I have "both" experiences under either theory of time. — Luke

There are different senses to having "both" experiences as I have pointed out in my last post. If you are saying you have them in both senses, then that doesn't make sense.

But when I speak of having them "together", I mean having them simultaneously, at the same time. It probably depends how you wish to define "experience", but I don't see any problem in talk of having more than one experience at the same time, such as having a conversation and hearing background noise at the same time. But I deny that two disparate experiences separated by a long period of time can be said to be had together or simultaneously or at the same time. That quite obvious, so I still don't understand your claim that it requires some "larger experience". — Luke

I am not referring to multiple experiences over time "at the same time". Like I said, this is not what I mean at all and the "larger experience" does not require making such a claim.

Wait, I am not sure if you are trying to disagree with me or are agreeing with me. Under what theory of time are you saying that you have both experiences? Are you saying that you have them one by one with the passing of time (as in tensed theories of time) or are you saying that you have them both in the way, say I have an experience of seeing a computer screen and an experience of a buzzing noise in my room (in the manner according to the worm theory)?

This would require experiencing each moment of my life simultaneously or "all at once". Didn't you already argue against this kind of thing in the OP? — Luke

Yes I did, but I did say that you are subject to multiple experiences regardless. The point is, can one be subject to having multiple experiences without experiencing them together? Personally, this sounds impossible to me to imagine or conceive of and it sounds inherently impossible. Perhaps it is because I recently read Chalmers and Bayne echoing the same sentiments but I just find the notion incoherent.

This is under the assumption that both experiences are by together by the same subject, under the worm theory right? If not then you aren't understanding my question.

Can you elaborate on what you mean here?

Alright – I still don't really get it. I don't know what the difference between a past time 'existing' versus not. It seems to me to be a confusion about the way we talk about time using tense. For example, past events happened, individuals that once were alive but are now dead did exist but don't anymore, and so on. Certainly we make reference to past times – does that mean they 'exist?' — The Great Whatever

That is actually a problem for presentism. If certain events from the past don't exist NOW, how can we say they are true? Eternalists and Growing Block theorists have a way of accounting for claims about the past, because there is a truth-maker represented by his existence at that time that they can refer to NOW. Presentists, however, don't have that luxury. So if you find yourself confused here, then you aren't alone. The fact that we can still apparently refer to events that don't exist NOW as being true under presentism is often called the truthmaker problem.

As for this NOW thing, I'm trying to grasp from your usage what it means and I can't. I can say things like, 'there was a time when...' or 'there will be a time when...' Perhaps even 'there existed a time when...' etc. So perhaps the obvious thing to say is that past times existed, and future times will exist? Is this a case of existing in 'the general' sense of NOW? — The Great Whatever

Again, it seems like you are operating under an A-theorist framework (which is of course the common everyday sense of time). If an event will happen in the sense of the passage of time, then no, it doe not exist NOW.

But then, NOW seems to have nothing to do with 'now,' since it covers all times not just now. — The Great Whatever

Exactly. NOW of course doesn't mean now as in temporal location. That was the whole point of the Stanford quote.

Isn't this thread about your argument? Do I have to accept some sort of metaphysical theory in order for your argument to make sense / be valid / be persuasive? I'm a little lost as to your rhetorical strategy. — The Great Whatever

Not at all. All I am saying is that you need to understand what I am talking about before saying that I am wrong. If you don't understand what the metaphysical theories say, then read about them first before correcting me on what they should say.

Whether the word "will" makes sense isn't contingent on any metaphysical theory, since we already observe that it makes sense independent of any such theorizing. It is an empirical fact that such words have a meaning, we know how to use them, etc. — The Great Whatever

It makes sense to the common everyday layperson but that doesn't mean it can't be false. The idea that the sun rises and sets would be acceptable to children who don't know any better, but that doesn't mean that the sun revolves around the earth no matter what.

Eternalism isn't common sense. It is not intuitive at all, and it certainly doesn't conform to our everyday beliefs about time. It says things that goes against our everyday notions of time, and that includes the idea that events had or will happen through the passage of time. That is just what it basically says.

I am not sure why the worm theorist ought to be committed to that. She is committed to the temporal stages of a person being parts of that person. Those stages add up mereologically to a worm and the person is numerically identical with this worm. But it doesn't follow that experiences had by that person at different stages make up a unified experience. Likewise, my organs and limbs are part of me. But it doesn't follow that my organs are part of a unique super-organ or that my limbs are part of a super-limb. It is the stages of the subject of the experiences that are parts of the whole person (i.e. worm) according to worm theory, not necessarily the experiences themselves. — Pierre-Normand

At this point, you are objecting to my P2. To me, P2. seems like the straightforward consequence of being an entity that consists of parts which each individually has experiences of their own. I can imagine what it is like to have two limbs without having a super-limb and similarly have multiple organs without a super organ, perhaps because the way they are defined restricts what an organ or a limb can be. But the problem is that the same can't be said for our experience. I can't possibly imagine currently being subject to multiple experiences without being subject to all of them together. What would it even be like for you to now have two experiences, and not have a larger experience that contains them both? That just seems like a basic feature of having multiple experiences in a unified consciousness.

SImilarly, if I have the property of being a man and I also have a property of being over 20, then I have the property of being both a man and over 20. Maybe you don't accept this, but if you think that any two properties cannot be said to be had together, then it would seem to give way to seemingly contradictory situations. I can be a bachelor and I can also have a property of being married, but there won't be a contradiction because I don't have the impossible property of being a married bachelor. In a sense, married bachelors can exist, but of course, this all sounds incredibly strange. As well, I would argue against the idea that I am having an experience of being in excruciating pain, and an experience of complete pleasure without saying that I have them both as not making sense.

