Using naming practices without using descriptive practices... — creativesoul

Do we actually do this?

Yes, we do.

Does it successfully pick out an individual to the exclusion of all others?

Yes. It does.

Can it be done?

It is, therefore... not only can it be done, it has already been done!

Conclusion:Descriptive practices are not necessary for all cases of successful reference.

There's an 'intuitive' use of the term "necessary"...

...counterfactual with no reference... — Wallows

That's a brilliant phrase.

This post begins working through the idea that we successfully refer in one of six different ways. We can do this by 1.)using naming practices without using descriptive practices, 2.)using descriptive practices without using naming practices, 3.)naming that which had been only previously described, 4.)naming that which had been both previously named and described, 5.)describing that which had been only previously named, and 6.)describing that which had been both previously named and described.

The first group above is existentially dependent upon naming practices. The second group above is existentially dependent upon descriptive practices. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth group above are existentially dependent upon both naming practices and descriptive practices.

The term "both" applies only to a quantity of two. There are four combinations.

What this shows us is that there are four possible ways to combine naming and descriptive practices and asserts that there are six different ways to successfully refer. Successful reference can be the result of any one of these 'methods'.

Or at least...

That is exactly what I'm attempting to take proper account of, and hopefully by doing so will be able to determine whether or not all six suggested methods are capable of successful reference.

If my current musings are relevant to Kripke's examples has yet to have been determined. It is relevant to successful reference. By default alone, it ought be at least partially applicable, for Kripke's lectures directly involve what counts as successful reference.

The italics on 'him' show that the additional stipulation to which Kripke is referring is that the protagonist in this alternate world, who loses the election, is Nixon. The stipulation is neither by name nor by DD, as both of those may be different in the alternate world. It is by mental pointing. — andrewk

You misunderstand. Kripke is clear at the very beginning of the lectures. If you do not work from what he actually claims, then you're not talking about what he actually claims. What he actually claims will not be captured by a quote taken out of context to such a degree that the truth conditions of the claims are questionable.

That's what you've done here. Looks a bit like confirmation bias?

He is referring to the individual picked out of this world. He continues - as do we all - referring to that same unique individual that we've already picked out. We're not - according to Kripke - picking Nixon out of alternative circumstances. In fact, he readily appeases anyone who wishes to say that that individual could have a different name. Different name, same referent. His point is that the proper name alone is both adequate and sufficient for picking out the unique individual from this world.

The evidence is brutally strong. Actual examples do not include anything else in order to do so. There is no stronger justificatory ground for either holding that claim to be true or assenting to his point.

The referent is Nixon. The name of the referent is "Nixon". We pick Nixon out of this world. That man, that individual is picked out in this world to the exclusion of all others. We then stipulate the alternate circumstances.

I think that a proper understanding of Kripke can be of two varieties. The first requires having a good grasp upon several different philosophical positions, which further require a good grasp upon formal modal logic, Possible World Semantics, and a host of other highly nuanced philosophical notions.

The second requires understanding the methodology he's proposed be used as both a method of implementation and a method by which to sensibly interpret what's being said during possible world discourse.

He is not claiming that his method is the only one. He is not claiming that he has offered a replacement theory of reference/identity/meaning. He admits an overwhelming amount of times that he's not answered all possible questions.

He's pointing out that proper names are always used as rigid designators. He's pointing out that there are other things we can glean from holding that fact in proper consideration.

My understanding of Kripke's position is that he believes we use stipulation. We mentally point at an individual in the alternate world and stipulate 'this one is Nixon'. See page 44.

That is not my position. But as far as I can tell it appears to be Kripke's. — andrewk

That's not my understanding at all actually.

Stipulation is key to Kripke.

Kripke says that when we are talking about possible world and/or counterfactual scenarios, we begin by picking an individual out of this world and stipulating alternative circumstances for that individual. The possible world then consists entirely of such stipulation.

