No, your account wants for nothing. It is incoherent, and hence not an account. — Banno

:flower:

I'll leave that alone.

In so far as we ascribed beliefs to cats, we are not treating beliefs as attitudes towards propositions. We are using the word differently. — Banno

In the same argument, using the word differently is equivocating.

It's not my accounting of belief that has been found wanting.

Obfuscation is disappointing.

Do cats have beliefs?

According to the position you're working from, in order to avoid self-contradiction, incoherence, and/or equivocating the term, you must admit that they do not.

The cat can't form an attitude towards a proposition, because it cannot form a proposition. That is, it can't believe it is hungry, but it can be hungry.

Talk of cats having beliefs is at best metaphorical. — Banno

That's one way to skirt around the issue, but leaves you with being forced to admit that cats do not have belief. Otherwise it's still an equivocation fallacy, incoherence, and/or self-contradiction regarding the use of "belief". I say that that is ground for rejecting the "attitude towards a proposition" definition. It's wrong, plain and simple. The notion that all belief has propositional content is based upon conflating reports of belief with belief.

Red cups, apples, and pains in hands are not propositional content. They are most certainly always part of the correlational content of belief about them.

I would completely agree that a cat cannot believe it is hungry, but it can be hungry.

One can hold an apple in one's hands prior to language use, just as one can have a pain in one's hand prior to language use. Language use is not part of the content of a language less creature's belief(conscious experience). It is most certainly a part of our accounting practices thereof.

So, it becomes clear that there is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between our reports of an experience(Jack's notwithstanding) and the experience being reported upon, particularly when we're discussing how to best take an account of language less creatures' belief. That distinction between another's belief and our account must be drawn in terms of content, particularly regarding the content of language less pre-theoretical conscious experience, linguistically informed pre-theoretical conscious experience, and linguistically informed theoretical conscious experience.

There are always apples and pains in all such experiences. There is not always the ability for the creature having the experience to report upon it's experience, nor need there be.

The interesting, relevant to the topic, portion is what sorts of beliefs(conscious experiences) are existentially dependent upon language use, and are thus neither private nor ineffable. There are also a broad category of 'properties' and experiences that are quite simply not immediately apprehensible without prior language use. The coffee tasting comparisons between then and now come immediately to mind. Such experiences are not private for they are existentially dependent upon language use, and language use is not. Remove language use, and you remove the capability to compare past and present. Remove the capability to compare past and present and there is no such experience as a change in one's preference, even if it actually happened. A change in one's own personal preferences would not even be possible to experience as such, for that change would not even be apprehended without the comparison/contrast that only language can facilitate.

It is pointless to continue a discussion in which it cannot be agreed that some stuff is only between the ears. — Mww

Biological machinery.

Apples are directly perceptible external things. Pains are directly perceptible internal things.

I'm always left wondering why so many participants around here seem to think that arguing for direct perception always and only implies naive realism - an outright denial of indirect perception...

That's the go to critique, a ridicule of sorts, and it's a charge that those making seem to think counts as a knock-down argument or some such. I suppose it could be, if only it were true. Saying something is so doesn't make it so. The move seems more like grasping at some familiar straws when faced with admitting of much better accounting practices, and/or escaping cognitive dissonance.

The underlying mistake is - once again - thinking in terms of either/or when it comes to direct/indirect perception. There's also the use of "perception" that is always extremely problematic, particularly when used as a blanket term to include both linguistically informed and non linguistically informed conscious experiences(which is also an inadequate dichotomy). Not all conscious experience is all direct perception or all indirect perception. Leaning too far either way leads to conflating pre-theoretical language less conscious experience, pre-theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience, and theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience. Notice there are three distinctions here... not two. Only the first of the three consists entirely of directly perceptible things.

That's where we all start.

Absolutely. And you’re the only current participant that even attempts an exposition of some form of the discipline, even if it’s your own personal creation. I’m down with the attempting the discipline, but promise nothing regarding the practice of it. — Mww

You look?

Because that's how it is!
— creativesoul

Nonsense. Unless you can taste wavefunctions and see X-Rays.

I bet you can't even do sonar! — Marchesk

Sarcasm doesn't translate well into written word alone.

Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are.
— Mww

Anyone who does that is truly naive, both philosophically and scientifically. One might be a direct realist, but it does take more work than just "things are exactly as they look". Or at least I hope they bother to do the work.

Because if not, their lack of philosophical rigor will be called out. Lazy bastards! — Marchesk

Because that's how it is!

Are you asking me to justify my asserting what the content of the cat's conscious experience is?
— creativesoul

Apparently, the content is that which exists in its entirety, and so far, that’s the extent of the assertion. Maybe not asking so much the justification for asserting content, but asking instead, what the something’s content actually is. — Mww

But I answered that already in the longer posts about the cat's experience.

And even if the something’s content is some ubiquitous or pervasive correlation, I still have no more understanding of that, than I had with understanding merely the ambiguous something.

Understanding that conscious experience consists of correlations drawn between different things is just the start of a very disciplined practice.

seems to hold a position very similar(the most similar, I think) to my own. — creativesoul

On a second reading... it seems that the similarity may end sooner than I thought.

So, then some belief is not an attitude towards a proposition, and we've arrived at incoherence and/or self-contradiction.

Belief is an attitude towards a proposition(propositional attitude). Cats have beliefs. Cat's beliefs are not propositional attitudes.

Cats do not have belief.
— creativesoul

Indeed. — Banno

Ok. I didn't think you were willing to say that that statement is true.

That is a new statement of contention.

