Wouldn’t you agree it’s possible for a human and some other kind of intelligence to have a common perception? — Mww

No. I would say that a perception is unique to the being that perceives it. This is due to a multitude of factors, unique spatial temporal perspective, unique features of the perceiving body, etc.. So I believe it is impossible that two beings could have a common perception.

Your second paragraph is missing a crucial, unavoidable and clearly required aspect. That is the objects which engage our perception. — AmadeusD

Why do you assume that there is an object which engagers a person's perception. Like I said, the perception is a creation of the perceiver. Therefore the perceiver creates the object.

Otherwise, we are perceiving nothing. — AmadeusD

This is an unjustified conclusion. A person can be wrong in what they believe they are perceiving, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are perceiving nothing. So, a person can wrongly believe that they are perceiving objects, when in fact they are not perceiving objects, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are producing nothing. They might simply be perceiving something other than objects, and falsely believe that what is perceived is objects.

That's clear. — AmadeusD

As explained above, what appears to be clear to you is completely illogical.

Have bene over this several times with several people and it is, to me, obviously and somewhat incredibly, wrong. — AmadeusD

it's incredibly wrong to you, because you have an illogical thinking process.

He refers to Kant's transcendental hylomorphism, by which he means that Kant transposes Aristotle's form and matter relation to the register of cognition itself (where form is supplied by the a priori structures of sensibility and understanding, and matter by the manifold of intuition). — Wayfarer

This is exactly the crucial thing to understand about Kant. He brings the potential of matter (by Aristotle's principles) right into the conscious mind as "the a priori structures of sensibility". Accordingly, since "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect of reality, Kant makes the unintelligibility of reality a feature of the mind rather than a feature of the independent reality. A deficiency of the mind is the cause of the unintelligibility of the mind. Simply put, it is the minds dependence on the senses. This is distinctly different from the Neo-Platonic perspective which assigned perfection to the mind, as immaterial anmd independent, making the reason for unintelligibility something separate from the mind, matter. In a sense, for Kant, mind is already corrupted by the presence of matter, as the a priori intuitions.

I appreciate and admire efforts.

Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby". — Janus

But what is it that you call "the wallaby"? Is it the colour? No, because then the dogs wouldn't be seeing the wallaby. Is it the shape? Why would you think that the dogs see the same shape as you if they do not see the same colours? Colours outline the shape. What exactly is it that you are seeing, which you think the dogs are also seeing, which makes you conclude that they see the same thing as you? That you insist it is "undeniable" that they are seeing the very same thing, which inclines you to say "wallaby", is simply ridiculous.

In reality, you are just seeing something and assuming, or concluding that there is a thing there called a wallaby. But the dogs are neither assuming nor concluding a thing called a wallaby, so why would you conclude that they are seeing a thing called a wallaby? They are seeing something, and perhaps they are even assuming something about what they see, but they are not assuming "a wallaby". So what makes you think that they are seeing "the wallaby"?

You are merely forcing your own subjective conclusion onto the other (dogs in this case). Without even discussing it with the dogs, you simply conclude that because you see what makes you think "wallaby", and the dogs are seeing something, then the dogs must also see the very same thing which makes you think "wallaby". But this is so obviously illogical, not having the premises required for that conclusion.

You even admit that what you are calling "the wallaby" "may look different to the dogs". So, unless you can say what you see which inclines you to designate "the wallaby", and show how the dogs are also seeing the very same, so that they would also be inclined to designate "wallaby" in the same way that you do, your claim is completely unsupported. It's just an arbitrary assertion, perhaps designed to support a very likely ill-conceived ontology.

Take it as it stands: a true ontology is a bottomless ontology.

He is criticizing attempts to secure the bottomless abyss with tautological absolutes, whereas he'd rather leave the chasm open, engaging with it with mental acrobatics. — Pussycat

We'll just have to disagree then. I think what he says, is that this form of ontology, absolutism, hits bottomlessness, and that is the truth. He is not saying that any true ontology would hit bottomlessness. Further, the bottomlessness spoken about is a form of untruth, "to be recognized by its fascist
fruits", as described in the prior section. So the truth is that this ontology, absolutism, is untrue. You seem to be neglecting the negative aspect of the dialectics, truth is to reveal what is untrue. Look at the full sentence:

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

Notice, bottomlessness is hit by this absolutism. The point is that bottomlessness is a feature of this ontology, not a feature of negative dialectics. That the objection of bottomlessness is incorrectly directed at negative dialectics was the point of the prior section.

Are you familiar with the book Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon, a biological anthropologist. He develops the idea of absentials, which are ‘constitutive absences’ - a purpose not yet achieved, such as a seed aiming to become a plant, or the absence of a specific structure, like the cylinder in an engine that channels force, which gives it causal power. or the axle hole which allows the wheel to spin. — Wayfarer

This is similar to the idea that knowledge progresses through a determination of what is impossible. In a world of possibility, the impossible constitutes necessity. A multitude of impossibilities may be shaped or formed as constraints, which leave a designed "hole" allowing for only a specific type of possibility.