I think that I've 'discovered' an approach that may prove useful. I'm still working out the details. It seems to me that there are six different ways to successfully refer. All cases are one of the six. It amounts to the number of possible ways to use naming practices and descriptive practices.

It seems to me that that's relatively important.

We look at this world and see whether X identifies a unique individual in it. But that tells us nothing to do with whether X would pick out a unique individual, no individuals, or multiple individuals, in an alternate world. — andrewk

What do you mean? What else could we possible use as a standard, as ground, upon which to build our position, if not for how we do it in this world?

The underlying point, on my view, is that that is what Kripke seems to be attempting to do. He lays out all sorts of different historical issues and/or accounts, and then shows how a case of successful reference places those under suspicion.

He doesn't assume. He doesn't presuppose. He doesn't conclude.

He shows the actual cases of successful reference, and then applies them to the specific historical position and/or issue he deems fit.

That determination of sufficiency for picking out Nixon in an alternate world scenario is always and only established by whether or not the actual language expression being used to refer to Nixon successfully picks Nixon out of this world to the exclusion of all others. If it successfully picks out Nixon to the exclusion of all others in this world, then it most certainly is sufficient for picking Nixon out in a possible world scenario.
— creativesoul

Could you elaborate on why you think that? — andrewk

How else would you suggest that we answer the question:Is 'X' capable of picking an individual out to the exclusion of all others? Let 'X' be the language expression being considered.

We focus on what things we wish to consider being different about Nixon, with everything else remaining the same if it does not create a logical contradiction. It will be relevant to consider whether the things that remain the same are sufficient to pick out Nixon in the alternate world. — andrewk

That determination of sufficiency for picking out Nixon in an alternate world scenario is always and only established by whether or not the actual language expression being used to refer to Nixon successfully picks Nixon out of this world to the exclusion of all others. If it successfully picks out Nixon to the exclusion of all others in this world, then it most certainly is sufficient for picking Nixon out in a possible world scenario.

There is no need to consider the group of things that remain the same.

am dubious about whether it makes sense to say that somebody that differs from Nixon in even the slightest way 'is' Nixon in another world. The Nixon of 1971 to whom Kripke referred would have been shaped by his victory in 1968 and the events that followed from that. So to imagine 'him' as not having won in '68 seems questionable. For me it makes more sense to say we are imagining an alternate version of Nixon. — andrewk

We do not openly espouse and/or express all of the things that we think and/or believe about Nixon, and yet we still successfully refer to Nixon. It only follows that successfully referring to Nixon need not include everything we believe about Nixon. Since successfully referring to Nixon in this world need not include everything that we think and/or believe about Nixon, and this world is a possible world, it only follows that successfully referring to Nixon in a possible world scenario need not include everything we think and/or believe about Nixon.

The contentious issue hereabouts seems to be not that we can and do pick an individual out to the exclusion of all others, but rather it seems to be more about what's necessary for that to happen, and whether or not those things remain necessary afterwards.

that A is necessarily the same thing as B.

Now A is a pain, and hence necessarily a pain.. — Banno

Equivocation of the term "necessarily"?

Let's see...

The first use joins two variables with unknown value. The second does not.

Yep.

I did, and I don't.

I'm going back to re-read some stuff in N&N. Trying to catch up to Banno. Kripke's arguments at least follow from what he said. Yours don't and as a result are moot and irrelevant.

The irony around here could be called "delicious" by some...

It just stuns me...

Goddamn..

See where paraconsistency leads when applied where it doesn't fucking belong?

Anyway you are pedantically focusing on a point which is of little consequence instead of addressing the more difficult objections to your view. — Janus

If this would make any fucking sense at all, it would have been followed by an objection to something I said.

It wasn't.

:roll:

"Some" country is not a class of countries. Being a country that borders Greece is the only necessary and sufficient condition that need be met in order to be picked out by "some country that borders Greece".

"Some country that borders Greece" is not both necessary and sufficient for picking out a unique individual to the exclusion of all others.