Furthermore, while I cannot imagine a super-limb or a super-organ in any case, I can imagine a complex experience being made up of smaller experiences. Any complex experience that we would describe, such a visual image of the Mona Lisa to tasting fine wine while hearing classical music can be made sense of. In fact, it seems that experiences do seem to necessarily combine together when we consider things spatially (and this is something that all theorists on time should agree upon). We are spatially extended bodies, consisting of a complex set of sensory organs each giving rise to particular experiences that we all now have. But it doesn't seem like I have multiple separate experiences of, say, a pain in my right leg or a buzzing in my ears separately. It seems like I have a single unified experience that consists of these smaller experiences as experiential parts (I have an experience of a pain in my right leg and a buzzing in my ears). In fact I can't imagine not having them in such a manner either. So if experiences necessarily combine together over space, then the question is why should we make an exception with time? Now you may argue that time isn't like space, but they are very similar to one another, and to me they are similar enough to make analogies like this have some force (and it would be even more convincing if you are an eternalist who considers time to be just another dimension of space).

(Sorry if the above came out messy. My computer somehow decided to post it while I typing)

This is not what I was asking. I was asking what this word, NOW, you've made up, means. This does not help. You need to use it in sentences. — The Great Whatever

Okay, Eternalism says that the past, the future and the present are all NOW. According to the block universe, every event from the Big Bang to whatever the end of the Universe is like exists NOW. This is in contrast to presentism, which says that only the present moment exists NOW. The Growing Block theory says that the past from the Big Bang to the present exist NOW.

I have no particular opinion on the matter, and it should make no difference since presumably your argument should have some sort of force without prior commitment to a metaphysical thesis. — The Great Whatever

If you really aren't interested in learning what the theories are, then I am not sure if I can even have a proper conversation. Even the everyday presentist viewpoint wouldn't make sense to you (which may be the case since earlier it seemed liked you did) if you just insist on taking the claims at face value regardless of clarification. I can't do anything about that. Sorry.

The terms "will" and "existed" make perfect sense, regardless of what theory you subscribe to.
...
But the terms do make sense, full stop, as anyone who knows English can see. — The Great Whatever

So you say. But that is simply just wrong.

I don't know what this means. How many senses of existing are there? — The Great Whatever

You know how eternalism says that the past and future exist while the presentist doesn't? Of course, you don't need to take my word that that is what those views entail.

That doesn't tell me anything. Is it an adverbial? A predicate? Use it in a sentence, or give me an idea of what it means to 'exist in the most unrestricted sense.' Do other things exist 'in a restricted sense?' — The Great Whatever

Eternalism says that the past and future exist just as much as the present does. Or to quote someone else:

Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, which takes the view that all points in time are equally real, as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real, and the growing block universe theory of time in which past and present are real while the future is not. — Wikipedia Author on Eternalism

And for the record, "real" = "exists".

The 'me' tomorrow and the 'me' yesterday are just me. And I would say that I existed, do exist, and will exist. I don't know what it would mean for 'them' to be a part of 'me.' Can I be part of myself? I suppose, trivially. Those times, at which I did exist and will exist, are parts of my life. — The Great Whatever

And see, that sounds very much like you are an A-theorist. I did mention earlier that those terms don't make sense without a flow of time (as the eternalist worm theorist asserts there isn't). That is simply because "will' and "existed" as A-theoretic terms are simply incompatible with a theory that rejects the A-theory of time!

Presumably, the answer I adopt will depend on what's true! — The Great Whatever

Fine then. Which theory of time do you think is true?

But you had found them before,and will find them later. See how that works? — The Great Whatever

Again, those terms make no sense under eternalism if we are talking about them in A-theoretic terms. You keep saying that they do but apparently you don't know yourself. So either read up on what Eternalism says, or stop making claims about what you think it should say.

There is no ontological sense of 'now,' if by 'now' you mean the English word. If you do not mean this word, then why not make up a new one so as to be less confusing? — The Great Whatever

I just did. It's called NOW, in accord with the Stanford definition of "existing in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers", that they themselves call the ontological sense of now.

You can make whatever claim you like – but it won't make more true the claim that you or I can intuit such a thing from our introspective experience. I intuit that right now I only experience such-and-such, but not that I exist only right now, or all that I experience is that. So I see no plausibility in the premise. — The Great Whatever

Really? Sure seems like I do. Not sure about you though.

Of course, I mean that in the sense of NOW. If what you are saying is that the you that exists in every possible sense of the word (NOW) does not exhaust who you are, then I am interested in what else you consider yourself to be since frankly I find that claim implausible. Of course, it could also be that you are still insisting upon "now" as in "the specific time of this utterance". I highly suspect this is the case.

I really don't know how to answer this question, because I'm not sure what it means. How can a time be a part of a person? It seems like a category error. — The Great Whatever

Please. The "you" tomorrow and the "you" yesterday. Do they exist in any ontological sense, and are they are part of you NOW? The answer to that would again depend upon the theory of time you adopt.

Tell me, what is your stance on the philosophy of time?

They do include experiences of all such times; it's just that the future ones will happen latter. Obviously. — The Great Whatever

Great then. My argument is that I simply find nothing of the sort in my experience.

According to worm theory, those future and past experiences would be experiences had by stages of yourself that are part or you now in the ontological sense of "now". They are not experiences had by you now in the ordinary sense of "now" (i.e. the temporal location sense of "now"). Let us use "now-o" (ontological) and now-l (location) to disambiguate those two senses as distinguished by the eternalist theorist. Provided that you don't equivocate between those two senses, then it seems that P3 asserts that you are not experiencing anything other than sitting at your computer now-l. — Pierre-Normand

Under the worm-theory, those experiences of being at my computer are had as part of a larger experience which includes other times. But simply put, it doesn't seem like I do have those experiences as a part, they just feel like they are had in general, as the totality of what I experience in an unrestricted sense (or you could say, in ontological terms).

