3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions.
— Antony Nickles

Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth. — Luke

I would say an explanation does not show something's significance. Or that a definition imposes itself over anything else of consequence. What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all).

@Hanover @Janus

The first problem with the private language "argument" is that it (and the whole of PI for that matter) is seen as only true/false statements, rather than the work of finding out for ourselves the insights from these claims. It is taken as an argument for a conclusion, as @Banno has noted (or multiple). As elsewhere, Witt is coming up with examples (even fantasies such as this), in order to draw out their implications which reveal our interests, needs, and desires (at times, looking for a particular outcome). This is not an explanation of human biology or "language" (the language claims/examples are to reveal the implications, which are about our lives).

People also get stuck just saying language cannot be private (and how it cannot), overlooking that we do have "privacy", as in personal experiences (the awe of a sunset by myself), sensations (feelings), and our own desires, interests, needs, and intuitions. These are mine, separately, perhaps secretly, maybe alone (this counters some* of our feeling of being denied/losing something). Witt could be said to make room for the personal, even the ineffable (think: opera, painting, crying). This is not the erasure of the self, nor is it a fight against "solipsism"--the idea I control, judge, or value everything, as it were, individually (without history, our lives, language, etc.)--which ends in our solving our skepticism of each other by saying "you do not!", perhaps (as emphatically) pointing to our "forms of life", language, rules, etc.

More important than proving that a private language is not possible or is nonsensical (pointless), his investigation is to reveal our hidden desires and the state of our human condition. Beyond (in between) the "Private Language Argument" is that:

1) I do not "know" my own pain; I feel it/I express it. There is no space between those for certainty (my "knowledge"). So "referring" to my pain, even the sensation, is in the sense of making it known, as in revealed (to you), not "referring to", as in pointing to a "thing" (an object of knowledge). And "doubt" is just not what I do with pain; I repress it, ignore it (though the example of pain makes this seem impossible, as if I am skewered on it, Cavell says; imagine instead, say, sadness). We focus on, or suppress, our pain/experience, as we would express it to others (or hide it). And you and I have the same pain, experience, etc. to the point we can express and accept them as similar. Here Witt shows that the picture of solipsism comes from a desire to be unknowable.

2) I also don't know your pain, say, by inferring it from behavior, or through science (@Isaac). I do not "know" your pain, I acknowledge it, I react to it (or deny it, blind myself to it) (Cavell--drawn out in my OP on the "Lion Quote"). Knowledge is not our only relation to the world; we have a relationship to others (we may treat them as having a soul, PI p. 178); and our acts/expressions at times define us, even adverse to our culture (beyond what is meaningful to it/in it).

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. This desire for rules is to ensure beforehand that my expressions work out, but most importantly, without my being responsible for my actions, answerable to others (even myself). And the picture of causality satisfies the human wish (for me) to be necessary and for my experience to be special (certainly known, or never fully).

4) There are such things as deception, lies, faking, acting, repressing, etc. Though our word is our bond (Austin), there is just no getting around this (other than reading credibility and the context, etc.). Our response is to try to reach past you, in a sense, to something fixed (inside or out) that we can rely on. The shear fact of this failing leads us to deny the other (as a person) in order to ward off the conclusions of the skeptic; however,

5) *There is a truth to skepticism: that we are separate(d) individuals (we have our "own" pains/sensations/experiences, not because they are necessarily special, but because we "own" them, express/hide-accept/deny them). More to the point, we are responsible to answer for our expressions--and the attitude we take, the aspects we see (or ignore). And we can always/endlessly work to understand each other and our expressions, though there is no assurance this will lead to a resolution--which is the same fear that fuels our desire to turn the fact of our not being the same (person) into an intellectual problem.

What does Witt make of the various ways feelings are experienced? We can imagine a feeling, remember a feeling, experience a vague sensation that is ambiguous and sets us off on trying to differentiate whether it is a tickle, pain or pleasure sensation. When I say to my self after some exploration , ‘Ah, that really was pain rather than tickle’, or when I correct an initial impression and say. to myself ‘I only imagined that pain’, what have I done? — Joshs

Not to dismiss your concerns, but what makes us believe that we have that conversation any differently with ourselves than we would with someone else? We are "expressing" the pain, only to ourselves, but isn't that just to say: not out loud. What your two sentences "do" (Cavell would say Wittgenstein is drawing out the implications) are: correcting a mistake, and, realizing a presumption (like freaking yourself out when there is nothing actually there to be scared of).

More importantly for Wittgenstein is: what desire do we want from the picture we believe to be necessary?

To radically simplify: If I understand ED, there is a distinction between the physical and the non-physical, and that the physical (body activity) has a casual effect on the physical and non-physical.

If I have this correct, it is a jumble of concepts. First, simply because the body does all the things it does, does not make a movement an action. We need all the history of our lives, along with the procedure of the act (say, apologizing), plus the context it is expressed in, to recognize it as that "action"--waving hi, pointing, etc. So to say apologizing is a physical act is partial, as well as saying the physical is the "cause" of the apology, as we want a "cause" in order to skip over the public nature of the history, procedure, and the responsiveness that is necessary to have it accepted as/be an apology (Witt calls these, "concepts"). We want to ensure (beforehand) that my cause makes (I make) the action what it is, have the "meaning" it does, makes it certain, or ensure it works out predictable, universally, without my being responsible for my expressions. This is where people start talking about "solipsism"--or that I control, judge, or value everything, as it were, personally (without history, our lives, language, etc.)

Second, people get stuck on saying language cannot be private, missing that we do have personal experiences (the awe of a sunset by myself), secrets, and also our own desires, needs, and intuitions. More important is what Witt gets around to after the "Private Language Argument", that: 1) I do not "know" my own pain, I feel it/I express it (there is no space for knowledge between pain and its expression). We have the same pain, experience, etc. to the point we can express and accept them as similar (solipsism is also the desire to be unknowable, "special"). 2) I do not "know" your pain, I acknowledge it, I react (or not) to it--knowledge is not our only relation to the world; our "acts" at times define us, even adverse to our culture. 3) There are such things as deception, lies, faking, acting, etc. There is just no getting around this (other than reading credibility, the context, etc.), but the shear fact of it leads people off a cliff of skepticism. 4) there is a truth to skepticism: that we are separate(d) individuals. But we are responsible to answer for our expressions and we can always work to understand each other (though there is no assurance this will ensure agreement).

This is a classic example of how the desire for certainty forces a picture on us that we then try to intellectually solve. — Antony Nickles

Of course that's their desire; they're scientists. We should not admonish scientists for attempting to explain, predict, etc. — Luke

Neuroscience pictures the concept of intention (and the entirety of humans) as a physical phenomenon, an empirical occurrence, which comes from the belief that science can explain everything, anything. The conceptual misunderstanding forces their hypothesis on them. They're like a politician, looking around for evidence to shore up the conclusion they've already decided upon.

He completely misses the point of #641, taking the phrase "the most explicit expression of intention is by itself insufficient evidence of intention”, to signal that: there must be sufficient evidence of intention out there somewhere! — Antony Nickles

Isn't that precisely what Wittgenstein signals here? Otherwise, what does he signal with this statement? — Luke

Yes, that was insufficiently worded. We are not talking about evidence for a scientific explanation, sufficient to make our knowledge of our intentions certain, for the specific type of conclusion that the scientist wants. As with a lot of what Witt says, this is a grammatical statement: that the context of the expression is necessary. There is no intention of an expression if there is not a context in which there are conditions which would make it possible to ask about or have an intention.

'I am not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention which I had.'—And didn't the intention lie also in what I did? What justifies the shame? The whole history of the incident. — Witt, PI 644

Something happened which was out of the ordinary for this incident, something shameful. Why was it out of the ordinary? In every way and everywhere we look and find something unusual from what we would normally expect. These are the criteria and substance of what matters to us about asking after, or explaining, intention, such as the requirement for a reason--for clarification, as an excuse, as a curiosity, etc.

'But when Witt says an expectation is "imbedded in a situation" (#581), he is saying the context is what makes expectation here even possible (with a bomb about to go off). Only "in these surroundings"(#583) is there any significance (meaning) to "expecting". — Antony Nickles

I'll just point out that an intention is not an expectation. — Witt, PI 644

The author takes up expecting as similar to intention with the idea that both occur over a period of time. They're not wrong, only that it is the "whole history of the incident" (#644 above) and not just the pattern of the person's behavior, say, extrapolated chronologically.

quote="Witt, PI 644"]Also, it's "embedded".[/quote]

You'll have to take that up with Anscombe, or the British in general.

How do you account for PI 647: "What is the natural expression of an intention? — Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape." - This is not about "an unanticipated part in a situation." — Witt, PI 644

This is the expression of an intention. Neither the look on a cat's face nor the beast's actions would be an intention without the context of the stalked bird or the cage. An intention would never "dawn" on us, like an aspect, unless there was a situation were, say, the bird was out of our frame. "What is that cat (intent on) doing?" or we had not factored in the context that a beast does not normally want to be in a cage (we might think it was just scratching its back or trying to get attention for food; then the context would set the intention in relief).

it is the (cultural/personal) expectation that makes the discussion of intention even possible, not the occurrence or lack of someone's "intention". — Antony Nickles

Are you saying that "the (cultural/personal) expectation" is an intention? — Witt, PI 644

The expectations (and the confusion about an expression) are the conditions necessary for there to be intention at all.

Now we say belief (opinion) can be justified. Now based on these first two uses of justification, this could be that my belief has authority (I am right), or it could be in the sense of removing me from any need to stand behind what I say (letting the justification absolved my responsibility).

I don't understand how a belief/opinion "could be in the sense of removing me from any need to stand behind what I say (letting the justification absolve my responsibility)". How is that a belief/opinion? By not understanding this, I don't understand the rest of what you say here. — Luke

Justification; it's two senses of justification. One is authority, the other sense is a justification that props up my opinion so it doesn't matter that I said it, say, a rule, or scientific methodology.

If a police officer, who has the authority to kill someone under certain circumstances, does so under those circumstances, we could say they had justification, but we might be left with the feeling that is no justification, that here, there is authority without absolution. These were two senses/two uses that we could be said to be familiar with, that were applied to a different context (belief), and then both brought to weigh in on their original context in reasonable but contradictory ways.
— Antony Nickles

Who is "we" in this situation? — Luke

Wittgenstein's method is to make a claim that would apply for everyone, for each of us to see for ourselves, "prove" to ourselves in a sense, to accept. So he speaks using "we" and "our" and "us", giving examples of what "we say", etc. There shouldn't be claim I'm making where "we" can't be me, you, anyone, everyone. The fact they might conflict is the point.

If "we" feel it is unjust, then why do "we" say it is just? — Luke

It could be justified, in one sense, because the police had authority; at the same time, in another sense, there could be no justification as we are not absolved of our guilt, even if only for conferring our authority. Both things pulling at us at the same time is the anxiety that creates the desire to have a rule (rely on definitions) for the "meaning" of a word.

What role do "our" feelings play here? — Luke

The feeling here was meant as a nagging suspicion, like we're missing something, overlooking a consideration. I'm not sure it plays a role (in the justification?), only that it marks our cultural investment in the conflicting justifications.

