Two meanings of ‘representation’ in play there. He objects to representative realism but I’m sure he would accept that the sight of smoke represents fire or a dangerous animal represents a threat. — Wayfarer

There are also two meanings of "perceive".

One meaning of "perceive" is something through one of the five senses, such as "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise".

Another meaning of perceive is to understand something in the mind, such as "I perceive she is getting bored".

In the sentence "I perceive smoke through my sense of sight and I perceive the smoke has been caused by fire" the word "perceive " has been used in two different ways.

In Berkeley's expression "esse est percipi", I understand the word "perceive" to refer to something through one of the five senses, not to something understood in the mind.

In my view, this conceptual shift had profound consequences for the entirety of Western philosophy. Instead of exploring being itself as an event or process, metaphysics became preoccupied with the search for a static, indivisible “substance”—an unchanging foundation of reality. — Astorre

Consider "Socrates is a philosopher".

On the one hand, "is" could be a static "being", an unchanging substance. On the other hand, "is" could be a dynamic "becoming", a changing process.

Regardless of the meaning of "is", consider the meanings of "Socrates" and "philosopher".

"Socrates" and "philosopher" are concepts.

Even if "is" is being used as a static "being", the expression as a whole "Socrates is a philosopher" is dynamic, as all concepts by their very nature are dynamic.

No concept is static, in that no concept has a fixed meaning. The meaning of any concept constantly changes. What I mean by a particular concept is most certainly different to what you mean by the same concept, and what I mean by a particular concept is constantly changing as I learn new things.

Fixity in language is impossible. Language by its very nature is dynamic.

As regards black holes, Berkeley doesn’t reject inductive inference; in fact, his Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues show that he accepts the regularities of experience and the way we extend them to predict or explain things we haven’t directly sensed. — Wayfarer

A Black Hole may emit gravitational waves, and it is these gravitational waves that we can perceive.

These gravitational waves "represent" the Black Hole that emitted them.

However, Berkeley rejects representationalism.

Both Reid and Berkeley reject ‘representationalism’, an epistemological position whereby we (mediately) perceive things in the world indirectly via ideas in our mind, on the grounds of anti-scepticism and common sense.
https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jsp.2019.0242?journalCode=jsp

As you wrote:

What Berkeley objected to was the notion of an unknowable stuff underlying experience — an abstraction he believed served no explanatory purpose and in fact led to skepticism. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure about that. The gravity waves from black hole collisions can be perceived via gravity wave detection. Wouldn't that put them in the same category as, say, neutron stars? — RogueAI

"Esse est percipi" can be translated as "to be is to be perceived”.

A Black Hole causes gravitational waves. We can perceive these gravitational waves. Does that mean we perceive the Black Hole?

In Air Traffic Control, the operator can perceive dots on their radar screens. Does that mean they perceive the planes that caused these dots?

That for example, if an alien were to arrive and tell us how things are, to give us the full explanation of existence in a manual. — Punshhh

An alien may as be different to us as we are to a cat.

Would a cat understand if we explained Sartre's theory of existentialism to it?

Would we understand if an alien explained what they know to us?

George Berkeley....................best known for his philosophy of immaterialism — the view that physical objects exist only if perceived — Wayfarer

Humans cannot perceive Black Holes.

They may be inferred, but they cannot be perceived in Berkeley's terms.

Would it be Berkeley's position that Black Holes don't exist?

Also some can seek guidance, some can develop wisdom, some can learn to interpret ancient teachings and mythologies and gain insight. — Punshhh

At this moment in time I only know the reality that I exist within at this moment in time. I cannot know anything outside this reality because I cannot know what I don't know.

I could read The Republic by Plato and learn new things, but even after reading The Republic, even though my reality may have changed, it is still the case that I only know the reality that I exist in at that future moment in time.

It remains the case that at any moment in time, I can only know the reality that I exist in at that moment in time. However, this is not saying that my reality doesn't change with time.