With modern computational capacity, to collect and classify statistics, the focus has moved away from impossibility, to deal with possibility directly under the concept of probability. However, probability does not obtain the same degree of certainty as the necessity of impossibility.

From my point of view, the division between past, present, and future is like a painting where three colors are differentiated without there being a clear division. — JuanZu

Using your colour analogy, my perspective is that past and future are distinct colours, like yellow and blue for example, and the present is a mixing, or overlapping of the two, green. Like yours, there is no clear division apparent to the observer at the present. However, unlike yours, I assume that there is actually a clear division which can be discovered through analysis of the elements at the present, to reveal which are blue and which are yellow. The issue being that intuition tells us that the past is of a completely different type from the future. Therefore the mixing must only be apparent, a deficiency of the observation tools, and there is a true distinction which lies underneath, waiting to be revealed. The mixing of black elements and white elements produces the appearance of a grey area.

There is a difference between past and future, but the difference is not clear. — JuanZu

When the categories are properly created, actual and possible, the difference is very clear, like black and white.

The discontinuous view of time requires punctuality in which each moment stops, and we would see how everything stops at each moment. But experience shows us the opposite — JuanZu

This is the critical point. The Platonic tradition in philosophy holds the basic principle, 'the senses deceive us'. This is the "deficiency of the observational tools" I refer to above. Experience shows us a continuity of activity, and we do not see that everything stops at each moment, but that does not necessarily mean that this is the reality of the situation. We know that a progression of still frames can produce the appearance of continuous activity. The binary on/off of "everything stops at each moment" could be a fundamental vibration of reality.

I speak of guaranteeing the unity of experience simply because I am talking about consciousness and how time passes through it. In this sense, the time of consciousness is analogous to that of the world, but it is not strictly that of the world; it is only a point where a little time flows, so to speak. A small number of events compared to the vastness of all events in the universe. — JuanZu

I think you should pay close attention to how you conceptualize "the world", and "the universe", especially in relation to the subject of the op. There are two ontologically distinct ways of conceiving "the world". In one way, "the world" is a large external unity, sometimes called "the universe", of which each person is a part of. In the other way, "the world" is a mind-created concept, held by the subject. Of course both are described as "distinct ways of conceiving" therefore the only one which could be true is the latter.

From this perspective, "the time of consciousness" is not "analogous to that of the world", it is that of the world. Any conception of an independent "time of the world", is just an extension of, or projection from "the time of consciousness".

So when you say "it is not strictly that of the world", there is untruth to this because "that of the world" is really just an extension of the time of consciousness. We can assume that there is a distinct 'time of the world', independent from the one we conceive of as an extension of the time of consciousness, but in doing this we must be prepared to accept that it may be completely different from our current conception of time, due to the deficiencies of our observational tools.

For me, the past and the future do not belong to being, so I cannot say that they are substances and therefore I cannot say that there is any dualism. Ousia is precisely present, and this can be found in Aristotle's physics. And when I speak of non-presents, I am speaking of something that is neither ousia nor substance. As I see it, we must opt for a category other than being and substance. Something other than substantialism. Derrida calls them traces, as things that are not present, but never totally absent, since we come into contact with them and they constitute us. According to this, we are made up of traces of the past and the future. — JuanZu

This is why we have to look very closely at "the present", our personal being at the present, and things like that, to question which propositions about the nature of the present are logically consistent with our own conscious being.

Consider the difference between your representation, of three distinct colours, and my representation of two distinct colours producing the appearance of a third, through mixing. The problem with yours is that it produces the need for two distinct boundaries, one between present and past, and one between present and future. This is what is required to isolate the present as distinct, and the only true "substance". That, I see as an unnecessary complication, actually producing three distinct substances. You class the two, future and past together, as other than being. But this is incorrect, because the difference between future and past disallows them from being classed together. The problem with mine is that it produces the need for skepticism and doubt concerning our "experience of the present". There is an appearance that the present is distinct, and separate from the past and future, as the substance of being, but that appearance is misleading. Which do you think i more logically consistent with your own conscious being, yours or mine?

I think you read it slightly wrong. My take is that Adorno says that identity philosophy despite claiming bottomlessness with its absolute, solid grounds, and scolding negative dialectics for lack of bottom, is in reality the epitome of bottomlessness. The fact that it doesn't recognize this, consists in its untruth. This is why he says that the objection of bottomlessness "needs to be turned against the intellectual principle which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins", it's a turntable, ah you said so yourself. And so the untruth lies in the claim, not in the bottomless itself. — Pussycat

This is very consistent with my reading, except I read bottomlessness itself as untruth. It's like an infinite regress of indeterminacy. The accusation that negative dialectics is bottomless is untrue for the reason I explained. And, the assumption of the absolute, which creates bottomlessness, is an untruth. I don't know how to take the following sentence, maybe "is" is a typo which should be "in"? If so, then bottomlessness is clearly an untruth itself.

"Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is the place of truth."

So it seems that he is really against any absolutizations, then, one would say that he is a relativist, since you must either be the one or the other. — Pussycat

I don't know about that. If one does not take a positive stand, but remains critical, it would be possible to be against both, absolutism and relativism.

But the flow of time implies that the relation with the past and the future is not discontinuous. — JuanZu

I don't think we can make this conclusion. The flow of time itself appears to be continuous, as a continuous activity, but consider what is happening. Future time becomes past time. August 29 will change from being in the future to being in past. In the meantime, it must traverse the present. What I propose is that the present acts more like a division between past and future, than as a union of the two. Therefore the relation between past and future is discontinuous.

Here you lost me. Can you explain this? — JuanZu

The difference between the deterministic world view, and the free will world view, is that the deterministic perspective assumes a continuity of existence, from past, through the present, to the future. This is what is supposed to be a necessary continuity, stated by Newton's first law. Things will continue to be, in the future, as they have been, in the past, unless forced to change. Any change is caused by another thing continuing to be as it has been, so that any change is already laid out, determined. That support a block type universe.

The free will perspective allows that as time passes, there is real possibility for change, which is not a continuity of the past. This violates Newton's first law. But in order to allow, in principle, for the possibility of this 'real change', we must break the assumed continuity of existence, past through present, into future. We must allow that at any moment of passing time, Newton's first law, the determinist premise, may be violated. This means that the idea of a thing having equal existence on the future and past side of present, would have to be dismissed as wrong. What this implies is that an object's existence is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is the only principle which will allow that a freely willed act can interfere in the continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of existence is false. Of course, this is not difficult to accept, for those who believe that objects are a creation of the mind, anyway. The mind can only create the object as time passes.

They cannot be two consciousnesses as two substances. Because we have to guarantee the unity of experience, for example that the past is a past of mine just as the future is a future of mine. In this sense we are body, where non-presents and non-consciousnesses constitute us. This body is the world that constitutes us. — JuanZu

Why do we need to guarantee such a unity? From the free will perspective this proposed unity makes no sense. Experience is entirely past. We have no experience of the future. We think of the future in terms of possibilities, but it is irrational for me to think that all possibilities will come to pass, and be a part of my experience. Only those possibilities which are actualized will be experienced. Therefore we cannot say that the future and past are united in experience. Only the past has been experienced, and future possibilities always remain outside of experience.

It is not a dualism it is simply two dimensions that relate to the present. But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. We do not perceive these dimensions in themselves unlike the present. There is something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness. I call it the form of the world because we normally understand the world as something beyond consciousness and distinct from experience. There is an analogy with the non-present and the non-conscious. — JuanZu

I agree with this, except there is one big problem. The problem is that we understand the non-present to consist of two parts which are radically different, the past and the future. We know that with respect to the future there is real possibility in relation to what we will do, and what will come to pass. And, we also know that with respect to the past there is an actuality as to what we have done, and what has come to pass. So, if we accept this as a reality, that the past consists of actuality, and the future consists of possibility, dualism is unavoidable.

You call this "something that is not conscious that constitutes consciousness", "the form of the world", and I am pointing out to you, that the form of the world consists of two very different aspects. And because there are two very different aspects which constitute the form of the world, we need a dualism to understand the world.

Thanks to Husserl's analyses, we understand that consciousness is constituted at this level by diferences in protensions and retentions. — JuanZu

Protension is the way that we relate to the future, and retention is the way that we relate to the past. As being at the present, we recognize a significant, even substantial difference between the two, past and future. Deterministic principles serve to dissolve this difference.

Whitehead, in his process philosophy, uses the concepts of "prehension" and "concrescence" to explain how a being at the present can experience the flow of time.

This implies that there is always a non-present side with which consciousness is continuously in contact. This non-present is precisely the form of the world, as something not given in consciousness. — JuanZu

The non-present, which is "the form of the world", must necessarily be divided into two, to accomodate an adequate understanding of it. This is due to that substantial difference between past and future, and the result is that some form of dualism is necessary in order to derive an appropriate conception of "the world". Again, deterministic principles serve to dissolve this requirement.

But that non-present is fundamental to consciousness and its functioning. — JuanZu

We can understand that within the conscious being, the two distinct substances of past and future, are united into one, as retention and protension, and this constitutes conscious being at the present. This implies that being at the present, consciousness, "is constituted at the most fundamental level", as a combination of these two distinct things, past and future.

There's no reason to deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects. — AmadeusD

This is a very fine example of the faulty deterministic perspective derived from the overextension of Newton's law.