Now you could continue to insist that I am just wrong my statement, and that what I "really" am claiming is actually restricted to a time, that fact happening to be simply beyond my ability to even notice (which is why I don't mention it), but I see absolutely no reason why I should accept your words over my own, especially since I am the one having those experiences. In other words, it seems like you are just rejecting my claims and trying to fabricate some other claim about what I am "really saying" in its place, begging the question.

For instance, you claim that I am experiencing a pain in my right foot. I say that I am not experiencing any such pain at all. In fact, I would say that I find that I am not having any sort of pain experience in general (in any part of my body) because that is just what I find through introspection. If you were to claim that "no, when you said that you weren't experiencing any pain at all, you were "really" saying that you weren't experiencing any pain in your left arm (or any body part that doesn't include your right foot). This is still compatible with you having a pain in your right foot", then I see no reason why I should take your word over mine and I don't think you would be convinced either of that response either if you were me. If you disagree with my reply then I am interested to hear what you think of it.

Those senses are not how the word is used in the English language. So if you want to use them in a non-standard way, you must flag to begin with what you are using a different, technical language, and defined its terms, and state your premises in that language. In a word, you must say 'by "now," I don't actually mean "now," but xyz...' — The Great Whatever

Personally, it seems like the ontological now is more basic than the sense of "now" in terms of temporal location (but I am not saying it is how the english term is used mind you), but whatever.

Now do you accept it as a way of making my claims, as something that is framed in this "quasi-English" technical sense? If so, then let's just go with the ontological sense of "now" and call it "NOW" just to be absolutely clear.

No, since you'll exist tomorrow and existed yesterday and had experiences then as well. — The Great Whatever

Are those other times which have those experiences a part of me right NOW? If not, then they don't count.

A presentist would consider their total experience to be limited to the one existing present, so it would only be limited to their time of utterance. A stage theorist would have those times exist, but they wouldn't be considered parts of themselves either, any more than a random stranger would be considered a part of who they are.

Under the worm theory, those other times should be a part of me NOW (since they exist, in an ontological sense), so so much as I am talking about my total experiences, they should, assuming the worm theory, include experiences of all these times.

If I can intuit from my introspective experience "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is sitting at my computer, etc.," and the truth of this requires that stage theory be true, it follows that I can intuit from my own introspective experience that stage theory is true. — The Great Whatever

Nope. It could also mean that presentism is true as well, but that is if you are not an eternalist. Technically, the worm theory can still be true, if we consider spacetime worms to be instant sized. Of course that option sounds ridiculous.

Or, if you like, I can't intuit from my introspective experience how long I exist for. Yet if I can't intuit this, then I can't know what "the time in which I exist" is, and so I cannot intuit the truth of any such proposition as "The only thing I experience during the time in which I exist is..." — The Great Whatever

So far as I can tell, I am not introspecting upon a part of my experience, the way, say, I consider a colour patch on the left side of my vision to be a part of my phenomenal experience. In fact, it doesn't seem like the specific experiences of sitting in my room are a part of any larger experience at all. So it seems like I am referring to my total experiences, which would, by definition, include all of my experiences that occur at every time I exist, however long that may be.

Note that none of the above assumes the truth or falsity of the worm theory. Under the worm theory, that total experience should include my other life experiences, but does what I consider to be my total experience match up with that?

This is, so far as I can tell, nonsense – it's not possible for all times to be at the same time, since to be different times is precisely for them not to be (at) the same time. So either eternalism is nonsense, or your construal of it is false. My guess is the latter. My guess is the eternalist would say that all times are on a par in some sense, but not in a temporal sense, i.e. that they're all 'at the same time,' any more than all spaces are 'at the same space.' This simply makes no sense. — The Great Whatever

I don't think anything I can say would help convince you, since not knowing anything about eternalism yourself we are at the point where you will just assume that I am mistaken. So here is a quote from Stanford:

It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a Non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists right now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is present’. The Non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of ‘x exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates. When we attribute to Non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit the Non-presentist only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — Stanford Entry on Time

And here is some random guy I found online saying what I would say:

Saying "all times exist now" is really shorthand for "The [Eternalist] ascribes to the Past and Future the same type of reality which the A-theorist only ascribes to the Present." — Aron Wall

Not authoritative, I know, but still I am not the only person making claims like this.

If you do not want to so anchor them, you must not make them in English using the present progressive. For that is what that grammatical construction will do, regardless of your intentions or theoretical assumptions. You must cast them in some non-English or quasi-English technical vocabulary, or find some way to avoid using that tense. — The Great Whatever

It's not that I do not want to anchor them. I will have to make statements in the sense you ascribe as far as I can tell. It is just the idea that it has to be "anchored to the speech time" that I find objectionable. There are other senses of what "now" could mean, as the Stanford article mentions, so I don't see why it should necessarily refer to the time of utterance.

First off, thank you for responding to my request. Because of that, I now have a better understanding of your objections so hopefully the conversation can continue from there.

But this just doesn't even sound true. For my own case, I don't find that at all – I find that I experience many things while I exist: yesterday, for example, I existed, and I experienced being on the L-train, and not at my computer, as I experience myself being now. — The Great Whatever

You seem to be equating "the temporal duration in which I exist", with "my entire life". This is a fact that is only true under certain theories of time. For instance, under the worm theory, we are temporal worms, and are extended through our entire lives, but under presentism and also the stage theory, we are only limited to a single time, which of course is not what we would consider our entire life (note that I am not endorsing presentism here). The use of the former was meant to be neutral with respect to those theories of time.This was the reason why I have assumed presentism in my earlier example, to make clear the distinction between the meanings of both.