Try imagining justifying (the rules of?) the concept of justification in the two uses (senses) in the case of the police shooting above
— Antony Nickles

These rules of the concept of justification are simply the two different uses (senses) of the word "justification" that you have described; the rules for using these words with different senses. There is no need to justify the existence of the different uses/senses of our words. — Luke

To say the rules of a concept are simply a description of its use, say, that we are using justification in its sense of authority, does not seem to tell us anything that would make that a "rule". And I did not mean justify the existence of a sense of a concept, I meant justifying how we justify, or justified, as in the kind of justifications that run out, for, in our example, following a rule.

Maybe the law (the rule) represses the sense of what might be just, and a righteousness (based on a moral law) would seem to undermine society's ability to assert its authority.
— Antony Nickles

The sense of the word "just" is already established; you already know what it means. Are you saying that the law could repress or change the sense of the word? Okay, but so what? Maybe it doesn't change the sense of the word, and it only changes our views about what acts or events we would classify as being just or unjust. — Luke

Yes, the sense of justification as, say, authority is already established, but it is not unchanging (as our lives change). Also, justification by authority, as much as we are familiar with it, can be different when pushed into a new context, e.g., taken from the church to the state. What is important about it might change, or some criteria for it might matter more, or again (having been ignored previously).

And you keep talking about words. The law (authority) can repress our sense of right, or our ability to redress its failings. To talk as if this "only changes our views", is exactly the suppression that imagining rules of classification imposes with a picture of right/wrong which leaves our expressions merely opinions.

Whether or not the killing is just does not affect the two different senses of "justification" (or "just") here. — Luke

This is exactly an example of the death of a moral conversation before it even starts. The desire for our words to bring stability to our lives is why a killing can be justified by a definition. We have no concerns about our concepts? If shame has replaced guilt, what is absolution for us know? how does legislative authority have or not have moral authority? And our culture changes, sometimes because of people dying without justification. What counts and matters to us about authority or having a clean conscious are not fixed timeless equations (which criteria are important, how we are to apply them, what facts count under them). Extending justification in the sense of being wiped clean of guilt from its home in the world of religion into the context of a police shooting affects the grammar and criteria of the concept. In this sense, if we can't find a way to wipe away our guilt for a killing we've authorized, our society is irredeemable.

But it seems to me that it is possible to try to change the practice. One might call this inventing a new practice, depending on the degree of continuity. But in any case, there will be a kind of negotiation. I don't see how this is inconsistent with the above view. Would you agree? Does this fall under the "politics" you refer to? — Welkin Rogue

Cavell expounds Wittgenstein's description of continuing a concept into a new context. Since our concepts aren't complete, predetermined, universal, etc., we can have familiarity with a concept, say, the form of a fictional romantic comedy, and we can write our own comedy, even building off the standard formulas. Or we have the concept of justification in the senses of authority, righteousness, or rationale. Any or all could be applied to a new context of an event we have never experienced, a new context which makes certain criteria and grammar of a concept more important, or newly important, newly alive. Or our world slowly changes over time such that the concept of what is right, what is considered justifiable, absolving us of sin, has moved from the judgment of guilt to, say, the assessment of shame.

The realm of politics is of course a way of navigating our moments of how to continue a concept into a new context, a moment where we are at a loss as to how the criteria of our practices are to be applied or how our laws and words will meet our changing lives. Cavell analogizes this as a conversation between us and our culture that can be rational, rigorous, specific (based off the grammar of our concepts). Though Cavell is at pains to differentiate the relationship we have to our society from the picture that we agree on or decide our concepts (as "conventions"), or their criteria or grammar (unless they are the ones we decide--rules, measures, etc.).

The inability for politics to find a way forward for us together, much as the impotence of our moral reconciliations, does not mean they are hopeless, just not ensured. Our frustration and disappointment with our conflicts and politics is what leads to the desire to make our concepts discrete and fixed (with a "meaning") so all its applications are determined, or logically determinable, in advance, say, with rules.

I came across this neuroscience article (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6499020/#sec3title) which I think has a good discussion of Wittgenstein on intention. I note it's quasi-conclusion that Wittgenstein "solves the problem of causation-by-states by positing an equally contested form of causation-by-agents." However, since it still involves causation, I'm not sure you would agree. — Luke

This is a classic example of how the desire for certainty forces a picture on us that we then try to intellectually solve. It starts out okay by breaking the bad news to "neuroscientists" that intention does not come down to a physical process. Unfortunately, it does not stop there; but why? Why are we driven to continue? The problem is that they want to have our explanation of intention be "normative" or, be subject to "explanation, prediction, evaluation, and regulation". This is their desire. In the essay Must We Mean What We Say, Cavell takes the air out of the desire to find some intellectual normativity by pointing out that something is normative to the extent the practice is normative in our lives. Intention is just not like promising--each concept has its own implications, consequences, or none; you can say whatever you like, but only some things will be considered, say, instructions, or an excuse.

But the author plows forward claiming that "we need to answer the question: what makes the ascription of an intention (by others or by oneself) legitimate?"(emphasis added) But, again, what is this need? He completely misses the point of #641, taking the phrase "the most explicit expression of intention is by itself insufficient evidence of intention”, to signal that: there must be sufficient evidence of intention out there somewhere! Here he tries to latch onto a pattern in our behavior rather than seeing the grammatical distinction that talking about intention only happens in certain situations.

The author quotes the same passages I did (#581-583), but they take the "situation"(#581) or the "surroundings"(#583) to be what is happening with the person, their "pattern" over time. Intention not being mental, they would have it be behavioral--"ascribed" to the person--as if to push causality into them externally. But when Witt says an expectation is "imbedded in a situation" (#581), he is saying the context is what makes expectation here even possible (with a bomb about to go off). Only "in these surroundings"(#583) is there any significance (meaning) to "expecting".

The same applies for intention; it is not a cause, it is an unanticipated part in a situation--"Did you intend to (do something unexpected)?" "I intend to (do something I might not otherwise)." It is the (cultural/personal) expectation that makes the discussion of intention even possible, not the occurrence or lack of someone's "intention". Intention is part of a discussion, not an action, nor a person.

Still the author clings on. "But does not this overlook one of the most important features of the concept of intention, namely that the commitment they express plays a guiding role in human action?" (emphasis added)--important to whom? why? The machinations the author and all those cited are going through are based on the same fears and for the same desires that shape this discussion about rules.

Do you ever critique any aspect of Kantianism from the vantage of more recent philosophers, like Hegel, Kierkegaard or Schopenhauer? — Joshs

@mmw@tim wood

@Welkin Rogue How did this thread get Kant-jacked?

Cavell does reference a few of Kant's ideas. He points out that Wittgenstein's idea of the grammar of a concept are categorical as Kant would say, that the criteria of a concept are how we judge the identity of a thing being what it is compared to another, as if this applies to every word.

Also, he takes Wittgenstein's reference to penetrating a phenomenon as a reference to Kant's line drawn between us and the thing-in-itself, and that what Witt is doing is investigating the possibilities of phenomenon (#90), which is to say, the Kantian conditions of a thing's possibilities. Thus, why Witt says Grammar expresses essence (#371) because identity and possibility and conditions show what is essential, as in important, to us about a thing.

Cavell also borrows from Kant's Critique of Judgment as a way to explain Austin and Wittgenstein's philosophical method. We speak in Kant's "Universal Voice", positing a grammatical claim about a concept (its implications, identity, categorical criteria, etc.) based on an example of an expression in a context: When we say X, we imply ___. As with aesthetics, you must see for yourself.

I appreciate you taking the time, Antony. It's helpful. — Welkin Rogue

It's what I studied but no one takes him seriously, especially as an analytical philosopher.

I took the give and take of reasons to occur when there is a conflict between any two sets of commitments. This can take place even between people in different cultures. Nobody needs to feel lost or conflicting with respect to their own culture. — Welkin Rogue

I would say commitments is the wrong word, as if they are personal or chosen. My main point was that we are dealing with a moral moment, event, in time, with a context, not clashing ideals, as if to answer, say: "what's more right?" Because it is a moment, of crisis, Cavell is saying: we don't know what to do, how to find our way forward, which, as you say, may be between us and someone who does not share our culture, but we may be lost in our concepts, our words may be empty, we may be in a new context, etc.

knowledge is not our only relation to the world (it is also our act). We do not 'know ' another's pain, we acknowledge it, react to it (or not).
— Antony Nickles

I would have said 'knowledge is thus about our relation to the world, which includes how we act with respect to it. — Welkin Rogue

This is hard to draw out briefly, but the point is that there is a truth to skepticism, that, as part of our human condition, we are separate. Knowledge (or philosophical theory) itself can not bridge that gap. For example, we do not 'know' another's pain, we acknowledge it, react to it (or not). We do not judge our acts so much as take responsibility for them; my moral reasoning is what I am willing to stand behind.

I take it this 'logic' is basically the same thing as 'grammar'. And then there's the negotiation of or coordination among our various grammars or logics. Considered broadly enough, this negotiation seems to be the whole of moral conflict. For example, we are negotiating (or affirmingdifferent conceptions of) the practice of promising, from our different personal commitments and reasons - when has a promise taken place, what are good excuses for failing to keep a promise, and so on. Not in the abstract, but in relation to some particular case of promising, I take it. — Welkin Rogue

Yes, Cavell uses the same idea as Witt's term grammar, which is the kind of ordinary "logic" each of our concepts have (another Witt term)--these are not individual (mine). The words negotiate or coordinate make it seem like we decide, say, what an apology is, but that is of course already just a part of our lives, like choosing. We may have reasons for promising, but we individually don't conceive of what promising is (with reasons ). This is Witt's method, but, for example, when we don't know how a concept applies to a new context, we could provide examples and make claims about the grammar of the concept in this unforeseen situation, drawing out the implications of what we say or do in this case. The grammatical claims are made to apply to everyone, to be accepted or clarified by anyone, but it is remembering those implications, not justifying them. I would consider this a philosophical enterprise more than a practical one. We are not deciding between morals, but simply learning more about intention, understanding, knowing, seeing, thinking, etc. I'm not sure grammar helps with what a good excuse is, as that seems political. Austin spent a lot of time examining the grammar of excuses, but that was to learn about action.

But taken as an individual pursuit, [Moral Perfectionism] cannot simply be a question of aligning one's behaviour to one's authentic sensibility or some such thing, right? Surely, it is also a question of how to cultivate one's sensibility.

Could you help me make sense of how Cavell understands this question, given that there is nothing, no ideal, to aspire to which is not independent of the individual? Is it a kind of dialectical unfolding, where we aspire to cultivate new aspirations, which lead us to go after yet newer aspirations, and so on...? — Welkin Rogue

The first paragraph makes it seem like we are just changing ourselves to meet some ideal we have picked, and then: what is the right ideal? It is just the realization that we are (and will be) what we say and do. Emerson changes Descartes to read "I think! I am!" As you say in the second paragraph, it is becoming the next version of yourself, to each their own, but answerable for it. This is, of course, broad strokes, possibly misremembered. You'd have to read the preface of Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome to get your questions answered correctly.

What....method for me examining my own expressions, or methods for another to examine my expressions? — Mww

Our expressions, as in "I know he is in pain" or "Did you intend to shot your neighbor's donkey?" for the benefit of making explicit the different implications (of knowledge, intention) in different contexts. Witt used it to understand our philosophical motives. A claim about the logic of what makes up, say, an excuse, is for each of us to come to see for ourselves rather than being emperically true. This is not a different solution to the same picture of the need for a foundation for our acts.

quote="Mww;593286"]As worthy a dialectician as you are, we have a history of opposing paradigmatic metaphysics. Which is fine, kinda cool, actually. I have answers for whatever you say, you reciprocate with equal vigor and justice. And the world is a better place.[/quote]

I'm only trying to explain not to disagree but so you aren't just dismissing this without understanding.