Rather, it picks out a single country within a group. It is not capable of picking out an individual country to the exclusion of all others because it picks one out of many. If it picks one out of many, it is not picking out one to the exclusion of many. If it is not picking out one to the exclusion of many, it is not picking out one to the exclusion of all others. If it is not picking out one to the exclusion of all others, then it is not a fucking definite description...

For fuck's sake....

..."A" country is not a class of countries.

All cases of successful reference are existentially dependent upon fixing the referent. A referent is fixed via naming practice(initial baptism), description, and/or both.

Not all cases of successful reference include description(definite or otherwise).

All successful reference is existentially dependent upon that which not all successful reference includes. That which all successful reference is existentially dependent upon is not equivalent to that which all successful reference includes.

If what counts as "necessary" for successful reference is determined solely by virtue of existential dependency, and not all examples of successful reference include that which it is existentially dependent upon, then it only follows that successful reference need not include that which is necessary for it's own existence.

If what counts as "necessary" for successful reference is determined solely by virtue of what's included in specific cases thereof, and successful reference does not always include that which it is existentially dependent upon, then it only follows that successful reference need not include that which it is existentially dependent upon.

How's that for intuitive?

There's a bit of irony here. I've been charged with invoking a notion "successful reference" that is purportedly moot and irrelevant to N&N as a result of not being mentioned, by one who is using the notion of definite description - which is mentioned and used within N&N - in a way that is both moot and irrelevant to the way it's used in N&N...

:snicker:

Banno's charge of abuse holds good. It's certainly been 'proven' true by the facts.

If you know it's true, should be able to prove that. — andrewk

Rubbish. There are all sorts of statements that I know are true but cannot be proven by any means. Formal logical proofs cover even less.

Not equivocation, rather allowing for the fact that descriptions can obviously be more or less definite. It's not black and white and there may be disagreement in particular cases as to whether a definite desciption is "necessary and sufficient" to pick out just one entity. Your qualification "purportedly" acknowledges this. — Janus

My qualification "purportedly" acknowledges that I may not agree with the pre-conceived notion's criterion. It is the criterion none-the-less. A description either satisfies the criterion or it does not. If it does then it is a DD. If it does not, then it is not.

Triangles are not more or less squares...

"Some country over there" is not a DD. Calling it such is equivocating the term DD.

Whatever, of course I believe that. It's also true.

No I acknowledged that DDs are more or less definite. — Janus

No???

The charge was that you are equivocating with your terminological use of "definite descriptions"...

You've neglected to draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between definite descriptions and one's that are not definite. The proof of this is the thread itself. The above quote overtly denies equivocating and then goes on to describe what you're doing. The description itself satisfies what counts as equivocating.

So, charged with abusing an otherwise perfectly intelligible notion like "definite description", you answer "No" in the same sentence that is also admitting to satisfying it's criterion. That is to compound the abuse by adding the term "no" to the term "definite description".

That's a performative contradiction is it not andrewk? I mean, you've been invoking the speech act theorists.

Furthermore, the abuse is even further compounded by how the term "acknowledged" is used. "Definite description" is a pre-conceived notion. Kripke invokes it. No one here determines the criterion for what counts as a definite description. That has already been determined.

Definite descriptions are always definite. What makes them so is that they are - purportedly - both necessary and sufficient for picking a unique object out of the world to the exclusion of all others. That is what makes them different from those that are not.

There is no "more or less". They either meet the criterion or they do not. One cannot acknowledge that definite descriptions(as invoked by Kripke) are more or less definite, anymore than one can acknowledge that a square is more or less a rectangle with four sides of equal length. Some of your 'less definite' ones look more like triangles.

One can acknowledge that they have been using the term in such a way. That would be to admit of equivocation. Equivocation is shown by and/or results in self contradiction, as well as the kind of incoherency that renders the otherwise perfectly intelligible notion of "definite description" virtually meaningless.

So, are you mistaken or is this a deliberate attempt at muddying the waters?

Something else just occurred to me...

