All objects that can produce multiple human beings are individual human beings. A mother, for instance, can do that. But this is also true of asexual reproduction. An individual amoeba, for instance, can produce another amoeba. Unfortunately (and oddly), we may have to think of one zygotic twin as the parent of the other. — NOS4A2

You're proposing a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. I reject this as a sufficient condition: we could theoretically produce multiple humans from each stem cell in your body. Each stem cell fits your stated condition.

would never deny you or other women your privileges, but your distinctions are completely arbitrary. Worse, they are inapplicable to those with developmental disabilities

I referred to a "properly functioning human being". This doesn't imply one must be proper functioning to be a human. I wasn't even trying to suggest a necessary condition; I was defining a typical human being, not excluding the atypical.

At any rate, the reduction of humanity and dignity to that of “material” is the name of the game for anyone who wants to end such a life.

You're reading that into what I said. I do happen to think that humans are material; the only alternative is immaterial; it's a well defined dichotomy. Nevertheless, I never said humans are nothing more than material. Being a human is absolutely something in addition to being material.

It occupies its own unique and distinct position in space and time. A zygote is alive. At no point does a zygote die and get replaced by another living being. If left to live a zygote can continue his life, without interruption, for upwards to one hundred years.

Twins are individuated at the zygote level until it reproduces asexually, then there are two individuals. — NOS4A2

This is a tangent. I have no problem with identifying an individual identity as a series of causally-connected spatiotemporal stages. The objection I have is in defining the "natural kind" (for lack of a better term) of "individual human being". This would have to be based on a well-defined set of necessary and sufficient properties, that unambiguously identify an object as either being one of these, or not. An object that can produce multiple human beings cannot possible be said to be an individual human being, even though it is commonly in the developmental history of human beings. The same is true of blasotocysts- clusters of cells, that may produce multiple human beings at several stages.

So my position is that an individual human being (i.e. an object of that type) is something that emerges. gradually during fetal development. I regard a properly functioning individual human being as a self-sustaining organism with certain physical and intellectual capabilities, including a sense of self. You can disagree, because there is no unequivocally correct answer. But you have no rational basis for denying me (or women) the privilege of deciding for ourselves.

If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality. — javra

How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?

Being contingent upon entails a dependence, does it not?

Agreed.

Provide your complete principium individuationis. My issue is that there is no such thing because "individual human being" is a concept with vague boundaries. A zygote isn't a strict boundary because a zygote can produce multiple individuals. If we focus on the histories of a set of twins, they are clearly not individuated at the zygote level.

Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? — Wayfarer

It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental.

And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate: — Wayfarer

A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists.

My definition of the physical: the ordinary objects of experience, and everything that is causally connected, through law-like behavior, to these ordinary objects of our experience.

Quantum systems fit this.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

The difference is this is the one thing in there with its own distinct and unique genetics, occupying its own unique and distinct position in space and time, and will remain as such until the end of its life. — NOS4A2

Identical twins begin with the same genetic material, they lack this uniqueness you mention. So unique genetics can't be the basis for identifying an individual human life.

It's true that every adult human's existence can be tracked back to a specific zygote. Similarly, every oak tree can be traced back to a specific acorn - but an acorn is not an oak tree. An acorn merely has the potential to develop into an oak tree, and a zygote merely has the potential to develop into 1 or more human beings.

We obviously perceive space and time...
— Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions).

Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.
— Relativist

So, what does it depend on, then? — Wayfarer

Physicalism = the thesis that everything that exists is physical. It is false only if there exists something non-physical. It depends only on this being true.

So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world. — javra

Absolutely! The fact that we (i.e..Einstein) developed a theory that transcends the "human perspective" of time is a testimony to our ability to transcend our own perspective, and endeavor to be objective.

It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. — Wayfarer

The fact that models makes successful predictions demonstrates that we know something about the nature of physical reality, and that's really the basic thing I'm defending.

Quantum mechanics indeed shows that reality is not identical to that which we directly perceive, but this fact is itself a relevant truth about reality. Re: the "observer problem", don't jump to a conclusion consistent with your confirmation bias. No interpretation of QM is verifiably true, but it's a near certainty that reality actually exhibits the predictible law-like behavior that we observe.

As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental. — Wayfarer

So you aren't denying that genes exist. You're pointing to the fact that there are other factors that influence growth and development. So once again, genetics does tell us something about life: more objective facts.

I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. — Wayfarer

Sorry I didn't understand, but that's how it sounded to me. Glad we could clarify that you agree scientific knowledge is efficacious- so I assume you agree that we indeed have some knowledge about the world external to minds.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.

transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made — Wayfarer

I completely agree with this; it makes perfect sense. My issue has been that these intuitions don't preclude discerning aspects of reality.

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The very notion of a perspective entails having a mind. We are sufficiently aware that we can recognize the fact we even have a perspective.

We obviously perceive space and time, so why doubt that this is an aspect of the actual world? The mere fact that we have a perspective does not entail that this perspective is an illusion.

