For Heidegger the ontological is something like a condition of possibility, but it is not transcendental in Kant’s sense. Think of it as a stance or perspective, the Being of a being in terms of its way of being, not what a being ‘is’ but how it is. These stances do not precede the existence of the world, they are what it means to exist. To exist is to open up a stance. — Joshs

Is it like a Derain painting, which exists as shapes and colours, and where the form of the shapes and colours allows the possibility of content within these shapes and colours.

However, the form of shapes and colours cannot be said to precede the content of shapes and colours, as the form is what it means for there to be a content.

The form of shapes and colours is the ontological condition of possibility for an epistemology of content of shapes and colours. Yet, at the same time, the form of shapes and colours don't precede the existence of the content expressed by shapes and colours, the form is what it means for the content to exist.

Maybe not a perfect analogy, but it introduces the relationship between form and content.

Heidegger would reject the framing of the question, because it presupposes a priority of epistemology over ontology. — Joshs

Ontology is about the nature of reality, and epistemology is about how we know the nature of reality.

There is an analogy to Mary's Room, the knowledge argument. If Mary is embedded in a black and white world, can she ever discover colour.

If I see the colour red, is it possible for me to directly see the cause of my seeing the colour red.

If I don't know something, is it possible for me to decide to search for it.

If there is another reality outside my own reality, can I ever discover it.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

Perhaps this is "Dasein".

This means that I am limited to thinking about the ontology of my own reality, and the process of thinking about my own reality is epistemological.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology.

Kant pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are the ontology of the human brain, and these allow the brain to cognise, which is the epistemological aspect.

So yes, the ontology of the brain precedes the possibility of epistemology by the brain.

My understanding of the definitions
As an Indirect Realist, I know that I, as a human, exist and I believe that a world independent of humans exists.

Ontology can be thought of as a noun, and is about the nature of reality.

Epistemology can be thought of as a verb, and is about how we know the nature of reality.

Substantialism is the theory that substances are the ultimate constituents of the reality of the world.

Processuality is the theory that humans, even at one moment in time, are not static things, like a rock, but are dynamic things that experience a continuous becoming.
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My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language and not on the epistemological perception of reality. — Astorre

How can you arrive at an ontological belief without first going through an epistemological process?

Is your ontological perception about the ontology of the substantialism of a world independent of humans or about the ontology of the processuality of humans?
===============================================================================

Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world — Astorre

I agree that Indirect Realism concerns epistemology in how we can know the ontology of the world.

But as the Direct Realist believes they directly experience the ontology of the world, epistemology is redundant to the Direct Realist.
===============================================================================

and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). — Astorre

Am I right is thinking that Processuality only concerns humans and their continuous becomings, whereas Substantialism concerns the nature of reality in the world?

Am I also right in thinking that by the ontology of processuality, you are only referring to the ontology of humans, and by ontology of substantialism, you are only referring to the ontology of the world?
===============================================================================

That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism. — Astorre

As "from Athens" is something that exists in the world, then substantialism seems appropriate.

However as "seeks wisdom" is something that only exists in the human mind, and humans experience processuality, then this would infer that human concepts are also subject to processuality.

Concepts are never static, continually change, are dynamic and flow through the mind like birds on the wing. Concepts are not substances that make up the reality of the world.

From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. — Astorre

As a first approximation, one could argue that thinking in the West tends more to a search for substance and in the East thinking tends more to a search for process.

However, in the West, there is another aspect. For example, looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", the word "philosopher" refers to two distinct things.

First, there is the concrete: Socrates was a Greek from Athens, known through the posthumous accounts of classical writers, particularly his students Plato and Xenophon, accused of impiety and corrupting the youth in 399BC and after a trial that lasted a day was sentenced to death (Wikipedia, Socrates).

Second, there is the abstract: a philosopher is a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment, a scholar and a thinker, a student of philosophy, a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with equanimity easier, an expounder of a theory in a particular area of experience and one who one who philosophizes (Merriam Webster, philosopher).