Without the sheer power of reason, how do I even know what an abominable moral act is? ...if I lack moral wisdom I have no reason to judge my act as immoral in the first place, which then tells me absolutely nothing about my moral constitution. — Mww

The start of seeing the difference is that, yes, we have a social moral structure (as we have lives with each other), but the desire for a certain answer beforehand to what is right, clouds the truth that we are separate individuals who must act, at times, beyond/apart-from/against that structure, with an understanding that our rational morality does not absolve use from the responsibility to be answerable after our act to ourselves, others, our society. Having that in mind, we learn not what is right, but how an act is judged, what our responsibility here will be, and thus our duty to ourself in relation--in defining our character (over intellect, Emerson says).

The alternative can only be, I must be informed from external sources what an abominable moral act is. If such be the case, it cannot be said I’ve followed a method of rationality, which contradicts the methodological necessity of obtaining ethical wisdom, insofar as mere information about a thing is very far from the understanding of it. * * * This isn’t moral philosophy, it’s empirical anthropology. — Mww

We are not trying to determine what is right and wrong, but a kind of "information about a thing" that is an "understanding of it"--an ethical epistemology of the nature of our acts. Though this is specifically not empirical anthropology, but Witt's (and Austin)'s method of examining our expressions (or examples of those--even made up ones), not empirically, but to learn what the implications are of what we say (in a context and time). We are learning the criteria that we use to judge what a thing is, what makes a movement a certain action, and, with Witt, what matters to us about something, what (all) our interests are in such a thing, the actual needs of our lives.

Elsewhere, he says something like “Let your experience of the object teach you how to think about it” (from memory). — Welkin Rogue

This starts with Socrates, but the modern version is Wittgenstein, in realizing that there is not one over-arching theory, but that each activity and object has its own grammar (everyday logic, rationality) and so in learning the criteria our culture has for judging a thing, we take a more ethical approach to it; understanding a person by walking in their shoes, as it were. Heidegger also tries to get us to let a thing attract us on its terms in What is Called Thinking?.

"But really, once you've read Cavell, most discussion of ethics - in a philosophical setting anyway - come off as unbearably stilted and artificial. It's great."
— @StreetlightX

His initial work was reacting, as was Austin and Wittgenstein, to logical positivism and it's desire to solve radical skepticism. The refreshing thing about Cavell is that he treats philosophy as a trail of texts, so it is not just his work, but re-figuring the history of analytical philosophy as contributing to an idea of the betterment of the self. Other than Wittgenstein (and Austin), his work is most similar to Nietzsche, later Heidegger, and Emerson, but also draws from ideas in Kant, Socrates, Marx, James, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Wisdom, Malcolm, etc.

I've been meaning to follow up some secondary/elaborative lit on the issue. In any case I would even suggest that your questions about ethics - "what are we doing? What are we aiming at?" ought to be read back into ethics as the sine qua non of ethical practice itself: that the demands that ethics makes on us are demands to grope at finding whatever partial, workable, passable solutions to just those questions. And those are questions of life and practice that cannot be closed off by any theoretical investigation that would provide any kind of ethical guidebook from on high. — StreetlightX

The other seminal book (other than the one mentioned to @Welkin Rogue) is a book of essays on political philosophy called "Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome", which sets out Cavell's claim that some philosophy points to a moral path for each individual in relation to our society. There is also an essay in that book that I am discussion in another thread about rules and the end of justifications.

It is about the giving and taking of reasons, in a fairly ordinary sense, and this in itself is part of its telos, if you like: it is about the respectful engagement with others at the personal level... The personal nature of ethical reasons and judgement is what distinguishes Cavell most, it seems to me. — Welkin Rogue

There are just a few comments I can add. To differentiate, this is specifically not about how we feel or some Humian individual moral compass. Also, the point is not for another ethical foundation, only this time, "arising from our way of being in the world, our form of life", which I think was taken back anyway. We "give and take" reasons because Cavell pictures a moral moment, an event where we are lost or conflicted within our culture so our acts carry from our aligned lives into a sort of extension to an unknown with each other.

A moral reason must issue from our commitments - commitments which are proven as such when we show ourselves to be prepared to take responsibility for them, to defend them and their consequences to others. — Welkin Rogue

And so we define ourselves by what we are willing to accept the implications for, what acts we take as ours, at this time, here, in response to the other, society, etc. And thus knowledge is not our only relation to the world (it is also our act). We do not 'know ' another's pain, we acknowledge it, react to it (or not).

Cavell, I think, has a Kantian streak in that he gives reason a central place in ethics... Impersonal reasons, insofar as they are impersonal, therefore lack all traction in what actually matters, ethically. — Welkin Rogue

This is not to say we only act from our own interests. He, like Witt, sees that our ordinary criteria for what counts for a particular activity, how we identify a thing, are what matters to society (thus, to us) about that thing (a concept Witt calls it). The interests of our culture are reflected in the way something works the way it does. So these interests and my interest most times align, but when they conflict, they do so reasonably, for reasons and from the everyday logic of each thing we do, or at least possibly, as we may fail to come together. This is the hope, and fear and dissapponment with the moral realm at all.

While ethics isn't just about coming to understand one another - at times Cavell places enormous emphasis on this aspect - it is surely an important part of moral reasoning, for all sorts of reasons. I take this as a substantive ethical point in itself. — Welkin Rogue

Part of learning the criteria for how things work is we find out what we are getting ourselves into, but, also, because the criteria are for the judgment of our lives, we, in a way, learn about ourselves at the same time.

On the other hand, this view seems to make obscure the notions of moral progress and moral aspiration. ...And further, how are we doing whatever it is that we are doing? What are the 'methods' of ethics? — Welkin Rogue

Elsewhere he specifically addresses what he calls Moral Perfectionism, but it is each individual, in a sense, doing what they find their duty is to themselves, with the same sense of accepting responsibility. And the methods would be, as well, to learn the makeup of the activity (it's implications, criteria, judgments) that we are involved in.

We aren't even required to aspire to coherency or consistency (except as a moral stance in itself - wherever that stance might come from... as such it would call out for an ethical justification in this loose sense). — Welkin Rogue

The consistency is our culture, all our lives, and, when it comes down to it, in a moral moment, me, who I am to be.

The Claim of Reason is pretty hard reading. If you are interested, there is a much more focuses set of short essays that are foundational for his insights. Must We Mean What We Say, especially the one on Later Wittgenstein, Knowing and Acknowledging, Aesthetic Problems, and the title essay, though that's a little dense too.

Well, I prefer (so far) to just pick up Wittgenstein. — Zugzwang

I commend this. Of course going through the book on your own first is paramount. I also think noting one’s own thoughts in reaction are almost more important, as this is not about being told things as much as coming to see something for yourself.

Or actually,, once W breaks the ice, to just start paying more attention to the barks and moans and tweets we do. — Zugzwang

Witt’s method enables anyone to pitch in on what the implications are of an example of an expression. And our examples can follow our personal interests.

You draw an interesting connection here between mathematics and Platonism. I wonder if this is what Antony means by “mathematical” in the thread title. — Luke

The term "mathematical" is Cavell's, meant to differentiate the type of criteria (how we judge indentity of a thing, the ways it matters, what counts under that concept, etc.) that we attribute to math (chess, etc.), like certainty, predictability, completeness of every application, etc., from the ordinary diverse open-ended criteria for other concepts, like understanding, seeing, apologizing, etc. The starting point is the desire for ordinary criteria to work like mathematical ones and how, here with Kripke, that creates a picture of rules for that kind of backdrop, which limits our options when things go sideways.

If language was like math… we'd be essentially free from humiliating surprises. — Zugzwang

Behind all the fuss to be certain about what is right, is a desire to predict outcomes, which will avoid our being responsible after our act. That I can say, “Well, I followed the rule correctly!”

How can I be sure? Not sure enough to act with confidence...but even surer than that somehow. Infinitely sure. — Zugzwang

One new thing I realized in this thread is the difference Witt shows between the sense of certainty as perfection, from certain in the sense of resolute, understanding the terms of our commitment to stand for our actions.

I just ordered the first Hacker & Baker volume — Zugzwang

I don't recommend this. It's like when people teach themselves piano, then, when they try to go back really serious about playing, it is hard to break their old habits, e.g., hold their hands in the formal position, etc. Hacker will just reinforce a reading of Witt that is limited and unconsciously driven by the same forces Witt is trying to investigate. I would suggest Cavell's The Claim of Reason, in which he discusses Hacker, or, easier, the very short essay The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein.

The question only comes after the expression. My claim is that we don't always intend what we express; that that idea creates a necessity which, as Witt would say, forces a picture upon us (of causality). — Antony Nickles

You seemed earlier to be disputing that we ever use language intentionally, in relation to our discussion about meaning and use. I did acknowledge earlier that we may not always speak intentionally (e.g. on autopilot), but I would say that we speak intentionally at least most of the time. — Luke

The picture you have of how language works creates the picture of intention as present during speech. We can intend what we say, as in choose, for speeches etc., but intend as in cause is not a part of speech. Now #648-660 account for the feeling that intention happens before every expression. The actual grammar of intending is a person being determined about an action (#588); grammatically different than a decision (not that sure). There is something about an intention that is open to other possibilities ("I intended to go, why?") There needs to be evidence other than expressing it (something in the context calls for the expression of it)(#641)--as Austin says, something phishy. We can see intention, even a cat's (#647).

We can intend to say something--we can reflect and try to say something specific, perhaps explicitly trying to influence (ahead of its reception) which way to take what we think might be misunderstood as another sense of the expression. However, most times we don't intend what we say in this sense, as a deliberate choice. — Antony Nickles

I think that we generally use words with intention, particularly by intending one meaning of a word or sentence rather than another; intending to express something or other. Whether it is taken in the right way, understood or interpreted correctly by its audience is another matter. However, I confess that I don't think this talk of intention is very relevant to anything Wittgenstein was saying. — Luke

The reason why it is relevant is this picture: you say something, something specific, specified by your intention, let's say following the rules, communicated correctly. And so "whether it is", say, heard, is now on us. If we take it in the wrong way and misunderstand, you are still assured you said the right words in the right way to intend one thing rather than another. If there is a problem, it is a problem of "interpretation" rather than the responsibility of the parties. This leads to the characterization of language as slippery, which ends up with us wanting to cause words to follow a set of rules.

you were bordering on a misunderstanding whereby grammar is no longer about language, but about the things themselves (about "the world" and "our lives in it"). Hence, my blunt responses to remind you that grammar is about language.[/qu

It would help if you could say more yourself (to me or for yourself) other than grammar is about language. I'll try again. Witt is giving examples of what we say in certain situations, but not to shed light on what we should or should not say, but to see from that data (of the way we say something in a situation) what it reveals about the grammar of the thing. In drawing out the grammar of pain, we find out what is essential to us, meaningful to us, about pain itself. We indirectly get past Kant's line in the sand by looking back at expressions. If that can't be accepted, I'll need a little more justification and evidence to buy that Philosophical Investigations was meant as just some kind of etiquette book about how we should talk.
— Luke

That, unlike the mathematical, these concepts are opened-ended, extendable into unforeseen contexts. — Antony Nickles

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you appear to suggest that it is not the concepts themselves which can be extended (in terms of their family resemblance), but it is the applications/uses of the concepts which can be extended "into unforeseen contexts". — Luke

Let's try an example, say, the concept of justification. I can be justified if I was right in killing another, in the sense of absolution. But I am also justified to kill another by right, as by authority (by rule, law). Now we say belief (opinion) can be justified. Now based on these first two uses of justification, this could be that my belief has authority (I am right), or it could be in the sense of removing me from any need to stand behind what I say (letting the justification absolve my responsibility). If a police officer, who has the authority to kill someone under certain circumstances, does so under those circumstances, we could say they had justification, but we might be left with the feeling that is no justification, that here, there is authority without absolution. These were two senses/two uses that we could be said to be familiar with, that were applied to a different context (belief), and then both brought to weigh in on their original context in reasonable but contradictory ways.