In reality, the activities of the living being are caused by the being itself, not some external forces. Perception is an activity of living beings. Therefore, we have a very strong reason to "deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects".

That is why your interpretation of Kant is like Sushi says, "flat out wrong". Kant proposes that the a priori intuitions of space and time are put to work by the human being, like tools in its production of the phenomenon you call "perception of physical objects", rather than perception being caused by what you call "physical objects".

He doesn't say that bottomlessness relates to untruth, rather the opposite, that the acknowledgment of it is what touches truth. Negative dialectics, being foundationless and non-unitarian - better, a dialectics which is no longer “pinned” to identity - will be either accused of: — Pussycat

I agree with this to an extent. Acknowledgement of the bottomlessness is what touches the truth, but it is an acknowledgement of bottomlessness as untruth. What actually constitutes bottomlessness, is the untruth, and this is what negative dialectic sees in identity philosophy. And, the charge that negative dialectics is bottomless, is itself an untruth. This is evident in the last statement of the section. The bottomlessness of the untruth creates the vertigo which is the index of truth, in the negative approach. In general, the untruth of identity is the truth.

The vertigo which this creates is an index veri [Latin: index of truth]; the
shock of the revelation, the negativity, or what it necessarily seems to
be amidst what is hidden and monotonous, untruth only for the untrue.

As explained in the lectures, negative dialects is actually pinned to positivism, or identity, in a negative way. It is pinned to the falsity of positivism, and this constitutes the determinate negative. Otherwise negative dialectics would be completely indeterminate, negating anything, and everything, therefore useless. The subject of negative dialectics is the untruth of positivism and identity philosophy, and in this sense it actually is pinned to identity, in a way which allows it to escape the bottomlessness which is actually a part of the identity philosophy it resists.

Here I think he is alluding to Heidegger, not Hegel. — Pussycat

I think it applies to both, the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. I mean, Hegel is mentioned, as the philosopher who wished to have his dialectics as the "prima philosophia". He put the "identity-principle" as the "absolute-subject". So we cannot remove Hegel from this category of absolutism which Adorno is criticizing, even if Heidegger is cited as the prime example.

The key point being that "bottomlessness" is really characteristic of this absolutism. This is why the accusation of bottomlessness, although charged against negative dialectics, ought really be turned against this absolutism. Heidegger is the best example. The bottomlessness which is supposed to be truth, is really untruth.

Heidegger, by throwing away first principles, arrived at Being. But this Being, according to Adorno, is neither absolute, nor free in itself, it is still dependent on what is thought. When philosophy forgets this and hypostasizes its own creations - without relation to what is being thought - it becomes irrational, null and stupid. — Pussycat

I think it is important to note that this is described by Adorno as untruth. "The falsity of the jettisoned rationality which runs away from itself..." It is falsity because it dissociates thinking form its content, to make thinking, or as you say "Being" absolute. But content is necessary to thinking, so this way of absolutizing Being is a falsity. Therefore the "rationality which runs away from itself" by accepting this false impression of itself, as an absolute, is really irrational.

One of the many reasons why relativity theory ought to be rejected as false and misleading, it assumes there is no difference between being at rest, and being active.

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling — RussellA

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. That negates the point of your argument, that the apple is accelerating.

Being intellectual they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind. So we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t. But they are inferred because if we experience appearances, then they must be appearances of something. Something which is inaccessible to us, because if they were accessible to us, they would be appearances. — Punshhh

I don't think the conclusions you make here are logical. First, if "they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind", then we cannot conclude that "we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t". The proper conclusion is that we can say whatever we want about what they are or aren't. Next, we cannot initially make any conclusions about how they are related to our experience of appearances.

We might consider that our construction of mathematic concepts is an attempt by us to represent noumena as intellectual concepts (traditionally understood as independent Forms). Notice that the pure mathematician is free to use whatever axioms one wills. This is the act of saying whatever we want about the noumenon. At this point of production we cannot make any necessary statement about any relations between this proposed representation, and our experience of appearances. Then, after practise, experimentation, application of theory, we can start to make some conclusions about such a relationship. In this way, the field of practice, application, and the world of phenomenal appearances in general, always stands as medium between our representations of the noumenon and the noumenon itself.

The important point being that we cannot judge our representations of the noumenon by means of a comparison to the real noumenon, because of the inescapable brute fact that the world of phenomenal appearances forms an unsurpassable boundary between the two.

The question is, why do you assume that absent the effects of sensation, there are "objects", plural. Division into distinct objects is a part of sense perception.

Only the elements are apart of the set. — Banno

If the set really was "only the elements", then the empty set would be impossible. No elements, no set.

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force) — RussellA

I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force.

The question is if things - objects - have a nature independent of our (a way of being or existence). I think they do, but if they do, the way they exist must be completely incomprehensible to us. — Manuel

I think that by asking about "things", "objects", you've already assumed more than what is granted by the premise of "the in itself", or "the One". You've already assumed a multitude of distinct things. In effect, you've succumbed to the influence of sensation.