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations gave the example of the duck-rabbit picture. One day when looking at the picture one perceives a duck and the next day, looking at the same picture, one perceives a rabbit.

Similarly, in thinking about "Socrates is a philosopher", one has two distinct thoughts. There is the concrete, "Socrates was Greek", unchanging, a substance, historical and existence. There is the abstract, "a philosopher seeks wisdom", changing, a process, ahistorical and being.

Similarly with the philosophical schizophrenia between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. I would guess that one-third on this Forum are Direct Realists, one-third are Indirect Realists and one-third are confused between the two.

The Direct Realist believes that tables and chairs exist in the world independent of any human observer whilst the Indirect Realist believes that tables and chairs only have being in the mind. Direct Realism is about literal immediacy whilst Indirect Realism is about phenomenological representation. Direct Realists include Thomas Reid and John R Searle, whilst Indirect Realists include Immanuel Kant and Bertrand Russell.

As a second approximation, in the West, when looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", not only does "philosopher" refer to not only the concrete existence, "from Athens", but also the abstract process, "seeks wisdom". In addition, for the Direct Realist, concrete existence means a substance in the world and for the Indirect Realist, concrete existence means a being in the mind.

In the West, thought is also about both existence and being.

At least to a point that we cannot say something as silly as "English is more extensive than Russian" — Moliere

It would be silly if that is what I had said.

What I actually said was "It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

You left out the words from your quote "it seems that" and "in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. — Astorre

Though this sounds very similar to Continental Philosophy, with its emphasis on human behaviour, existentialism and psychoanalysis.

I agree not exactly the same, but sharing a family resemblance, and more similar than Analytic Philosophy.

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes

Their approach to philosophy is more reflexive as they try to understand human behaviour by using social science. They do not believe that scientific models that dissect, analyse, and explain ideas provide a comprehensive answer. Instead, they look at things from a humanistic perspective, thus investigating the context and history of a subject matter to draw a conclusion.

And I said how, with respect to this topic at least, this is enough to say they see things differently. — Moliere

As regards this topic, I see things differently to you, and we are both English speakers.

We don't need to speak a different language to see things differently.

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. — Astorre

Language expresses thoughts. In an uncertain world, language mirrors this uncertainty

We say "this apple is healthy" until we discover that although apples themselves are generally safe to eat, their seeds contain a compound called amygdalin, which can release cyanide when chewed or crushed.

We are aware that the world is not stable, in stasis or changeless and our language represents this

If someone says "the world is static", then the copula "is" is being used ironically. If someone says "the world is dynamic", then the copula "is" is being used literally.

We use the copula "is" to refer to something that is a process rather than an essence.

As the BBC wrote: Why the world feels so unstable right now

For many of us, life seems to progress smoothly and predictably for much of the time. Indeed, it seems one of our biggest concerns appears to be getting stuck in a rut. But then, seemingly out of nowhere, our world is turned upside down. A global pandemic strikes us down, killing millions of people and forcing entire countries into lockdown. Then inflation takes off and economic downturn threatens our livelihoods. And (not unrelated) one country invades another and the resulting war affects us all. Whoa! Where on Earth did all that come from?

We exist (sushchee) within this changing world, unable to have much affect on it.

But being (byt) in this world, we are part of the world and as part of the world both part of the problem and part of the solution, as Don Paterson writes in his poem "Being"

Silent comrade of the distances,
Know that space dilates with your own breath;
ring out, as a bell into the Earth
from the dark rafters of its own high place –

then watch what feeds on you grow strong again.
Learn the transformations through and through:
what in your life has most tormented you?
If the water’s sour, turn it into wine.

Our senses cannot fathom this night, so
be the meaning of their strange encounter;
at their crossing, be the radiant centre.

And should the world itself forget your name
say this to the still earth: I flow.
Say this to the quick stream: I am.

The copula "is" should be seen in the context of metaphor, and metaphor is more "being" than "existing".