You're ignoring my point: a zygote is not identical with an individual human being. Rather, they are a material that have the potential for developing human being(s).

In theory, your skin cells (which contain a complete set of your DNA) could be manipulated into developing into human beings.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.
— Relativist

Just say this quibble between you and Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds. — javra

That doesn't address the issue I raised.

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief.

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think the idea of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, then you can't believe there exists a mind-independent reality. I believe there is. Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? Understand that I acknowledge that physicalism could be wrong, but the belief in a mind-independent reality isn't dependent on physicalism being true.

No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent.

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.

Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.

It seems obvious to me that there are objective facts about the world that we know or can come to know. It is objective fact that we live on the third planet from the sun, which we orbit. How is this anything other than an absolute fact?

Why does this matter?
— Relativist

As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters. — Wayfarer

That's fine, and we can discuss it, but do you agree it has no practical significance? That's what I meant.

I'm willing to defend Armstrong's metaphysical theory against alternatives, so I need to understand what alternative you propose. I don't claim it's necessarily true; I simply think it's the best explanation for what we know about the world -broadly. It's conceivable that everything in the world is physical, except for minds.

Is his theory of mind the only thing you object to, or do you think there are flaws that are unrelated to his account of mind?

FYI, when we get to specifics of Armstrong's theory of mind, I won't be limiting myself to Armstrong's specifics, but I will stick with physicalism in general.

In the meantime, I need to better understand your position. If you don't believe we can know truths about the world, that seems more significant than whether or not the mind can be adequately accounted for through physicalism. I don't see how you could propose a superior alternative with such a background assumption.

I happen to think the non-essentialist process is the better process. It is why we rarely find a clear line between anything. It is why Heraclitus was the wisest of them all. It is why Aristotle is easy to dismiss (although he was the second-wisest). It is why Kant's phenomenal veil will always be pulled over our eyes. It is why Hegel may be the third wisest. It is why eastern thinkers who take essence and show how it must implode as it crystalizes are also wise...

But there is no speaking, no significance to any word, if we don't acknowledge gray, fuzzy lines of difference. It is easier to talk in essentialist terms, so essentialism is more like a tool of language.

You have to sound like an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" at all. To avoid essentialist speak is to conduct tiresome linguistic acrobatics to bring us to the same place anyway - the difference between this and that. — Fire Ologist

No, you don't have to be an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" or "individual human person" or not. As you've noted elsewhere, essentialism is the notion that there are necessary and sufficient properties that define what is the "essence" of a thing (or type of thing). Essence is a metaphysical concept.

Without appealing to essences, we can define SORTALS - a set of properties that we use to segregate objects into sets. It is conceptual, like set theory, not metaphysical. So we could define "having a beard" as "facial hair growth with a mean length of 5cm", and thus sort men into the bearded and unbearded in this way. My point is that there's no objective basis for defining a sortal in this way, when there is vagueness in the concept of what we're trying to distinguish.

We could define "individual human being" in such a way that we could sort the objects of the world on this basis. But there will be some degree of arbitrariness to it, at the boundaries. For most purposes, the boundary conditions don't matter. For abortion, it does.

If that is an human zygote, every person who has ever existed goes through this stage in their lifecycle. What leads you to believe it is not a person? — NOS4A2

A zygote can develop into multiple persons.

I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. — Relativist


It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. Hurricane behavior is not best understood in terms of particle physics, but there's no reason to doubt that it is fundamentally due to the behavior of particles.

Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism. — Relativist


My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity. — Wayfarer

I'm not defending physicalism here, I'm defending the existence of the external world and that we are able to determine some truths about it.

Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information. — The Blind Spot

Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?

Is the mind your sole focus? I'm happy to discuss that further, but I need to understand your perspective of everything in the world BESIDES minds.

To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. — The Blind Spot

Why does this matter? No metaphysical account of the mind is without flaws, and none can be proven as true. A person could practice psychology without a metaphysical account of the mind. On the other hand, neurology depends mostly on the physical - but often relating it to the "magic" of behavior (both physical and mental). But even here, a metaphysical account doesn't contribute to the practice of the discipline.

The field is not an ontological concept, but a phenomenological one. If we were as small as a photon, we could formulate an ontology of the very smallest. And only then would there be a unified physical theory. — Wolfgang

Quantum fields can be considered ontological, although you aren't compelled to do so.

it makes no sense to try to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic world — and this also applies to philosophical conclusions. — Wolfgang

Quantum effects have an impact on the macroscopic world, so it can't be ignored.

Why don’t classical and quantum physics go together? Are we dealing with two different worlds or are they just two different descriptions? — Wolfgang

There's only one world, and it seems to be fundamentally quantum mechanical (subatomic particles do not behave like classical objects). But there is clearly a disconnect in our ability to describe the macro world in quantum terms. That doesn't disprove reductive physicalism, but it does leave room for one to deny it-perhaps there is ontological emergence.

Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind... — Wayfarer

"Supposedly" a mind-independent reality?! Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? I read the following statement as indicating you agree there is a mind-independent reality:

though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — Wayfarer

Which implies you agree with the "judgement" that this is the case, even if you don't make that judgement on the same basis. The question of whether or not there exists a mind-independent reality does not depend on physicalism being true.

I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism. — Wayfarer

I know that, but I was explaining why I believe there is an external world: it is necessarily the case that our perceptions provide some access to this world that is at least functionally accurate.. So, even though your are rejecting solipsism, you seem overly skeptical that we can know something about the external world. I fully accept that our image of the world is rooted in our human perspective, but that fact doesn't imply our understanding is false or even suspect. I think it just means we need to take ourselves, and our perspective, into account when seeking objective facts about the world.

Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, — Schopenhaurer

Taken literally, I think this is absurd - it contradicts my view that there is an external world, that we have a functionally accurate image of it through our senses, and that this provides a foundation for learning objective facts about the world.

But maybe he's using "the whole world" to refer to our human concept of the world. That's a bit more palatable, but it still seems to imply we're too detached from it to discern object truths about it. If I'm correct about this, why would anyone believe this? This seems like unjustified skepticism.

For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have. — Wayfarer

Why think this is not an existential fact? Why think our inherent belief in a world external to ourselves is false or completely inscrutable?

Why are you calling the facts of scientific inquiry "contingent"? Is it because they can't be rigorously proven and theories are necessarily falsifiable? That doesn't preclude getting some things right, nor of getting many or most things at least partly right. I just don't understand why one would have such a pessimistic view.

the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

I completely agree with this statement, because "meaning" is a term that pertains specifically to conscious beings.

Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism.

Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. Does this quoted statement have broader implications?

What is the subject of "The universe exists"?

You acknowldge that we can discover objective facts about the universe. Isn't "the universe exists" an objective fact?

I can buy into the notion that all of our knowledge is grounded in ourselves. We individually develop language because we interact with the world, perceiving that world in our uniquely human way. But my point is: there is an actual world that we are perceiving.

My argument for denying solipsism is related to this, so I'll describe it.

We innately believe there exists a world external to ourselves. This is a basic, non-verbal belief- it's not derived logically from other beliefs. Importantly, it is a properly basic belief because it is a consequence of the way the world actually is and of the necessity of interacting with that world for our survival. (If you've read Alvan Plantinga, this will sound familiar. He argues that belief in God is rational - if there exists a God who instilled within us a sensus divinitatus).

Even a properly basic belief could be false. It's possible solipsism is true, but that mere possibility doesn't defeat the inherent belief that we have. I also acknowledge that IF solipsism is true, our belief in the external world is irrational. But that possibility doesn't worry me in the least, because my belief in the external world is so strong - I literally have zero doubt.

This is not an argument that proves solipsism is false. Rather, it shows that belief in an external world is rational, if it is true that there is an external world that produced this innate belief of ours. It is rational to maintain a belief that has not been defeated.

So, irrespective of what anyone else may believe, I am justified in believing there to exist a world external to myself, which I am a part of. If this belief is true (as I am convinced), it is an objective fact, not a subjective fact that is only true for me. It is an objective fact even if everyone else holds a false belief in solipsism.

It seems to me, this basic objective fact, that there exists a world outside the mind, is a reasonable starting point to derive additional objective facts about the world.

Trump hasn't done shit other than having a perfect sense of the direction in which US democracy is falling. — Benkei

Trump has leveraged the perception that US society is "failing" by permitting things like same-sex marriage, sensitivity to LGBTQ concerns, and ostensibly permitting non-white immigrant to enter the country illegally, "poison our blood", commit crimes, and take jobs.

[Quote[Trump is a symptom of the righteous distrust common people have of the political elites and rich people. [/quote]
So they support a rich person because he voices the same irrational concerns they have. Political elites are a problem because most people don't have the capacity or inclination to make well-informed voting decisions.

Distrust informed by their moral intuition that something simply isn't right and most things are unfair.

Moral intuitions that are often rooted in ignorance and prejudice.

This will not go away unless the US government repairs and regains trust by - I don't know - actually improving the material conditions of all its citizens instead of those that are already rich enough to lobby for favours.

How ironic. Encouraging racism, Christian nationalism, undermining rule of law, and embracing a demagogue isn't likely to "repair" the US government.

And that distrust is fueled by selfrighteous pricks decrying they are deplorables, garbage or aren't voting in their self-interest, thereby really only affirming that they don't trust "the other side" and therefore aren't to be trusted by "the other side".

Amplifying inappropriately worded comments to incite outrage in one's followers doesn't contribute to good voting choices. Truly demonizing "the other side" is more pervasive among the Trump cult.

The best way to win someone's trust, after all, has always been to call the other side "dumb shits".