We can change our reality, for example by reading The Republic, but we can never know what exists outside our reality. We can never know whether our reality is or is not reality itself.

As with Heidegger's Dasein, at each moment in time, there is an ever-changing horizon of knowledge that we can never go beyond.

My reality is not a static thing but is a dynamic thing.

My reality doesn't exist as a stone exists but has being as humans have being.

My reality is more a process in time than a substance in space.

. According to the main idea of my work, language itself - through grammatical structure and, in particular, the copula - inclines us to such fixation. — Astorre

Is any kind of fixity possible in language?

Consider "the apple is on the table". It is true that there is fixity here. We are explicitly told that the apple is on the table, and the copula "is" has fixed the apple on to the table.

However, "apple" and "table" as parts of language are concepts, and concepts are far from fixed. For example, your concept of "table" is presumably different to my concept of "table", and my concept of "table" changes daily as I learn new things.

Proof that the concept "table" is not fixed is the impossibility of describing "table" in words. Any description would be either incomplete or inaccurate.

Yes, the copula "is" has fixed the apple on the table, but as nether the concept "apple" nor "table" are fixed, the copula "is" is not capable of fixing anything.

Your "own reality" is not reality itself, but your idea of it...We invent tools to expand the boundaries of the senses — Astorre

No one can ever know if one's own reality is or is not reality itself.

Mary, in the knowledge argument, lives in her black and white world.

At each moment in time, Mary only knows what she knows. She doesn't know what she doesn't know, and what she knows makes up her reality.

Mary reads a book by Abai Qunanbaiuly, and in learning new things, her reality changes.

The book is a tool that Mary has used to expand the boundary of her senses.

Mary knows that her reality has changed since reading the book, and can reason that in the future she may know things that she doesn't know today.

Mary knows that in the future she will know new things, even though she doesn't know what these new things will be.

In such a way Kant knows that there are things-in-themselves, even if he doesn't know what they are.

Mary can reason that her reality will change, and can ask herself "is there a reality itself of which my reality is just a part?"

This question is unanswerable, as Mary can only know the reality she exists in at each moment in time. She can never know what she doesn't know.

In such a way is Heidegger's Dasein

Mary can never know if there is a "reality itself" of which her reality is just a part, because she can never know what is outside her own reality.

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part.

It follows that it is not even possible to say that "your own reality is not reality itself", because this is something one can never know.

For Heidegger the ontological is something like a condition of possibility, but it is not transcendental in Kant’s sense. Think of it as a stance or perspective, the Being of a being in terms of its way of being, not what a being ‘is’ but how it is. These stances do not precede the existence of the world, they are what it means to exist. To exist is to open up a stance. — Joshs

Is it like a Derain painting, which exists as shapes and colours, and where the form of the shapes and colours allows the possibility of content within these shapes and colours.

However, the form of shapes and colours cannot be said to precede the content of shapes and colours, as the form is what it means for there to be a content.

The form of shapes and colours is the ontological condition of possibility for an epistemology of content of shapes and colours. Yet, at the same time, the form of shapes and colours don't precede the existence of the content expressed by shapes and colours, the form is what it means for the content to exist.

Maybe not a perfect analogy, but it introduces the relationship between form and content.

Heidegger would reject the framing of the question, because it presupposes a priority of epistemology over ontology. — Joshs

Ontology is about the nature of reality, and epistemology is about how we know the nature of reality.

There is an analogy to Mary's Room, the knowledge argument. If Mary is embedded in a black and white world, can she ever discover colour.

If I see the colour red, is it possible for me to directly see the cause of my seeing the colour red.

If I don't know something, is it possible for me to decide to search for it.

If there is another reality outside my own reality, can I ever discover it.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

Perhaps this is "Dasein".

This means that I am limited to thinking about the ontology of my own reality, and the process of thinking about my own reality is epistemological.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology.