Western philosophy, from Parmenides to Heidegger, sought the essence of being—eternity, phenomenon, givenness—relying on the formula "Being — is," rooted in a language where "is" fixes being — Astorre

Your analysis of the copula "is" has planted the seed of enquiry in my mind. You have nurtured my curiosity, and I am struggling to bring a quietude to a cacophony of thoughts. I am aiming to discover an island of knowledge within such a vast ocean of information that you have presented.

An important aspect of language is its metaphorical nature, including similes and figures of speech.

Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action.

Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor

The word "gravity" is certainly a figure of speech. When we say "the rock fell to the Earth because of gravity", we are able to understand gravity using the metaphor of a heavy ball on a sheet of rubber.

Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas", through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject

The word "is" may be used literally, as in "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris", ironically, as in "Harry Potter is my favourite character in literature", sarcastically, as in "He is very clever" or metaphorically, as in "Socrates is a towering figure".

It is rare that "is" lends stability to being or fixes an essence in reality.

The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but it could have built at the World Fair in Prague. Harry Potter may not be my favourite character now, but then I have not yet read "The Philosopher's Stone". I may not think that he is clever, but I may have misunderstood him. There is also no fixed meaning to the metaphor "towering".

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning.

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations wrote about the duck-rabbit picture.

I see Parmenides and see a philosopher. The next time I see Parmenides I see someone born in Elea. The next time someone who came from Magna Graecia. The next time someone from Italy. Parmenides has many essences. Each time I see Parmenides a discover a new essence.

I see a picture of a duck-rabbit and see a duck. The next day I see a rabbit, But an object such as a picture cannot have contradictory essences, which infers that the essence of the object is in the mind of the observer rather than in the object.

This suggests that the essence the observer finds in an objects exists in the mind of the observer rather than in the object itself.

I think you have to pay attention to context to discern what properties are essential. — frank

Yes, to call someone a used car salesman is almost a derogatory term, casting doubt on their character, even though it is worthwhile employment.

If I refer to Parmenides, the philosopher, then my reference will only pick out people who are philosophers. Parmenides, the philosopher is a philosopher in all possible worlds in which that object exists. — frank

Are we saying the same thing?

If you refer to Parmenides, the philosopher, you will pick out the possible worlds where Parmenides is a philosopher, but you won't pick out the possible worlds where Parmenides is a statesman.

I agree that Parmenides, the philosopher is a philosopher in all possible worlds where Parmenides is a philosopher.

Philosopher isn't metaphysically necessary to Parmenides — frank

As you say, being a philosopher isn't metaphysically necessary to being Parmenides.

Kripke's essentialism refers to Parmenides as a rigid designator. A rigid designator is the same object in all possible worlds regardless of what properties it may have. This means that Parmenides is the same individual in all possible worlds, even if a statesman in one world and a philosopher in another world.
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So I can turn philosopher into an essential feature by way of my intention. — frank

I don't think that you can.

In one world Parmenides may be a statesman, and in another world he may be a philosopher.

By your intention alone, you cannot force Parmenides to be a philosopher in all worlds.

You have no control over what employment Parmenides decides to follow.

The existence of such distinctions in the Italian language suggests that it is natural for humans to feel both a certain sense of the processuality of being and its static nature. — Astorre

European Romance Languages

The Italians and Spanish in their use of "being" are able to distinguish between, as you say, a fundamental characteristic of a person's identity (Latin esse) and a person's temporary, transient mood (Latin stare).

However, as you also say, the English language does not have this feature. English, being a Germanic language, doesn't have a direct equivalent of the Latin "stare".
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"Is" lends stability to being: Socrates is not merely a philosopher; he is a philosopher, as if fixed in reality. — Astorre

Bertrand Russell On Denoting

https://www.finophd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/russell_on_denoting.pdf

There is the essentialism of the Greeks Plato and Aristotle, though of slightly different kinds.

For the Ancient Greeks, in the expression "Parmenides is a philosopher", the copula "is", as you say, not just a word but a mode of thought. An example of substantialism rather than processuality, establishing a permanent fixity rather than a temporary presence.

