Summarizing that story, out of our fear of the other, — Antony Nickles

What or who is this "other"? Other minds (i.e. everyone else) or just those who are different to us (those with whom we identify)? I don't think that most of us have a fear of everyone else, so I assume you mean only those who are different to us?

philosophy created an intellectual problem of doubt about them — Antony Nickles

Philosophy created a problem about knowing whether other people have minds, not only about those who are different to us.

when the skeptic is right that there is no fact of the other (or ourselves) to know that will resolve our worries. — Antony Nickles

Is this the skeptic's claim?

But Wittgenstein sees that this truth is only because our relation to others (the mechanics of it, the grammar) is not through knowledge resolving our doubts about them, but that it is part of our situation as humans that we are separate, that our knowledge of the other is finite. But the implications of that are simply that the ordinary mechanics of our relation to others is not one of, here, knowing “their understanding”, but of accepting or rejecting them; that their otherness is at times a moral claim on us, to respond to them (or ignore them), to be someone for them. Thus “the urge to transcend the human”, in our ordinary lives, is to avoid exposing ourselves to the judgment of who we are in how we relate to others. In the case of understanding, by only wanting to treat what others say as information we simply need to get correct, rather than acknowledge their concerns and interests, and have ours be questioned. To put it that this is the “result of having language” is the picture of something like that what we say has a “meaning” that stands alone from who we will be judged to be in having said it, rather than it expressing us, allowing who we are to be read through it. — Antony Nickles

I consider it a massive stretch that Wittgenstein says any of this. This is reading a lot into the text that just isn't there. This is better attributed to Cavell than to Wittgenstein.

I think how I put this to Bano here might be a good start. — Antony Nickles

We actually are scared of the ever-present truth of our human condition: that we are separate, that there is no guarantee that we will work out our differences, or that our criteria will always be sufficient, or that we won’t be wrong even after working to (pre)determine what is right, that we might still be guilty (or lost) after following all the rules, etc. — Antony Nickles

I don't believe Wittgenstein gives any indication that Cavell's so-called "skepticism" or "need for certainty" is an "ever-present truth of our human condition". I might be inclined to agree that it has been an historical philosophical problem. However, Wittgenstein is explicit that his philosophical approach solves particular philosophical problems, not an "ever present truth of our human condition".

109. [...] All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light — that is to say, its purpose — from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized — despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.

123. A philosophical problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about.”

133. We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. — Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. —– Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. — Wittgenstein, PI

This just seems very different to what Cavell reads into it.

I read through Minar's paper. Here are my first impressions:

Cavell cannot see that “Wittgenstein’s certainty logically dismisses scepticism.”(Ibid.) Now, nostalgia for metaphysics is supposed to be the desire to transcend the human. Cavell is trying to place that yearning in the weave of our lives, not indulging it. Disappointment with criteria is a function of how criteria do work, their dependence, in particular, on our attunement in judgments and agreement in form of life. It does not, then, feed an “ineluctable skepticism”, as though Cavell agrees with some skeptical conclusion about the failures of certainty. That is, 1) Cavell explicitly does not accept the thesis of skepticism, that we do not know the world or other minds with certainty. Our relation to the world is not one of knowing. The truth of skepticism is not the expression of “dissatisfaction with knowledge” from some metaphysical height; rather, it points to a feature of our condition of which, presumably, the urge to transcend the human is an expression. To go further, 2) “if the fact that we share, or have established, criteria is the condition under which we can think and communicate in language, then skepticism is a natural possibility of that condition; it reveals most perfectly the standing threat to thought and communication, that they are only human, nothing more than natural to us.”(CR, 47) — Minar's paper

There seems to be tension between 1) and 2) here.

According to 1), Cavell does not accept "the thesis of skepticism, that we do not know the world or other minds with certainty". However, according to 2), Cavell also considers skepticism to be "a natural possibility" which results from "the fact that we share, or have established, criteria [which] is the condition under which we can think and communicate in language". In other words, skepticism is a natural possibility which results from our having language.

How can Cavell reject the thesis of skepticism - that we do not know the world or other minds with certainty - while also claiming that skepticism is a natural possibility which results from having language?

The reason Cavell can reject 1) and accept 2), it seems, is because he rejects the meaning of "skepticism" given in 1). In 2), the "truth of skepticism" is not a metaphysical dissatisfaction with knowledge, but is instead an expression of "the urge to transcend the human".

But how exactly are these different? What does the "expression of the urge to transcend the human" amount to if it is not a "metaphysical dissatisfaction with knowledge"?

Criteria bring out that the thesis of skepticism – which starts life as a claim about our intellectual or epistemological limitations – transmutes into the truth, which is (again) that “our relation to the world is not one of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain. So it is also true that we do not fail to know such things.” (CR, 45) — Minar's paper

What does this have to do with skepticism? Since Cavell changes (or "transmutes") the meaning of the word, then we are no longer talking about metaphysical skepticism.

4.2 Disappointment with criteria
The connection with Wittgenstein here is all but explicit:
If I am to have a native tongue, I have to accept what "my elders" say and do as consequential; and they have to accept, even have to applaud, what I say and do as what they say and do. We do not know in advance what the content of our mutual acceptance is, how far we may be in agreement. I do not know in advance how deep my agreement with myself is, how far responsibility for the language may run. — Minar's paper

What does "agreement with myself" mean?

Here Rhees underscores the importance of the kind of openness – openness that in some sense “threatens the possibility of understanding altogether”(Rhees, 13) – that I have suggested he associates with skepticism: “If language really were a technique, then…. there would be no connexion between philosophy and scepticism. You should not understand what was meant by the notion of the distrust of understanding.” — Minar's paper

I take the argument here to be that if language were a technique then there should be perfect understanding and no room for scepticism or doubt. Therefore, we should not understand what "scepticism" (or the notion of the distrust of understanding) even means. But this does not follow. If language is a technique then we should perfectly understand what the word "scepticism" means, and be able to use it sensibly, even if there is none.

[delete]

Not propositional, but still conceptual.
— Luke

Does Hacker discuss Wittgenstein on what might be called conceptual seeing - seeing as, seeing aspects, seeing connections? — Fooloso4

I wasn’t talking about Hacker here. You said:

There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4

I’m saying that those aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are not propositional but still conceptual. This is even evident in some of the sections you quoted, e.g. “A conceptual investigation”.

@RussellA @schopenhauer1 @Paine @Fooloso4 @Banno @Antony Nickles

I heard this lecture as a podcast yesterday.



I think it gives a good basic understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Some of the earlier posters in the discussion who expressed skepticism towards W's philosophy might find some value in it. It might also help to answer @Banno's earlier question succinctly, when he asked:

The question in hand here is, what happens with the picture theory as Wittgenstein moves on to the Investigations?