And yet, that's exactly what Trump does- and his followers find it appealing. "Are you an Democrat or an American?" was posted on the Trump campaign website, and repeated by many on social media. A person on my neighborhood's facebook page said we need Trump because the Democrats want to "sexualize children". “These are horrible people,” said Trump at a North Carolina rally, referring to Democrats. “Oops, we should get along with everybody. They’re horrible people. Some people you just can’t get along with.”

suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line? — Count Timothy von Icarus

My objection to an infinite past is not based on cosmology. Rather, I am persuaded that an infinite past is logically impossible.

I first came to this view after analyzing William Lane Craig's defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. His defense of a finite past wasn't persuasive but it got me thinking. I landed on the fact that an infinite past entails an infinite series being completed in a sequential, temporal process. That seems logically impossible.

I don't know that cosmology can necessarily establish this. The big bang doesn't: it just raises the scientific question of what conditions led to the big bang.

Perhaps a theory of the nature of time could support it - if it could be shown that time (as we know it) is an emergent aspect of something more fundamental. I understand that Sean Carroll is working on something like this.

I am making clear the sense in which perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists — even if what we’re discussing is understood to exist in the absence of an observer, be that an alpine meadow, or the Universe prior to the evolution of h. sapiens. The mind brings an order to any such imaginary scene, even while you attempt to describe it or picture it as it appears to exist independently of the observer. — Wayfarer

This makes perfect sense. But the following does not:

In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it. — Wayfarer

This seems to contradict the bolded portion of the first quote. I could grant that a subjective perception of some aspect of reality exists only if it is perceived, but this doesn't account for your statement of neither existing nor not existing".

What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. — Wayfarer

Fair point. We do need to take our subjectivity into account. But this doesn't preclude our determining some objective truths about reality. You seem to acknowledge that the universe exists. This is an objective truth, even though the words in the statement rely on minds to give them meaning.

This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.

I don't understand this. Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists". Truth about something subjective: "The images of the 'Pillars of Creation' produced by the Webb telescope are beautiful".

the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

I can accept this if "unseen realities"=The subjective perspective of something in the world.

It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I'll read it, and respond in that thread.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.
— Relativist

Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God. — Wayfarer

I read some addition reviews. This one says, "Armstrong is not presenting a case for God in the sense most people in our idolatrous world would think of it...Armstrong promises that her kinds of [religious] practice will make us better, wiser, more forgiving, loving, courageous, selfless, hopeful and just. Who can be against that?"

So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence. If you've read the book and see something these reviewers missed, please identify it.

Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by"refute"? Do you simply mean the objectivist claim hasn't been proven logically impossible? That would be an unreasonable standard. A better question is: how does an objectivist justify believing what they do?

What we believe ought to be based on evidence and reasoning. So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief.

Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly reasonable to believe there are aspects of reality we will never figure out, and it's also true that a metaphysical theory can never be verified, but it could be falsified if there's some known aspect of the world that is incompatible with the metaphysical theory.

So...is there something incompatible with Armstorong's theory? If so, then what is it?

...just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.
— Relativist

No, it's an argument from epistemic humility. — Wayfarer

Are you suggesting remaining agnostic to the existence of the unnatural? What is a reasonable attitude toward something that is merely logically possible?

It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively ...My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory... — Wayfarer

I don't see how you could justify such a claim. It's true that a retrospective analysis of our evolutionary history tracks with increasing brain size. I imagine the evolutionary history of giraffes tracks increasing neck size. But how can you evaluate how long a feature should take to evolve? Evolution proceeds through such things as genetic mutations, genetic diversity within the populations, changing environmental pressures, population size, and gene flow between populations - all of which would influence the time for adaptive change. We don't have data about these factors to form the basis of a fair judgement. So, again, I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes.

I get it, that to a committed theist, God's involvement is always a live possibility - but how can one apply this, in practice, without getting in the way of actual scientific advance? Couldn't God be sufficiently clever to simply get the ball rolling when he created the universe, without needing to intervene along the way? Did he also kill the dinosaurs, who's continued existence would have changed the subsequent paths evolution took? I suggest that the most intellectually honest position to take is to simply assume God is responsible for everything, but in unknown ways- rather than inserting him as the answer to any scientific unknown.

The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief? — Wayfarer

Thanks. The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence. Instead, she criticizes religious fundamentalist and polemical atheists. Good for her. I agree with both sets of criticisms.

↪Relativist

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

No it doesn't, per your own explanation. There is a state before which there are no prior states. Call it S1. Now you claim that some thing or things had an S1 for no reason at all. They existed in S1 having not existed in any prior states. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't undercut anything I said.

Now, why can't anything else have an S1, starting to exist when it has existed in no prior state, for "no reason at all?"

The state of affairs didn't "start to exist", because it exists at all points of time. Rather, time begins as the state evolves.

You are trying to read some prior time before S1 back in, which is a strawman. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I'm not. Time begins; the foundation of reality does not begin.

I'll try to make this clearer. I'll assign a label to whatever exists at S1: F (standing for the foundation of existence).