Please don't take this personally, but the reason I often don't respond to your posts is that it seems as though your interpretation of what I've said that you're disagreeing with seems to me so far from what I intended that I find it difficult to get enough purchase on what you are saying to respond. — Janus

So you say, but as I observed yesterday:

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

My disagreement is with things you repeat over and over, which are false. Since these are repeated statements of yours, it's highly unlikely that I interpret them incorrectly. What is actually the case, is that you really don't know what you are saying, and this is why my interpretations are not consistent with what you intend. You intend to express your beliefs, but your statements betray the falsity of them. You do not intend to express false beliefs, so the interpretation of what you say is unintelligible to you.

It appears like after I point out to you the meaning of what you stated, and the falsity of it, you decide that it is not what you wanted to say. Then, since you cannot determine in your own mind what you actually wanted to say with those words, other than what you did say, and my interpretation which demonstrates the falsity of what you said is the only interpretation of those words which makes sense, you simply dismiss my reply as unintelligible to you.

In other word, since I demonstrate to you, that the fundamental principles you repeatedly insist on, are very clearly false, instead of addressing the meaning of those words which express those principles you strongly believe in, to understand why your fundamental beliefs are false, you insist that the conventional interpretation of those words which express those strong beliefs, is nonsense

From Wikipedia:

Rutabaga has a chromosome number of 2n = 38. It originated from a cross between turnip (Brassica rapa) and Brassica oleracea. The resulting cross doubled its chromosomes, becoming an allopolyploid. This relationship was first published by Woo Jang-choon in 1935 and is known as the Triangle of U.

Be aware of the mysterious "Triangle of U".

For example, the property of redness would be identified with the set of all red things, or the property of being a car would be identified with the set of all cars. — litewave

The op is messed up. You cannot identify the property of redness with the set of all red thing. The supposed conclusion would actually be inconclusive, requiring a definition. Further, "being a car" cannot be defined as a property.

No, rutabaga is a different plant, from the pictured turnips

Turnips, Purple Tops.

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. — Janus

Don't say this to me. I firmly believe that an independent reality would be completely different from, and not at all similar, to the representations we have of it as the sense perception of objects. In direct contrast to what you say, I have no real doubt that the supposed independent reality would be in no way similar to the everyday objects we encounter in our perceptions.

For analogy, consider that a word, numeral, or any symbol, may be completely different from, and similar in no way to whatever it represents. Sense perceptions are representations. And in general, representations, like the symbols of language, are produced and maintained trough principles of use and efficiency, not by principles of similarity.

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible. — RussellA

Why do you say that? It was your claim, not mine. You said that the verb "is" expresses a "state of existence". There is no need to assume any "instants of time", because the state of existence, such as the example the apple on the table, may last for a duration of time. My claim is that for this so-called state to become a part of an activity, causation is required.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

That does not follow. The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity?

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized. — Janus

I think that's one of the best examples of a straw man that I've ever seen.

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. — Janus

The extendedness of objects is just another concept which you've swapped for "space". You started off by saying "I perceive the space between objects", and when I informed you that you do not actually perceive whatever it is that separates objects making them distinct, you changed your proposed meaning of "space", to define it as "the extendedness" of objects.

But the "extendedness" of objects is purely conceptual, just like "space" is. You do not perceive extendedness. To "extend" is to increase something. So to conclude that something has been extended, "stretched out spatially" requires an application of logic. It is not a perception but a logical conclusion.

You are still not distinguishing between perceiving, and applying concepts. I suggest, that once you recognize that this distinction is impossible to make at the foundational level, you'll understand the need for a priori concepts. The application of concepts is inherent within even the most basic acts of perception. This implies that conception is prior to perception, therefore conception is not dependent on perception. That is why Kant proposed the a priori, as intuitional 'concepts'.

It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. — Janus

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. In fact, the argument that different people never see the same thing is far more sound then the argument that people see the same things. To begin with, if you point to an area and ask people to describe what is there, they will never use the exact same words. And even if we point to a location, and agree on the words to be used in reference to that location, this does not imply that the people see the same thing. It only means that they are agreeable. Therefore in reality, it is an undeniable aspect of human beings, that they are agreeable, and you falsely present this as "It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things".

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation.

The separation of objects just is the space between them. — Janus

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space.

Suppose one object here, and another object over there. implying a separation between them. You perceive other objects in between, perhaps the movement of air. By what principle do you replace the objects you perceive between the two objects, with the concept "space", and then claim to perceive this "space".

This is the same issue I had with I like Sushi, only that was with the concept "matter" rather than the concept "space". I like Sushi claimed that we measure, and weigh matter, but we do not. We weigh particular things not matter. Matter is purely conceptual, as is space. The two being very good examples of universals. Now, you and I are going through the same thing with the concept "space". You claim to perceive space, but you don't, you have a concept of space which you apply when you perceive that things are distinct from one another. Application of concepts is not the same as perception.