If I am asked why, given that I was told to add 2, I wrote ‘1002’ after ‘1000’, there is little I can say other than ‘That is what is called “adding 2”. — Baker and Hacker, exegesis of PI 217

What will you say to the poor sod who continues to demand further justifications for why we write '1002' after '1000' when we are told to add 2? How will you avoid "repressing" them during this "crisis"? — Luke

A. No one is going to ask why; we don't need a justification; and what they say is just condescension; and
B. That’s math! All I've been talking about is how the ideal of mathematical concepts affects the rest of our concepts.

Try imagining justifying (the rules of?) the concept of justification in the two uses (senses) in the case of the police shooting above, and now try to reconcile them. Is this enough of a crisis? Is there still "little we can say"? Maybe the law (the rule) represses the sense of what might be just, and a righteousness (based on a moral law) would seem to undermine society's ability to assert its authority.

Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting. — Witt, PI 572

We do not follow a rule to expect something, but are said to be expecting (in that state). — Antony Nickles

The rule pertains to the use of the word "expect", not to (how to) expect something. The emphasis is on "said to be" (expecting). - "we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history". — Luke

If grammar are rules, then in what way is the grammatical rule--that expectation is a state--about the way to use the word expect? And the question is actually how do we judge someone being in
the state of expectation, not just whether we have said expecting correctly.

Imagine it as grammatical claim meant to differentiate "being in a state" from other concepts, say, "being in a position", and to claim we have ways of judging someone else being in a state. This is not explaining a rule we could say they followed rightly. As you say, we are not doing science, but ask yourself what indicators matter to us in saying someone was expecting--are all of them (any of them) rules?

115. A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably. — Luke

None of these quotes help your claim that any of this is just about language, particularly without any explanation of your reading of them, instead somehow imagining that it is clear exactly what they are supposed to point out, without saying anything.

It is not a problem with language that we can't get outside it or that we keep getting the same picture. You are trapped because words are so important, even to you (that you want to fix them), not a trivial annoyance or bewitching filter. It is our desire for certainty that creates the picture. Language is just the means of creating the self-delusion, but it is thus also the method of our self-knowledge.

Pursuing a theme that will be familiar to readers of Cavell's earlier writing, he does not dispute the skeptic's claim that rules lack absolute grounds but laments the skeptic's cure. The cure, associated with Kripke, strips rules of their pretense of resting on an independent reality but then restores a demystified, antifoundationalist version of rules in which they ground themselves not in truth but in consent. Cavell claims that skepticism rejects one justification of conformity to existing rules only to endorse a more sustainable conformity. Skepticism, in this light, encourages conformity to community consensus. This argument about the politics of antifoundationalism should prompt further discussion of the links between liberalism's antifoundationalist update and the ongoing crisis of conformity in US democracy.

Well if this were any more '90s he would have used the word "agreement", but it doesn't seem helpful in getting an idea of the content or Cavell's method or impact. The writer seems particularly stuck with the idea philosophy is always worried about what foundation it does or does not have.

If I can find the time, I think I'll like Cavell. — Zugzwang

The essay we are debating is in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome. It is a later work that builds on The Claim of Reason, which is a massive undertaking, but also his first book of essays, which are easy enough to get through, Must We Mean What we Say. The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein is a good place to start.

What's clearly missing from this list is "compelled" and friends.. but I guess you might want to compare the two sets, if you could be certain the variation isn't stylistic.) — Srap Tasmaner

Imagine we can take every word and placement seriously, as if it all mattered, that nothing is rhetorical (Cavell basically, from The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein). That every unanswered question was for us, every claim subject to our acceptance. If we take it that there is no depth our reading can't reach, maybe we will learn the responsibility we have for our actions, even if only to ourselves. So I do see a reason for the different phrasing: that we have a desire for certainty that forces us to see things a particular way; we are compelled to see a word I say as something I (and you) can be sure of, e.g., that I am tempted by the picture that I use (intend) words in the way, a practice, in which they are supposed to be, normally, rightly (or wrongly).

[my children] move a rook in a great curving arc, flying over various pieces and pawns, and capture my piece. That's not misunderstanding but a signal that they're done for now. The best response always seemed to me to join them — Srap Tasmaner

When we are at a loss as to how to respond, as to how to take an expression, there are many actions we can take: judgment, dismissal, projection, moralism, assumption, etc. Socrates recommends in the Theatetus not to trip up your opponent, looking for controversy, but to be fair, in earnest and, with a friendly and congenial spirit, find out what they really mean. And putting himself in the other's shoes is the exact process by which Witt presents his examples. I haven't read through the idea of the continuation of the relationship we have with the opaque and strange people (p. 223), but one idea is that they are hidden from me, by: me, my inability to join them, ignoring their movements as actions, dismissing their institutions as without purpose.

Some parents tend to be a little tone-deaf about this sort of thing.... Treating failure as self-exclusion from the game (as readers of LW sometimes will) strikes me as similarly tone-deaf. — Srap Tasmaner

The phrasing of not being able to hear a tone, bounces off Witt's image of understanding an expression as like a theme of music (#528). Cavell, In a Pitch of Philosophy, examines the idea of the human voice in philosophy (through opera), and its repression, turning on its head (side) the emperical idea of seeing reality for a hearing, listening for the right sound of an argument.

"I don't want to play anymore right now"... as "I don't want to play" or "I don't understand" or "I don't want to learn this" or any of the various other ways the game you're playing might stop. Being alive to those differences matters[/quote]

Each of these expression have a sense simply of which the child does not want to continue (as overwhelmed, play with you, put more rules on this game making it boring). Outside of their not wanting to engage anymore with the game, is a context the concept is extended into that doesn't involve interaction with the game, but is connected to the fact that they "just can't play anymore right now because my brain is tired". Can we say the sentences now have a different sense? Perhaps as excuses to save pride or avoid shame?

There's no top-down authority on what our noises and marks mean... Any of us can give examples of when 'better' is used appropriately. — Zugzwang

This is actually the basis of Wittgenstein's method. He sets out an example of what we might say (maybe setting out part of its context) and then makes a claim about how and why it seems appropriate or not to fit or to reveal something about us, for us to see for ourselves. This would be why he says he is not advancing theories, because for anything to have value as a grammatical claim, we have to come to it on our own, and then he hasn't really told us anything we didn't already know. There is a difference between a grammatical claim and a definition, but I wanted to acknowledge the democratic affinity.

I've tended to take this in terms of justifying claims that one knows something. A dry example: a king is put in check by a bishop. Someone doubts this or doesn't understand. You explain the rules, perhaps trace the diagonal path of the bishop. If that fails to convince, there's nothing more to do. There's nothing deeper, nothing hidden. — Zugzwang

You may be interested/challenged by Cavell's reading, which I draw out in the first post, as he compares it with Kripke's, who puts an emphasis on rules, and neither take the claim to be that there is a fundamental justification. As a teaser, Cavell points out that we are only inclined to, as he reads it, throw up our hands.

"If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'

If I may jump in, all that's needed is a relatively stable background of conventions. For instance, I trust that you understand well enough what I'm getting at here, thanks to extremely complex conventions in stringing words together that have become almost automatic for both of us. — Zugzwang

Not to quell interest in any topic of discussion, but we are at the moment at which something falls apart: your understanding, our conventions, the "automatic" naturalness of expression and reception, and, in particular--what Witt is discussing here (PI #217, above)--the end of our ability to justify our actions to each other. It is, unfortunately, a tortured thread; I appreciate the interest.

I have referred to this wider sort of grammar - Wittgenstein's concept of grammar - as a corrective to what is indicated by the discussion title: 'Rules' End', and to Antony's explicit statements that some concepts are without rules; the idea that some meaningful language-use is not rule-governed. That's just not the case. — Luke

Not to get in the middle of this, but my pithy yet misleading title is not a narrow claim that we operate at the "end of rules". It would have been better to have said: what happens at the end of justification? What I was shooting for is the end of the idea that Witt is touting rules as a conclusion/solution/judgment rather than an example, among others. The line of discussion of this OP was supposed to be Cavell's reading that takes criteria and our human falibility as more important for Wittgenstein than rules (here championed by Kripke). We strayed into the issue of meaning and use because that picture allows for rules to be structured a certain way, say, to resolve everything other than our following them or not.

IFurthermore, it is a clear misreading by Cavell (followed by Antony) to view PI 217 as pointing to an end to rules or an invitation for further justification. (Cavell reads far too much into the word "inclined".) — Luke

It is simply not clear how this is a misreading, though I see that is how you adamantly feel. This would be a case where, as Cavell says, we may come to where I say, "This is simply what I do", but that does not confer any authority, as we have not come to any resolution of what is "right". Thus, just an emphatic declaration that he is (I am) wrong carries no weight. We would need questions for clarification, counter-examples, to see the sense of another view, to address a claim seriously, etc., but not a patent rejection. It were as if there was a rule, and I am simply not following it. Here I would think, at the very least, there would need to be an accounting for the evidence of the text. Why, then, are we only inclined to say so? Witt uses the phrase at least 30 other times in the text, say, at #144. He also uses, "we should like to say", "we are tempted to say", "we might say". I would call these the data of investigation. Evidence from which he makes his claims to the grammar of an example, sometimes for correction, sometimes to allow for greater possibilities.

Also, the opportunity left by this only being an inclination is not for further justification (though possibly repeated, or reworded) but to show that we are now two people (or society and me) in a relationship (here, "teacher" and "student" as in #211 to "continue" after "instruction"--call it justifyor and justifyee if you like) that may continue the conversation about the crisis, or rift between us. This does not have to be about what justifying can not seem to accomplish here: to resolve whether the rule was followed correctly. We may have to turn against ourselves in the sense of finding the rule no longer agrees with our lives.[/quote]

Rather than judging whether the use of a word correctly follows the rules for a practice (language), I am judging how an expression, something said, fits into a concept (it's possibilities) based on the concept's criteria, e.g. "How did you mean 'I know'? [what use of "I know" is this?]"
— Antony Nickles

Your question "How did you mean 'I know'?" implies what I am saying here. You are asking what use of 'I know' was intended by the speaker. Why do you think that we use language without intention? — Luke

The question only comes after the expression. My claim is that we don't always intend what we express; that that idea creates a necessity which, as Witt would say, forces a picture upon us (of causality). We can intend to say something--we can reflect and try to say something specific, perhaps explicitly trying to influence (ahead of its reception) which way to take what we think might be misunderstood as another sense of the expression. However, most times we don't intend what we say in this sense, as a deliberate choice. As I said, we ask "what did you intend when you said?" when (after) what you say is unexpected in this situation. Witt puts it as "An intention is embedded in its situation" (#337). Sometimes it would be strange to even ask what we intended, as when a question can not exist. The possibility, and possibilities, of us having to clear up the sense of an expression is the grammatical structure for the concept of intention, not casual or determined or a part of what happens during expression.