Who can give a simple, direct answer to that? — Banno

At around 13:00, the video states that in his later work, instead of treating language as a picture, [Wittgenstein] wants to treat language as a game.

I'm not sure if this tells us what happened to the picture theory, but it is at least a succinct account of Wittgenstein's different approach in his later work.

This might be a good place to start. What quickly becomes evident is that his interpretation of Wittgenstein is grounded on the problems and analysis of propositions, as can be seen in such claims as:

It [philosophy] is concerned with plotting the bounds of sense.

(43)

What philosophy describes are the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, presupposition, point and purpose, role and function among propositions in which a
given problematic expression occurs. Philosophy describes the uses of expressions in our language for the purpose of resolving or dissolving conceptual entanglements.

(45) — Fooloso4

I don't find evidence in the linked paper that Hacker limits his interpretation of Wittgenstein to propositions. His interpretation might be grounded on the problems and analysis of language, more generally, or of concepts, but I don't believe he limits it to propositions. This would be consistent with passages such as:

Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. (PI 109)

What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116)

119. The results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language.

The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life — that is the philosophical problem. (PI 125) — Wittgenstein PI

There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4

Not propositional, but still conceptual. I read those passages as relevant to his remarks on private language. Regarding their conceptual nature, consider PPF 160, 183, 191, 221, 222.

It is here that we can see continuity between the Tractatus and his later work. It is also here that the limits of Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein can be seen. — Fooloso4

I agree insofar as any putatitve non-conceptual parts of our private experience must be passed over in silence.

Is there an inexpensive way to see the writing upon a larger scale? — Paine

I don't know, sorry.

For anyone interested, this is PMS Hacker's exegesis of PI 389:

1. W. concludes this part of the discussion by pin‐pointing one deep aspect of the illusions that beset us here. We think of our mental images as pictures which only we can see, in fact as ‘super‐pictures’ which cannot be misinterpreted. For an ordinary picture, though it is a picture of X, may look like (and be wrongly taken to be) a picture of Y. But it is essential to a mental image of X that it is of X and nothing else. So it comes to seem like a super‐likness. Yet this is confused, for that the mental image of X is an image of X is not determined by its likeness to X. We are prone to think that it is a picture which needs no interpretation, so closely does it resemble what it is a picture of. It is true that it needs no interpretation and also that it makes no sense to suppose that I might be mistaken in my characterization of my mental image. But that is not because it looks more like its object than any picture. It is rather that it neither looks like nor fails to look like its object. It is not a picture at all. How does one know that one’s image is of X and not Y (which looks like X)? One does not know, nor can one be mistaken. One says so, without grounds, as one says what one means or what one thinks.

2. The relation between an image and what it is an image of is comparable not to the relation between a portrait and its subject (where the portrait may resemble someone or something else), but to the relation between an expectation and what fulfils it (BB 36), a thought (or proposition) and what makes it true (PG 161), or a possibility and what it is a possibility of (PI §194). It is not an image of X in virtue of a method of projection or in virtue of a similarity, let alone a ‘super‐likeness’. (Cf. LA 67.) — PMS Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations), Part 2: Exegesis, Section 243-427

My mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be an image of the Eiffel Tower. — Fooloso4

Of course your mental image could be of anything and is not restricted to being an image of the Eiffel Tower.

However, in order to rightly be called a “mental image of the Eiffel Tower”, then it must be an image of the Eiffel Tower. You are saying that your mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be a mental image of the Eiffel Tower, which is contradictory.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly
— Luke

You seem to have lost track of the argument. It is not required. The question is whether the mental image must of the Eiffel Tower and nothing else. — Fooloso4

My point was about use of the the name. There are no names mentioned in sentence 3 if PI 389. Sentence 3 can be true and yet still play no part in the determination of linguistic meaning. Mental images are similar to pains in this respect: they enter into our language games only via their outward expression/behaviours.

Why would you think I am suggesting that when I said the opposite? — Fooloso4

You did not say the opposite.

What object is being referred to at PI 389?
— Luke

According to the interlocutor (and you(?)), whatever object the mental image is of is what the object is. — Fooloso4

Considering that Sentence 3 does not involve the use of any names, yes. The mental image cannot be correctly associated with any object without the use of language. As we have noted, one might think that some landmark has a different name than it actually does, but there can be no errors or corrections without the use of names.

If M is the mental image then M is not the image of M. — Fooloso4

Right, but it’s difficult to distinguish a mental image from its content.

Another way to describe Sentence 3 could be:

It is an intrinsic feature of a mental image (M) that it has this content (C) which represents this object (O) and nothing else. To be true, (C) and (O) must be the same, or (C) can only represent (O). In order for that to be true, the object must be identical to whatever the content of the mental image is. You can’t say that some object is not identical to (C) because no object is named at Sentence 3.

How is the correction between the mental image and the object to be made? In the example of the Eiffel Tower I need to become aware that the mental image I have is the image of something else. Pointing to the object my mental image is an image of I might say: "See, this is the Eiffel Tower and my mental image looks just like it". — Fooloso4

Are you correcting yourself? If such a "correction" cannot be verified by others, then how can we be sure that it is a correction? You might tell me that your mental image looks just like the Eiffel Tower, but I have no way of verifying it. For example, it is possible that you are still in error (e.g. you are again not standing before the Eiffel Tower). Or, the Eiffel Tower may be slightly different to how you imagined it, but you say it's exactly how you imagined it.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly, or that having a particular mental image is required in order to pick out the Eiffel Tower? Consider PI 151 and the different ways that the pupil may be able to continue the series of numbers. The correct result can be produced via various different associated mental images or thought processes; or there may be no thought process associated at all.

Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem. — Fooloso4

You seem to be suggesting that you can "correct the problem" by comparing your mental image to (what you correctly think is) the Eiffel Tower. But this can't be done without (also) knowing that the name of the landmark is the "Eiffel Tower".

You said earlier that:

The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up... — Fooloso4

I don't believe that you can "correct the problem" without using any names and only by comparing your mental image to the (unnamed) landmark before you. However, we can dispense with mental images here and speak only of (the name of) the landmark, and whether or not you correctly used the name.

In the example of the Eiffel Tower there is, but at PI 389 there is no confusion as to what object is being referred to, and so, no need to name it. — Fooloso4

What object is being referred to at PI 389? PI 389 makes only general statements regarding pictures and mental images and does not refer to any specific object.

Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object.
— Luke

It is not an intrinsic feature of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower that it is the image of "this" (the Eiffel Tower) and of nothing else. — Fooloso4

Sentence 3 of PI 389 does not mention the Eiffel Tower. It is a general statement about any mental image. It is not a statement about a particular mental image. "It is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that..." To use a particular example, if the mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, then it is the image of the Eiffel Tower and of nothing else. And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else.