The notions of reference/identity that Kripke's targeting seem to be the ones that claim and/or lead to claiming that all reference depends upon definite description. A criticism of those is rightfully applicable to the purported problems with identity across possible worlds as well.

That's killing several birds with one stone.

And of course, the ambiguity regarding the notion of "depends upon" is proving to be much fodder as well. I've been playing around with the consequences following from different versions, as well as different versions of "necessary" and the interplay between the different combinations thereof. Interesting results. Could be very powerful justificatory ground. May already be, and I've just begun to recognize that much.

Seems that Kripke was at pains promoting intuition as adequate ground for certain notions. What counts as being necessary seems a fantastic candidate for that.

If you're continuing on the bishop notion... all bishops become queens, unless it is not one of theirs, then they become pawns.

If your remark is about whether or not a discussion of true/false belief is too far off track... well... I'm trying to make sure I have a good grasp upon what Kripke is not claiming...

:wink:

I don't know, but it seems to me that he's doing very little aside from pointing out the facts. I mean, I'm very impressed by the first two lectures. The more I read, and the more I watch folk like you put his stuff into actual practice, the more impressed I become with his method.

My definition of a definite desciption would be something like: " Infallibly picks out a particular entity". — Janus

Then you're equivocating. There have been numerous descriptions that are not capable of picking out a unique individual that you've referred to as "definite". "A country over there somewhere" is one.

I find the notion of 'absolute truth' at least just as flawed as you. It's not helpful here.
— creativesoul
Being mistaken is always a result of having false belief.
— creativesoul
What does it mean for a belief to be 'false' if there is no absolute truth? — andrewk

As much as I'd love to get into this. I'm not. It's too far off track. Besides, I just wanted to explain how and that your charge of irrelevance was unfounded. That's been done.

Back to Kripke's N&N...

You are misusing the term definite description. — Banno

Bishops move diagonally.

Good. Then what does 'mistaken' mean to you... — andrewk

I've already answered this.

Being mistaken is always a result of having false belief. It is not the only result.

As it pertains to the earlier parts of this conversation, you and Janus are both sorely mistaken as a result of believing that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to N&N. You've pointed out that Kripke doesn't mention "successful reference". I can only assume that you believe that that lack of mention somehow warrants the subsequent belief - expressed by your claim - that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to N&N.

If lack of mention constitutes warrant to believe that that which is not mentioned is moot and/or irrelevant, then it would only follow that all of Kripke's original terminological use explicating his doctrine of rigidity is irrelevant to any and all of the philosophical positions he's targeting simply because those positions did not mention his doctrine and/or it's terminological use.

:brow:

All of Einstein's conceptions would be moot and/or irrelevant to all of that which they expanded upon. Every single paradigm shift that begins with new ways to talk about the same things; all of the new language would be moot and/or irrelevant.

That's patently absurd.

There's more than one way to show that a position is mistaken. You and Janus are both sorely mistaken if you think/believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to N&N.

I find the notion of 'absolute truth' at least just as flawed as you. It's not helpful here.

It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be.
— creativesoul
Sure, if all 'mistaken' means is 'has an opinion that I do not agree with'... — andrewk

That's not what I mean. Let me clarify...

Having an opinion that I do not agree with is having a different opinion. Having a different opinion is equivalent to and/or the result of having different belief. I do not always disagree with different beliefs. All opinions that I disagree with are different.

Being mistaken is the result of having false belief. Two people can have different false beliefs. They are both mistaken. Two people can have the same false belief. They are both mistaken. Two people can have different true beliefs. Neither is mistaken. Two people can have the same true belief. Neither is mistaken.

So, having an opinion I disagree with requires having different belief. Having different belief is not equivalent to being mistaken.

And...

It's still does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. It follows that a formal logical proof is an inadequate means for showing the mistakes.

If the difference between being mistaken and having a different opinion is not the presence of a proof, then what is it? — andrewk

See above.