However, this Greek way of thinking has been updated by Bertrand Russell's 1905 article On Denoting, referred to by Frank P. Ramsey as "that paradigm of philosophy".

Parmenides was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers.

Russell analysed the expression "Parmenides is a philosopher" as there is something that was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers. This something that was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers is named "Parmenides".

However, I do accept that my understanding of On Denoting may be improved upon.

What this means is that "is a philosopher" has changed from being an essence of Parmenides to being a description.

Being born in Elea, Magna Graecia is not a necessary truth of Parmenides but a contingent truth. Parmenides could have been born in Constantinople, he may not have written the poem dactylic hexameter and he may have been a statesman rather than a philosopher

In the expression, "Parmenides is a philosopher", the copula "is" is not establishing "philosopher" as a fixed and static essence of Parmenides, but rather describing a contingent rather than necessary truth.

Something like the obtuse writings of people like Derrida and Foucault who privately stated that they had to write in that style or French academia would not take them seriously — I like sushi

If you want to be part of the Artworld, and enjoy the glitzy parties, then as with Derrida and Foucault, you have to play the game.

From Miami to Seoul, Brussels to Hong Kong—wherever collectors, dealers, curators, advisors, and everyone in between lands to shop and talk art—parties are a fundamental fixture of the international art world. Conversations that start at booths or galleries often continue at multi-course seated dinners and martini-soaked festivities.
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-glitzy-parties-ultimate-art-currency

South Korean infants are taught Korean with their parents emphasizing Prepositions rather than Nouns. This leads to a small developmental period where are cognitively more proficient at spacial tasks but poorer at categorisation compared to other infants. — I like sushi

What you say seems sensible, and as I see it may be called the weak Whorfian hypothesis.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis

In the Renaissance, drawing was the foundation of all the arts. Giorgio Vasari said that drawing was 'the father of our three arts: architecture, sculpture, and painting.'

It wasn't until the 19th C Romanticism and Expressionism that painting started to take precedence to drawing, as being able to better convey atmosphere, mood and emotions.

This difference in priority between drawing and painting helps to account for the difference in styles of Andrea Mantegna and Vincent van Gogh, for example.

As you say, if prepositions are emphasized rather than nouns, the student becomes more proficient at spatial tasks rather than categorization. Similarly, if drawing is emphasized rather than painting, the student becomes more proficient at line and form rather than colour and texture.

All these are examples of the weak Whorfian hypothesis, where the language of the teacher does influence perception by the student to some degree.

"Is" lends stability to being...............................The verb "to be" in Russian behaves differently than in Western European languages.................the emphasis is on change, becoming. — Astorre

How about the Italian essere (derived from the Latin esse) and the Italian stare (derived from the Latin stare).

Both essere and stare function as copulas.

Essere indicates permanence. For example, "è in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen", meaning where it usually is.

Stare indicates transience. For example, "sta in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen". meaning where it usually isn't

Perhaps the Russian verb "to be" functions more like the Latin "stare"?

That Russians distinguish such and such means they see something different from us. — Moliere

Though the Russian speakers colour chart "How to Choose Paint Colour for Walls" lays out the colours exactly as we English speakers would lay them out.
https://forum.domik.ua/uk/kak-vybrat-cvet-kraski-dlya-sten-t29350.html

I've appreciated your creative efforts in proposing formalisms, but I think you've missed the point a few times now about the effect of language on perception — Moliere

I don't see the sense in a strong Whorfian hypothesis, where language determines a speaker's perception of the world. It seems that a strong Whorfian hypothesis is not generally accepted in modern linguistics.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis.
Previously I wrote:

It it were accepted, it would lead into another chicken and egg situation, in that we couldn't even perceive colour 9 without knowing its name, and we couldn't know its name until we have perceived it.