The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up, but that the mental image I have is actually an image of something else, the Arc de Triomphe. — Fooloso4

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct mental image to the object?

"This" refers to some object. At PI 389 there is only one object. There is no need to name it. — Fooloso4

If the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, then there is a need to name the object. If the object is not named, then one can stand in front of the Arc de Triomphe and think it's the Eiffel Tower and yet sentence 3 still remains true: it is an intrinsic feature of their mental image that it is an image of this (stone arch, in this case) and of nothing else. Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object.

Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object.
— Luke

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. If I am told that this object I am standing in front of is the Eiffel Tower then I can see that my mental image was not what I thought it was. What I was picturing was not the Eiffel Tower. — Fooloso4

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object.

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else.

Your example shows why this is not true. — Fooloso4

Sentence 3 does not mention any names. Sentence 3 only makes an ostensive reference to this.

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower,
— Luke

Do you mean that when they see the Eiffel Tower they are actually seeing a mental image of the Eiffel Tower? — Fooloso4

No.

And they would be mistaken. It is not the Eiffel Tower. The mistake can be corrected when the two objects are correctly identified. — Fooloso4

You said earlier: "The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them".

The point of my last post was that this is not the case: they can be standing in front of the Arc de Triomphe having a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe and yet still think that it's the Eiffel Tower. Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object.

The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them. Before seeing them the mental image of the Eiffel Tower is a stone arch. — Fooloso4

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, and when they stand before the Arc de Triomphe their mental image is of the Arc de Triomphe. If they visit the stone arch they might think "Wow, so this is the Eiffel Tower". And if they visit they Eiffel Tower, they might think "This impressive monument seems familiar."

They've compared the mental images to the objects in front of them but may still be none the wiser. So why do you say "the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them"?

The mental object and mental image are the same thing.

But you said that the mental image is not of the object?
— Luke

It is not of the object if:

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower
— Luke — Fooloso4

You said earlier that:

The mental image is not of the object.... — Fooloso4

Now you have made the qualification that the mental image is of the object except where the mental image is not of the object, or when the mental image does not represent the object, or when the person has made a mistake.

What does it mean to say that the mental image does not represent the object?

If I am looking at an object and aware of it before me, then isn't my mental image of that object? If so, then the mistake is not a mismatch between my mental image and the object in front of me. So, what is the nature of the mistake?

They can make the comparison. We can't. If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake. — Fooloso4

Again (assuming normal mental functioning), there will not be any mismatch between their mental image and the object they see in front of them, so what is the mistake?

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness?
— Luke

It shows that the mental image need not be more like the object than a physical picture. — Fooloso4

Was a comparison able to be made between the mental image and the Eiffel Tower? Or how was the mistake discovered?

The mental image is not of the object before your mind. The mental object is the object before your mind. The mental object is an image of the same object that the picture is. The claim is that the mental image is more like this object than the physical picture is. — Fooloso4

I find the introduction of "mental object" confusing.

Let's say I imagine a teapot. Are you saying the mental object is a teapot but that my mental image is not of a teapot? But surely it is.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object.
— Luke

Of course it is! Both the mental image and the physical image are images of the same object. — Fooloso4

But you said that the mental image is not of the object?

The interlocutor is claiming that the mental image is more like that object than the physical image is. — Fooloso4

How do you demonstrate that it isn't? You can't see their mental image. No comparison can be made between their mental image and the object that their mental image is of.

The same can be said of a mental picture. I might think my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower when it id actually a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe. — Fooloso4

I don't see how this relates to the idea of a superlikeness, or to sentence 3 in particular. If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness?

On my reading, I think that my mental image is of this (imagined or real) object before my mind and of nothing else. I cannot possibly mistake the content of this mental image, as I am seeing or imagining it now, for anything else. That's why I make the erroneous inference that my mental image is a better representation than any physical picture, because unlike a mental picture, a physical picture is open to (mis)interpretation.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object. The mental image cannot be compared to the object for likeness or resemblance, and so the mental image cannot be said to "look like" or to resemble the object.

This is why the comparison between a mental image and a physical image is misguided. — Fooloso4

I don't see that as being the point of PI 389.

In the case of 2 the image "I make" may be seen by others as a picture of something else. In the case of 3 no such ambiguity arises because no one else can see the image. If they could, the same ambiguity might arise. The mental image is not a superlikeness. — Fooloso4

How does the conclusion follow?

If I draw a picture or take a photograph of X, it is not a picture of anything else. Whether someone thinks it is a picture of something else makes no difference. It is a picture of X. — Fooloso4

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of the Arc de Triomphe. You might think you've drawn a picture of Kanye West but everyone else says it looks just like Adam Sandler. Likewise:

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it. — Fooloso4

OC 13: "...from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it."

A second person in involved in 2 but no one else can be involved in my mental image. If 2 and 3 are to be compared on an equal bases then a second person should not enter into the comparison. — Fooloso4

Are these remarks intended to support a rejection of sentence 3? If so, how?

If you want to compare 2 and 3 "on an equal basis" then, in order to remain faithful to the rest of the text, this should be done from a public perspective, not from a private one.

From a public perspective, and in accordance with my argument above, this would make sentence 2 true:

For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else. — PI 389, sentence 2

If you were satisfied (or if you "knew") that the picture represented what it was supposed to represent, and if it were only up to you to decide what the picture was supposed to represent, then it would not be possible for the picture to be "of something else". But it isn't only up to you, and others may interpret it as something other than what it is "supposed to represent".

Regardless, I don't see why sentences 2 and 3 should be compared "on an equal basis". You seem to read sentence 2 as being from the private perspective and sentence 3 as being from the public perspective, whereas I take the opposite view. I read sentence 2 as being from the public perspective and sentence 3 as being from the private perspective:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else. — PI 389, sentence 3

Only I can see that my mental image is the image of this and of nothing else. From the public perspective, as you note, the mental image cannot be seen. How can sentence 3 make any sense from the public perspective where a mental image cannot be seen by anyone?

Why do you say W rejects it?
— Luke

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it.

b) My mental image of X is an image of X.

What is the difference between a and b with regard to being an image of X? — Fooloso4

The difference, I suppose, is that one image is mental and the other is physical? I can see how your "a)" contradicts or rejects sentence 2, but how does your "b)" contradict or reject sentence 3?

In the first case, the picture I draw of X may look to you like something else — Fooloso4

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it?

in the second, it cannot look to you like something else because you cannot see it. — Fooloso4

Cannot see what?—Something else? That would make sentence 3 true. Why do you say W rejects it?