I don't know what to make of the present progressive 'am experiencing.' The present progressive is clearly anchored to the speech time... — The Great Whatever

Earlier, I said that your saying that your use of A-theoretic terms in the sense above is wrong-headed because we are talking about situations where one is assuming Eternalism. You apparently weren't sure about what to make of that then, but let me try to expand upon what I mean when I said that.

Technically, under eternalism, all times are equal. Time in this case is very much like space here, to the point where it has often been said by eternalists that time is literally the fourth dimension of space. This is why terms such as "will" experienced" that you mentioned earlier make no sense because under a theory in which there is no flow of time, there is no sense in which an even "will" happen. It at best is described as being "later" than other events just as much as a location in space can be described to the "right" of another. It has sometimes been said that eternalism is sort of like presentism in the sense that technically, under A-theoretic terms, everything is "now". The block universe would not be fundamentally different from a glorified present moment, sans the flow of time, which contains all facts about the universe from beginning to end. All times, existing on a par, can also be said to be "present" in an A-theoretic sense as well.

So much as you are saying we use the present tense in an argument, assuming by that you mean the common A-theoretic version of the term, it doesn't mean what you normally think it means unlike common everyday situations, because the situation under the worm theory is quite alien to our usual understanding of things passing from moment to moment through the flow of time.

It is for this reason why I find unjustified the assumption that my claims about my experience must be anchored to a specific time of speech, when the one making the claim is a temporally extended worm. It makes as much sense as saying that "here" means "the specific place of the utterance itself" for us beings who are spatially extended (which is a fact that holds for all theories of time). Even if claims about our experiences must always be confined to a specific time of our entire lives, assuming that we should experience all of them together, then that fact should at least figure explicitly in the sort of judgement I make (that is, I should understand when I am talking about a part of my experience and not the whole. Saying that I have an experience at a temporal part would be no different from saying that I have a pain in a specific part of my body). So the problem, as I see it so far, is that you were neglecting the fact that our discussion is done within the context of eternalism and are interpreting facts in a manner that conforms to our everyday sense of time.

But this seems prima facie false, assuming only that your existence extends both to the past and to the future (or even, only to the past). It only appears true under the assumption that your own existence is restricted to the duration of your present experience. But this assumption seems to build stage theory onto your premise P3. — Pierre-Normand

Just because my existence would extend throughout my entire life, that doesn't suddenly invalidate it. The only way in which I would believe it to be wrong is if we assume that any such claims regarding the contents of my experience must strictly refer to a single time. However, in that case, you would be the one making the assumption about the sorts of claims that I make.

Here I am only making a claim about the contents of my experience in general, without making explicit reference to any particular part of my experience. If this sort of claim would have to be framed temporally, then the only manner which makes sense to me is to say that it would refer to the entire temporal duration in which I (the person having those experiences) exist, not a specific temporal part. How long such a duration could be could very well vary depending on one's theory of time, but regardless of whether that duration is an instant or a lifetime, it shouldn't matter.

It is relevant because you are appealing to intuition for the truth of an English sentence and presenting your argument in English. — The Great Whatever

So even if I clarify what I mean on the specific terms I use, you will still insist on reading them at face value?

P3 and whatever variations of it you might want to use seem to be either not plausibly true, or not relevant for the conclusion you want to draw. — The Great Whatever

Maybe it is, but even so, I am still not sure why you think that is. Let me repeat once more the version of P3. that I have been proposing:

P3. I find that I am only experiencing sitting in my room during the temporal duration in which I exist. (This is what I find through introspection upon my direct experience)

So far, I still am not clear on what you think about this. I understand why the habitual claim is false (or at least, what I take to be the habitual claim. I can't be sure because you don't seem to be interested in telling me if my description in the last post matches yours), and I can also understand how saying that I only experience sitting in my room "at the time of this utterance" won't work for the purposes of my argument. However, I have still not heard a strong enough rebuttal to the above, even though it is clear that you think that it is wrong.

Do you think it is ill defined? Are the meanings of the individual words used incorrectly? Is it implausible? Is it irrelevant? Do you think this collapses to either the habitual claim or a claim that is actually about the a single time of utterance? Or do you just not understand it?

Even if this sort of claim is completely wrong, I have no idea why you think it is wrong, and because of that I can't respond to your criticisms. Who knows, maybe I'll change my mind if you point out my mistakes, or maybe I'll still think your interpretation is mistaken, but so far, you haven't addressed what I am saying here in any direct manner. The best that I've heard is at best indirect and ambiguous. In some cases, it seems you object to it on grounds of meaning. On others, you seem to object to it as being implausible, and other times you seem to take it as a version of the habitual view.

So please, if you could give me your thoughts on this particular claim, and specifically why it fails, then I will be probably be convinced by your argument. Otherwise I'll just feel like what you've been saying is irrelevant.

I think the reason we are talking past each other is because I am taking the sentences you say at face value as English sentences, and interpreting them that way. You seem to want to interpret them in a theory-laden way. So when you ask "can you clarify what you mean by..." I dont' know what to say. If you speak English, you should be able to understand the sentence. Likewise, you should be able to hear the contradiction. — The Great Whatever

Most likely that we're talking past each other, but I have tried to clarify what I meant by both sentences so what the terms I use mean normally in English shouldn't be relevant, at least not anymore. I am still not sure how much more clearer I can be on that front.

Okay, let me give you an idea of what I think you mean when you make that statement. The way I see it, according to you, the phrase "the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer" means "I don't occasionally experience anything else other than this experience of sitting in my computer". The opposite of this claim seems to be that "I occasionally experience other things other than my computer experience". For instance, on one occasion, I may experience being outside, and another in the shower. Of course, my body is free to walk around and go outside, there is nothing stopping me from getting in the shower, and most of us are subject to these situations all the time so this seems obviously true.