However I do accept a weak Whorfian hypothesis, where language does influence perception to some degree. Previously I gave the example:

This is understandable, in that someone not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern when looking at artworks and when asked to make judgements about these artworks will perform differently to someone who is aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

The weak Whorfian hypothesis is supported by the introduction to the article
"Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination"

These results demonstrate that (i) categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual color tasks and (ii) the effect of language is online (and can be disrupted by verbal interference).

Could you say again what point you feel I have missed about the effect of language on perception.

This is Catherine's Palace in St. Petersburg. — frank

We had made all the arrangements to visit, then covid-19 happened.

the color blue. — frank

:up: A mix of Modernism and Postmodernism.

I wonder how they translate "Der Blaue Reiter" into Russian.

I think it's more that naming helps fix the mind on something, and remember it. If your visual field is filled with color, you'll remember the aspects of it that you have associated with a name. — frank

True, but you don't need to know the names of the colours 1 to 20 in Fig 1 in order to see them.

"more extensiveness", whatever that might mean — Moliere

For example, English has a word for "blue" that the Russians don't seem to have.

It seems in general that English has a larger vocabulary than Russian, possibly because many English words were borrowed from Latin, French and German.

How many words are there in the Russian language?
There are many estimates. However, several of the larger Russian dictionaries quote around 130,000 to 150,000. Now, that’s a lot of Russian words. But if you compare it to English for instance – which has more than 400,000, then it’s not that bad.

Isn't it interesting that they have two distinct words for what we'd call "the same"? — Moliere

The relationship between category and concept is interesting.

It seems that the Russians don't have one word for blue but have one word for pale blue голубой and one word for dark blue Синий. However, in English, we also have two distinct words, ultramarine for dark blue and cerulean for pale blue.

It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to.

As regards the copula, "ultramarine is blue" and "cerulean is blue".

This is the beginning of categorization. Violet is a visible colour, blue is a visible colour, cyan is a visible colour, green is a visible colour, yellow is a visible colour, orange is a visible colour and red is a visible colour. Visible colour can then be categorized into violet, blue, cyan, green, yellow, orange and red.

Ultramarine is not the same as cerulean. Ultramarine is not the same as blue. The word "same" is not used as a copula, as a copula connects two different things.

Each of these is also a pre-language concept in that we don't need to know the names "violet" and "blue" in order to be able to discriminate between violet and blue.

It is the fact that we are able to discriminate between violet and blue, as we are able to discriminate between pain and pleasure, that enables us to develop a language that is able to categorise these discriminations.

It would indeed be strange if we could only perceive those things in the world that we happen to have names for. It would mean that if we had no name for something, then we couldn't perceive it, and if we couldn't perceive it then we couldn't attach a name to it.

It's explicitly about both. — Jamal

The introduction to the article writes that they are investigating discrimination between colours, not the perception of colours

We investigated whether this linguistic difference leads to differences in colour discrimination.

Though of course, in order to be able to discriminate between colours 1 to 20 in Fig 1 they first they must be perceived. But this is not the topic of the article.

Kant's pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are not linguistic. The article is about linguistic discrimination.

Yes, Синий and голубой are basic colour terms and are thus seen as basic colours, not as shades of the same colour....The difference is that we think of ultramarine and cerulean as shades of blue, since in English that's what they are. — Jamal

The article "Russian blues reveal effects of language on colour discrimination" is about how people discriminate colours, not about how people perceive colours.

The article points out that in Russian there is no single word for the colours seen in Fig 1, and asks whether this means that Russians discriminate colours differently from non-Russians.



It seems certain that language does affect how people discriminate not only colours but observations in general. For example, someone looking at various artworks who is not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern will certainly categorise these artworks differently to someone who has learnt the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

It should be noted however that even through the Russian may not have a single word for the colours in Fig 1, and make the distinction between lighter blue голубой and darker blue Синий, this is a similar approach to English that makes the distinction between cerulean blue and ultramarine blue.

Again, because a linguistic distinction has been made between colours, it does not follow that there is a perceptual distinction. For example, an observer's perception of colour 9 in Fig 1 doesn't change as its name changes. An observer perceives the same colour regardless of whether it is called голубой in Russian, cerulean in English, bleu pâle in French or azzurro pallido in Italian.