Kant pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are the ontology of the human brain, and these allow the brain to cognise, which is the epistemological aspect.

So yes, the ontology of the brain precedes the possibility of epistemology by the brain.

My understanding of the definitions
As an Indirect Realist, I know that I, as a human, exist and I believe that a world independent of humans exists.

Ontology can be thought of as a noun, and is about the nature of reality.

Epistemology can be thought of as a verb, and is about how we know the nature of reality.

Substantialism is the theory that substances are the ultimate constituents of the reality of the world.

Processuality is the theory that humans, even at one moment in time, are not static things, like a rock, but are dynamic things that experience a continuous becoming.
===============================================================================

My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language and not on the epistemological perception of reality. — Astorre

How can you arrive at an ontological belief without first going through an epistemological process?

Is your ontological perception about the ontology of the substantialism of a world independent of humans or about the ontology of the processuality of humans?
===============================================================================

Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world — Astorre

I agree that Indirect Realism concerns epistemology in how we can know the ontology of the world.

But as the Direct Realist believes they directly experience the ontology of the world, epistemology is redundant to the Direct Realist.
===============================================================================

and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). — Astorre

Am I right is thinking that Processuality only concerns humans and their continuous becomings, whereas Substantialism concerns the nature of reality in the world?

Am I also right in thinking that by the ontology of processuality, you are only referring to the ontology of humans, and by ontology of substantialism, you are only referring to the ontology of the world?
===============================================================================

That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism. — Astorre

As "from Athens" is something that exists in the world, then substantialism seems appropriate.

However as "seeks wisdom" is something that only exists in the human mind, and humans experience processuality, then this would infer that human concepts are also subject to processuality.

Concepts are never static, continually change, are dynamic and flow through the mind like birds on the wing. Concepts are not substances that make up the reality of the world.

From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. — Astorre

As a first approximation, one could argue that thinking in the West tends more to a search for substance and in the East thinking tends more to a search for process.

However, in the West, there is another aspect. For example, looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", the word "philosopher" refers to two distinct things.

First, there is the concrete: Socrates was a Greek from Athens, known through the posthumous accounts of classical writers, particularly his students Plato and Xenophon, accused of impiety and corrupting the youth in 399BC and after a trial that lasted a day was sentenced to death (Wikipedia, Socrates).

Second, there is the abstract: a philosopher is a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment, a scholar and a thinker, a student of philosophy, a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with equanimity easier, an expounder of a theory in a particular area of experience and one who one who philosophizes (Merriam Webster, philosopher).

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations gave the example of the duck-rabbit picture. One day when looking at the picture one perceives a duck and the next day, looking at the same picture, one perceives a rabbit.

Similarly, in thinking about "Socrates is a philosopher", one has two distinct thoughts. There is the concrete, "Socrates was Greek", unchanging, a substance, historical and existence. There is the abstract, "a philosopher seeks wisdom", changing, a process, ahistorical and being.

Similarly with the philosophical schizophrenia between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. I would guess that one-third on this Forum are Direct Realists, one-third are Indirect Realists and one-third are confused between the two.

The Direct Realist believes that tables and chairs exist in the world independent of any human observer whilst the Indirect Realist believes that tables and chairs only have being in the mind. Direct Realism is about literal immediacy whilst Indirect Realism is about phenomenological representation. Direct Realists include Thomas Reid and John R Searle, whilst Indirect Realists include Immanuel Kant and Bertrand Russell.

As a second approximation, in the West, when looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", not only does "philosopher" refer to not only the concrete existence, "from Athens", but also the abstract process, "seeks wisdom". In addition, for the Direct Realist, concrete existence means a substance in the world and for the Indirect Realist, concrete existence means a being in the mind.

In the West, thought is also about both existence and being.

At least to a point that we cannot say something as silly as "English is more extensive than Russian" — Moliere

It would be silly if that is what I had said.