F can have failed to exist only if it exists contingently. But F is contingent IFF there exists something to account for it being contingent. If F were the product of quantum indeterminacy, it would be contingent: F could have failed to obtain, while an alternative F' obtained instead. But this can't be, in our case, because quantum indeterminacy entails a quantum system existing prior to the indeterminate outcome. Nothing precedes F.

F could be a quantum system, such that what follows is the product of quantum indeterminacy. In that case, what follows from F is contingent (F accounts for what follows), but F itself is not contingent.

Let's consider contingency more broadly. Here's a general approach to accounting for contingency*:

x is contingent IFF there exists A, which accounts for x, and A can also account for ~x.

IOW: A accounts for (x or ~x).

But F is uncaused, so there is nothing that accounts for its existence. Therefore there can be no A that accounts for (F or ~F).

You seem to be conflating conceptual possibility with metaphysical possibility: you can conceive of F', so you erroneously assume F' is metaphysically possible. This ignores the need to account for contingency.

Anyhow, you have entirely ignored the question of why any certain thing should begin to exist in S1 rather than any other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've answered that now. F did not begin to exist, and F does not exist contingently.

This seems to me like a God of the Gaps solve it all to be honest.

Then you haven't followed.

"God of the gaps" is a form of argument from ignorance. I've made no such argument. My position is consistent with both deism and naturalism, and it follows logically from the premises I stated as axioms (first principles). Your error seem to be: 1) conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, and 2) ignoring the stated need to account for contingency. I hope I've sufficiently clarified these points.

You can reject the metaphysical axioms I've stated: I haven't claimed they are logically necessary. But I do think they are a better explanation than the alternatives, and I think I've shown that. We can discuss that further, once you accept the coherence of the framework I've stated.

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* I've tried to convey my view of contingency in my own words, as clearly as I can - but if it's still unclear - here's an alternative description, taken directly from Amy Karofsky's book, A Case for Necessitarianism:

"A theory of contingency offers a metaphysical explanation for ways things could have been and for the possibility that some actual thing might have been otherwise than it is by explaining why an entity is such as it is rather than not. Such a metaphysical explanation of contingency describes: that in virtue of which a contingent entity could have failed to have existed (obtained, held, happened, etc.); what it is that provides for the possibility that an entity could have been otherwise than what it is; and that which accounts for the ways in which an entity could—and the ways it could not—have been different.

"Metaphysical explanation is often tied to the concept of grounding. Kit Fine explains that “philosophy is often interested in questions of explanation—of what accounts for what—and it is largely through the employment of the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be pursued.”… Thus, a metaphysical explanation for a contingent entity provides the reason why the contingency is such as it is, rather than not, by pointing to an ontologically prior entity that is that in virtue of which the contingency could have been otherwise.”

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

Suppose B is a brute fact, meaning that it exists for no reason and therefore lacks any further ontological grounding. B exists, and (trivially) B is therefore possible. But is B necessary or contingent? Contingency implies ~B is possible. But B doesn’t fit the above: there is no explanation for B, and thus no explanation for B & possibly(~B). So if a brute fact exists, it exists out of metaphysical necessity because there’s no ontological basis that accounts for possibly(~B).
.

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present — Relativist


And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely true. Consider position and momentum: it is not that they lack a value at all, it is that the they don't have a precise value. Position and momentum are examples of complementary variables. There is a distribution of possible values that the pair will have when a measurement occurs. This distribution constitutes objective information about these particles, and it hints at something weird about fundamental reality that is beyond what we'd expect from our ordinary perspective. My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality.

Also, consider that quarks and antiquarks have a color charge, while leptons and antileptons do not have a color charge. Even if the value of the color charge is a complement of another property, it's still an objective fact that color charge is a property that that quarks have, but leptons do not. It's also an objective fact that everything in existence is composed of the elementary particles identified in the standard model (I'm setting aside the fact that the standard model may not be complete, and that it may not actually be the most fundamental basis of reality. I embrace the spirit of structural realism, so that the standard model points to something objectively true about reality, even if not completely accurate).

As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance. Arguments from ignorance can be corrected by recasting as an abductive case, arguing that the chosen hypothesis is a better explanation than alternatives. But it seems to me that any non-physical account will be at a clear disadvantage, because it will depend on ad hoc assumptions that raise more questions than answered.

What seems more likely?: 1) that intelligent minds would gradually develop in isolated instances (as few as once), somewhere in a vast universe that's evolved in a myriad of ways over the billions of years of its existence, or 2) that an intelligent mind (with a vast store of magical knowledge that just happens to exist without cause) would just happen to exist by brute fact?

I haven't seen a case for the latter, whereas the former is consistent with statistical entropy.

Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason? — Wayfarer

It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking. Humans differ from most by the fact that they have language and a more fully developed ability to think abstractly, but it's aligned with such behavior.

Why trust reason? Because we each intrinsically trust our sensory perceptions and the inherent reasoning we are born with. Were it not effective, we would not have survived.