On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects. I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space. — Janus

I don't think so. We don't perceive space between objects, we perceive separation. And knowledge tells us that there is another, invisible object, air, which exists in the medium. And we actually sense that air, feeling the wind and the smells. We don't ever perceive, or apprehend space except as a concept.

So, you say that you perceive space, but not empty space. Imagine the space which you believe that the air occupies, or that some other object occupies. How do you think you are perceiving this space, rather than simply assuming it as a fundamental concept?

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things. — RussellA

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma. — Wayfarer

This is what I see as the greatest difference between Kant and Plato. Unlike Kant, Plato allows that the human intellect can have direct access to what Kant calls noumena, the independent intelligible objects. By Platonic principles, human beings can receive ideas through means other than the senses. This is where "the good" plays its role, and Plato\s "good" is absent from Kant. The good is what is intended, or desired, and as such it does not yet have material existence, and cannot be sensed. Therefore the source of these ideas is not sensation.

The nature of "the good" is not well understood because it avoids the grasp of knowledge, by Plato's description. as prior to knowledge. It illuminates intelligible objects like the sun illuminates sensible objects. Notice that we do not consider ideas to be knowledge until they are justified by empirical principles. So human intention and desire will create all sorts of fanciful ideas which cannot be justified, and will never be knowledge.

We can understand Kant's a priori intuitions of space and time as a replacement for Plato's "the good". Both perspectives realize that it is necessary to assume a principle, or some principles, which are prior to empirical sensation, which enable the mind's capacity to produce ideas and knowledge. For Plato this is the good, for Kant it is the a priori intuitions. We can see how Kant's imposition of space and time limits the scope of knowledge to the sensible world, while the more general, "the good", allows the potential for knowledge to extend beyond the limitations of empirical justification.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time... — Janus

The problem, is that science demonstrates to us, that at the very small scale, quantum particles, and at the very large scale, spatial expansion, our intuitions of space and time are highly inadequate for understanding the presumed things in themselves. So we ought to think of these intuitions, space and time, as useful and purposeful, and highly evolved, but most likely not representative of the supposed things in themselves, because they didn't evolve for that purpose. Then to "speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time" is really misguided speculation, because the way that these supposed things in themselves actual exist is probably not at all similar to how we understand them, through the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is known to mislead.

Kilograms. That is how we do physics. — I like sushi

Sure, i see a lot of things weighed in kilograms, but never matter. As I said, I've never heard of anyone trying to measure something called matter. I've seen people measuring and weighing all sorts of different things, but I've never heard of someone measuring something they call matter. Tell me where you think you might find matter being weighed in kilograms. I know a number of physicists, and never heard them talk about weighing matter.

Is this to say, in Aristotle things come with identity? — Mww

That's right one of the things Aristotle is famous for, is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This law puts the identity of a thing within the thing itself, rather than something which we say about the thing. Hegel was very critical of that law.

Identity being what a thing is, in Kant, identity is assigned to things, not for what it is, but for as what it is to be known. — Mww

This is how "identity" is commonly understood today, as what we assign to a thing in knowing it. But Plato showed how sophists abused this principle, because it annihilates the separation between what we say about things, and how things truly are. Truth gets dissolved into justification when we have no principles which stipulate that there is such a thing as the way something really is. So when a thing's identity is simply what we say about the thing, then as long as it is accepted conventionally (justified), then it is the truth, because there is no such thing as an independent "the way that the thing is".

That is why Aristotle insisted on the law of identity, which tells us that even though we don't necessarily know the way that a thing really is independently of us, there is such a thing. It sort of puts truth out of our grasp, but recognizes that there is such a thing. The ontological ramification is that this divides the assumed independent reality into a multiplicity of particular things, each with its own identity. Then those who hold "the One" as first principle would need to support this proposed unity. Kant's use of "noumena" and "noumenon", indicates that he supports this multiplicity of things. However, his principles sort of disallow us from even having that knowledge, of whether the assumed independent reality is simply one, or a multiplicity.

What happened with Whitehead, and process philosophy in general, is that when the supposed independent reality is understood to consist of process (consistent with "energy" as the basic foundation), then principles are required to explain and understand divisions and separations, individuation in general, because it\s all one big process. Then it becomes very difficult for process philosophy to explain why we perceive separations, and divisions which constitute individual things. However, substance philosophy really does not have any advantage in this matter, because they still have no principle to account for why we perceive individual things. Substance philosophy just takes the existence of individuals for granted, by the law of identity. But until we question this, what we take for granted, we won't figure out why we perceive individuals. Maybe, since things are supposed to have a 'centre of gravity', it has something to do with gravity, whatever that is.