You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to Kripke's lectures and/or many of the historical positions that he targets.
— creativesoul
Do you not find it strange then, that Kripke does not mention 'successful reference' in N&N? — andrewk

It's not at all strange to me.

Putting the notion of successful reference to good use...

The impasse between Banno and Janus is a direct consequence of incompatible frameworks attempting to take account of the same thing... successful reference.

Banno looks at what the specific examples of successful reference include and draws conclusions about what's needed or not based upon what's included or not within the example. So, he's working from the presupposition that what's necessary for a specific case is equivalent to and/or determined by what's included within that case. I do not know if he would agree with this summary of his method, but it seems clear to me and the evidence in the thread(his examples and their explanations) support it.

Janus works from the notion that all examples of successful reference are existentially dependent upon the same core set of things, and draws conclusions about what's needed or not based upon that core regardless of what may or may not be included within the example.

Hence, when Banno points out that "who is Thales?" successfully refers to Thales and yet does not include definite description, he concludes that there is no need for definite description, because that is a prima facie example of successful reference that does not include definite description. If definite description need not be included in an actual case of successful reference, it most certainly is not necessary for that case. If it is not necessary for that case, then it is not necessary for all cases.

However, Janus points out that definite description for "Thales" has already been provided somewhere else along the line, and if it were not for that being so, then "who is Thales" would fail to successfully refer as a result of "Thales" having no referent.

The underlying issue is that there's a gulf between what all successful reference is existentially dependent upon(the basis of Janus' position), and what all cases of successful reference include(the basis of Banno's position).

That gulf, I would strongly argue, is a direct result of inadequate frameworks. That's plural on purpose. The bridge would be a framework that can take account of the fact that some cases of successful reference do not include that which they are existentially dependent upon.

Janus offers no direct concerted attempt to bridge that gulf, although skirts around it when claiming that all cases of successful reference are dependent upon descriptions even when and if those descriptions are not always used within the successful reference.

Banno also offers no direct concerted attempt to bridge that gulf. I suspect it is because he does not see the need to do so. However, I do think that Kripke's notion of a causal chain of reference, and Banno's invocation of shared meaning also skirt around it.

I pretty much agree with andrewk that the notion of "successful reference" is moot or irrelevant. — Janus

Well, in that case, you're both mistaken.
— creativesoul

'Mistaken' is not a relevant concept in this field. There is no correct and incorrect. There are no proofs of correctness. If there were, Kripke's opinion would either have been proven correct and thereby accepted by everybody that is capable of following logic, or it would have been proven incorrect, in which case no logically competent person would accept it. Since neither of those is the case, it must not be amenable to proof, so 'right' and 'wrong', 'mistaken' and 'correct' are not applicable concepts... — andrewk

Being mistaken is relevant to everything ever written, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered. Being mistaken is not existentially dependent upon formal logical proof nor the ability thereof to properly account for it. It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. Rather, it only follows that formal logical proof is inadequate for showing that and/or how different positions can be and/or are mistaken.

Being mistaken is not just a matter of being true/false. It's also a matter of being adequate/inadequate for taking proper account of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account thereof.

Successful reference is one such thing amongst many.

You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to Kripke's lectures and/or many of the historical positions that he targets. You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to philosophy of language. You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant for being useful and/or helping us out in all of the ways that you've implied philosophy of language is.

I pretty much agree with andrewk that the notion of "successful reference" is moot or irrelevant. — Janus

Well, in that case, you're both sorely mistaken.

:wink:

Say in our hypothetical conversation the novice has not been able to tell whether Thales is a man or a women, or even a domestic animal or a place. In then inquiring 'What does "Thales" refer to?", would you say she or he has "successfully referred", or even simply referred, to Thales?

"What does 'Thales' refer to?" is a case of successful reference if "Thales" has a referent. The questioner is asking about the referent of the name.