I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism. — Wayfarer

The existence of laws of nature can't be deductively proven, but their existence seems the best explanation for what we observe. We could test that if you'd care to offer an alternative.

The existence of laws IS evidence for physicalism, in the general sense. I think you mean that the existence of laws does not entail physicalism, which is true. However, abductive reasoning entails determining the best explanation for a set of facts - the set of facts are "evidence" for any of the proferred explanations. Explanatory scope is one aspect of abductive reasoning, and it entails explaining more facts, so all facts are potentially relevant - they are evidence.

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist. — Wayfarer

It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God. Alchemists also got some things right. Human endeavors, including science and philosophy, advance by building on - and correcting- past achievements, not by starting afresh.

Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing more. I've examined traditional arguments for God, and found none of them at all compelling. They invariably depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions (which seem carefully contrived), and often make the unjustified assumption that magical knowledge is plausible (i.e. knowing things without developing the knowledge, and having this knowledge exist without being encoded - it's just there).Perhaps worse, none of them make a case for a God of religion. Even if sound, they only make a case for deism- a potentially indifferent creator.

First of all, it is incorrect to suggest that an initial state entails "spontaneous generation". "Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

The initial state of reality necessarily exists uncaused, because causes temporally precede their effects*, and it is logically impossible to temporally precede an initial point of time.

Could this brute fact of an initial state be contingent? No, and here's why.

Classical (non-quantum) physics entails strict determinism: a specific type of cause will necessarily produce a specific effect. If all laws of nature were of this sort, there would be no contingent things in the universe.

Contingency in the universe arises only with quantum systems when the wave-function collapses (i.e. quantum indeterminacy). This is the only known source of contingency in the world. The initial state of the universe is not temporally preceded by a quantum system that collapses, hence there is no source of contingency for the initial state. Therefore it exists out of necessity. This is not strict logical necessity; it is metaphysical necessity because it is the logical consequence of the metaphysical principle that contingency requires a source of contingency*.

If there is a divine creator, the initial state of reality consists solely of this divine creator, existing uncaused, and with no temporally prior state. Therefore it exists as a necessary brute fact (brute fact, because there's no explanation for the specific, actual creator existing rather than not). This creator is a source of contingency for whatever it creates, and it implies everything, other than itself, exists contingently (at the will of this creator).

If there is no divine creator, then there is no source of contingency for the universe, so the universe (the totality of reality) itself exists out of metaphysical necessity. So my analysis doesn't preclude a divine creator, but it clearly shows that a creator is not entailed. It simply implies that something exists uncaused, and that its existence is metaphysically necessary.
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* Notice that I have stipulated two metaphysical axioms:

1) causation is temporal (causes temporally precede effects). This is not an arbitrary first principle, it is consistent with everything we know about reality.
2) Contingency requires a source of contingency. Also not arbitrary: the only known contingency in the world is a consequence of quantum indeterminacy.

The many-worlds interpretation of QM entails no contingency at all: all possible outcomes of a (seemingly) indeterminate quantum effect are actualized. It could entail an initial state of a quantum system, that is comprised of a multitude of eigenstates- each of which evolves into a "universe" (a system of stars, galaxies, etc), causally isolated from each other, except they share a common initial, quantum state.

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics. — Wayfarer

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present, as is the fact that they emerge when measured, and that the set of measureable properties is unique to each type of elementary particle. This isn't a matter of phenomenology giving us a questionable view of objective reality- which is what I was addressing.

Computers don’t come into existence de novo. They are artefacts built by humans according to human aims and purposes. In other words, whatever purposes they pursue are extrinsic. — Wayfarer

My point is that there's nothing about the application of logic that is inconsistent with physical mechanism, so the mere fact that we can apply logic doesn't falsify physicalism. How we evolved the capacity to do this is a different matter and a different discussion.

I don't think physicalism can explain how semantic properties emerge from, or are identical to, these physical states without appealing to, or assuming, non-physicalist explanations of meaning. — Wayfarer

We interact with the world to survive. Successful interaction is dependent on our pattern-recognition capacity which enables us to distinguish types of objects and activities. We also have the physical capacity to make and hear various sounds also fitting recognizable patterns. Relating a recognizable sound (a word) to a type of object or activity doesn't seem at all problematic. The word then "means" the object or activity.

What is that 'something ontological', and how can it be described as physical, when it's not described by physics? — Wayfarer

A universal exists immanently- in its instantiations, so the "something ontological" is the instantiations of a law of nature.

I may have made Armstrong's metaphysics sound more detached from physics than it really is. A law of physics that is actually identical to a true law of nature, has no detachment at all. I was simply trying to convey that the metaphysics is not dependent on the current state of physics, which is never 100% correct.

But, he says, this assumption of natural order is itself a metaphysical commitment, one that exceeds the bounds of empiricism — Wayfarer

I disagree that this exceeds the bounds of empiricism. Empiricism in science leads to theories, established by abductive reasoning. By extension, we can abductively conclude there are laws of nature, on the basis that this best explains the success of science.