What I actually said was "It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

You left out the words from your quote "it seems that" and "in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. — Astorre

Though this sounds very similar to Continental Philosophy, with its emphasis on human behaviour, existentialism and psychoanalysis.

I agree not exactly the same, but sharing a family resemblance, and more similar than Analytic Philosophy.

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes

Their approach to philosophy is more reflexive as they try to understand human behaviour by using social science. They do not believe that scientific models that dissect, analyse, and explain ideas provide a comprehensive answer. Instead, they look at things from a humanistic perspective, thus investigating the context and history of a subject matter to draw a conclusion.

And I said how, with respect to this topic at least, this is enough to say they see things differently. — Moliere

As regards this topic, I see things differently to you, and we are both English speakers.

We don't need to speak a different language to see things differently.

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. — Astorre

Language expresses thoughts. In an uncertain world, language mirrors this uncertainty

We say "this apple is healthy" until we discover that although apples themselves are generally safe to eat, their seeds contain a compound called amygdalin, which can release cyanide when chewed or crushed.

We are aware that the world is not stable, in stasis or changeless and our language represents this

If someone says "the world is static", then the copula "is" is being used ironically. If someone says "the world is dynamic", then the copula "is" is being used literally.

We use the copula "is" to refer to something that is a process rather than an essence.

As the BBC wrote: Why the world feels so unstable right now

For many of us, life seems to progress smoothly and predictably for much of the time. Indeed, it seems one of our biggest concerns appears to be getting stuck in a rut. But then, seemingly out of nowhere, our world is turned upside down. A global pandemic strikes us down, killing millions of people and forcing entire countries into lockdown. Then inflation takes off and economic downturn threatens our livelihoods. And (not unrelated) one country invades another and the resulting war affects us all. Whoa! Where on Earth did all that come from?

We exist (sushchee) within this changing world, unable to have much affect on it.

But being (byt) in this world, we are part of the world and as part of the world both part of the problem and part of the solution, as Don Paterson writes in his poem "Being"

Silent comrade of the distances,
Know that space dilates with your own breath;
ring out, as a bell into the Earth
from the dark rafters of its own high place –

then watch what feeds on you grow strong again.
Learn the transformations through and through:
what in your life has most tormented you?
If the water’s sour, turn it into wine.

Our senses cannot fathom this night, so
be the meaning of their strange encounter;
at their crossing, be the radiant centre.

And should the world itself forget your name
say this to the still earth: I flow.
Say this to the quick stream: I am.

The copula "is" should be seen in the context of metaphor, and metaphor is more "being" than "existing".

Western philosophy, from Parmenides to Heidegger, sought the essence of being—eternity, phenomenon, givenness—relying on the formula "Being — is," rooted in a language where "is" fixes being — Astorre

Your analysis of the copula "is" has planted the seed of enquiry in my mind. You have nurtured my curiosity, and I am struggling to bring a quietude to a cacophony of thoughts. I am aiming to discover an island of knowledge within such a vast ocean of information that you have presented.

An important aspect of language is its metaphorical nature, including similes and figures of speech.

Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action.

Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor

The word "gravity" is certainly a figure of speech. When we say "the rock fell to the Earth because of gravity", we are able to understand gravity using the metaphor of a heavy ball on a sheet of rubber.

Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas", through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject

The word "is" may be used literally, as in "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris", ironically, as in "Harry Potter is my favourite character in literature", sarcastically, as in "He is very clever" or metaphorically, as in "Socrates is a towering figure".

It is rare that "is" lends stability to being or fixes an essence in reality.

The Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but it could have built at the World Fair in Prague. Harry Potter may not be my favourite character now, but then I have not yet read "The Philosopher's Stone". I may not think that he is clever, but I may have misunderstood him. There is also no fixed meaning to the metaphor "towering".

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning.

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations wrote about the duck-rabbit picture.