That is a stretch too far. We can -- and do -- measure matter. — I like sushi

There is a large variety of things which we measure, and each has a name. There is also a variety of different types of measurements. I've never heard anyone claim to be measuring matter. What type of measurement do you think that would be?

Here he is explicit: sensation provides the matter of appearances, while space and time are the form in which that matter is ordered. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't say that this is explicit. "Form" and "matter" are terms you apply in your interpretation. Aristotelian terms do not correlate very well to Kantian terms, because Kant did not stay true to the Aristotelian structure. Aristotle was explicit in defining "form" with actuality, and "matter" with potential. But Kant blurs the boundary of separation with concepts like "forms of sensibility". Notice that "sensibility" is a potential, so his structure has 'forms of potential'. In this way Kant allows potential (matter perhaps) into the mind, as the a priori intuitions. But Kant is proposing a new way of dealing with the age old active-passive intellect dilemma. The need for "noumena" demonstrates that Kant's proposal, though novel, is not conclusive.

Looking at your statement now, you say "space and time are the form". And, yes, they are the "form", by Kant's words, but they are the form of sensibility, which makes this supposed "form" a potential, inconsistent with Aristotle. And, as potential, these forms of sensibility, space and time, do not possess the principle of activity which is required to order matter. So Kant's proposed system lacks this required principle of activity.

Notice it is "that which corresponds to sensation" which you give the name "matter" to, but in the Aristotelian hylomorphism, it is the form of the particular, not the matter, which is supposed to correspond. Because the form is received in abstraction, it is necessary that there is something passive, potential, within the intellect. That is the passive intellect, which gave the scholastics all the problems, because they wanted the intellect to be purely actual, an independent form, to support absolute knowledge, the afterlife etc.. The passive aspect for Kant is the a priori intuitions, space and time.

If it is true in Aristotle matter acquires form to become particular substance, and because it is true in Kant matter acquires form to become particular phenomena, then originally to both is matter, which leaves Kantian noumena, as it relates to matter, out in the cold…...right where it’s supposed to be. — Mww

I'd agree with this. The difference between Kant and Aristotle then, seems to be that "particular phenomena", for Kant is occurring within the mind, whereas Aristotle has instances of "particular substance" independent from the mind, things with an identity. The reality of the "particular substance" is supported by the concept of matter for Aristotle. Since Kant places the potential, which Aristotle assigned to matter, into the mind, as the conditions for the possibility of phenomena, there is no need for the concept of matter. The a priori intuitions take the place of matter. Therefore that entire Aristotelian world view, this assumption about 'the external', that it consists of particular instances of substance, things with an Aristotelian identity by the law of identity, supported by "matter", is thrown aside, to be replaced with "noumena".

If only those many people would just study the damn book. One does not have to accept what he’s saying, but should comprehend the point he’s making, the major premise in the “ground of the division of all objects”. — Mww

Philosophy, metaphysics and ontology especially, is extremely complex and difficult. A great philosopher is very difficult to understand, requiring much study, and usually subject to an array of different interpretations. However, what generally happens is that a very simple interpretation starts to develop, which clings to specific terms, and since it is simple and easy to understand it rapidly gains in popularity, becoming the conventional understanding of that philosophy. Of course "simple" is the converse of "complex" so the conventional understanding is never very adequate, or properly representative.

A good example is Plato, and Platonism. The simple, conventional interpretation, known as Platonism, holds that Plato promoted the philosophy of independent ideas like mathematical objects, derived from Pythagorean idealism. However, a thorough reading of Plato will reveal that he actually rejected this Pythagorean idealism, and provided refutation of it in his later writings. But even in those ancient days there was divisiveness as to what principles constituted "Platonism". Aristotle, whom many argue was a true Platonist continued with the refutation of Pythagorean idealism, while the Neo-Platonists, who maintained the "Platonist" name, persisted in promoting Pythagorean idealism.

I get your point, and your quotes support it. But I don't see things the same way, being more skeptical, or even cynical. Metaphor is an intentional 'misuse' (if you will) of words, to produce meaning in an unconventional way. That implies a sort of limited understanding. I apprehend your examples as unintentional misuse which annihilates meaning and misleads. And this implies misunderstanding.

So are we not forced to admit, insofar as Kant offers no definition of what a noumenon is, offers no descriptions of what a noumenon would be like, but authorizes (B115) its validity as a mere possible, non-contradictory, conception, there can be no talk of noumena as such, but only the conception itself, represented by that word, which is actually nothing other than talk of the modus operandi of the faculty of understanding in opposition to its own rules? — Mww

I think this is a very important point. "Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. They are strictly conceptual, not referring to any independent thing as people are inclined to believe. But "matter" is more like the limit of conception, the closest we can come to contradiction without crossing that boundary. Then many people assume these concepts to be a description of some independent feature of reality. But they are not descriptions at all, just concepts which somehow represent what cannot be described.

