonomously of the other - except in the faulty abstractions of some. That said, one does not conclude that up and down (and derivatives such as top and bottom) pose a contradiction, however.

Indeed–and in conclusion–the presence of relativity in object interactions precludes any actual (materially “existent”, for lack of a better term) cause and effect; yet it necessitates a conceptual cause and effect that the self-aware agent engages as a means to define and identify both what an object is, and how it is observed (i.e. its position relative to the observer at any given moment).

As to this idealist interpretation of things - with heavy emphasis on idealism not equating to sole-self-ism (this being an issue for a different thread) - I'll leave that open-ended on my part.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra

Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am. — TheMadFool

A disingenuous answer to the issue at hand. My point is that in the phrase "it is" the being (verb) addressed is not a doing: the specified "it" doesn't do the specified "is".

Your retort is to tell me the obvious about what the cogito translates into.

My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. — TheMadFool

No it is not. I agree that argument 2 is faulty.

Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. — TheMadFool

You've here gone off into abstractions regarding awareness rather than sticking to concrete instantiations of its first-person occurrence - with the latter including, for example, an immediate awareness of one's own emotive states of being (e.g., being happy/sad), this in addition to perceptions, sensations, and understandings.

Mind, however, is an abstraction whose occurrence can be doubted. Some eliminative materialists do so often enough.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra

Read above. — TheMadFool

Another disingenuous answer to the issue addressed.

You want to avoid the issue of awareness and stick to the "I think therefore I am" argument, go for it. As I stated in my first post on this thread, I too find Descartes' cogito to be possible to doubt in practice.

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further. — Pop

Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. I've disagreed with this on logical grounds in this recent thread.

So I disagree with your conclusion, instead agreeing with @Olivier5.

--Sextus Empiricus” — Darkneos

As in the truth to metaphysical and/or epistemological solipsism. Right. Deep questions that are best not cherry-picked.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being?

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb). — TheMadFool

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here.

What's really getting me worked up [...] — TheMadFool

If this conversation is getting you worked up, I'll stop partaking. Best not to get into even more worked up modes.

I'm still trying to understand the notion of panpsychism. Currently, to me, it seems to be a logical conclusion, though I can't make sense of it, not to my own satisfaction at least.

If you don't mind indulging me further, what of the distinction I alluded to in my reply to TMF?:

Thought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens.

Don't mean to badger. Only want to flesh out whether or not they are the same thing in you view.

OK. Thanks. Due to the plasticity of language, I'll agree that the terms' extension is debatable. Just to further this: Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? I'm asking out of a curiosity to see if so conferring would be deemed commonsense, or else counterfactual.

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought [...] — Pantagruel

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical.

:cool:

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. — TheMadFool

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing.

Secondly - and this is harder to address impersonally rather than from an experiential vantage, but I'll try - for "X to be aware" is for X to be in a state of being of awareness ... which entails that X is, i.e. holds the property of isness being, i.e. is a being (here, is a given that is).

I don't aware; I am aware.

Contrast this with the cogito. Here, the affirmation of "I think" is questioned due to lack of evidence that that which is done (the thought in question) pertains to a particular doer ("I"). Differently expressed, that that which is (the thought in question) is a product of some agency (the "I"); here, then, there can be the implicit issue of causality, as in X causes Y. It might have been Descartes demon that was doing (else causing) all the doubting that Descartes ascribed to his own agency, for one example.

However, (and correct me if I'm wrong about this) you've granted that "I am aware" is a sound experiential fact whenever the given "I" is aware. At this junction, X's awareness cannot logically occur in the absence of X; X must be in order for X to be aware. If Descartes was aware of all the given doubts he talked about - even if we get into weird doubts about telepathy on the part of the demon being the cause of this awareness, or some such - it remains the fact that a first-person awareness which addressed itself as Descartes was aware. Since this first-person awareness was aware, this first-person awareness was.

To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.

... Interesting to see where this goes.

but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but [,,,] — TheMadFool

Are you intending to infer a homonculus to first-person awareness? I'd strongly disagree with that. We don't infer that we are aware so as to conclude that we are aware; instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. And this regardless of us being entities, processes, both, or neither .... an ontological issue that can only be resolved (if at all possible to resolve) by inference and, hence, thoughts of which we are aware. No? (I'll check back in tomorrow.)

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought. — Pantagruel

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens?

- is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges could be not real. — TheMadFool

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such.

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking. — TheMadFool

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place?

I'll offer a suggestion: we are aware of our own thought, ergo we conclude that thought takes place. Now, one could play linguistic games with being an "aware-er" or else keep things in tune with commonsense expressions and just stipulate that we are aware beings. Here, epistemologically, our awareness of our thoughts takes precedence as a known over the thoughts in question of which we are aware.