I agree, no definition of "individual human being" works to make a public policy based on that definition, because its fuzzy and no one agrees on the less fuzzy parts even. But if we were to all agree that abortion would remain legal forever, even up to the moment of birth, carve the law in stone and make it a constitutional amendment, is anyone still interested in being a philosopher and answering the question of when my life or his life or her life actually begins? Just for curiosity sake? Anyone?

Seems just weird for someone to say he didn't always exist (which he didn't) but that he won't even conjecture on which point or time period in history when he'd have to say he started existing. — Fire Ologist

You acknowledge the concept is fuzzy, and yet you think it should be possible to identify a point at which a human life begins.

Consider another fuzzy concept (with no pun intended): having a beard vs being clean-shaven. What's the point at which whisker growth constitutes a beard? Even after shaving there are follicles present. Shall we say, 1mm of growth? 1cm? Any point we identify is arbitrary.

A human life is something that gradually emerges, similarly a beard gradually emerges. There is no objective point of demarcation. That's what it means to be a fuzzy concept. Fuzzy doesn't mean it's a mystery to be solved- it means there is no fact of the matter that determines a boundary.

Here's an article that discusses the problem of vague concepts, which is exactly what I'm referring to.

We could figure out exceptions to the rule. But we need a rule first. Is anything a human being? — Fire Ologist

Exceptions demonstrate the problem with a rule. Suppose we establish the rule (as a law) that a 6-month fetus is a human being. There are instances where the carrying to term of a (damaged) 6-month fetus will kill the mother. The rule would necessitate killing the mother.

No rule, no definition of "individual human being" can work universally because "individual human being" is fundamentally a fuzzy concept. Any definition will have exceptions - and that was the point I was trying to make. Establishing a definition in the law (if that's what you're after) is therefore pointless. Rather, the law ought to be based on the reality that it IS a fuzzy concept. This permits individuals to make their own decisions in their own circumstances.

I think some religious people think that the reason human beings are valuable is because they have a soul, and souls come from God at conception. Great. Wonderful for them. But there is nothing to argue about there, nothing to talk about, nothing to measure and no explanatory power. — Fire Ologist

Actually, there is indeed something important to argue about: public policy. It is understandable that the sort of religious person you described would want to stop people from killing zygotes, and there's no reason why they can't try to influence public policy.

Regarding the core matter that we're discussing, I'd just say that "individual human being" is a fuzzy concept, so there is no objectively correct answer as to when a developing entity is a full-fledged human being.

When I saw you quoting someone saying that a "human has a head...", I thought of Abby and Brittany Hensel, conjoined twins that share a single body (one torso, one set of arms and legs)- so (by every definition I've seen) they comprise a single organism , but it wouldn't make sense to treat them as a single person.

My argument is everything is arbitrary after you have a living organism with 46 chromosomes. — Fire Ologist

Even that doesn't work. People with Klinefelter syndrome have 47 chromosomes, and there is also a condition where a person has 48 chromosomes.

You also haven't addressed my evidence that thsoe who have the latter NDEs don't really believe in them. — Clearbury

I don't think that follows. We have a natural inclination to keep on living, so this could get in the way of suicide. In addition, those who are religious may also believe that suicide would "kill" their chances of a happy afterlife. So I can accept that at least some of the people who've had these vivid dreams, in circumstances in which they are near death, actually believe these illusions are real.

The unique vividness of a near-death dream may be related to "terminal lucidity" that Alzheimer's often experience as they near death. In their case, it is a sudden, brief burst of lucidity as they near death. The physical changes that take place in a brain nearing death cause both.

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. — Relativist


I think its failure on that score is beyond reasonable doubt. The crux of that issue is logic itself, reason itself. I don't see how can there be any plausible physicalist account of the nature of reason, which inheres in the relationship of ideas, 'if-then' statements. — Wayfarer

Logic is semantics, and entails meaningful relations between statements. Computers demonstrate that logic can be mechanized, so I don't understand what you see as a problem.

If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them — Relativist


Nor can philosophers then appeal to physics in support of what they describe as 'physicalism'. And if their physicalism is not supported by physics, then why does it deserve that designation. — Wayfarer

What's the problem with the way Armstrong appeals to physics? (i.e. the basis for believing there exist laws of nature).

Your objection was based on interpretations of QM - and an interpretation isn't really physics, it's metaphysics - ontology. It would be physics if it were testable and falsifiable, but by all accounts I've seen, it is neither.

The proffering up of brute fact claims strikes me as primarily a manifestation of the inability to acknowledge mystery. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that's the case for my claim, because I argue that reality there is a brute fact by logical necessity. Here's my reasoning:

If (1) each temporal state of the universe was caused by the temporally prior states, AND (2) the past is finite, then there is necessarily an initial, uncaused state that exists by brute fact. (A metaphysically necessary brute fact, not a contingent one).