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3
— Fooloso4 — Luke


As I have said, the three claims are part of the same argument. You can separate them as part of an analysis but you need to put them back together.

The claim at three is that it is an image of this. "This" is the object it is an image of. We cannot ignore the question of resemblance. — Fooloso4

In order for your assertion to be true, the point of PI 389 must be to reject claims 1, 2 and 3. If it can be shown that W does not reject one of these sentences, then your assertion that "the point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1-3" is false.

Also, as I said earlier, I disagree that he rejects sentences 2 or 3.

If I remember correctly, this discussion began with PI 389 and you have returned to it more than once. PI 389 is about the likeness of mental image vs a picture to an object. — Fooloso4

Yes, although we disagree over our reading of the third sentence of PI 389 in particular.

When you say a mental image of X, X is the object that a mental image is an image of. When you say a mental image of ... there is something that it is an image of. — Fooloso4

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3 — Fooloso4

I am interested in why you think the interlocutor might endorse sentence 3 of PI 389, viz.:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing else. — PI 389, sentence 3

If the correct reading is that "X is the object that a mental image is an image of", then you and the interlocutor both appear to consider sentence 3 as true. So why do you view W as rejecting claim 3?

Also, if we accept that "X is the object that a mental image is an image of", it could follow from sentence 3 that "it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of [object X] and of nothing else." That is, it is an intrinsic feature of one's mental image that it can only ever be of X (where "X" refers to this particular object), and of no other object. But I can't imagine that anyone would hold such an absurd belief which limits all of their possible mental images to only one object, or why W would want to refute such an absurd view.

When you gave the example of mistaking a hat for a sandwich both a hat and a sandwich are objects. — Fooloso4

I never gave that example; you did.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture
— Luke

Have I made that argument? — Fooloso4

You have made that argument:

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. — Fooloso4

My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture, because whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind".
— Luke

I can't follow this argument. — Fooloso4

Apologies, I wasn't very clear. I was not making any reference to PI 389 with this comment. I was arguing against your claim that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture due to the fact that:

One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. — Fooloso4

My argument was that the phrases "mental image" and "picture before the mind" are synonymous. Therefore, if I have this mental image, called image X, then I must also have this mental picture, called picture X (because these terms are synonymous). My argument was that if I had another mental image instead of image X, say image Y, then it would be no different if we were talking about a physical picture instead of a mental picture/image. I could equally have another physical picture instead of picture X, say picture Y.

Their relative stability or change relates only to whether they are mental or physical, but is not relevant to whether they are both pictures, or to whether the word "picture" is being used differently in each case.

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that? — Luke

You draw or describe your mental image and what you draw or describe looks like or sounds like a sandwich. Based on this representation of your mental image they will tell you that you are mistaken, it is not a hat its a sandwich. You might protest and say "I know it's a hat because its my mental image of a hat". If you are then asked to get a hat and put it on will you put a sandwich on your head? — Fooloso4

What you describe is not a verification of his mental image, but a verification of his description or drawing of his mental image. This is not about verifying his mental image, but about his correct or incorrect use of words such as "hat" or "sandwich".

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?
— Fooloso4

Yes.
— Luke

Isn't that because a mental picture is not a physical picture? — Fooloso4

Of course a mental picture is not a physical picture. Neither is a physical horse an imaginary horse, but that doesn't mean that the word "horse" has a different meaning in each case.

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich
— Luke

Oliver Sacks' The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat might be of interest. — Fooloso4

Except that you changed your original statement from 'if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y' to 'if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a Y'.

You keep wanting to change the discussion to talk about resemblance to an object, but that's not what I'm talking about. I don't know what you meant when you said in your last post: "What follows from this tautology? We covered that pages ago."

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture because a mental picture might change whereas a physical picture remains relatively stable. I responded that a mental image of X is equivalent to a picture ("before the mind") of X (because the terms "mental image" and "picture before the mind" are synonymous). It might have been clearer if I had said instead - and what I meant was - that mental image 'X' is equivalent to mental picture ("before the mind") 'X'. Whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind". There is no question of resemblance to some object here; we are simply naming an image, or different images. My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture. W's use of "picture" does not change when he talks about a mental picture or a physical picture, because if it was mental picture 'Y' instead of mental picture 'X', then this would be no different than if it was physical picture 'Y' instead of physical picture 'X'. Therefore, saying that your mental image might change is not an argument for a different meaning of "picture" between mental and physical pictures.

I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made.
— Luke

If this person tried to eat a hat and we asked him why, we would know a mistake had been made. — Fooloso4

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that?

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture? — Fooloso4

Yes.

If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich?
— Luke

I don't know. I would say that that this raises a problem. Wouldn't we say that if someone's mental image of a hat was a sandwich she would be mistaken? — Fooloso4

You said that if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y.

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich, or even for a picture of a sandwich. I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made.

It might change in various ways. Some features may become more prominent. Something left out or added. I think it might help to think of this in terms of memory. Our memory of things change. — Fooloso4

Maybe. Who’s to say? Can you give a specific example of how your mental picture of Zeus might have changed? What exactly has changed?

If I say: "I was this picture" you might think I mean movie or photo or painting but would it cross your mind that I meant a mental image? — Fooloso4

No, I wouldn’t think you meant a mental image. That’s why W qualifies the use of “picture” when referring to a mental image with the “picture before one’s mind” or something similar. Otherwise, he does not use “picture” and speaks only of a “mental image” instead. I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image. Instead, he clearly distinguishes between a picture and a mental image. Otherwise, he speaks of a picture or description as being the content of a mental image.

If the mental image is of Y instead of X, then the picture before one's mind must be of Y.
— Luke

If I mistake X for Y my mental image of X is a picture of Y. — Fooloso4

My position is that W is using “picture” (as a noun) with a consistent meaning throughout the text.

As I said earlier, I acknowledge that, in the early passages you cited, W is using “mental image” synonymously with “picture before one’s mind”. Therefore, if a mental image is of X, then the picture before one’s mind must also be of X, only because “mental image” means the same as “picture before one’s mind”.

This is tautological and has nothing to do with a correspondence or resemblance to some object.

Anyhow, I don’t see that what you say follows. If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich? If your mental image is of X then the picture before your mind is of nothing but X.

Yes, but even though it changes, my mental picture of Zeus is still my mental picture of Zeus. — Fooloso4

How has it changed?

No. The word is used in various ways. If you ask me to show you the picture in one case I can but in other I can't. If I remember correctly this was why you were reluctant to call the mental picture a picture. — Fooloso4

Yes, we can distinguish between a mental image (picture before the mind) and a physical picture, but how is the word “picture” being used differently here?