I see Parmenides and see a philosopher. The next time I see Parmenides I see someone born in Elea. The next time someone who came from Magna Graecia. The next time someone from Italy. Parmenides has many essences. Each time I see Parmenides a discover a new essence.

I see a picture of a duck-rabbit and see a duck. The next day I see a rabbit, But an object such as a picture cannot have contradictory essences, which infers that the essence of the object is in the mind of the observer rather than in the object.

This suggests that the essence the observer finds in an objects exists in the mind of the observer rather than in the object itself.

I think you have to pay attention to context to discern what properties are essential. — frank

Yes, to call someone a used car salesman is almost a derogatory term, casting doubt on their character, even though it is worthwhile employment.

If I refer to Parmenides, the philosopher, then my reference will only pick out people who are philosophers. Parmenides, the philosopher is a philosopher in all possible worlds in which that object exists. — frank

Are we saying the same thing?

If you refer to Parmenides, the philosopher, you will pick out the possible worlds where Parmenides is a philosopher, but you won't pick out the possible worlds where Parmenides is a statesman.

I agree that Parmenides, the philosopher is a philosopher in all possible worlds where Parmenides is a philosopher.

Philosopher isn't metaphysically necessary to Parmenides — frank

As you say, being a philosopher isn't metaphysically necessary to being Parmenides.

Kripke's essentialism refers to Parmenides as a rigid designator. A rigid designator is the same object in all possible worlds regardless of what properties it may have. This means that Parmenides is the same individual in all possible worlds, even if a statesman in one world and a philosopher in another world.
===============================================================================

So I can turn philosopher into an essential feature by way of my intention. — frank

I don't think that you can.

In one world Parmenides may be a statesman, and in another world he may be a philosopher.

By your intention alone, you cannot force Parmenides to be a philosopher in all worlds.

You have no control over what employment Parmenides decides to follow.

The existence of such distinctions in the Italian language suggests that it is natural for humans to feel both a certain sense of the processuality of being and its static nature. — Astorre

European Romance Languages

The Italians and Spanish in their use of "being" are able to distinguish between, as you say, a fundamental characteristic of a person's identity (Latin esse) and a person's temporary, transient mood (Latin stare).

However, as you also say, the English language does not have this feature. English, being a Germanic language, doesn't have a direct equivalent of the Latin "stare".
===============================================================================

"Is" lends stability to being: Socrates is not merely a philosopher; he is a philosopher, as if fixed in reality. — Astorre

Bertrand Russell On Denoting

https://www.finophd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/russell_on_denoting.pdf

There is the essentialism of the Greeks Plato and Aristotle, though of slightly different kinds.

For the Ancient Greeks, in the expression "Parmenides is a philosopher", the copula "is", as you say, not just a word but a mode of thought. An example of substantialism rather than processuality, establishing a permanent fixity rather than a temporary presence.

However, this Greek way of thinking has been updated by Bertrand Russell's 1905 article On Denoting, referred to by Frank P. Ramsey as "that paradigm of philosophy".

Parmenides was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers.

Russell analysed the expression "Parmenides is a philosopher" as there is something that was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers. This something that was born in Elea, Magna Graecia, wrote the poem dactylic hexameter and was one of the pre-Socratic philosophers is named "Parmenides".

However, I do accept that my understanding of On Denoting may be improved upon.

What this means is that "is a philosopher" has changed from being an essence of Parmenides to being a description.

Being born in Elea, Magna Graecia is not a necessary truth of Parmenides but a contingent truth. Parmenides could have been born in Constantinople, he may not have written the poem dactylic hexameter and he may have been a statesman rather than a philosopher

In the expression, "Parmenides is a philosopher", the copula "is" is not establishing "philosopher" as a fixed and static essence of Parmenides, but rather describing a contingent rather than necessary truth.

Something like the obtuse writings of people like Derrida and Foucault who privately stated that they had to write in that style or French academia would not take them seriously — I like sushi

If you want to be part of the Artworld, and enjoy the glitzy parties, then as with Derrida and Foucault, you have to play the game.