Where's the flaw in this reasoning? How can there be a reason for an initial state? The desire for a reason is not grounds for believing there is necessarily a reason.

↪Relativist


Yes. If they [laws of nature] weren't [natural], then all forms of naturalism would be false.


I am not sure of this. The Physics, from which we get the term "nature" and other early forms of naturalism focus on "things acting the way they do because of what they are, i.e. because of their 'nature.'" So there are no extrinsic laws governing things and their behaviors, there is merely the natures of beings, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I defined "laws of nature" as extrinsic relations between universals, but intrinsic to the natural world. It indeed entails "things acting the way they do because of what they are". If there were unnatural laws of nature, then it would mean there exists something unnatural - thus falsifying naturalism.

Representationalism wed to physicalism makes it such that phenomenal awareness is mere appearance, whereas reality is the "objective," requiring a "view from nowhere." — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Mere appearance"? I'll grant that our perceptions don't necessarily reveal the world exactly as it is, but I'd argue that they do present us with a reflection of reality. It also appears to me that we are indeed able to discern many aspects of reality, both directly through our senses, and indirectly through scientific investigation. How we discern and describe this is intellectually and semantically grounded in our own nature (this is inescapable), but that doesn't make it either invalid or untrue. If you are suggesting objective reality is completely indiscernible to us if physicalism is true, I don't agree. If you mean something else, then please elucidate.

Regarding a "view from nowhere": the best available description of the fundamental layer of material reality is the standard model of particle physics. Objects are made of these particles, and each particle has a well-defined set of properties. The existence of these particles were deduced, not perceived by the faculties of our "phenomenal awareness", but over time - their existence has been confirmed through measurements in particle accelerators. So tell me in what sense is this NOT objective reality.

And third, if Armstrong’s metaphysics is founded on the idea of scientific laws as real and necessary features of the world, then one would expect it to appeal to scientifically established theories. — Wayfarer

Armstrong appeals to scientifically established theory as justification for his hypothesis that there are actually laws of nature, and he does agree that it is in science's court to determine what the laws are, but science makes mistakes - the laws of textbook physics may very well change over time. Let's assume General Relativity is 100% true - if so, it is a law of nature that was also true during Newton's time. The same thing could happen with other laws of textbook physics - so if his system were tied to current physics, his metaphysics would be falsified as soon some current law is falsified.

Sure, Armstrong's physicalist metaphysics could be wrong (perhaps the mind isn't physical, or perhaps there are no actual laws of nature), but the same is true of any metaphysical system that has been, or ever will be, proposed. My primary points are that his system appears to me to be the best physicalist system available, and that consequently, when we're discussing physicalism (as some of us have done in this thread) - it's appropriate to bring up his system. I believe it's coherent and that it accounts for most things in the world quite well.

You wonder why, then, Schrödinger published his notorious thought-experiment on the not-dead-or-alive cat. He sought to illustrate the fundamental indeterminacy that characterises the so-called 'fundamental particles' of physics by providing a hypothetical example of their absurd implications were they to manifest on the level of everyday experience. The fact that the equation is accurate is not at issue, as it is firmly established that the accuracy of the predictions of quantum mechanics exceeds anything previously discovered in history. It's what they say, or don't say, about the so-called fundamental constituents of reality that is the philosophical point at issue. In other words, it's the ontological implications that are at issue, not the practical effectiveness. The fact that Armstrong can blithely wave these away says something about his theories, in my view. — Wayfarer

Each interpretation of quantum mechanics corresponds to a hypothesis about the an important aspect of reality. It's interesting to discuss these, and their implications (as did Schroedinger), but I don't see any reason to hold this against Armstrong. If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them. So I really don't understand why you'd hold this against him. If one were to embrace his more generalized theory, it wouldn't preclude augmenting it with his favorite ontological basis for QM.

I'm not completely committed to Armstrong's theory, and I also don't think anyone ought to commit to any particular theory - because they are untestable. But in my opinion, physicalism is an appropriate starting point - because it's pretty clear that the physical world actually exists, and I also agree with Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa that there are laws of nature in the world and these are a better account of causality than the alternatives I'm aware of.

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. The struggles don't seem fatal. Non-physical theories of mind also have issues. But as far as I'm concerned, this is the area where the most interesting discussions are.

I would disagree about which work is Armstrong's magnum opus. His life's work was his comprehensive metaphysical system, so I'd vote for "Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics", which outlines his comprehensive system, as does his earlier "A World of States of Affairs". Both of these books subsume his theory of mind and most of his other various writings. It's rare for a philosopher to be as comprehensive as he was.

The system is so fundamentally broken that it needs to collapse so that all can examine the individual pieces, throw away the bad and rebuild with the working parts. — Christoffer

If our society collapsed, I doubt the population would be any better at examining and judging the individual pieces than they are at choosing leaders today. I'd expect that the situation would be more likely than ever to search for simple solutions to the complex problems.