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it.
— Fooloso4

It is neither a picture of a mental picture nor a description of a mental description.
— Luke

Have you changed your mind? In the prior post you asked:

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)?
— Luke

Was your answer no they cannot be made public? — Fooloso4

I clarified earlier that I had made some concessions to your reading. However, this is consistent with my reading that mental and physical pictures can both have the same content and that “picture” has the same meaning in either case, except for the difference given by the distinction that one is physical and one is mental. But that’s why W qualifies the latter with “picture before the mind”.

They are the same only is so far as they are pictures of the same thing. My mental picture of you may be very different than a photo or portrait of you. If I see that picture I might say: "You are much more handsome than I pictured". — Fooloso4

I don’t disagree that “picture” when used as a verb (e.g. to picture) has a different meaning to “picture” when used as a noun (e.g. a picture). If that’s the extent of our disagreement then we can leave it there. But none of the passages we have been discussing or have quoted uses “picture” as a verb.

The mental picture may or may not stay relatively stable, but there is nothing to compare it to in order to determine that. One's memory of it may be more or less reliable. — Fooloso4

In order for you to read Wittgenstein as saying that a mental image is a picture before one's mind at PI 6, PI 37 and PI 73, you must acknowledge that it can be a picture of X (before one's mind) only while it is a mental image of X. If the mental image is of Y instead of X, then the picture before one's mind must be of Y. If a mental picture changes, then it's a different picture compared to the original picture. Therefore, I don't follow your argument of relative stability with its implication that the (single) picture is potentially changing. The mental image is the picture before the mind at a given time, whatever its content may be.

Therefore, I don't see why you would assume that it's the same picture at time 2 which has changed since time 1, instead of saying that they are just two different pictures. Furthermore, how can you compare the two mental images at different times? And doesn't your argument - that the memory of mental images is unreliable - make this impossible comparison between mental images even more difficult?

The sketch or description is not the mental picture. It is a representation of it. — Fooloso4

It is neither a picture of a mental picture nor a description of a mental description.

The distinction made is between an image in the mind and a physical image. But a mental image and a physical image are are both pictures. — Fooloso4

Doesn't this imply that the meaning of "picture" is the same in both cases? Granted, one picture is mental and the other is physical. But this singular meaning of "picture" may be why we can say they both have the same content. Apart from the mental/physical distinction - which you maintain here - is there any other significant difference in the meaning of the word "picture"?

Wittgenstein may use "picture before the mind" (or a minor variant) as a synonym for a mental image at PI 6, PI 37 and PI 73, but he does not use "picture" (alone) as a synonym for a mental image.

I note that Wittgenstein is using these examples to undermine the (then) common view that such mental images are necessary to the meaning of a word.
— Luke

Was that in dispute in our discussion? — Fooloso4

I wanted to draw attention to the fact that he introduces the notion of a "picture before the mind" only to later reject it as a source of meaning or the source of a rule. I think this is important to the reading of PI 280 and PI 389, which are both still related to the private language argument on my reading.

If a mental picture and physical picture have the same content, then what is the point of PI 389 on your view? Is the point simply that it's wrong to assume mental pictures and physical pictures don't have the same content?

Do you think people often make the false assumption that an intrinsic feature of a mental image is that it's more like its object than a picture is? Do you consider this false assumption to be unrelated to the private language argument and of no philosophical interest?

PI 6. a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word.

PI 37. hearing a name calls before our mind the picture of what is named

PI 73. I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind — Fooloso4

I acknowledge that Wittgenstien uses the phrase "a picture (of X) before/in one's mind" synonymously with a mental image here.

However, when I asked you earlier to explain the two different uses of "picture" you were reading into the text, you responded:

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4

How do these "pictures before the mind" in the early passages you cite meet your criteria of a mental picture, viz.:

• cannot be made public;
• is relatively unstable and changing

Can these mental pictures not be made public (e.g. via a sketch or description)? Do they change immediately upon hearing the word/name? I imagine that the picture must at least remain stable enough for it to come before a person's mind when they hear the word/name or while they are having the idea of the shape of a leaf.

I note that Wittgenstein is using these examples to undermine the (then) common view that such mental images are necessary to the meaning of a word.

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between pictures (or descriptions) and mental images in the later passages we have been discussing, especially at PI 389, PI 280, etc.

Perhaps we can agree that their content is the same while maintaining this distinction between them, as I believe he does at PPF 10?

Here is Hacker's reading of PI 280:

A final analogy to illuminate the misguided supposition of predicates of perceptual qualities (e.g. ‘red’) having a double meaning (cf. §273). A theatrical or cinema director may sketch on paper roughly (etwa) how he imagines a scene. On the model of §273 it might seem that such a picture has two distinct representative functions. For others it represents the scene they are to create as the person envisages it. It tells them how he imagines the scene. But for him it represents his mental image of the scene which only he knows (since only he has it). Indeed, his visual impression of the picture he has painted tells him what he has imagined in a way in which, for others, it cannot. For in his case, his visual impression of what he has painted must surely coincide with the mental image he had when he imagined the scene.

This is a muddle. To paint what I imagine is not to copy a picture that is already ‘painted’ in my imagination (although I can, of course, imagine painting something, and then go on to paint what I imagined painting). The director’s sketch does indeed represent how he imagines the scene; i.e. to the question ‘How do you think it should look?’ he might produce the sketch and say ‘Like that’. This is what is called ‘representing what I imagined it should look like’. But it is erroneous to think that the picture represents to him what he imagined in any different sense, for it does not represent it in virtue of resembling his mental image, any more than the verbal expression of what he thought resembles his thought. It informs others how he imagined things should look, but it does not inform him! What makes the picture a good representation of what he imagined? Not its likeness to his mental image, but rather his avowed acknowledgement that that was what he had in mind. But that acknowledgement does not rest on an ‘inner glance’ at his mental image. ‘The image is not a picture, nor is the visual impression one. Neither “image” nor “impression” is the concept of a picture, although in both cases there is a tie‐up with a picture, and a different one in either case’ (Z §638). Hence it is a mistake to think that when I paint a picture to show you how I imagine a scene, the picture is a piece of information or a representation for me. It is an articulation or expression of how I imagine the scene, not an ‘outer’ picture of an ‘inner’ picture. Moreover, an impression of a picture is not a representation of a picture (cf. PI §366).

Similarly, although hearing the word ‘red’ may call forth a mental image of red (or of a field of poppies or a sunset), the answer to the question ‘What do you mean by “red”?’ is given by pointing to a sample. And if I ask myself ‘What do I mean by “red”?’, the answer is no different. — PMS Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations), Part 2: Exegesis, Section 243-427

The don't access my mental image. Their brain creates their own mental image in response to perceiving my picture. — wonderer1

Right but your mental image is not a picture, because others cannot access your mental image like they can access a picture. Your mental image does not inform others like a picture can. This is why a mental image does not even approximately inform others.