Isn't it a moot point whether or not the questioner 'successfully referred to Thales'? I can't see that any tangible difference follows from a Yes vs a No answer to the question 'was a successful reference made?' Rather, it's just a question of what words one uses to describe the speech acts. It's what David Chalmers calls a Verbal Dispute - something about choice of words with no actual import. — andrewk

What counts as successful reference underwrites this entire thread.

Seems to me that that is not established and/or determined solely by the words we choose to talk about it. Rather, we successfully referred long before our ability to take an account of what we had long since been doing. As a result, we can be mistaken in our account thereof. So...

Not just any words will do.

The question "who is Thales?" does not include definite description. It can be used as a means for successful reference. That much is undeniable, and proven beyond all reasonable doubt by the cases where the question gets correctly answered. The correct answer is not a part of the question. The question successfully refers to Thales. The correct answer is not a part of the successful reference. It only follows that not all successful reference includes description(definite or otherwise).

The only true answer to the question of whether or not that is a case of successful reference is "yes". That's of utmost importance.

FWIW I regard 'who is Thales?' from an eavesdropper to the conversation as shorthand for:

"Your conversation sounds interesting and, If you don't object, I'd like to join in. I note that you keep on using the word 'Thales' as if it were a name of a person. Is it the name of a person? If so, could you please tell me a little about the person whose name it is, so that I can enjoy your conversation more, and maybe even participate?"

The meaning of that is quite clear, and whether or not the questioner has 'successfully referred to Thales' seems to have no significance. — andrewk

That is a very charitable attribution of underlying meaning to the question. While it most certainly may be true when some people ask the question, it cannot be true when everyone asks the question. The question can be asked by people with different personalities and/or world-views and in a number of different scenarios besides the very polite and considerate eavesdropper scenario you've put forth.

...in asking "who is Thales?" the questioner is assuming that there is a definite description of just who he is, and is asking for it. — Janus

All questioners asking that??? Some perhaps could be. Definitely not all. You're assuming precisely what's at issue here. Seems that all definitely assume that the person they are asking can answer the question. Not all answers to that question include definite description. So, your comment above is found wanting...

The questioner did not use definite description. The questioner successfully referred to Thales nonetheless.

Think about it, if you don't know who is being spoken of in a conversation, how could those who do know (or purport to know) answer your question about who is being spoken of without giving any definite descriptions? — Janus

What's at issue is not what an answer to the question includes. What's at issue is whether or not the question itself can be used as a means for successful reference. It certainly can, and it does not include definite description. The fact that another can set out the referent of "Thales" by virtue of definite description proves this point beyond any and all doubt.

I agree that 'Thales' is not, in the case that the name is being used to refer to the famous Presocratic philosopher, merely an empty placeholder; it does have indeed have a role in the conversation or speech-act in those kinds of cases. — Janus

Then you agree that when it was asked "Who is Thales?", the question was about Thales. So the questioner made reference to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description.

That is, it is possible to refer without having access to a definite description.
— Banno

Well, if a conversation is about Thales,the famous Presocratic philosopher, then right there is a definite description of who the conversation is about. — Janus

Yeah you and Banno are talking about different things as well.

He's pointing out that the questioner successfully refers to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description. That is, he's pointing out what's not included in that case of successful reference. It does not include a definite description. Thus, not all cases of successful reference include definite description.

You're pointing out what's included in a completely different scenario.

Ah I wasn't worried about anything like that. That stuff is nearly inevitable. I just realized that my own analysis here was treating false descriptions as though they could not be definite descriptions, and that that seemed to be a large part of our misunderstanding.

That problem was on my end...

I think we are talking about two different things. I have said that a definite description does not need to be wholly true to refer uniquely to someone. I think the question about whether successful reference is possible by false description is related, and as I have already said, I am not convinced that it is possible without the person referring knowing something true about the person being referred to, even if that is nothing more than knowing what they look like — Janus

We were. Much of that is on my part as well... My apologies.

Gotta run. Catch you chaps later...

Then that's not a case I'm talking about. There are numerous ones where there is nothing true in the description and yet successful reference happens anyway.