One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do. — Outlander

Surely you understand that each individual is a unique person in a unique position. The majority of the beliefs which are necessary for me to live my life are probably not even similar to the beliefs necessary for you to live your life. That's how varied life actually is, because we adapt ourselves to our environment, which itself is extremely varied.

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5". — RussellA

As I told you "=" does not mean "is". Therefore your proposed analogy is false. We are not saying 2+3 is 5, we are saying that they are equivalent, and that is the literal meaning, not metaphorical.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low". — RussellA

I would agree with you, that many people use this technique, but I would not say that it constitutes understanding, rather I would say that it is misunderstanding. Likewise, I argue that people who understand "=" in mathematics as meaning "is", or "the same as", misunderstand. And, people who understand numbers as mathematical objects, are making them concrete, and misunderstand.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor. — RussellA

According to what i said above, I believe that set theory is based in axioms of misunderstanding. You call it metaphor, I call it misunderstanding. It is misunderstanding rather than metaphor, because the users of it understand it as literal, not metaphor. The terms "literal" and "metaphorical" apply to the way it is interpreted. The users of set theory do not interpret the axioms as metaphorical, they interpret them as literal, therefore rather than using metaphors in their work, they simply misunderstand.

Not true―in the determinist picture there are both exogenous and endogenous causes of action. — Janus

Are you saying that the determinist perspective denies Newtons laws? Or, is it the case that "endogenous causes of action" are simply represented as interactions of internal parts, which are each external to each other. This would mean that the so-called "endogenous" causes are really just modeled as exogenous interactions. Therefore the "endogenous" is not true endogeny. Language police on patrol.

Potential is a different thing to the noumenal, which is what we have been discussing. If something has a potential it is built into the actuality of the thing, and is real in that sense. — Janus

This is not necessarily the case. That is simply how we represent what is named as "potential", as something built into the actual. This is because our knowledge is strictly formal, it consists of forms. And so any understanding of the potential of the world, must be approached through the actuality of the world. For all we know, the so-called "noumenal" could be the potential. Notice that Kant speaks of "the possibility" of sense appearance, and names space and time this way, placing them into the larger category of potential.

Furthermore, we notice, observe and experience sensation at the present in time, now. However, the potential for whatever happens at the present must be prior to it, therefore this can never be sensed, nor experienced in any way. So we cannot accurately understand the potential of a thing as being built into the actuality of that thing, because it is necessarily prior to the thing, temporally. Now we tend to represent the potential for one thing, as the actuality of another thing, in a the way of determinist causation.

But this cannot provide an accurate understanding either, for two principal reasons. First, it produces an infinite regress of "actual things" one being the potential for the next. That would mean that everything in the world is determined, but determined from nothing, no start, infinite regress. The second reason is more complicated, and requires an understanding of how we relate to "potential" in our active experience. Whenever there is potential (understood here as possibility), there is always a multitude of possible outcomes. That is the nature of potential. It implies that an active form of selection is required to produce the outcome which actualizes. If we say that this is an actual "thing" in the sense described above, we deny the reality of selection, and move back to the determinist infinite regress of things, described above. Therefore the active form of selection cannot be the actuality of a thing.

This is why Aristotle proposed two principal senses of "act" . The one sense is the "actuality" of the thing, as what the thing is, its form. The other sense is "activity". The two are fundamentally incompatible, as the thing's form is understood as static being, what the thing is, while activity is understood as the active cause of change.

So, I would say that actual potential exists, but that what it is potential for does not exist until it is actualized. — Janus

OK, this is a good starting premise. Now, you see that the potential for a thing is necessarily prior in time to the thing's actual existence. Do you understand the two reasons I provided above, as to why "potential" must be a distinct category, and cannot be adequately understood as "built into the actuality of the thing"? Even if we qualify "the thing" as a collection of all things, such that potential is passed from one thing to another as energy, we do not get the premises required to adequately understand "potential". We get lost in an infinite regress. Further, if you believe in the reality of potential, you must also believe in what this implies, the need for an act of selection any time one possibility is actualized rather than another. The act of selection cannot be attributed to "an actual thing", or else the reality of selection is negated.

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5. — RussellA

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. Maybe some mathematicians will tell you that "=" means "the same as", but that is misunderstanding.

Explain to me then what it could mean to say that something is, and yet that it neither exists nor does not exist? — Janus

Are you familiar with the concept of "potential"? In Aristotelian philosophy "potential" names a category which is required to describe becoming, change. This is what forms the category for those aspects of reality which are neither being nor not being, but may or may not be. Potential is very real, yet it cannot be said to exist nor not exist. Therefore it "is" in the sense of real, yet it neither exists nor does not exist.

Matter is in this category. This is because particular things exist as forms, determinate this and that, but they each have the potential to be something else. That potential is attributed to the thing's matter. But the matter itself cannot be a determinate this or that, or this would negate its definition as potential.