"If anyone says: "For the word 'pain' to have a meaning it is necessary that pain should be recognized as such when it occurs"—-one can reply: "It is not more necessary than that the absence of pain should be recognized." The point is not to explain how language works, but to feel out the limits and logic of the world (our lives in it). (#119)
— Antony Nickles

No, the point is grammar, and what it makes sense to say (e.g. about pain). — Luke

That is one point, but not the one I was trying to draw your attention to there. I was pointing out the framing of the claim, not commenting on the topic of the paragraph. Those are not mutually exclusive.

Sometimes we just have to be an example, #208. #474.
— Antony Nickles

You have cited #208 a few times now, but I think you are mistaking what Wittgenstein is saying. He is not talking about something "beyond the rules", as suggested by your OP. — Luke

As poorly misleading as the OP is named, I would still say: other than rules, but of course my topic was the influence of the mathematical on the desire for rules to play the part Kripke gives them. The mathematical can be extended repetitively with certainty and completeness for every application, predetermined and predictably (even when--particularly when--"used" incorrectly). It is this desire for certainty which "muddles" our expectation for everything else, generalizing the picture of meaning based on rules to impose as close to those criteria as can be across the board in place of the ordinary, various means of judgment for each different thing. Now granted grammar is sometimes about limits and do/don't-do, but clinging to that alone is to overlook that, as in this passage of Witt, our application of a concept may be in a never-before-mentioned way. That, unlike the mathematical, these concepts are opened-ended, extendable into unforeseen contexts. That we are not at a loss (limited), because complete knowledge is not necessary in advance to "continue a series" (with the ordinary this is metaphorical for extending a concept into a new context). Examples are necessary because we can not explain rules for our concepts that cover every situation--account for every context or predict the way in which they may go wrong. One example may shed light on a grammatical consideration, an implication when we say something in a certain situation; something to keep in mind, to educate us about ourselves, what we are getting ourselves into in saying this, here.

A cardinal point of W.’s argument is that a series of examples can itself be employed as the expression of a rule. Cf. ‘Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of games . . . and so on’ (PI §75) — Hacker

This question is by the Interlocutor, who desires or believes possible a "complete expression" of a concept by explanations and describing examples. I take Witt's answer to the question here as no (or, not outside mathematical concepts, like the height of a mountain). In the paragraphs following he points out that we can draw boundaries around different parts--mine loose and yours definitive--but that ultimately most times we can't completely express a concept by explanation; we can't say what we know (#78) or we can't anticipate the 9 mil ways an expression may be meaningful (#79)(even apart from just "what I intend it to be").

Despite that false start, there is a lot to agree with Hacker about unpredictability and our desire to overcome that. I would say he sees the problem of our desire for predictability, but his remedy is to contain our involvement to salvage some surety. He puts the variability on our unpredictability, when I would say its just that most concepts (non-mathematical) are categorically without the mathematical criteria (certainty) we hope for, even from rules.

And Hacker couches the desire for predictability as our delusion, where I take Witt's Interlocutor to be voicing our real, human fear of the threat of skepticism. Witt is saying that fear is what stokes the desire for certainty, say in our rules, removing the involvement of the fallible, unpredictable human, who is, then, merely subject to judgment based on those rules--the outcome of an expression falling on my precarious shoulders alone.

What do you make of the last [ paranthetical ] paragraph of PI 217?

"(Remember that we sometimes demand explanations for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the explanation a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing.)" — Luke

I don't see how it alters Cavell's reading of the paragraph above, only to say that we sometimes judge by the adherence to grammar rather than the truth of a statement; that saying something the right way (in the right form) is more important than saying the right thing (content).

We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do (BB 143). The chain of reasons has an end. When one has exhausted justifications, one reaches bedrock. This is what I do; and, of course, this is what is to be done. * * * W.’s point is not that where justifications thus give out my action is unjustified (haphazard, a free choice), but rather that it has already been justified * * * The bedrock is the point at which justifications terminate, and the question ‘why?’ is answered simply by ‘Well, that is what we call “. . .”.’ — Baker & Hacker on #217

Hopefully, this shows that PI 217 is not indicating an invitation for further justifications. — Luke

The standard reading of Witt here is based on our requirement eventually for some kind of foundational justification, which is most times projected through all his terminology (forms of life, language games); that our shared lives are the final or preexisting justification for our choices. Kripke allows us "inclinations" and Hacker appears to give us "propensities", but the common practice is "what is to be done". This is Cavell's point in saying that Kripke's picture ends the conversation before we even begin about what to do when we are at a loss, what to base our action on in a situation when our justifications to each other run out--that Kripke's picture limits our relationship to judge/defendant. This is not to say there are further justifications, but that we are only "inclined" to end the discussion with a shrug (which you and Hacker have completely ignored). Cavell calls this (p. 95) assertion of judgment ("the repudiation of deviance") a "stance"** to the other (not a ground) without the authority to then claim we are right. (**you will notice the similarity of a "stance" to an "attitude" or a "conviction", as quoted previously about ethics). The desire for normativity creating social repression, suppressing the fallibility of the ordinary with the need to avoid the chaos of the skeptic's conclusions: we may not be justified, we may not (continue to) share a life, we can not be sure, relying on our knowledge and predetermination of practice or rules.

Part of the reason to discuss rules would be to draw a limit around how rules differ from grammatical/logical rules.
— Antony Nickles

How do they differ? There is no difference. There aren't rules on one side and grammatical rules on the other. The rules are techniques that we learn how to apply, as per B&H's exegesis of PI 208. — Luke

There are grammatical limits (of identity) that you could call a rule (demarcating a threat from a warning), but not all grammar nor criteria are rules (and not something we are necessarily taught explicitly). As I've noted, Wittgenstein realizes our grammar shows our interests in our lives (what is important to us about something), and I'll point to this again as well:

Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.)
— Witt, PI #572

To say expectation is a state, is not to say there is a "rule"; nor is pointing out that it is a state necessary for making the word "expect" have the sense of anticipating, much less an obligation, or probability. We do not follow a rule to expect something, but are said to be expecting (in that state). The judgment of that being the case is made by our criteria for expecting, how it differs from waiting, is similar to hoping, etc., we could say, necessarily, there must be the possibility of something going wrong (we are not sure or certain), but this is a categorical requirement, not a rule.

Witt's term "concept" is used in the sense of a classification for what we do: apologizing, understanding, knowing, seeing, etc. These are parts of our lives, so concepts are not abstract from that, nor individual nor arbitrary.
— Antony Nickles

But neither is "what we do" separate from the words "apologizing", "understanding", "knowing", "seeing". The words encompass "what we do" and our uses/meanings of the concepts. — Luke

One hopes our langauge and the world are always together, connected in a way that is inseparable, but sometimes our language does not keep up with our lives, sometimes our words are dead to degenerate times, sometimes the use of words must fly in the face of practice. So to say we are only talking about language is minimizing, but to assume that in talking about language we are talking about our lives without separation, is to ignore the threats that exist to our communication and understanding, our lives as shared.

Let's call it the grammar of our ethical situations.
— Antony Nickles

Let's not. — Luke

Okay, sure.

virtue ethics tries to answer the question "how do we ought to be ?" while consequentialism, deontologism and other views on ethics tries to answer the question "what do we ought to do ?". — Hello Human

Perhaps what you do is who you are; in which case asking what you ought do is exactly asking who you should be. — Banno

Deontology is an asking of what I should do... in terms of best reason that can be brought to bear * * * I do not see ethics as identical with personal virtue or moral character. — tim wood

I would just add that we seem to agree that a moral moment is a particular situation, say, when we don't know what to do, at the end of the rules or customs, or when our lives conflict with our culture. It may help to say we make the best decision we can based on all the available information--the most rational decision; based on the best methods or highest standards for our conduct. Though a fear remains that our decision is individual or personal, seemingly arbitrary. I would say that in Nietzsche, Emerson, Wittgenstein, and more currently, Cavell, this is both an argument about what to do and our part in that. The decision is not Ought vs. Am, but a realization that I play a part. Not that the reasons I decide upon before acting stand by themselves against society ( as just interests, desires), but that I must be willing to stand behind my acts (or not). We define ourselves (as @Banno points out), but we do not rely on our independence. I am responsible to answer for what I have done, maybe even without fobbing off on a rule or justified value or personal superiority or rationality (though I may have rationale). Cavell puts this that my relation to the world is more than knowledge, Emerson says character is higher than intellect, Wittgenstein asks us to see someone as having a soul (instead of wanting to know it), Nietzsche expresses this as attaining the human (Cavell also speaks of our "voice"). All of this is surrounded by ethical admonitions to look closely at each case, in history, with a context, extended from our rules and concepts and culture, even while turning against it, being adverse to it, beyond it.

I never quite understood why logical positivism kinda faded out of existence and was taken over by a new methodology in science called fallibilism, so named after Popper established it as a better method than verification of conjectures or hypothesi.

In my opinion, it seems that when stating a hypothesis in science, we are guided by existing factual knowledge about the domain or field of study in question, and upon feeling quite confident that it is true with respect to existing knowledge, we attempt to design experiments that (and here I'm not sure) validate(?) or invalidate a hypothesis. — Shawn

I don't have the knowledge to talk much about science, but my reading of logical positivism comes down to the Tractatus and A.J. Ayer's book on language and logic, and J.L. Austin's essays in response and Wittgenstein's response to himself (and the Vienna Circle).

My understanding is that a referential or correspondence picture of language is not refuted by the later Witt nor Austin. The problem they both saw was that it is only a part of language and meaning. Austin will say there are more ways to be "true" than just a statement being true or false; Wittgenstein will discovery that there is a sense of logic (grammar) to every different part of our lives, not just one all-encompassing theory of meaning (as I believe @Seppo already pointed out).

However, even if we simply keep reference to a particular narrow area, there is still the motivation which drove LP, which I believe is alive and well (though in various forms). The certainty and universality; predictability and predetermination that we desire (to refute skepticism) is the criteria that drove LP. That ultimately limited it, but the desire remains as a constant temptation for philosophy (and humans). Wittgenstein attempts to tease out why we want this, but it still infects our understanding of communication, our politics, our vision of knowledge, and, I would think, our science (though, again, fuzzy there). All I can add to the science is something I read by Cavell in The Claim of Reason; he claims that the "factness" of a fact does not come from its correspondence with the "world". Its "sciencey-ness" of completeness, certainty, predictability, etc., comes from the method of science, how well it is done. Thus, we can have the solidity we imagine "the world" gives us, but still incorporate mistakes, changes in course, and even the kind of paradigm shifts which Kuhn discusses; "being wrong" does not crumble everything to the ground because the method of science is the constant thread.

Witt Rules 9/2

If you are talking about "what counts" in the concepts, then you are talking about the criteria of the concepts. — Luke

Yes I am, and I agree. Cavell says Kripke just takes Wittgenstein to be giving rules too much importance. The hard part here is that Witt does examine rule-following as an example (as he does with understanding, thinking), and he is not wrong about the concept, which makes it seem central. Also, it is tempting for rules to clear up our uneasiness with the uncertainty and unclarity of what we say.

I don't make, or intend for, words to have "a public, conventional use". They already have that without me. I only intend how I use them. — Luke

Intend them every time? Not just when we stop and consider how to use our words, but every word is intentional?