This might be clearer once you have read through the PI.

How does your mental image inform others of anything?
— Luke

By stimulating the other to develop their own mental image which is approximate to mine. — wonderer1

But how do others access your mental image?

Because he contrasts the mental picture to the picture. — Fooloso4

He contrasts the picture to the mental image. He does not call it a mental picture.

Wittgenstein poses the question: What is the content of the experience of imagining? And answer it:
The answer is a picture, or a description.

He is not asking about how that picture can be represented or communicated. — Fooloso4

His question is about the content of the experience of imagining. If his question was about the experience of imagining and he answered that the experience was a picture or a description then I would agree with you. Do you deny that a mental image and a (physical) picture can have the same content? If not, then there is no reason to assume that his answer is or must be a mental picture or description.

How can I tell? I can't compare them unless two conditions are met: 1) I could call up the mental picture and 2) that it will remain unchanged each time I call it to mind. I do not think those conditions can be met. — Fooloso4

You don’t think that a mental image and a (physical) picture can have the same content? Then the set stage painter cannot paint a picture which shows how he imagined the stage set.

This:

it informs others, as pictures or words do
— Luke

and this:

has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do
— PI 280

are not the same. He does not reject the former but does reject the latter. It informs those who build the set. — Fooloso4

Yes, I agree. He rejects that the painting (i.e. a picture) has another function besides informing others of how the painter imagines the stage set. Unlike a picture or words, one’s mental image (alone) cannot inform others. Therefore one’s mental image is neither a picture nor words, although its content may be that of a picture or words.

Why not approximately inform others? — wonderer1

How does your mental image inform others of anything?

I guess I wouldn't expect a painting to be anything other than an approximation of the painter's mental image. — wonderer1

Why only an approximation? In PI 280 is it a painting of the painter’s mental image or of the stage set or of both?

I would expect that in painting the picture he'd likely recognize inaccuracies to the way the painting represents the mental image and recognize that the painting is not the mental image. — wonderer1

I don’t disagree, but I think it’s a mistake to call the mental image a picture. The mental image is not a representation and it cannot inform others.

The picture or description is what is imagined. — Fooloso4

Thanks for clarifying. Is this also how he is using “picture” at PI 389? If not, how can you tell? And how can you tell he means a mental picture or description at PPF 10?

The former, but to answer the question I could draw a picture or describe that content. — Fooloso4

So it is possible for the content of the physical picture/description to match the content of the mental picture/description?

Suppose I draw a picture of or describe a picture I saw at an art show. Is that picture or description of what I saw the same as what I saw, that is, the picture? My picture might embellish or omit certain things. It is still a picture of this, that is, the picture I saw at an art show, but the pictures will not be the same. — Fooloso4

It’s not a question of whether the content of your physical picture/description matches reality; it’s a question of whether the content of your physical picture/description matches your mental picture/description.

What PI 280 rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined ... — Fooloso4

Yes, and what he also rejects is that (my emphasis):

This picture [that he painted in order to show how he imagined the stage set] has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others. — PI 280

This is not saying that he doesn’t need to paint the picture in order to know what he imagined. This is saying that the picture does not serve a double function for the set painter, because it is not both a picture of the stage set as well as a picture of his mental image. It is not “for him…the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else.”

You are claiming that his private impression of the picture does tell him what he imagined in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others, because you claim that there is a private mental picture that he can compare his painting to in order to see whether their content matches.

As you noted earlier, that mental picture might change, so how could you establish whether or not the physical painting matches it? This is similar to the private language argument, where the private diarist cannot rely only on their memory to establish the meaning/use of ‘S’.

My point here is that it’s incorrect to call the mental image a “picture”, because a mental image does not inform others “as pictures or words do” (PI 280).

I don't see any inconsistency. — Fooloso4

I initially asked whether you agreed that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined". You replied: "Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change."

However, you also quoted Wittgenstein's PPF 10 which tells us that "the content of the experience of imagining" is a picture or a description. Do you believe that this picture or description (at PPF 10) is relatively unstable and subject to the same change as your imagination?

You also said:

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

Regarding the picture or description that W mentions at PPF 10:

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

Do you think he is referring to "the picture or description that occurs in the mind" or to your drawn (physical) picture or description of that content?

If you were to draw a picture of that content or describe that content, like you say in the quote above, then is the content of the physical picture/description the same as the content of the imagined picture/description at the time that you draw/describe it? If not, then why do you suggest that you are able to "answer the question" of what the imagined content is by drawing a picture or by describing that content? If so, then when does the content between the two change?

If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"?
— Luke

This shows how a picture hanging on the wall differs from a mental picture. — Fooloso4

Does a mental description differ from a physical description in the same manner? If not, why not? If so, how does the mental description change? Is the content of the mental and physical descriptions the same at the time that the physical description is made of the mental description?

I see no reason to think that Wittgenstein is using two different meanings of "picture" here, where one is used for an internal "picture" that may contain different information from the external picture. This is just what PI 280 rejects.

We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures.
— Luke

How do you reconcile this with PI 389? — Fooloso4

I don't see there as being any internal pictures at PI 389, or in the PI at all. I believe this is something that Wittgenstein rejects. I don't see him using the word "picture" in a different sense for internal pictures than for external, public pictures. There simply are no internal pictures (which are not also external pictures). This is why I said originally that a mental image is not a picture. If what we imagine/visualise is a picture of any sort, then it is a regular sort of (in principle) public picture, or can at least be made into one. We can think to ourselves using public pictures in the same way we can think to ourselves using public language.

At PI 389, I believe Wittgenstein is referring to a public (i.e. static, unchanging) picture. He contrasts a picture with a mental image at PI 389, so how do you reconcile your view of mental pictures, mental images and public pictures? When he refers to a picture at PI 389, do you read it as being a mental picture or a public picture? Do you consider there to be any difference between a mental image and a mental picture?

They are at t1 and t2 my inner picture of X. My inner picture of X has changed. It should be noted that I may not even be aware that it has changed. — Fooloso4

But you can draw or describe it at t1 and you can also draw or describe it at t2, right? Wouldn't you then notice it has changed?

No. Why would I need a private impression of the picture I imagined to tell me what I imagined? — Fooloso4

It is not the point of PI 280 that you don't need the picture to tell you what you imagined. The point is that there is no information missing between the physical picture and what you imagined. The point is also that it's not a picture of a picture, or that the physical picture is not "the picture of his image, as it can't be for anyone else".