The article notes that categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual colour task. This is understandable, in that someone not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern when looking at artworks and when asked to make judgements about these artworks will perform differently to someone who is aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

These results demonstrate that (i) categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual colour tasks and (ii) the effect of language is online (and can be disrupted by verbal interference).

The article also concludes that performance can be disrupted by verbal interference. Also understandable, in that is someone was told that a particular artwork was an example of Modernism when in fact it was an example of Postmodernism, their immediate, instinctive judgment about the artwork would clearly be disrupted.

There is the strong and weak version of the Whorfian hypothesis. In linguistics, the Whorfian hypothesis states that language influences an observer's thought and perception of reality, and is known as linguistic relativity. The strong Whorfian hypothesis suggests that language determines a speaker’s perception of the world. The weak versions of the hypothesis simply state that language influences perception to some degree. The strong version has now been largely rejected by linguists and cognitive scientists, especially with the development of Chomskyan linguistics, although the weak version remains relevant. The weak version does allow for the translation between different languages.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis.

Speakers of different languages can look at colour 9 in Fig 1 and perceive the same colour regardless of its name. They are able to perceive the colour with the "innocent eye" described by Ruskin. He wrote that it is not the case that we can only perceive something if we already know what it is. This would inevitably lead into an infinite regression of perception and knowledge.

This is in opposition to Gombrich who argued that there is no "innocent eye". He wrote that it is impossible to perceive something that we cannot classify, thereby supporting the strong Whorfian hypothesis. But today the strong Whorfian hypothesis is generally not accepted. It it were accepted, it would lead into another chicken and egg situation, in that we couldn't even perceive colour 9 without knowing its name, and we couldn't know its name until we have perceived it.

The article makes sense that categories in language do affect a person's performance, but this is not saying that categories in language affect a person's perceptions.

Habit actually configures highways through the nervous system, so maybe language (not just the syntax, but the whole history and emotional anchoring) influences what a person is conscious of. — frank

Language does affect what a person is conscious of.

Count how many times the players wearing white pass the basketball

But pain is not art, nor is it an interpretation of an object's aesthetic elements. So there's a problem with that comparison. — Tom Storm

Though the experience of pain and the aesthetic experience are both subjective feelings, and both exist in the mind rather than the world.
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By your reckoning, all we're doing is looking at shapes and colours, without context, composition, and experience. That strikes me as a very limited conception of aesthetics. If one did this to a work by Caravaggio where would we get? — Tom Storm

Take away all the shapes and colours from Caravaggio's "Boy Peeling Fruit" c. 1592-1593 and what would remain?

As Clive Bell said, it is the Significant Form of these shapes and colours that establishes the aesthetic.
==============================================================================

Going back to pain for a moment, in a hospital, one of the first questions asked is, "On a scale of one to ten, how much does it hurt?" This reveals that pain alone isn’t self-interpreting; we need language and description to give it meaning, to locate it within a framework that allows for understanding, assessment, and response. — Tom Storm

I walk into my house holding my hand and looking for antiseptic after being stung by a wasp.

I am carried into a hospital after being run down by a car and screaming in pain.

Language is not needed to distinguish the level of pain on a scale from one to ten.

If you actually take on board what I said, which is that Russians (Russian speakers) do not see light blue and dark blue as shades of the same colour, then you will understand why this is the case — Jamal

Are you saying:

1) Russians don't see light blue and dark blue as shades of the colour blue. I would be surprised if Russians saw colours differently to non-Russians.

2) Russian speakers have Russian words for "light blue" and "dark blue", and these Russian words don't make any reference to being part of the same colour "blue". But this applies to English also, in that neither ultramarine nor cerulean refer to the colour blue.

Sure, you can see cadmium blue without knowing the name, but you only recognise it as cadmium blue (or see it as meaningful) because you’ve learned to see it that way and have been given a name. Otherwise, it’s just part of a blur of unfiltered input. — Tom Storm

Perhaps we are too far apart on this matter.