Again, how is using an expression "intentionally" not causal?
— Antony Nickles

It is causal. I cause my use of the expression.[/quote]

And this is where I couldn't help but wonder what is happening here. Colloquially perhaps this picture of causing amounts to the same thing when I frame it that we say something, express something, in that there is no evaluating it except against the external practice, in your case, along rules, in mine with criteria in conjunction with, to whom and the place and time in which it is said.

However, there can clearly be right and wrong ways of using these words (such as "dreaming" or "justice") — Luke

A word can be judged right or wrong when they are names or defined. This is also how words together can look like a sentence we understand, as "I am here" (#513), which in that sense cannot be judged as language incorrectly used, though neither can we say we know the importance of the expression from that determination alone. The picture of meaning solely within language does make judgment specific, recursive, and predictable, but an expression is a sentence in an event (in time and place) and criteria are what matters to us in our lives, what is meaningful to each actual thing. The uses of the word justice in its concept are what is just in our lives. Grammar is what is essential about a thing. (#371)

One ought to ask... how the word 'imagination' is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word "imagination" as my question is. — Witt, PI # 370

Part of the problem here I think is the method Witt uses. He is looking at or imagining what we say or would say, and he will call that “language” sometimes, so it may seem as if he is only talking about how language works. The method of making claims (they will look like statements) about the implications when we say X, is to, e.g., reveal how we judge that X is the case (grammar/criteria). An example (of an expression in time with a possible context) like when we say "Did you intend to shoot the mule or was it an accident?" (Austin) shows a use of the word "intend", but it also tells us something about (real-life) intention (it only comes up when something goes wrong). A lot of times these claims look like statement about what we can or cannot say: "If anyone says: "For the word 'pain' to have a meaning it is necessary that pain should be recognized as such when it occurs"—-one can reply: "It is not more necessary than that the absence of pain should be recognized." The point is not to explain how language works, but to feel out the limits and logic of the world (our lives in it). (#119)

If we can only know afterwards whether an expression is meaningful, then how can we teach (the meaningful uses of) language to anyone? What is it that gets taught in the teaching of a language? — Luke

It is only when there is a problem that we worry about where an expression fits into our concepts, how it is meaningful, which we learn as we grow up into our lives of actions and judgments and repercussions, etc. Our concept of a thing is absorbed with coming into our culture, being acculturated. I don't tell you (the grammar or rules or explanation of) how to choose something, it is part of our lives. We can, of course, examine what it means to be said to choose something (its grammar), or work out in a particular instance to what extent we could call something a choice, but neither of this is necessary before or after. Sometimes we just have to be an example, #208. #474.

Again:
— Luke

"...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”. — Witt, PI #201

A "way of grasping" that is not "an interpretation" is not meant to make a rule (and thus a word) fundamental, final, but to say that obeying a rule is not to interpret the rule, be an interpreting of it; it is simply the act (event) of applying it in a specific case. Since it is not an interpretation, it does not answer a conflict about a rule, nor eliminate the possibility of interpretation. Though interpretation is not involved at this point in this case, we still express a rule, interpret them by "substitution of one expression of a rule for another". Id. And you still (may) have to justify your action. (In this case, you could point to the rule, but you can have different justifications, as you do when rules are not involved). Of course, justifying how you obeyed the rule as you did may lead to a point where we run out of justifications.

I really don't understand your argument that language (or an expression) is not used. — Luke

I think there is an important difference between a persons's use of words following the rules of our practices or not, and the picture of something said and then resolving any confusion, justification of how it fits into (which use or sense of) a concept by means of its criteria and the situation, and where that leaves us afterwards. Rather than judging whether the use of a word correctly follows the rules for a practice (language), I am judging how an expression, something said, fits into a concept (it's possibilities) based on the concept's criteria, e.g. "How did you mean 'I know'? [what use of "I know" is this?]"

Cavell would say this is placing too much importance on rules, not seeing that rule-following is discussed and then moved on from to show how the grammar of other concepts differs.
— Antony Nickles

Why do you (or Cavell) think rule-following is discussed at all? — Luke

Part of the reason to discuss rules would be to draw a limit around how they differ from grammatical/logical rules. Grammar can logically differentiate between the identity of one thing from another, but they also tell us how something matters to us, what our interest in a concept is.

So I am inclined to distinguish between the essential and the inessential in a game too. The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. — Witt, PI #564

There's also the grammar of understanding a sentence (#527), seeing as opposed to looking; pain (see index); seeing an aspect pp. 166-177.

can you provide a reference that W shows "how the grammar of other concepts differs"? — Luke

Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.) — Witt, PI #572

To say expectation is a state, is not a "rule"; nor is this a rule for using the word "expect". We do not follow a rule to expect something, but are said to be expecting (in that state). The judgment of that being the case is made by our criteria for expecting, how it differs from waiting, is similar to hoping, etc., we could say, necessarily, there must be the possibility of something going wrong, but this is a categorical requirement, not a rule.

But if the judgment is simply that my use is senseless (wrong), then that does not give us anything to do other than correction (re-conformity) or rejection.
— Antony Nickles

Why do you need something more to do? Nobody complains that breaking a rule of badminton "does not give us anything to do other than correction...or rejection". — Luke

There are some things people disagree about (justice, beauty, the limits of knowledge) where resolving them has to do with more than the application of a rule; though we can even disagree about the application of those, and our justifications possibly come to an end.

Expression is judged on criteria, not rules, and words are (nothing without) concepts.
— Antony Nickles

I think W would say you have it backwards; that concepts are nothing without (the use of) words. Concepts are ideas; mental contents. — Luke

Okay, you need words, yes. Witt's term "concept" is used in the sense of a classification for what we do: apologizing, understanding, knowing, seeing, etc. These are parts of our lives, so concepts are not abstract from that, nor individual nor arbitrary.

And to say, e.g., that "recognizing your fault" is a criteria for an apology does not mean that it is a rule of correctness. The apology may still come off (I may accept it), as you may acknowledge your blame but I may still not consider it an apology.
— Antony Nickles

Why would you not consider it an apology if you accept it as such? Or is your acceptance or rejection about something other than whether or not it meets the criteria of being an apology (i.e. the grammar of "apology")? (Consider PI 354-355 and PI 496-497) — Luke

You may acknowledge your transgression, but, yes, part of the grammar of an apology is that I can reject it. Now, you may be apologizing correctly, and I may be “wrong” in rejecting it, but that is all within what is acceptable, and I may have my own reasons (outside the criteria that identify an apology), only one of which may be that I do or do not feel you are sincere. In this way, I matter more than the rules.

Unless you can provide evidence to demonstrate that Wittgenstein is talking about morality in PI... then the evidence explicitly indicates that Wittgenstein's interest is limited only to grammar. He is not concerned with morality in PI. — Luke

I'm thinking your idea of morality is different. Let's call it the grammar of our ethical situations.

"What is internal is hidden from us."... If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me. — Witt, PI #572

"I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible. — Witt, PI p. 223

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. — Witt, PI p. 152

Examples of Witt pointing out that there is a limit to knowledge (as with apologizing). We do not know the other by knowing what is going on with them. The "reasons for the conviction" make up our moral stance toward the other. Our desire for certainty (that "picture") overshadows our grammatical position--of reacting or not--to someone writhing in pain. This is our human condition of having an "attitude" toward the other (not based solely on knowledge). Say, I treat them as if they have a soul.

I have also said he is setting out an ethical epistemology; that it matters the kind of search we do (that we can't start with a desire for mathematical criteria or a need for rules).

Not falling into the desire to penetrate phenomena (to get at a thing in itself with certainty) #90. Not requiring ideal "mathematical" criteria, but sticking to our ordinary criteria that each concept has. #107 And I believe you have minimized his advice not to take the straight road of purity and the ideal (#420) as that he is merely dispelling the idea of something internal. But the whole point of dispelling that picture is to make people aware of our human desire to want to have something fixed to hang our skeptical hat on (whether internal or external); to admonish us (emphatically, morally) to keep our head up and look around to see the perfect ordinary means of being confidently certain, rather than mathematically so (p.191).

There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts. — Antony Nickles

Which concepts do not involve rules? — Luke

Hard to know how to take this. I don't mean to claim there are concepts that do not involve grammar at all (though see below). But the role of grammar as a gauge for identity, for a thing to be that thing, is judged by what is important in our lives and for our judgments, which cannot be entirely codified in advance in a particular structure (a "rule"), then generalized as part of all language. The grammar of concepts is more varied than simply (only) judging right and wrong (in accordance with a rule), such as what counts in the concepts of thinking, being in pain, seeing more than looking, mistaking, dreaming, guessing thoughts, understanding (as like a musical theme #527), not to mention the differences of the role (and limits) of grammar in the concepts of justice, beauty, virtue, progress, knowing the other's pain, illusion, fairy tales, nonsense poems (#282), etc.

However, even beyond a concept's grammatical requirements, a concept can be extended (#67, #209) into new contexts (because they are expressions of our interest #570), as we may claim something else/more to be essentially significant (as when our lives diverge from our concepts). The totality of conditions of a concept's grammar are not worked out ahead of time (#183). And concepts cannot all be taught by explaining rules, but in some cases only by giving/being an example or by practicing (#208).

It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, — Antony Nickles

To whom is it "senseless" if not we English-speakers? — Luke

The point is that an expression does not carry "sense" (or meaning) or "senselessness", as if within it, but that we make sense of it, or give up, call it "senseless", as in there is no sense of a concept with which we can associate it to see how it is meaningful, not that it is categorically without sense because it does not follow a rule.

But it still has an impact — Antony Nickles

Having an impact is not synonymous with having sense. — Luke

Even if we cannot make sense of an expression, place it within a sense of a concept--its grammar and criteria--a "sense" is not the only gauge or limit or result of an expression (you may just stare and gape #498).

How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein defines meaning in terms of use as an alternative to the commonplace picture that meaning is a mental act. You are questioning how use is not a mental act? If use is a mental act, and if 'meaning is use' as W says, then meaning must also be a mental act. This would defeat the purpose of Witt's definition of meaning in terms of use. — Luke

I'm not sure how this isn't entirely circular, but, yes, I am questioning "explaining" "meaning" (let's say, how it always works) as "using" words, as (the act of?) your "meaning" it, or "intending" a meaning, even if my "meaning" is judged by conformity to a practice or convention.

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Witt, PI #43

Not sure we can have a universalized picture of "meaning is use" when we would only define it that way most of the time. If my use of language in accordance with the rules for a practice is not the only definition of "meaning", then what are the other cases and how can these coexist? My claim is that in determining what is meaningful about an expression, it fits into, or we figure out how it fits into, what is important in our lives, which is "its use" within a concept, i.e., "what is the meaning (of this expression)?" is to ask in which way is it to have significance (between two options of a concept), what implications are we to associate (as we are surprised you are willing to adopt those of the concept that appears to fit your expression), etc. If that is the definition in most cases, then other cases would be where there is no importance and no implications, as in the case of simply referring to an object. Here, "meaning which?" is just to connect a demonstrative (this, that) or point out which object. Another case would be the expression of a definition, such as "The meaning of X will be Y", which would be to say, the meaning is all given, set, decided in and by the expression. There are no questions of context in these cases. Another case would be in which we expect the expression to be intended, chosen, purposeful, as in art, or a speech, as we would then claim something about the speaker "They are meaning to say X".