From Miami to Seoul, Brussels to Hong Kong—wherever collectors, dealers, curators, advisors, and everyone in between lands to shop and talk art—parties are a fundamental fixture of the international art world. Conversations that start at booths or galleries often continue at multi-course seated dinners and martini-soaked festivities.
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-glitzy-parties-ultimate-art-currency

South Korean infants are taught Korean with their parents emphasizing Prepositions rather than Nouns. This leads to a small developmental period where are cognitively more proficient at spacial tasks but poorer at categorisation compared to other infants. — I like sushi

What you say seems sensible, and as I see it may be called the weak Whorfian hypothesis.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis

In the Renaissance, drawing was the foundation of all the arts. Giorgio Vasari said that drawing was 'the father of our three arts: architecture, sculpture, and painting.'

It wasn't until the 19th C Romanticism and Expressionism that painting started to take precedence to drawing, as being able to better convey atmosphere, mood and emotions.

This difference in priority between drawing and painting helps to account for the difference in styles of Andrea Mantegna and Vincent van Gogh, for example.

As you say, if prepositions are emphasized rather than nouns, the student becomes more proficient at spatial tasks rather than categorization. Similarly, if drawing is emphasized rather than painting, the student becomes more proficient at line and form rather than colour and texture.

All these are examples of the weak Whorfian hypothesis, where the language of the teacher does influence perception by the student to some degree.

"Is" lends stability to being...............................The verb "to be" in Russian behaves differently than in Western European languages.................the emphasis is on change, becoming. — Astorre

How about the Italian essere (derived from the Latin esse) and the Italian stare (derived from the Latin stare).

Both essere and stare function as copulas.

Essere indicates permanence. For example, "è in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen", meaning where it usually is.

Stare indicates transience. For example, "sta in cucina" means "it's in the kitchen". meaning where it usually isn't

Perhaps the Russian verb "to be" functions more like the Latin "stare"?

That Russians distinguish such and such means they see something different from us. — Moliere

Though the Russian speakers colour chart "How to Choose Paint Colour for Walls" lays out the colours exactly as we English speakers would lay them out.
https://forum.domik.ua/uk/kak-vybrat-cvet-kraski-dlya-sten-t29350.html

I've appreciated your creative efforts in proposing formalisms, but I think you've missed the point a few times now about the effect of language on perception — Moliere

I don't see the sense in a strong Whorfian hypothesis, where language determines a speaker's perception of the world. It seems that a strong Whorfian hypothesis is not generally accepted in modern linguistics.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis.
Previously I wrote:

It it were accepted, it would lead into another chicken and egg situation, in that we couldn't even perceive colour 9 without knowing its name, and we couldn't know its name until we have perceived it.

However I do accept a weak Whorfian hypothesis, where language does influence perception to some degree. Previously I gave the example:

This is understandable, in that someone not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern when looking at artworks and when asked to make judgements about these artworks will perform differently to someone who is aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

The weak Whorfian hypothesis is supported by the introduction to the article
"Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination"

These results demonstrate that (i) categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual color tasks and (ii) the effect of language is online (and can be disrupted by verbal interference).

Could you say again what point you feel I have missed about the effect of language on perception.

This is Catherine's Palace in St. Petersburg. — frank

We had made all the arrangements to visit, then covid-19 happened.

the color blue. — frank

:up: A mix of Modernism and Postmodernism.

I wonder how they translate "Der Blaue Reiter" into Russian.

I think it's more that naming helps fix the mind on something, and remember it. If your visual field is filled with color, you'll remember the aspects of it that you have associated with a name. — frank

True, but you don't need to know the names of the colours 1 to 20 in Fig 1 in order to see them.

"more extensiveness", whatever that might mean — Moliere

For example, English has a word for "blue" that the Russians don't seem to have.