Thus, when you see me making the above claim the image that probably came to your mind is something like a vegetable strapped to a chair in front of a computer screen forced to live out their entire life in that room. In that case, we would say that such a person does not occasionally experience anything other than being in that room. Of course that is an extreme view to take and it is obviously false (though it could be true though since someone could be like that (which you seem to admit one time earlier) but highly unlikely).

Is this a good description on what you mean?

It is a fact of English grammar that simple present sentences can be read habitually (as well as sometimes being anchored to the time of utterance). I do not know of any other way to read the sentences you've said – and since neither reading seems to be what you want, I have no idea what you're claiming. — The Great Whatever

I have tried proposing that it could be "anchored" to the temporal region of the one making the utterance (which may or may not be bigger than the time in which you make that utterance), but I am not sure if you accepted that reading or if you just treated it as one of the two readings above. Or you could also just not understand what it means, which seems to be the case so far.

Something like, 'in general, the only thing I experience is sitting at my computer' or 'the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer.' — The Great Whatever

Can you clarify further what "the only thing I ever experience is sitting at my computer"? Sorry, I am still trying to make sure you mean what I think you mean.

(Also, I take it that my use of the word "general" earlier when saying that I only experience sitting in my room "in general" may have led you to believe that I was making some kind of habitual claim, given that you mention it in your description. Is that correct?)

I have merely been pointing out that it is a contradiction to believe you only experience one thing, and tend to experience other things as well. I'm not sure why you don't see this as a contradiction – yet this is what you seem to believe. — The Great Whatever

But you don't know what the former really means apparently, at least to the point where you can't explain what it means to you when I asked. That is why I am confused when you so confidently claim that they are contradictory.

Sorry, but I am afraid I still have no idea where you derive your contradiction from, and am probably as confused as you are. Maybe I haven't taken enough time to absorb your definition, but as far as I can tell, I don't see how it could be relevant to what I am saying.

Read this way, the sentence, 'I only experience sitting at my computer' is patently false, since there are many other things I experience. Note that this has nothing to do with any metaphysical assumptions: this is simply a way the English sentence can be read, and on that reading I take it to be uncontroversial that such a claim (that I only experience being at my computer, etc.) is obviously false. — The Great Whatever

Can you explain what "I only experience sitting at my computer" would mean under the habitual view? I just want to get a clearer idea on what you take this to be.

I don't know – this sounds like a technical notion. I know what it means to have an experience, and to have an experience at a certain time. — The Great Whatever

Do you need me to explain it to you again? If you don't understand what it means, then why have you been insisting that it was contradictory with your habitual claim?

Yes, that might have been your intent in the original post of this thread. (You argument then seemed to hinge on something like the synthetic unity of experience). But, just now, you had offered this as an explanation (to The Great Whatever) as to why you only are experiencing sitting at your computer, while excluding other experiences had at earlier or later times in your life. You also meant to insist that this is not meant simply to mean to refer to what you are experiencing now, but rather to what you are experiencing while you exist. This argument, which doesn't appeal to the idea of synthetic unity, now seems to hinge on the restriction on the temporal scope of your existence that distinguishes stage theory from worm theory. — Pierre-Normand

Not sure if you understood the context in which I was giving that explanation, but I was trying to explain what having only having a set of experiences at the duration in which we exist would mean, and how it is different from his habitual claim, cause TGW considers them both to be contradictory for some reason. I was not advancing an actual argument at that point.

Let's say (for the purposes of explanation) that the entire duration in which I exist is limited to an instant. — Mr Bee

That was an example to make things easier to understand. That was not my view or built into my P3. I am willing to initially assume in my OP that our existence can be any duration of time (stage theory or worm theory), whatever it happens to be.

Well, what you were asking about happens to be the presentist position (and no, I am not saying here it is my position, in case you were wondering). That is just what the view states.

Perhaps we are not properly understanding each other. I said earlier that I did not understand you habitual claim fully. Can you please, in specific detail, explain what that means. At the same time, explain what you think having a certain set of experiences only at the time you exist means?

Where did I assume that? Can you quote the phrase?

That is literally the presentist viewpoint. Are you telling me the presentist view is inherently contradictory?

Let's just assume a presentist world again. There is nothing contradictory in saying the following:

- My experience during the entire time I exist (which in this case is an instant) only includes me sitting in my room.
- I also tend to experience other experiences apart from me sitting in my room (since as time passes, my experiences will change).

Again, if you can tell me how they contradict each other, I would greatly appreciate it.

I accept 1) and 2).

What could possibly not be clear about it? If my doctor asks me if I am in pain, I find myself not to be in pain at all, and I tell him I am not. Would he suddenly be confused thinking that I am saying that I tend not to have experiences of pain?

If it means anything, please tell me, specifically, how the two statements contradict.

So you tend to experience other experiences? How, then, is the only experience you have of sitting at your computer? — The Great Whatever

Have you even read my post? I literally just explained how in the paragraph above it.

Is that the "I" that has no experience of 2010? How does your 2017 component come by memory of that year if it is not part of your experience? — noAxioms

For the last time no. If I just said that I am the temporal worm, the temporal worm that I said should have an experience of 2010 as a result of it being a part.

-

Please explain to me how the only experience you have, during the temporal duration in which you exist, is sitting at your computer, while also you tend to have other sorts of experiences besides sitting at a computer. I literally cannot make sense of this conjunction of claims, except as a contradiction. — The Great Whatever

Let's say that the entire duration in which I exist is limited to an instant. During that time, I am only sitting in my room and looking at my computer. My experiences supervene upon my brain states at that time which would include all of the phenomenal states of that time. That is how (of course, we could also be the size of our entire lives as well, not just an instant). These will be what I describe to be all of the phenomenal experiences I find myself having.