I suppose I could ask you how using a hammer is not a mental act? — Luke

If the analogy is that an expression is used as a hammer is used (as a tool), it does not follow that all expressions are "used", even though I grant that we can choose what we say, and even can agree that some concepts are (can be) tools, they can do things (as Austin points out), like promising; and that we can even try to do something with an expression, if a concept allows, not as if intending, but subject to failure, though not based on adherence to a rule, but to the other's acknowledgement of its success, like apologizing; or that saying something correctly is not to necessarily cause anything, as when threatening or persuading or truth-telling. Also, a hammer can be a tool, under the concept of hammering, but then so can a rock, though, even if used to hammer, is not then a hammer; and a hammer can be a weapon, but then would we say we have "used it" wrong? broken the rules of hammering? one could say I adhered to the rules for hammering (though on a person), but that is both true and yet seems to completely miss the point, as if to want to determine the meaning by an intellectual act. Maybe the use of the hammer is a foregone conclusion rather than a discussion, but, even so, the judgment of whether it is hammering or bludgeoning would be clear without involving "your" use at all.

How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? — Antony Nickles

Because I can't make words mean whatever I want them to mean. But I can use them with the conventional uses/meanings that they have. And intentionally so. — Luke

I agree that we cannot "make words mean whatever we want them to mean", but we also cannot make words mean something they can mean (our want does not factor in). In this picture you are still "meaning" them--using them to (or making them) "mean" some specific thing (here, a public, conventional use). Again, how is using an expression "intentionally" not causal? To take the "sense" or "meaning" out of your head and put it in the world, still leaves you in control of which use is meant, whether done right or wrong. Whether associated with a private meaning or a public one, to use them or to intend them collapses into your "meaning" them--if this is not by some mental process, how? Again, we sometimes choose what we say, but we do not always do so, nor "intend" a use for what we say, as if our intention was always picking which use we wanted.

If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. — Antony Nickles

How can we know the meaning/use afterwards if we don't know the meaning/use beforehand? — Luke

The use of "knowing", afterwards, is in the sense of figuring out ("Did you intend to shoot that mule?"); and before, that we are not aware ("I didn't know that was offensive!"), that we have not worked out (can not) all the issues that might come up ("It doesn't matter if you believe it's raining, you can't prove it."), we are not aware of all the implications, obligations that are involved. At neither point do we "know" a concept in its entirety, with certainty, in every application (context), even all of its possibilities. Sometimes there will be no issue, sometimes our speech will turn out empty, purposeless, sometimes we do not realize what we have said, sometimes what we say will need to change the world before it can be known, in the sense of taken in.

So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futility. — Antony Nickles

You're talking about what can happen in the future, as if a language-game or a game like chess is played according to all the rules over time that a game has had, does have, or will have in the past, present, and future. There might be conventional uses/meanings in the future which are not currently conventional uses/meanings, but that doesn't mean they have any meaning or use to us now. Should we postpone Wimbledon until we know what all the rules of tennis will be? Can we not decide whether or not a move in a game is legal (or makes sense) now? — Luke

I am not talking about the world (necessarily) changing after we say something, but that the discussion of how an expression is meaningful, if necessary, begins after something is said. The implication you assume is exactly the picture of rules for use that imagines we know all of the applications of a concept ahead of time, as if to resolve every discussion except whether we "used the expression" correctly. And there are games in which we can decide or agree to the legal rules beforehand, they just aren't all our varied life measured differently for each kind of thing (concept). Chess or tennis have rules, but those rules are not the grammar for their identity, but just, rules, for a game, that we agree on so we completely know what to expect with certainty. In this sense, they use (some of) the same criteria as "mathematical" rules. Basically, these example do not generalize to all concepts. Cavell would say this is placing too much importance on rules, not seeing that rule-following is discussed and then moved on from to show how the grammar of other concepts differs. But some people latch on to rules because they satisfy the desire for certainty and evaluation and prediction, etc.

If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end. — Antony Nickles

What's the difference in terms of language? — Luke

Maybe part of the problem here is the conviction that what we say does not create a relationship between the speaker and the listener, and, if so, I agree that it may not necessarily (most days there are no misunderstandings, or no one cares at least if there are). But if the judgment is simply that my use is senseless (wrong), then that does not give us anything to do other than correction (re-conformity) or rejection.

We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are embedded in our lives). — Antony Nickles

You seem to be talking about the criteria of our concepts, while I am talking about the rules for the use of our words. — Luke

I'm arguing those are two competing pictures. Expression is judged on criteria, not rules, and words are (nothing without) concepts.

— Luke

[A criterion] is not part of a theory of meaning, but a modest instrument in the description of the ways in which words are used....‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ (PI §580)... is a synopsis of grammatical rules that determine what we call ‘the inner’. [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'

The relegation of criteria to merely a description or synopsis is to overlook that they are the means by which we measure whether a thing is such a thing. They mark what counts, what is considered, what conditions need to be met; they allow for grammar itself. Criteria are not rules; we decide what sense an expression has by holding it up to our criteria for what counts in having said one thing rather than another.

— Luke

To explain the criteria for toothache, for joy or grief, intending, thinking or understanding is not to describe an empirical correlation that has been found to hold...To say that q is a criterion for W is to give a partial explanation of the meaning of ‘W’, and in that sense to give a rule for its correct use. — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'

Again, hard to say whether B&H need a correlation or something else that "has [to be] found to hold" but, if so, Wittgenstein does not remove the possibility that nothing will hold (us together). And to say, e.g., that "recognizing your fault" is a criteria for an apology does not mean that it is a rule of correctness. The apology may still come off (I may accept it), as you may acknowledge your blame but I may still not consider it an apology. So to say my contrition is an "explanation of the meaning of" an apology is to discount or limit what is meaningful to me, or in this situation, in exchange for a rule that dictates to me, over, say, my authority; skipping over, me.

— Luke

Philosophical questions commonly concern the bounds of sense, and these are determined by the rules for the use of words, by what it makes sense to say in a language. This is the source of philosophy’s concern with grammatical rules. For by their clarification and arrangement, philosophical questions can be resolved, and philosophical confusions and paradoxes dissolved. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

This paints the picture that we can clarify and arrange the rules for what makes sense regarding our questions, then they will be resolved as confusions or dissolve. Again, this puts our agreement about expressions ahead of the occurrence of an expression, now, by me, here, to you. It may be nothing, or it may be a philosophical moment, where we do not know how to understand the other, continue with our conversation; it may be a moral moment, where what I do in response defines who I am. None of these things are possible in a world where everything is agreed to ahead of time and all our questions are already answered, or deemed senseless, or confused.

— Luke

That a person’s action is rule-governed, that he guides himself by reference to a rule, is manifest in the manner in which he uses rules

(3) The explanatory aspect: [...] An action is explained by giving the agent’s reason why he acted as he did, and the rule which the agent follows provides part or the whole of his reason [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

Our justifications for acting only consist of pointing to rules to the extent a concept involves rules as part of its grammar. As they admit, even then a rule may only provide part of our rationale. We may also qualify our acts with excuses (mitigating our responsibility), extenuating circumstances (pointing to the context), etc. These are not judged as whether we rightly or wrongly followed a rule.

(4) The predictive aspect: The mastery of rule-governed techniques provides foundations for predictions. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

B&H's claim is ambiguous as to who is doing what, when, but let's take it that the foundation on which you or I make a prediction is "mastery of rule-governed techniques". One sense is that how correct I am at predicting you is how well I know the technique--that I am predicting whether you have mastered the technique. But this picture of the certainty of prediction is taken from science's ability to reproduce an outcome based on a fixed method. Wittgenstein has many examples and claims about predictions. At pp. 223-224 he is discussing guessing at thoughts, and claims "the prediction contained in my expression of intention (for example 'When it strikes five I am going home') need not come true, and someone else may know what will really happen.... my prediction (in my expression of intention) has not the same foundation as his prediction of what I shall do, and the conclusions to be drawn from these predictions are quite different." Here there are (at least) two foundations for prediction (even just of intentions). My prediction of what I will do is a hope, a goal, the foundation of which is in a sense a promise to you or myself. This goes wrong not because I don't know what intending or promising is, but that I may break that promise or be kept from it. Your prediction of my action is based on, at least, your familiarity with me ("They always say they'll leave but then they say goodbye to everyone") and/or my knowledge of the context ("They've got too much to do before five"). My "certainty" in this is not my knowledge of the practice of promising (though that may be the threshold, it is not determinate), nor, say, of "meeting a deadline", but that I am certain, as in: resolute, sure of myself, as confident as I am "of any fact", as in: "I would bet money that....", will hold to my conviction, shutting my eyes to anything else (p. 224).

(5) The justificative aspect: A rule is cited in justifying (and also in criticizing) an action — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

This is to want a rule to ensure the correctness of our acts (if we have prepared with mastery); to know we are doing the "right" thing because a rule is the kind of thing that justifies an act definitively, completely. A rule can be cited as justification for an action if the concept of the act allows ("I have freedom of speech!" (a law) or "Freeing Kuwait was a Just War" (based on Christian morality), but not all actions are associated with rules. Say, running into the street during traffic is an action, let's call it risking your life, but we do not have a rule to justify it, make it "wrong", unless that makes it simply frowned upon. We could say it is justified if we risked our life to save another, but that is not a rule, there is no foundation of a mastered technique.

(6) The evaluative aspect: Rules constitute standards of correctness against which to ‘measure’ conduct as right or wrong. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

And this is full circle, which is either that if I have mastered the technique and follow the rule correctly and can ensure that I am right, or it is basic moralism, as, in breaking the rule, I have no other recourse, and so not, possibly misunderstood, but wrong. Nietszche is rolling over in his grave.

Beautiful prose, although I don’t understand all of the allusions. — Wayfarer

Well thank you. Though it's not very analytic of me, all the imagery made me think along those lines. I'm happy to draw out or cite any of the analogy/metaphors.

My feeling about The Enlightenment is that its aim is to bend the world to our will and to make ourselves the arbiter of truth, rather than seek a truth to which we must conform. — Wayfarer

I was mirroring that sentiment in saying, roughly, we impose the criteria for certainty on knowledge, such as universality, predictability, predetermination, abstraction, etc. I feel as if interpreting Plato's forms as metaphysical lost Socrates method, ambition, and aspiration for virtue rather than our modern idea of knowledge.

the spirit of our age is deeply inimical to his kind. We threw the baby of wisdom out with the bathwater of religion. — Wayfarer

I would offer that the culprit is the desire for the outcome (certainty) that science provides, that the same outcome can be reached by anyone, so not only does it have nothing to do with our interests and commitments, but the process does nothing to make us a better person.

If you type in a search for a book or author in Google and then add "Filetype: PDF" after it you will only get links to PDFs (for the most part).

here is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything. — Socrates

we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free — Socrates

liberation from [the ignorance that binds us to] the round of birth and death — Wayfarer

Socrates does speak of the “loosing”, or “setting free” (lysis, apolysis) of the soul — Apollodorus

These conflicting ideas: of the prohibition on ourself (our ego, which would urge us to act), by ourselves, that binds us, in chains, corrupted by our body (politic), or that traps us, in a cave, turned from our truth; and: of the freedom to act, but only if necessitated, from outside ourselves (beside ourselves Thoreau says; our next self Emerson echoes), as an attitude (a chosen position) to our expressions that keeps in mind the end (or death) of the passive reception of our open-ended intuition, because a word is a kind of violence, which kills (the other aspect) as much as it births, so we only speak if we must, if our duty requires it (that Arjuna kill his brother, that Emerson shun his mother and father). Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, definitively makes statements, seemingly factually. But there is also a feeling of extreme restraint, as if he is reluctant to speak (too humble to say "I know") unless he is absolutely certain. Now our understanding from at least the Enlightenment has been that knowledge is that of which we are logically, rationally, validly, emperically certain, but what if our soul is voiced (made "I am!") only when we are certain of ourselves, confident that we have settled the terms of our act, not ignoring its implications, but fated to its consequences, willing to be held responsible, to appear foolish or arrogant or insane, resolved to answer for our need to act, even with our death.