It seems in general that English has a larger vocabulary than Russian, possibly because many English words were borrowed from Latin, French and German.

How many words are there in the Russian language?
There are many estimates. However, several of the larger Russian dictionaries quote around 130,000 to 150,000. Now, that’s a lot of Russian words. But if you compare it to English for instance – which has more than 400,000, then it’s not that bad.

Isn't it interesting that they have two distinct words for what we'd call "the same"? — Moliere

The relationship between category and concept is interesting.

It seems that the Russians don't have one word for blue but have one word for pale blue голубой and one word for dark blue Синий. However, in English, we also have two distinct words, ultramarine for dark blue and cerulean for pale blue.

It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to.

As regards the copula, "ultramarine is blue" and "cerulean is blue".

This is the beginning of categorization. Violet is a visible colour, blue is a visible colour, cyan is a visible colour, green is a visible colour, yellow is a visible colour, orange is a visible colour and red is a visible colour. Visible colour can then be categorized into violet, blue, cyan, green, yellow, orange and red.

Ultramarine is not the same as cerulean. Ultramarine is not the same as blue. The word "same" is not used as a copula, as a copula connects two different things.

Each of these is also a pre-language concept in that we don't need to know the names "violet" and "blue" in order to be able to discriminate between violet and blue.

It is the fact that we are able to discriminate between violet and blue, as we are able to discriminate between pain and pleasure, that enables us to develop a language that is able to categorise these discriminations.

It would indeed be strange if we could only perceive those things in the world that we happen to have names for. It would mean that if we had no name for something, then we couldn't perceive it, and if we couldn't perceive it then we couldn't attach a name to it.

It's explicitly about both. — Jamal

The introduction to the article writes that they are investigating discrimination between colours, not the perception of colours

We investigated whether this linguistic difference leads to differences in colour discrimination.

Though of course, in order to be able to discriminate between colours 1 to 20 in Fig 1 they first they must be perceived. But this is not the topic of the article.

Kant's pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are not linguistic. The article is about linguistic discrimination.

Yes, Синий and голубой are basic colour terms and are thus seen as basic colours, not as shades of the same colour....The difference is that we think of ultramarine and cerulean as shades of blue, since in English that's what they are. — Jamal

The article "Russian blues reveal effects of language on colour discrimination" is about how people discriminate colours, not about how people perceive colours.

The article points out that in Russian there is no single word for the colours seen in Fig 1, and asks whether this means that Russians discriminate colours differently from non-Russians.



It seems certain that language does affect how people discriminate not only colours but observations in general. For example, someone looking at various artworks who is not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern will certainly categorise these artworks differently to someone who has learnt the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

It should be noted however that even through the Russian may not have a single word for the colours in Fig 1, and make the distinction between lighter blue голубой and darker blue Синий, this is a similar approach to English that makes the distinction between cerulean blue and ultramarine blue.

Again, because a linguistic distinction has been made between colours, it does not follow that there is a perceptual distinction. For example, an observer's perception of colour 9 in Fig 1 doesn't change as its name changes. An observer perceives the same colour regardless of whether it is called голубой in Russian, cerulean in English, bleu pâle in French or azzurro pallido in Italian.

The article notes that categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual colour task. This is understandable, in that someone not aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern when looking at artworks and when asked to make judgements about these artworks will perform differently to someone who is aware of the concepts Modern and Postmodern.

These results demonstrate that (i) categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual colour tasks and (ii) the effect of language is online (and can be disrupted by verbal interference).

The article also concludes that performance can be disrupted by verbal interference. Also understandable, in that is someone was told that a particular artwork was an example of Modernism when in fact it was an example of Postmodernism, their immediate, instinctive judgment about the artwork would clearly be disrupted.