:brow:

Surprisingly.

conflating perception with reality stigma
— creativesoul

You lost me. Nobody’s a Kantian because that’s what they do, or that’s what he did? — Mww

The way things are, in and of themselves, serves as a basis. It is distinct from the way things appear. We only have access to the latter.

Something like that.

Cats do not have belief.

They can't. But they can have an attitude towards their food. — Banno

Their food is not a proposition.

That question needs answered.

It's the conflating perception with reality stigma.

Should we do this, again? — Banno

How about we do it for the first time?

:smile: :flower:

‘S ok. Take refuge in my having quined qualia years ago. In principle anyway, insofar as nothing with which qualia is supposed to be concerned, hasn’t already been accounted for. — Mww

Banno's not a fan of Kantian frameworks.

How can a language less creature have an attitude towards a proposition?

The notion of a proposition without language is nonsense. — Banno

I would concur.

seems to hold a position very similar(the most similar, I think) to my own.

I seem to recall a debate in which I used your ideas for floor polish.

Was that here, or in The Other Place? — Banno

I remember that several different ones ended similarly.

a belief is still an attitude towards a proposition. — fdrake

You do not seem to remember that the above ends here:Either propositions exist in their entirety in the complete absence of language such that a language less creature is even capable of having an attitude towards them, or language less creatures have no belief.

But a belief is still an attitude towards a proposition.
— Banno

Would be a good thread. — fdrake

It does not end well for the position Banno is arguing from/for.

a belief is still an attitude towards a proposition — Banno

Well, as we both know, our positions sharply diverge at that point. Maybe, just maybe, we will bridge that divide one day.

:wink:

...has done a fine job in carrying the good fight, apart from that strange stuff about pretheoretical beliefs. — Banno

The underlying topic is conscience experience(consciousness). If language less creatures can have conscious experience too, then an adequate account of all conscious experience must be capable of taking them into proper account as well as our own. The historical renderings(different schools of thought) do not, cannot. Since Aristotle(I think) we've placed our own conscious experience upon a pedestal, so to speak, and ferociously defended our own superiority over 'dumb' animals, by virtue of claiming that they are incapable of the kind of thought and belief - like reason - that we are. While that is most certainly true, and there are all sorts of other reasons we've wanted to be superior to other creatures, the mistake made by all was to not have taken proper account of our own minds to start with. The methodological approach was all wrong.

When methodological naturalism split from philosophy proper, it was already doomed to fail because it was already based upon and working from utterly inadequate dichotomies... subject/object, internal/external, objective/subjective, physical/non physical, mind/body, physical/mental, etc.

Emergent consciousness requires an ontological basis of at least three different categories.

I personally found the parts that , , and were discussing to be quite interesting... the modeling portions.

Mww uses Kantain terminology and framework.

I'm trying to quine conscious experience, thought, and belief...

:wink:

By definition, when it seems to you that you are angry you are, in fact, angry.
— khaled

Which parts of what counts as being angry is established by social convention? — creativesoul

All of it. — khaled

Then anger is neither private, nor ineffable. Qualia are(by definition). Therefore, anger is not qualia.

The breakdown intrigues me, honest. — Mww

Click on my avatar, then on my discussions. There are several OP's and discussions that you would find interesting. The titles are indicative of the subject matter.

....that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. (...) It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of (...) experience. The something else must already exist in it's entirety
— creativesoul

BOO-YAAH!!!!

Those illusive, enigmatic, nay, even damnable, “elemental constituents”, yes? — Mww

No. Elusive... perhaps depending upon method.

Not too difficult. What they can actually be is determined, in part, by virtue of their own existential dependency. For example, language less conscious experience cannot consist of language use, but some other mid-level pre-theoretical conscious experience can.

Point sustained:
It's all about the content. That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint sustained: where is the surety of what the content is. — Mww

Surety is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location, so the question doesn't make sense as written. Can you reword it so that I understand what you're asking me to provide?

Are you asking me to justify my asserting what the content of the cat's conscious experience is?

Point:
I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint: I’m not sure we have the warrant for that. — Mww

Sufficient reason to believe that other creatures' conscious experience is different from our accounts thereof ought be fairly uncontentious... no?

If cat's can have conscious experiences of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup without the color of the cup ever being distinguished and subsequently recognized, then it is clear that the color of the cup is not part of the cat's correlational content, and thus not part of the conscious experience.

There is most certainly a red cup in the experience, but the color is meaningless to the cat. There is no red qualia in the cat's experience. All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All conscious experience of seeing red requires that the color be meaningful to the cat. The color of the cup that that cat drank from is not meaningful to the cat, despite it's having been autonomously detected by the cat's eyes. Seeing red does not equate to conscious experience of red, unless one wishes to draw and maintain a distinction between detecting red autonomously, and seeing red.

When color is meaningful, that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. Being a part of the correlation is exactly how red becomes meaningful to the creature. Meaningful conscious experience of seeing red happens at the precise moment in time that red becomes part of the correlations drawn by the creature between the color and something else.

It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of another's conscious experience of red. The something else must already exist in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful to the creature... names of colors notwithstanding.

I would be more than willing to grant that some basic correlations between red and some autonomous biological function, like fear, hunger, thirst, could be drawn without issue at the language less level during the right sorts of circumstances.

By the way, there's quite a bit that can be ascertained by that cat post than may seem at first blush, particularly regarding how our own experience involving red cups begins should that be prior to language acquisition. It's also relevant with respect to how the private aspect is no longer. It's also relevant to how the ineffable aspect is no longer. It's also relevant to which parts are directly apprehensible and what it takes for them to become so...