I think [that philosophers are no different than the ordinary person] is very true in a general sense. However, Socrates is advocating the institution of philosopher-kings as a ruling class. So he seems to believe that the philosophical citizen is in some ways better qualified (and therefore entitled to authority) than the nonphilosophical. — Apollodorus

I always saw The Republic not (at least, not just) about how a city should be put together and ruled, but as an analogy for us, individually. Socrates is helping us learn about our practices and ideals. He wants us to be a better person. So the book is about what we are made of, how we ought to rule ourselves (claim authority over our self), what virtuous conduct is in the search for wisdom.

Stanley Cavell makes an interesting case that Socrates is not claiming to have a special or different kind of knowledge. The Apology begins, not with a boast (claim) of Socrates, but that “ 'not mine is the story' that I will tell; rather, I will refer it to a speaker trustworthy to you. Of my wisdom, if indeed it is wisdom of any kind, and what sort of thing it is, I will offer for you as witness the god in Delphi.... Chaerephon... asked [the oracle] whether there was anyone wiser than I. The Pythia replied that no one was wiser."

Cavell takes this as saying that Socrates is not claiming a better position than us. Socrates does not know anything that anyone else cannot see for themselves. The philosopher is not different than the ordinary person; we all have equal authority to make and accept claims. He has nothing better to tell than any other, such as an all-convincing explanation (with the authority of knowledge/logic/science); he is a barren midwife, unable to conceive. The point is that we must all see for ourselves whether a claim has merit; come to it ourselves. We reflect on our practices (remembering he will call it) and draw out the implications of examples (much as J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein did), and, in the process, we become aware of the terms and conditions upon which we speak and act, and, in the process, know ourselves better, are better people for it.

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).
— Antony Nickles

I think this is confused. Language does have rules (grammar) even though it is not "everywhere bounded by rules"; even though the rules are not "complete". — Luke

I think we're just pulling loose threads now, but I am not saying that the picture of language controlled by rules, is that they are necessarily bounded and complete; that is the "mathematical" desire for rules (the ideal). It is that desire that creates the picture of our "meaning" expressions. There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts.

The rules of language (that we are taught when we learn language-games) include how to use words "in accordance with the meanings that they have". And there are right and wrong ways to use them, otherwise any combination of words would make sense and none could be senseless (i.e. otherwise there is no grammar). PI 500 indicates this is not the case. — Luke

It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, with which sense of a concept (a different idea of "sense"). But it still has an impact (#498--imagine modern art which is yet to be understand because its context is too new, there is no known form of the art so the grammar of art comes to an end--but is it then "wrong"?). It is us drawing the boundary(#499), perhaps excluding the other or the expression--not automatically for not following a rule, but purposefully--(#500), as we are inclined to (possibly) leave the student with the exasperation of "This is simply what I do." (#217), or not abandon them.

'Meaning is use' views meaning in the "right light", rather than thinking of meaning as a mental act, — Luke

How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? (If you are "using language", where/how is the "using" process happening?) If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. Other than this sticking point of realizing "the use" is not our "using" (either causing or choosing), the only other thing hanging us up would be, in a sense, the timing (ruling before, or judging after) which affects the process of judgment. (Baker and Hacker do not appear to address the final paragraph of #81 (merely suggesting we compare the regular use of language with the ideal). In that last bit, Witt says that we must get clear about our picture of "meaning" to see why that leads to the idea of operating a calculus.)

What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?
— Antony Nickles

If you're talking about beyond the rules of language, then the answer can't be "more language" or "let's talk it out", because there is no sense beyond the rules of language (i.e. grammar). Grammar is the bounds of sense. — Luke

I will grant that a concept's grammar is where/how we begin our process of judgment, but they are not determinative, pre-determined bounds. It is us that may not know what to do with an expression (what sense it may have), still us that decides if we continue past the logic of grammar. Grammar does not justify or limit our expressions (see above). So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futily. We may court rejection or irrationality, but we are not doomed to it. This is exactly the point of the essay. If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end.

"The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is fixed in advance, so, not like rules.
— Antony Nickles

You seem intent on talking about criteria instead of rules. Are you talking about ordinary rules or ordinary criteria? — Luke

When Witt refers to the ordinary he means all the criteria that are not "mathematical" (except for "mathematical" concepts). Mathematical criteria would be complete, universal, certain. etc. Criteria is a part of grammar; they are the measure of our judgments about a certain concept: whether we have made an excuse, the things that count in being said to have an opinion (#573), making a mistake (#51), reading (#159), recognizing you have raised your arm (#625)--roughly, of having satisfied what is essential to us about a concept (its grammar). We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are imbedded in our lives).

But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation.
— Antony Nickles

Do you have a reference? — Witt, PI 520

All the talk of the sublime, logic, wanting to know another's pain (with certainty); basically the entire struggle with the Interlocutor and the reason we need to look and see the individual grammar of something rather than give in to our desire to have a generalized understanding.

I'm not sure I would call that "reading between the lines" so much as the big picture. Witt does not say things directly because they won't matter unless you see it, come to it, yourself. There are tons of backwards, hinted statements and questions left to be answered by us. He is also the writer of the Tractatus, so he still will not allow himself to say something he is unsure of, so that leaves a lot of ground covered only about how we go wrong, removing generalized explanations, but where we go from there is wide open, left unconstrained.

There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world.
— Antony Nickles

How is aspect blindness related, and do you have a reference for the knowledge part? — Witt, PI 520

Getting into this is for another time, but, if you're interested: If we cannot see something as something (p. 213), then we may want to "know" (be convinced) that someone is in pain (p. 223), rather than react to them as a person in pain (one aspect of the same thing skipped over by another; here, us). We may not treat them (have an attitude towards them) as someone who has a soul, in wanting to have knowledge that they do (proof for our opinion)(p. 179). That our eyes are shut (p. 224) by our conviction for certainty (p. 223).

The philosophical realization is that our lives involve what interests us, what matters to us, what our justifications look like, what obligations we have, how we judge, are accused, make excuses, etc. What careens us from "objective" to "subjective" is the fear of the fact that there is nothing stopping us from disagreeing about moral issues. Wittgenstein threads the needle with a few things. One being the solidity of us all being human, our culture, our language, etc., which people could intellectually pick apart if it were a moral theory, but Witt shows that every little thing (say, that I listed) has its own criteria, own ways of being rational; and, because of that variety and specificity, if and when we disagree, there is some mutual history to extend from (not manifest from thin air) and we have ways of working out our differences (which may be personal, but rarely secret--apart from anyone). Finally, that when we express ourselves, or judge the other, we are doing it, each separately, we are responsible, we define ourselves in that act, we are answerable, we stand for something. So we may end up disagreeing, but we at least have the ability to develop what our rationale are and what our position will mean for who we will be in saying it, and thus we have the possibility to respect the other for taking their position even though we disagree.

e.

I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke

We're in the ballpark. "The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is not fixed in advance. There are of course other kinds of rules than “mathematical” ones — But it is the desire for rules like math that Cavell is saying leads to Kripke’s picture of a rule-driven language (a complete system).

We do not invent their meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also be clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Witt, PI # 81

Wittgenstein is saying that the picture that we "mean" sentences (use them) is what leads us to think language operates on definite rules. That picture of langauge comes from an aspiration for langauge to operate like math, sublimely.

We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke

Well, again, I agree we do choose words (sometimes) and we do say them (in a context), what else is happening? what else does "us using words" look like? if we are using words to mean something, are we always using them? "mean" them every time? does it really change anything if we simply move the same picture of "meaning" from some internal process to something external (rules)?

A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke

At least we see that a concept does not operate with a complete set of applications already worked out. The judgment that the game is tennis (in this case) is not made by rules (but by criteria), even though there are rules to tennis (which one has to be broken or removed for it to not be tennis?). And if we do not have a complete system of rules (#133), then how can rules be the (only) way language operates? What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?

Consider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke

emphasis added

Well, in chess we choose every move, we deliberate over it, we consider the consequences, etc. We do not have this self-consciousness with most things we say or do. Only when an expression or action is not straightforward in the context, is there a need afterwards to sort out what use of a concept applies--not beforehand by the rules, or in you "meaning" some use. Yes, we do not decide the grammar of a concept, but we also can not ensure which use our words will have. We may want to make a request for the salt, but our emotions, or ego, or my authority over you (and whatever else comes into play of the context) make my expression a command, despite and apart from my desires and intentions.

However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke

Making the discussion about rules so important definitely makes any ethical or moral themes seem insignificant. But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation. The pursuit of knowledge of our lives through an investigation of our language, learning about ourselves, the other, can be done in an ethical manner, attending to each grammar for each different thing, or tainted by the desire for an all-inclusive answer.

e.

I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke

We're in the ballpark. Yes, it is the desire for rules like math that Cavell is saying leads to Kripke’s picture of a rule-driven language (a complete system). "The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is not fixed in advance.

We do not invent their [ word's ] meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with picturing acting/speaking as done "in accordance with the meanings that they have" because criteria are not rules; judgment is whether you have met them, not whether you followed them, the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).

quote="Witt, PI # 81"]All this [ impulse to the ideal ] , however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also be clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means orunderstands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.[/quote]

So the picture that we "mean" sentences (use them) leads us to think language operates on definite rules. And that picture of language comes from an aspiration for langauge to operate like math, sublimely. So we must attain greater clarity about meaning.

We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke

Well, again, I agree we do choose words (sometimes) and we do say them (in a context), but what else is happening? what else does "us using words" look like? if we are using words to mean something, are we always using them? "mean" them every time? isn't this simply to move the same picture of "meaning" from some internal process to something external (rule, practice)?

A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke

At least we see that a concept does not operate with a complete set of applications already worked out. The judgment that the game is tennis (in this case) is not made by rules (but by criteria), even though there are rules to tennis (which one has to be broken or removed for it to not be tennis?). And if we do not have a complete system of rules (#133), then how can rules be the (only) way language operates? What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?

Consider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke

emphasis added

Well, in chess we choose every move, we deliberate over it, we consider the consequences, etc. We do not have this self-consciousness with most things we say or do. And usually only when an expression or action is not straightforward in the context, is there a need (which comes afterwards) to sort out what use of a concept applies--not beforehand by the rules, or in you "meaning" some use. Yes, we do not decide the grammar of a concept, but we also cannot ensure which use our words will have. We may want to make a request for the salt, but our emotions, or ego, or my authority over you (and whatever else comes into play of the context) make my expression a command, despite and apart from my desires and intentions.

However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke

Making the discussion about rules so important definitely makes any ethical or moral themes seem insignificant. But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as an epistemological obligation. The pursuit of knowledge of our lives through an investigation of our language, learning about ourselves, the other, can be done in an ethical manner, attending to each grammar for each different thing, or tainted by the desire for an all-inclusive answer. There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world.