Replacing "cadmium blue" by "pain"

Sure, you can feel pain without knowing the name, but you only recognise it as pain (or see it as meaningful) because you’ve learned to see it that way and have been given a name. Otherwise, it’s just part of a blur of unfiltered input.

I would have thought that our subjective feeling of pain was independent of language. In other words, does knowing the name of our pain change the subjective feeling?

No. Russians don’t. Some pairs of hues are closer together than others, but the rest is preconceptions. — Jamal

I have never been to Russia, but they seem to have the word синий

What does синий mean?



https://linguapedia.info/en/russian/vocabulary/colours

To begin with, an innocent baby doesn’t know what colours are or what they’re called. They need to be socialised and taught colour, just as they are taught shapes, and patterns and even their meanings and uses (e.g., 'blue for boys, pink for girls'). — Tom Storm

When stung by a wasp, you don't need to know the name "pain" before feeing pain. You feel pain regardless of what it is called.

Similarly with seeing colour, you don't need to know the name "cadmium blue" before seeing cadmium blue.

Similarly with having an aesthetic experience, you don't need to know the name "aesthetic experience" before having an aesthetic experience.

You need a name in order to communicate your subjective experience with other people, but you don't need a name to have that subjective experience.

Do you see light blue and dark blue as shades of the same colour? — Jamal

Yes. Doesn't everyone.

The top two colours have a family resemblance, and as members of the same family are similar but not identical.

The ultimate "innocence," which I'm arguing is an impossible limit-case, would have you looking at the Lascaux painting from a kind of "view from nowhere" — J

This "innocence" is common in human cognition.

For example, when I look at grass, I don't think to myself, what colour should I see this grass as, should I see it as yellow, red, green or purple. I don't approach seeing colours with any preconceptions. In seeing the colour of an object my approach is no different to that of an innocent baby. I see the colour I see.

Similarly, with seeing an aesthetic in an object.
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Are you saying that your own cultural and individual experience of art, which you bring to the Fauve painting, has no effect on your perception of "great aesthetic value"? — J

Yes.

My belief is that every society in the past 17,000 years would recognise the aesthetic value in the Lascaux cave paintings. From the Sumerians through the Minoans up to the Greeks, Romans and into the 21st C, regardless of their particular religious, political or cultural beliefs.
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I think you're wanting to say that the painting contains, in and of itself, aesthetic value? — J

No.

"Beauty is in the eye of the beholder"

The object does not contain aesthetic value. The object contains a certain form in which an observer can see an aesthetic.

There’s plenty of postmodern art created by graduate artists and unknown, underexposed, even struggling artists who see in postmodernism a vitality and opportunity for expression that you or others may not. — Tom Storm

I agree that postmodern art is an opportunity for expression. I think less through the physical object but more through accompanying statements.

These unknown, underexposed postmodern artists, what exactly are they struggling against?

It seems that they are struggling to break into the Artworld, which is, as I see it, an exclusive club rather than a democratic institution.

My list of what constitutes an innocent eye was partial, but taking it as a starting point, do you feel that, when you encounter one of the above artworks (which are extraordinary, by the way, thanks!) you:
- know nothing about it? Really??
- know nothing about art yourself, from your own culture?
- are able to encounter the art in a way that is separate from a time and place?
- bring no cultural or individual experience to bear? — J

There are two distinct, separate and independent aspects.

On the one hand, there is the object as it exists independent of what one knows about it, and on the other hand there is what one knows about the object.

There is the object, for example a Lascaux cave painting.

There is what one knows about it. Estimated at around 17,000 to 22,000 years old, painted by the Magdalenian peoples, reindeer hunters who possibly engaged in cannibalism.

That the the object was possibly painted by a reindeer hunter has no bearing on the aesthetics of the object. The object has an aesthetic value regardless of whether it was painted by a reindeer hunter or a plant gatherer.