NONE of this has any implications upon the question of what sort of experiences my body tends to experience, if we are asking this question in a common everyday sense like you seem to be. Now, if this were a presentist world, the entire duration I exist would change from instant to instant. Over time, I would tend to have other experiences (unless my life were merely me confined to a chair in front of a screen). Under the stage theory "I" is a label to describe the person the counterparts represent, it represents personal identity. In this sense we can also say that "I" also tends to have other experiences. The worm theory, there shouldn't be any other experiences apart from the ones they have in the above, but the above should be meaty enough to include more than just the computer experiences.

Clearer now? We are not going to make any progress unless you see the difference between these two and drop the habitual talk.

Not at all. I believe it's false because they don't seem to be true, independent of theoretical position. If someone asked me what sorts of things I experience, I would probably say I experience all sorts of things, not just sitting at my computer.

Your entire argument therefore seems to rest on insisting that something that we would ordinarily say is false is true – that you only experience one thing, sitting at your computer. But of course you don't, you experience many other things as well. — The Great Whatever

Huh? Of course I am not saying that the sorts of things I experience is limited to sitting in a computer, if by that you mean the types of experience I tend to experience. That is not what I am saying at all.

I thought we were going with the notion of that "I only experience sitting at my computer during the temporal duration of my entire existence". Unless of course you thought that both the above notion and this one is the same, in which case I'm confused. If not, then I am still interested in why you reject that particular claim.

..

Of course you might only experience that right now. But then... &c &c. — The Great Whatever

I will say that I only have a certain set of experiences "right now" if by "right now" you are referring to the temporal region that I exist in (of course we can go with call it "right NOW" if you want, it doesn't matter to me). This is the closest I can get to making a statement about my experiences in general while still framing my experience within time. However, and again I must emphasize, I am not saying that I only have a certain set of experiences "right now" as in "at the time of my utterance".

In other words, so much as I am subject to a certain set of experiences only I am making the claim with regards to the whole temporal duration in which I exist (whether it be an instant or a lifetime). Is this description okay with you? Or is that something that we still have to work out?

I think we may be at a roadblock here, but I genuinely think your argument is based on a linguistic confusion and so can't both be interesting & valid. And the block can't be overcome until you recognize at the very least that there is an obviously false construal of P3, on its habitual reading, which makes it uncompelling as a premise. Do you agree with that? — The Great Whatever

I am still not entirely clear on what your habitual reading is referring to, but if it refers to the reading that you rejected above then of course I am willing to grant that it is obviously false if it means that much to you. Of course, that is not the P3. I am using and it never was.

You need to clarify your claim. What is "I" in that statement above? The 2017 component that has no direct experience of 2010, or the entire-worm-self "I"? — noAxioms

Under the worm theory, I am the entity that identifies with the entire worm. There is no other entity I can be.

Point out my inconsistency please. — noAxioms

I said that they were inconsistencies on strawmen that you pointed out, not your inconsistencies.

Mr Bee is using A-references (such as ambiguous "I") in discussion of absolute things, and getting the expected conflicts. Eternalism is an objective view of time, and objective terms should be used at every step. — noAxioms

Is "I" an A-theoretic term? It doesn't seem to me like it is.

It doesn't matter what you 'mean.' What I am saying is that the sentence you uttered, a sentence of English, cannot mean what you are saying it does. That is just not what the words mean. — The Great Whatever

When I was using the term "now", I was mainly referring to the temporal manner in which we frame our experience. Earlier, you mentioned that our experience must always be anchored by a present tense. I took this as meaning that our experiences must always be framed in temporal terms, such that we must always refer to them as being had "now", and I later conceded that this was the case. In fact, I went one step further than that and argued that not only are our experiences always framed in temporal terms, but they are also always framed in spatial terms as well (which is referred to similarly by the term "here").

My disagreement with you had to do with what this temporal framing amounts to, and what we mean here when we say that our experiences must always be framed as being had "now". So much as I disputed your use of the word "now", I was disputing it on those grounds. You claimed that this "now" or "present tense" must mean that we always describe our experiences as being had "at a time" to which I disputed that claim and provided my own interpretation on what it meant.

As for how the word "now" is commonly defined in English that is for the most part irrelevant. If you want me to refer to the "now" in the sense above by a different term, then I will be happy to call it "NOW" just to distinguish it from the use of the term in English. So, when I say that my experiences must be framed in temporal and spatial terms, I will say that they must always be described as being had HERE and NOW. That better?

If your claim is 'I only experience being at my computer during the time that I exist,' then this is clearly false – surely, you experience all sorts of other things during your life. — The Great Whatever

Why? I don't find my experience contains anything more than what I have identified. Assuming that you aren't reading this as a habitual claim, then I do not see how you can say it is clearly false without begging the question. If what you are saying that my claim about me only having an experience of being in my room is clearly false on the basis that we should have other experiences according to the worm theory, then it seems like you are already assuming that the worm view is true to begin with and using that as a basis for claiming that I am wrong.

If you want instead to say you only experience sitting at your computer during the temporal duration of your entire existence, you should instead say that, since it means something different from your only experiencing it now. — The Great Whatever

Okay, let's just go with that then. You've been insisting that I use the present tense and I tried to comply with your demands up until this point. But if the above description is satisfactory to you then I think it would be easier to just move on instead of focusing on disputes about meaning. In fact, I am more interested in addressing your rejection of it, so let's just focus on that.