However, this is the opposite of your reading with its relatively static external pictures and relatively changing internal pictures.

W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same.
— Luke

They might be but they need not be the same. — Fooloso4

If they are not the same, then it would contradict PI 280 and PPF 10, which both indicate that a public picture and a private picture have the same content.

No. I reject it because things are not always as we imagine them to be. — Fooloso4

Whatever picture we draw or description we make (of things) will reflect how we imagine things to be (at the time of drawing/imagining).

Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?
— Luke

Not necessarily. As I imagine something can change. — Fooloso4

This appears inconsistent with what you quoted and said earlier:

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?
— Luke

One is physical and can be made public, the other cannot. One remains relatively stable and unchanging the other may not. We can use one an item of comparison, the other only by the one whose mental image it is. — Fooloso4

Doesn't "picture" mean the same here? If you are saying that the mental image or imagined picture might change, then in what sense is it a "picture"?

As I questioned several posts ago, why does the picture have to change? We could think of it instead as a series of different (inner) pictures. For example, there could be a picture which is a (physically rendered) snapshot of your inner picture at t1 and then another picture which is a snapshot of your inner picture at t2. Instead of thinking of it in terms of a single picture that changes between t1 and t2, we could think of it as two different pictures; one at t1 and another at t2. In the same way that a movie reel represents change via static pictures, for example. Then there wouldn't be two different senses of the word "picture". Anyhow, I don't believe there exists a sense of the word as you believe W is using it - as a single image that changes over time. Unless you mean a movie? However, I don't believe W is using "picture" as a synonym for "movie" at PPF 10.

And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...".
— Luke

The first few examples of many:

2. Let us imagine a language
4. Imagine a script in which letters were used for sounds,
6. We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B — Fooloso4

These are examples of the use of the word "imagine", not examples of the use of the word "picture".

As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280.
— Luke

What he rejects is that:

His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined — Fooloso4

Isn't this precisely what you are claiming when you say that your private picture can change? That your private impression of the (changing) picture tells you what you imagined?

W's rejection here is consistent with the assertion that the content of a public picture and the content of a private picture are, or can be, the same. But you reject this assertion because you "imagine something can change"?

In case it was unclear, I made some concessions to your reading in my previous post. I now agree that a mental image can be a picture, but on the proviso that a private picture/description of one's mental image is not intrinsically private (or private in the same sense as a private language); that it can be made public. However, I sense that you have not gone far enough in your rejection of this "inner picture", which is why I asked: "how is it that we agree that a mental image is not its description?"

On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined.
— Luke

PPF 10. What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description.

The content of the experience of imagining is what is imagined. The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

I was referring to the content of the experience. Do you agree that the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether it is privately imagined?

The mental image is not a picture hanging on the wall of my mind. — Fooloso4

Can you explain how it is different? I note that a moment ago you said:

The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. — Fooloso4

The two uses of the term 'picture' belong to different categories. — Fooloso4

Could you please explain the two different uses of the term 'picture'?

It seems to me that W is using 'picture' as a noun at PPF 133 and that he is using 'drawing' as a noun at PPF 134. It also seems that the content of both an imagined picture and a physical picture are the same, even though the "medium" of the pictures is not. Other than that one is imagined and the other is physical, I don't see what different meaning the word "picture" has when used to refer to an imagined picture compared to a physical picture. And I don't see Wittgenstein using the word as a verb here, either, such as "picture this...".

I take PI 280 to be denying that the picture has a double function. The picture he paints to show how he imagines the stage set does not also inform him. It does not tell him what he imagined. — Fooloso4

I also take it this way. But do you consider there to be a single picture here or two different pictures? There is the (physical) picture that was painted but also the (imagined) picture of the stage set in his mind before he painted it. You appeared to be siding with the latter when you said:

The experience itself is a picture or description that occurs in the mind. In order to answer the question of what that is I can draw a picture or describe the content. — Fooloso4

As I noted earlier, this begets a picture of a picture or a description of a description. This is the view that W appears to reject at PI 280.

EDIT: Also, did you have any comment to make about our disagreement over sentence 2?

I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141. — Luke

The question is whether a description can be the content of the experience of imagining. Imagining how someone might come to regard a mental image as a superlikeness is to give a description of the steps taken. Isn't that what we are doing when we are figuring out how to respond to each other, imagining how this or that description might be persuasive? Imagining how this or that description might get the other person to see it differently? — Fooloso4

I'm not questioning whether the content of the experience of imagining can be a description. On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenstein means by this "content" is a public picture or public description of what is privately imagined.

It is your position that the mental image itself can be a picture or description. If a mental image were itself a description, then a description of that mental image (such as per the definition in PI 367) would be a description of a description. Likewise, if the mental image were a picture, then the public version would be a picture of a picture.

At PPF 133, W states:

133. The concept of an ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since the model for this concept is the ‘outer picture’; and yet the uses of these concept-words are no more like one another than the uses of “numeral” and “number”. (Indeed, someone who was inclined to call numbers ‘ideal numerals’ could generate a similar confusion by doing so.) — PI 133

I note that the SEP article on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics states (my emphasis):

The core idea of Wittgenstein’s formalism from 1929 (if not 1918) through 1944 is that mathematics is essentially syntactical, devoid of reference and semantics. The most obvious aspect of this view, which has been noted by numerous commentators who do not refer to Wittgenstein as a ‘formalist’ (Kielkopf 1970: 360–38; Klenk 1976: 5, 8, 9; Fogelin 1968: 267; Frascolla 1994: 40; Marion 1998: 13–14), is that, contra Platonism, the signs and propositions of a mathematical calculus do not refer to anything. As Wittgenstein says at (WVC 34, note 1), “[n]umbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there”. This means not only that numbers are there in the use, it means that the numerals are the numbers, for “[a]rithmetic doesn’t talk about numbers, it works with numbers” (PR §109). — SEP article on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

The implication is that the inner picture is the outer picture. If there can be any private use of pictures and descriptions as mental images, then such use follows public rules; it treats pictures and descriptions as public objects. There are not two separate descriptions or pictures where one is inner and one is outer; there is only the one description or one picture used for both inner and outer.

Then how is it that we agree that a mental image is not its description?

Perhaps a solution can be found if we agree that a picture or a description is intrinsically public (i.e. derives its meaning/use publicly), but that one can use these public instruments privately, such that one can imagine descriptions or pictures (using their public meanings).

Another way of looking at it could be that I have my private mental image (which is a private picture or description) which I then describe in our public language (or e.g. in a painting, etc). One could worry that something might get lost in translation from the private image to the public description. However, it could also be argued that nothing could possibly get lost because the mental image itself can only be publicly expressed as well as it can be privately imagined. If my private description (e.g. of directions to somewhere) is poor, then so, too, will be my public description. If the picture I imagine is hazy or indistinct, then my public description (or painting, etc) of what I imagine can only be as hazy or indistinct.