It is true that I know something about the Lascaux cave paintings, I know something about the Fauve artists of the 20th C and I have a particular cultural and individual experience, but all these have no effect on my seeing an object that has great aesthetic value.

In discovering an aesthetic in the Lascaux cave painting, my eye is innocent of any knowledge of facts and figures.

There is no such thing as an art work without an "accompanying statement.....................................Is there anyone on this thread who disagrees that this is a fiction? — J

I know that these images have an aesthetic and are therefore art without knowing anything about the cultures they originated in.

The beauty of the aesthetic in art is that the observer only needs an innocent eye.

One problem with Postmodernism is that depends on its existence through the promotion of elitism within society, an incestuous Artworld that deliberately excludes the "common person" in its goal of academic exclusivity.

I guess that's why we have critics... But I'd imagine the statement is part of the artwork. — Tom Storm

Copilot agrees "In Postmodernism, the boundary between the artwork and its accompanying statement is often deliberately blurred."

In that event, even though there may minimal aesthetic in the physical object, such as a pebble, there may be substantial aesthetic in the accompanying statements, whether by the artist, gallery or critic.

So overall, if a Postmodern artwork includes both the physical object and accompanying statements, there may well be substantial aesthetic in a Postmodern artwork.

That is why the physical object in a Postmodern artwork may be either minimal or imagined. In other words, conceptual. The concept in a Postmodern artwork is more important than any physical object.

The aesthetic is in the thoughts initiated by a real or imaginary object rather than the object itself.

As long as we recognise that the hierarchy is man-made......................................The difference isn’t in the objects themselves, but in the interpretive habits we've inherited. — Tom Storm

Exactly my thoughts.
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But since I'm sympathetic to postmodernism and you're not, maybe we won't get passed this. — Tom Storm

Though have sufficient interest to have been to the Venice Biennale.

I have a question.

Suppose the Postmodern artwork is a single pebble in the Whitechapel accompanied by a statement by the artist.

Is the "artwork" just the pebble or is the "artwork" the pebble plus the accompanying statement by the artist?

I’m saying that when an artist presents something as art, it’s an invitation to explore it aesthetically.............................But yes, more broadly, our experience of the world may also be largely aesthetic......................The aesthetic goes beyond art: our sensory and perceptual engagement with the world is aesthetic in nature. — Tom Storm

Totally agree.

As you say "It's pretty easy to say that a cel from a Bugs Bunny cartoon is less 'important' as art than a Rembrandt". There is a hierarchy in the importance as art of an object.

Similarly, it seems clear that there is also a hierarchy in the aesthetic of an object. For example, I am sure that most would agree that the aesthetics in the object that is Leonardo's painting "The Last Supper" are higher than the aesthetics in the object that is a straight line.

In other words, it is not the case that an object is either art or not art, or an object is either aesthetic or not aesthetic

Every object can be thought of as art and having an aesthetic, though some objects are more artistic or more aesthetic than other objects.
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How do you define an aesthetic experience? — Tom Storm

In words, I would agree with Francis Hutcheson's approach:

For Hutcheson, beauty is not in the object but is in how the object is perceived, and stems from uniformity amidst variety. Diverse elements come together in a way that feels balanced and harmonious, a dynamic process where we sense order within complexity.

The ability to discover patterns in chaos (ie, an aesthetic) is an important part of human cognition.

However, as with other aspects of human cognition, there are limits to any explanation.

For example, when you look at grass, why do you perceive the colour green rather than the colour blue. Any deep explanation is beyond current scientific or philosophical understanding.

Similarly, when one looks at "The Last Supper" and a straight line and have a greater artistic and aesthetic experience with "The Last Supper" than the straight line, any deep explanation is beyond current scientific or philosophical understanding.

I could say that "The Last Supper" is more complex than a straight line, but this raises the question, why is something more complex of necessity either more artistic or more aesthetic, to which there is no answer.

For me, an object is aesthetic if I discover within it a unity within variety, in the same way that I discover greenness in grass.