So, in general you only experience sitting at your computer? No, clearly not, unless that's all you ever do. — The Great Whatever

But then, that sentence isn't even plausibly true. So the argument doesn't work. — The Great Whatever

As far as I can tell the only reason why you seem to believe my claim to be false is because it is inconsistent with what the worm theory says we should experience. Surely I must experience things at different times, you have argued as according to the worm view, I have those times as parts of myself. And of course, this is clearly inconsistent with the claim that we have a limited experience.

To this, I would agree wholeheartedly with that assessment because that was the entire point of my argument from the beginning! I should have these other experiences, according to the worm view, but I simply find that I don't. Thus there is a clear tension between experience and theory here and something's gotta give. However, whereas I take this as "so much worse for the worm theory", it seems that you take the opposite conclusion from me prioritizing theory over experience, which I consider to be a wrong-headed approach.

The interpretation says this being does have the 2010 joys, but it does not say that the 2017 subcomponent has direct access to 2010 state (or 2020 for that matter). There seems to be an assumption that one must have simultaneous access to the experience of all of your being, which is not a property of a temporally extended definition of a being, since the being is not simultaneous (by definition). — noAxioms

Again, I never made the statement that the 2010 joys are had by the 2017 temporal part. In fact, I have tried to make that point clear in my OP.

I think your objection falls into the same mistake of mixing up my claim that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences (my P3.) as a claim that I am having a certain set of experiences at a particular time. I am simply not making the latter sort of claim.

Fine. The model as you explain it is clearly conflicting, as you demonstrate in your OP. The only mistake is labeling the model 'eternalism'. What you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else. — noAxioms

Correction, what you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else unrelated to my argument. That is what I mean when I say you are making strawmen.

I would have thought that "here" refers to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance. (This is how, at any rate, I would make explicit what the reference of "here" is, in particular occasions of its use, without this being meant as an explanation of its Fregean sense.) — Pierre-Normand

I can grant that. "Here" would refer to the spatio-temporal location of the utterance event (or alternatively the speaker of that utterance as I have been trying to argue for).

If ordinary language is to retain a pragmatic use (and some of its meaningfulness) as interpreted within a stage theoretical framework, then, although indexicals may be taken to make no (direct) tacit reference to the time of the utterance, they would still have to make tacit reference to the specific stage of the individual to whom later stages of this individuals (and of other people) are referring back to while interpreting the original utterance. This still seems to amount to making a tacit (albeit indirect) reference to the time of utterance. — Pierre-Normand

If we are talking about the stage theoretic framework, then indexicals such as "now" can still refer to the time of utterance regardless of which use of the word "now" you adopt. That's because, similar to dynamic views like presentism, the time in which the speaker exists and the time of utterance are identical. So reference to individual stages can just as well be taken to be references to the time of the utterance.

You seem to expect the 2017 component of yourself to experience the 2010 joys as if they were 2017 experiences. Sort of a dualistic thinking that what you are is an external experiencer that has time of its own, and should have access to the entire physical worm-being 'at once'. — noAxioms

No I do not. I am the spacetime worm that is composed of all times, not just the 2017 component of me. So much as the whole spacetime worm has the 2010 person as a temporal part, then we should expect this spatio-temporally extended being to have the 2010 joys. Also, I have no idea where this has led to dualism.

You should perhaps understand the view before writing a paper on it. It is merely a different interpretation, and the view is entirely consistent with your empirical experience. — noAxioms

And you should perhaps get a better understanding of what I am saying first before making such claims. As far as I can tell, none of what you have said characterizes what I am saying even remotely, with most of your claims consisting mainly of strawmen.

The only difference between eternalism and presentism is the existence of a preferred present that moves through time. — noAxioms

Not really. Presentism also denies that any time other than the present exists. There are views that have a priveliged present but do not deny the entire structure of the block universe (growing-block views for example).

I can also read the sentence as pertaining to what I am now experiencing. Then, it looks true, as you've said – but you've insisted that this is not how you intend the sentence to be construed. — The Great Whatever

So much as I have disagreed with you, it had more to do with the restricted definition of what you want "now" to mean. What I have insisted is not true was mainly the identification of "now" as "the specific moment in which this utterance is had". Nowhere does that notion come up when I say that I only have a certain set of experiences and nowhere do I even mean anything like that.

I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. I even gave an analogy involving our use of "here" to support it. After all, "here" simply specifies my location, not that of the utterance, and it seems like "now" should similarly specify the location in time, not of the utterance, but of myself, whatever that may be.

Apparently that didn't sit well with you because that is not how the word "now", as commonly construed in our everyday language, is used. Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). If you want to convince me that this usage of "now" is somehow mistaken, then you would need to give me more in way of an argument.

Is obviously a description of what your experiences were at the time of typing, not what they are in general or at different times. Surely you experience different things at different times? — The Great Whatever

But I was describing them in general, at least I wasn't intentionally specifying a specific time in which something like "I only experience x" rings true. I just mean "I only experience x simpliciter". Just because the set of experiences I have in general happens to be limited to the contents of a single time does not mean that I am saying they are limited to those contents only within that specific context, so I am not sure how you made that connection.

But this is just false, right? Read that back to yourself and ask whether it's true. The only thing you experience is being at your computer? No: you experience plenty of other things as well. — The Great Whatever

Like? Certainly my experience of being in my room describes a complex set of experiences. My visual experience of me of the computer screen in front of me, the feeling of sitting in my seat and the feel of the fingers typing on the keyboard, and the silent hum of the background noise. What more do you expect there to be?

The difference is that at any one time one experiences only the experiences for that time. — Banno

Just as much as for any bank account, I own only the money in that account. But that doesn't stop me from owning all the money in every account simply by owning all the accounts themselves. I still don't see how this is different from my P2. for our temporal experience since I am perfectly willing to say that at any one time we experience only the experiences at that time. Still doesn't stop someone who is composed of all of those times to have all of those experiences (in fact seems to be a straightforward consequence of having them as parts).