This way, a mental image is not a private picture or description (an idea I was keen to reject) and neither do we require two different versions of each picture and description: the public and the private versions (which thus avoids the need for pictures of pictures or descriptions of descriptions).

PI 280 is relevant here:

280. Someone paints a picture in order to show, for example, how he imagines a stage set. And now I say: “This picture has a double function: it informs others, as pictures or words do —– but for the informant it is in addition a representation (or piece of information?) of another kind: for him it is the picture of his image, as it can’t be for anyone else. His private impression of the picture tells him what he imagined, in a sense in which the picture can’t do this for others.” — And what right have I to speak in this second case of a representation or piece of information — if these words were correctly used in the first case? — PI 280

In response to the question of the mental content I might say: "I had a picture in my mind of a man on a horse". This description can be put in the form of a public or physical picture, but a mental picture and a physical picture of that mental picture are two different things. — Fooloso4

I guess that the mental and physical pictures both have the same content, though? In that case, yes, I see what you are saying.

perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this.
— Luke

The same question: an image of what? What is "this"? — Fooloso4

What I've been trying to say, and how I read sentence 3, is that the content of the mental image can only be this (i.e. whatever one imagines at a particular time) and nothing else. As he is inclined to say at PI 523, "A picture tells me itself".

As I argued earlier, I see no reason why a mental image must represent anything, or be of anything in particular. Maybe the interlocutor errs by thinking sentence 3 is true (when it is false), as you suggest, but I think this reading would make more sense if sentence 2 of PI 389 was also false.

However, I believe that Wittgenstein makes a case for sentence 2 of PI 389 - "For however similar I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it may still be the picture of something else" - in sections PI 139-141.

At PI 10 he says:

What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. — Fooloso4

This is consistent with his defintion of a mental image at PI 367:

367. A mental image is the image which is described when someone describes what he imagines. — PI 367

Note that he distinguishes between a mental image and its description at PI 367. So, there is such a thing as an undescribed mental image. When he speaks of "the content of the experience of imagining" at PI 10, I consider this to be the same as "the image which is described" at PI 367. In other words, the (physical) "picture, or a description" at PI 10 is the described mental image, not the undescribed mental image. Otherwise, why would he include "or a description" at PI 10? The content of the mental image can be physically represented by a picture or description.

If we cannot appeal to a mental image of a color then, with regard to color, we cannot determine that the mental image of a red object is more like the object than a physical picture of the red object. — Fooloso4

Weren't you making these same appeals to a mental image with your examples of the person on the telephone and your siblings' summer house? You claimed that the person on the telephone and the summer house were both unlike your mental images of them. One wonders how you and your siblings were able to show your mental images to each other in order to compare them.

The term picture is used in different ways. At PI 389 he is referring to a physical picture, something that others can see. But we can also picture things to ourselves as in PI 10. These pictures are mental images. — Fooloso4

I don't agree that he is using "picture" as a verb at PI 10. Again, the addition of "or a description" is at odds with that reading.

He says that 1) a mental image must be more like its object than any picture. This is because 2) a picture may be of something other than what it is supposed to represent. But 3) a mental image can only be an image of this. "This" does not mean an image of itself, an image of an image. It is an image of the object that he claims a picture may fail to represent. — Fooloso4

Maybe you're right. I'll try this reading on for size.

You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse
— Luke

The mental image of a horse is not a horse, it is an image of a horse. — Fooloso4

I said that the image was of a horse.

A mental image need not represent anything or be of anything, but this does not mean it represents itself or is of itself. It presents itself, it does not re-present itself. — Fooloso4

To make a last gasp argument for my reading, perhaps another way of saying this could be that it is an image of this. Similarly, if someone were to ask what the Mona Lisa is a picture of, one could respond by pointing at it and saying "it's a picture of this".

It is worth noting, however, that a major difference between a mental image and a picture is that, unlike a picture, one cannot point at a mental image. Neither can one point at this object that one is looking at and compare it to one's mental image of the object (that one is having while looking at the object). This is the faulty assumption behind the idea of "superlikeness".

When the interlocutor says at the start of 2: "For ..." the claim is that because a picture may be a picture of something else, the mental image is more like its object than any picture. This is not the same as simply saying a picture may be a picture of something else. Something specific is supposed to follow from the interlocutors claim that need not follow from the observation that a picture may be a picture of something other than what it is supposed to represent. — Fooloso4

The interlocutor might come to believe sentence 1 based (partly) on sentence 2, but I still don't consider PI 389 to be a rejection of sentence 2. It's a non sequitir wherein sentences 2 and 3 are true (and W thinks them true) but the conclusion at sentence 1 does not follow from them.

The point is that one's mental image is not part of the language game; only a description of one's mental image is.
— Luke

And what follows from this? — Fooloso4

For one thing, it follows that a mental image is not a picture.

Many of the surrounding passages of PI 389 are discussing undescribed or unexpressed mental images and questioning how (or whether) these relate to our linguistic abilities. He is trying to steer us away from "an inner ostensive explanation" (PI 380). The distinction between a mental image held only in the mind and a mental image expressed via action or description is crucial to this.

I assume you mean mental image
— Luke

No, I mean a picture, a painting or photograph. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein maintains a distinction between mental images and pictures at PI 389. On what grounds do you collapse this distinction? Wittgenstein may argue that a mental image does not have a superlikeness to its object, but how do you infer that there is no distinction betweem a mental image and a picture?

3. A mental image cannot be of anything else (but itself).
— Luke

The interlocutor's claim is not a mental image is a mental image of a mental image. It is an image of the object it is an image of. — Fooloso4

I may have expressed that poorly. It is the interlocutor's claim that the mental image is not representative of anything and that it is simply what it is: the image of this.

I can see how you might read it as: the mental image is a representation of the represented particular object. That is, a mental image is a representation of the object that the mental image is of.

To offer an analogy (while trying not to say that pictures are identical to mental images) what is a Jackson Pollock painting the image of; or what does it represent? If I had only the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting, what would it represent? You can say that the mental image of a horse is of a horse, but what does the mental image of a Jackson Pollock painting represent? My point is that I don't consider it intrinsic to a mental image that it must be of some particular object in the world. I believe that a mental image can also be of something not in the world; that a mental image need not represent anything or be of anything other than what it is: this.

However, I would more readily side with you on this point re: sentence 3 than I would agree with you that a picture is no different to a mental image. That is, I would not agree that a picture is no different to an unexpressed or undescribed mental image.