There is the strong and weak version of the Whorfian hypothesis. In linguistics, the Whorfian hypothesis states that language influences an observer's thought and perception of reality, and is known as linguistic relativity. The strong Whorfian hypothesis suggests that language determines a speaker’s perception of the world. The weak versions of the hypothesis simply state that language influences perception to some degree. The strong version has now been largely rejected by linguists and cognitive scientists, especially with the development of Chomskyan linguistics, although the weak version remains relevant. The weak version does allow for the translation between different languages.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Whorfian-hypothesis.

Speakers of different languages can look at colour 9 in Fig 1 and perceive the same colour regardless of its name. They are able to perceive the colour with the "innocent eye" described by Ruskin. He wrote that it is not the case that we can only perceive something if we already know what it is. This would inevitably lead into an infinite regression of perception and knowledge.

This is in opposition to Gombrich who argued that there is no "innocent eye". He wrote that it is impossible to perceive something that we cannot classify, thereby supporting the strong Whorfian hypothesis. But today the strong Whorfian hypothesis is generally not accepted. It it were accepted, it would lead into another chicken and egg situation, in that we couldn't even perceive colour 9 without knowing its name, and we couldn't know its name until we have perceived it.

The article makes sense that categories in language do affect a person's performance, but this is not saying that categories in language affect a person's perceptions.

Habit actually configures highways through the nervous system, so maybe language (not just the syntax, but the whole history and emotional anchoring) influences what a person is conscious of. — frank

Language does affect what a person is conscious of.

Count how many times the players wearing white pass the basketball

But pain is not art, nor is it an interpretation of an object's aesthetic elements. So there's a problem with that comparison. — Tom Storm

Though the experience of pain and the aesthetic experience are both subjective feelings, and both exist in the mind rather than the world.
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By your reckoning, all we're doing is looking at shapes and colours, without context, composition, and experience. That strikes me as a very limited conception of aesthetics. If one did this to a work by Caravaggio where would we get? — Tom Storm

Take away all the shapes and colours from Caravaggio's "Boy Peeling Fruit" c. 1592-1593 and what would remain?

As Clive Bell said, it is the Significant Form of these shapes and colours that establishes the aesthetic.
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Going back to pain for a moment, in a hospital, one of the first questions asked is, "On a scale of one to ten, how much does it hurt?" This reveals that pain alone isn’t self-interpreting; we need language and description to give it meaning, to locate it within a framework that allows for understanding, assessment, and response. — Tom Storm

I walk into my house holding my hand and looking for antiseptic after being stung by a wasp.

I am carried into a hospital after being run down by a car and screaming in pain.

Language is not needed to distinguish the level of pain on a scale from one to ten.

If you actually take on board what I said, which is that Russians (Russian speakers) do not see light blue and dark blue as shades of the same colour, then you will understand why this is the case — Jamal

Are you saying:

1) Russians don't see light blue and dark blue as shades of the colour blue. I would be surprised if Russians saw colours differently to non-Russians.

2) Russian speakers have Russian words for "light blue" and "dark blue", and these Russian words don't make any reference to being part of the same colour "blue". But this applies to English also, in that neither ultramarine nor cerulean refer to the colour blue.

Sure, you can see cadmium blue without knowing the name, but you only recognise it as cadmium blue (or see it as meaningful) because you’ve learned to see it that way and have been given a name. Otherwise, it’s just part of a blur of unfiltered input. — Tom Storm

Perhaps we are too far apart on this matter.

Replacing "cadmium blue" by "pain"

Sure, you can feel pain without knowing the name, but you only recognise it as pain (or see it as meaningful) because you’ve learned to see it that way and have been given a name. Otherwise, it’s just part of a blur of unfiltered input.

I would have thought that our subjective feeling of pain was independent of language. In other words, does knowing the name of our pain change the subjective feeling?

No. Russians don’t. Some pairs of hues are closer together than others, but the rest is preconceptions. — Jamal

I have never been to Russia, but they seem to have the word синий

What does синий mean?



https://linguapedia.info/en/russian/vocabulary/colours