The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place. — TheMadFool

Yup. As the cogito is most commonly understood - to regard thought but not awareness per se - it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs. As wiser folk than I have mentioned along with you:

One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking".[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"?

Realized after my post that I’m not a contributing member of the reading group, so I’ll back off the thread. Just wanted to clarify:

I wouldn’t agree that habit level processes are unconscious and thus that only attentional processing is conscious. — apokrisis

I wouldn’t agree with that either.

Does this mean that experience is not intentionally directed but emerges as an act of subconscious attentional focus? — magritte

It is more complicated. But as a general principle, yes. — apokrisis

If my memory serves me right, you used to talk of top-down process working in conjunction with bottom-up processes.

In your post you address, more or less, bottom-up process that result in what we experientially appraise to be voluntary behaviors that do not require cogitations on our part to accomplish. You’re sitting on a stool; you feel an impetus to drink a beer; then you voluntary ask the bartender for one; this without cogitations of whether or not you should drink a beer rather than a cola or a whiskey, nor with cogitations of which word choice to utilize in order to accomplish the feat of conveying what you want to the bartender (etc.). All good. A multitude of habitual behavior process kicking in. Given that our conscious awareness is not identical to our total mind’s awareness - which in laymen terms consists of both subconscious and unconscious awareness and cognitive activities, with neither the sub- nor unconscious mind (where differentiated) being the conscious awareness we as egos hold - it only makes sense that our non-conscious minds do a heck of a lot without any conscious input; and that this should be observable neurologically. (We, for one example, don't choose, intend, what to perceive; our non-conscious minds, in their interaction with our environment, are from where these percepts develop.)

Yet, when it comes to deliberation - wherein a choice is to be consciously taken between two or more alternatives (with these two or more alternatives themselves being products of the sub/unconscious mind) - the consciously aware ego can (or else cannot) hold top-down effects upon the substratum of its total mind and, therefore, upon the neurological correlates of the respective CNS.

I’m curious at this point. Are you now upholding that consciousness (as differentiated from the total mind within which it is embedded) cannot hold top-down effects upon the CNS via its consciously performed choices during times of conscious deliberation?

Concordantly, how are we to neurologically pinpoint such top-down effects by a consciousness when we can’t even neurologically pinpoint consciousness? … here alluding to the combination aspect of the binding problem.

This could all be part of what you meant by "it is more complicated". To me, at least, top-down process of consciousness - when they occur - do touch upon an important aspect of our cognition.

But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m familiar with both notions of solipsism, its just that I find a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept - much as I find metaphysical solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept.

1) Again, if there is uncertainty about being the sole self, and if uncertainty about X entails lack of knowledge about X, then how can such a position be logically labeled an “epistemological sole-self-ism”?

2) As to the egocentric predicament you mentioned, an “ego” experiences more than just perception, it also experiences its own volitional actions: e.g., to have your will as an ego thwarted can result in differing intensities of suffering, which is also an experiential given. Which comes back around to the logical contradiction of intending X and intending not-X at the same time and in the same respect as an ego … Something which we as egos never experience, but would nevertheless need to be a known truth either for a metaphysical solipsist (who affirms the ontological stance that only he/she occurs) or for an epistemological solipsist (who affirms that the only knowledge to be had is that he/she occurs, while also claiming that knowledge and what is ontic are, or at least can be, distinct).

3) Likewise, we’re here addressing knowledge, epistemology. And, while you make the case of you being infallible, you as of yet have not provided any notion of what you mean by the term “infallible” so as to differentiate it from what I understand by the term “infallible”.

What you previously said about time being a limited commodity, it applies to most of us. No hard feelings, but if the conversation we’re having in a thread labeled “logically impeccable” isn’t going to adhere to logic, I’d much rather utilize my own time differently.

OK. Take your time. Don't forget about this other question when you reply:

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds? — javra

Also, as I'm kind'a laughing my ass off about it:

That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. — javra

This sentence has two grammatical typos that I've corrected. Nevertheless, it's unintentional presentation speaks volumes as to a solipsists pov: self without other that is yet conversing with another that is its own self. My bad for the typos, but they're humorous in a way.

Forgive me for neglecting this bit, — Partinobodycular

Well, this is the bit that to me is nothing else be nonsensical equivocation.

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds?

As to the issue of infallibilism. I noticed that you ignored what I wrote about it:

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence. — javra

So I currently can't find meaning in this statement you gave:

But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. — Partinobodycular

Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way my mind can at least grasp what it is that your mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge.

Thank you for your reply. I do have difficulty with the notion of a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism. Your leading disagreement was with the definition of solipsism I provided, from which the rest of your arguments followed. Via the second wikipedia quote you specified:

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia

Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"?

As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition?

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence.

I'm in a little bit of hurry right now. Will try to get back tomorrow.