As far as I know, my experience is simply not like that. I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more. You could object like others that what I am "actually" saying is that I am only having these such experiences "at a time", but then I wouldn't see that as being anything other than dictating what I should claim to be experiencing.

As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017. You're saying I cannot have experience of 2010 despite my existence there? That makes no sense. 2010 is not a year of sensory deprivation for me. — noAxioms

I am not saying that you cannot (in face, P2. explicitly states that you must have them). I am just saying that you do not have them (or maybe you do, but I don't). If part of me really did exist at 2010, then I would've felt the experiences of 2010 as part of my overall experience. But I simply do not. The pains the joys of that year should be present as part of my total experience, but I simply do not find them to be there.

Shouldn't this read:
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have each of our experiences at each time in which we exist. — Banno

I don't see how that is any different from my P2. Suppose I have three bank accounts, each of which hold a certain sum of money. There doesn't seem to be a difference between these two claims:

- If I own all three bank accounts, I have all of the money that is had in each account together.
- If I own all three bank accounts, then I have each dollar that is in each of the bank accounts that I own.

Maybe this is what you want to say anyways. If so, then please tell me how the rest of my argument fails.

You can say, and believe: "I saw my friend earlier"; "I am seeing my friend now" and "I will see my friend later". In those forms of expression the words "earlier", "now", and "later" function as indexicals. The times that they refer to are functions of the time when the expressions are being uttered. (Likewise, the word "I" can refer to you by dint of the fact that it is being used by you; and the word "here" refers to a specific place by dint of its being uttered by someone located at that place.)

When you are enjoying the visual experience a tree, you need not be thinking of this experience under a mode of presentation (i.e. a Fregean sense) that could be expressed thus: "I am seeing this tree at 4:16 PM on April 10th 2017". You could also be expressing the same content under the different mode "I am seeing this tree now", which is equivalent to the content of "I am seeing a tree". — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure that's right, but in any case it doesn't matter – as long as there's a notion of having an experience at a time, the same holds, since the present tense in your claim will be translated to mean 'I experience only t at t,' t the time of utterance. — The Great Whatever

Maybe I don't understand indexicals well enough, but even if we were to assume that there was a present tense that attaches itself to my claims, I still don't see why it should only refer strictly to the time of the utterance itself and not, say, something less restrictive, like the time in which the person making that utterance exists. It might sound weird to distinguish the two, but that is because in usual cases where we use the term "now" we do not explicitly assume that we are temporally extended beings, and the speaker of a phrase always exists limited to a single time in which they make these utterances (in accord with the common sense views of time). But here, there is a distinction between the time in which an utterance occurs and the temporal region in which the person uttering it exists. I see no reason why we should use the former usage over the latter. In fact, I think the latter is a more reasonable view to take if we consider the similar case for "here".

Just as much as you can say that there is a present tense anchor to all of our experiential claims, you could probably also say that any claim about my experience should have a spatial anchor to it. This requires me to always describe an experience as being had "here". But what is meant by "here"? We can say that it is limited to the location in which the utterance is occurring, more specifically the location of the words themselves coming out of my mouth, but that sounds too limited IMO. It seems more reasonable to me to assume that when I say"here" I mean the spatially extended in which I, as the speaker of the phrase, exist. Similarly, it sounds more reasonable to assume that when I say "now" , I can only be referring to the temporally extended region in which I exist. If this is the case then I as a temporally extended worm cannot mean "the time of this utterance" when I use the phrase "now".

I'm in a rush right now, but I just want to say that the worm theory is an eternalist theory. The notions of "experienced", "will" and "present-tense" do not make sense under that sort of view since there is no such thing as a flow of time.

But this is just to say that the time at which you are having an experience doesn't figure explicitly as part of the content of this experience. — Pierre-Normand

There's more to it than that actually. If an experience is had as part of a larger experience, then I believe that this fact should figure into the content of that experience itself. Let me give an example of what I mean by that.

Take a visual experience of seeing only blue. Now take an experience of seeing only red. Imagine the two cases where you have them separately, and not together. Now imagine having them both together as parts of a larger visual experience. I imagine that in the latter case, you will probably see the red experience differently in this context then if it were had alone. More specifically, I imagine you will find that the red experience is had at a particular portion of your visual field (of course there are various configurations in which you can imagine this, perhaps the red experience is to the left side of your vision, or perhaps in the centre, while the rest of your vision is engulfed by blue). The same goes for your blue experience as well. The red and blue experiences can no longer be described as being seen simpliciter as they are when they are being had alone. In fact, when I ask myself whether or not I am seeing each of them in that way, I simply find that I do not have such an experience (in fact it seems impossible for me to even imagine what it would be like to see both red and blue simpliciter together). Instead I find that these colour experiences of mine are had "over there" occupying their own particular regions of my experience. Unlike when I have them alone, I have to specify a location to describe precisely how I experience them. In essence, as a result of both experiences not being had alone, they each feel differently.

Of course, I don't believe that this sort of interdependence is limited to just visual experiences. We also have this sort of experience with regards to our other senses as well (for example, I may be having a feeling of coldness in my left hand and heat in my right), but I think it's more general. I believe that any set of experiences had together would exhibit this sort of feature in some form, which also includes having multiple experiences over time. If this is true, then given that the worm theory requires that we are a subject which has all of our experiences, then our experiences at every time should similarly feel distinctly different as opposed to how they would feel if they were had alone. If this sort of distinct feeling can be characterized as the feeling of "being at a particular time" then I would have to disagree with you that the time of an experience does not feature within is felt content.