the only way we ever know about universals or laws is through the activity of reason, the mind’s ability to discern likeness within diversity and to infer necessity where the senses show only succession — Wayfarer

What's wrong with that? It's a metaphysical hypothesis with broad explanatory scope, and consistent with the success of science.

The difficulty is that law realists won’t acknowledge it, because it thinks mind itself is simply the product of those same physical processes which it situates ‘in things’. — Wayfarer

You're conflating law realism with physicalism. One could accept the reality of laws, while choosing to believe "the mind" is not the product of natural law - whether by faith (as religious scientists do), or by hypothesis - including whatever hypothesis of mind you are drawn to.

David Hume broke this supposed relationship. He argued that causation is not something we can deduce from reason alone — it's only ever inferred from constant conjunctions: "We see A followed by B, and infer causation." Hence, causation is not logically necessary but contingent and habitual. — Wayfarer

IMO, the Law Realists improved upon this by proposing that laws of nature entail a necessitation. They define a law of nature as a causal relation between types of things (AKA "universals"). Hume would notice the empirical evidence that every observed pair of electrons repelled each other, and label this a "constant conjunction", while law realists would say that electrons (a type of thing) repel each other - and this is constitutes a law. If A and B are electrons, then they it is physically necessary that they will repel, given that that this law exists.

So I'm curious if you agree that law realism is a better explanation of empirical evidence than constant conjunction?

Relativist, how far does the immunity go?
All the way until impeachment + conviction by Congress? — jorndoe

Immunity applies to any acts that are part of his official duties. For example, he can't be prosecuted for illegally firing people, illegally withholding funds from universities, or violating the Posse Comitatus Act (ordering the National Guard to enforce the law). He's done all these things.

He could have been convicted for his 2020 election fraud, when he wasn't in office. He was indicted for this, but it was dropped when he became President because (it has been decided years ago) any prosecution would interfere with his official duties.

He could certainly be impeached for any of the crimes he's committed, and it Dems control the House after the 2026 elections, they may do that. GOP won't, because Trump controls them. Regardless, even if impeached, he won't be convicted because it requires 2/3 of Senate.

It's going to be a long 4 years.

I'm having a surprisingly hard time locating any discussions in the literature of mental-to-mental causation -- that is, the idea that one thought or image could cause another thought or image. I've looked through the usual suspects on causation but haven't nailed it yet. Can anyone on TPF help? — J

That is exactly the topic of Peter Tse's book (from a physiicalist perspective), The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation

If a presidential order and actions on those orders are illegal, then US Marshalls should arrest Trump. Simple as that really. — Christoffer

No, it's not. Trump is immune. Even before SCOTUS established this (and before they became corrupted), the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had determined that a sitting President cannot be indicted. So the only way Trump can be held accountable is if he were impeached and removed from office.
The House of Representatives is controlled by Trumpists. They publicly rationalize everything he does. So although a judge determined Trump's action was illegal, Trumpist Congressmen say the judge got it wrong. It will be appealed, and they will continue to say the courts got it wrong unless and until SCOTUS affirms it.

Here's a classic syllogism in philosophy:
1. All men are moral
2. Socrates is a man
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal

The conclusion does not establish an equivalence between Socrates and being mortal. Neither does the statement "knowledge is belief" entail an equivalence between knowledge and belief. Regardless, it appears we've gotten through this misunderstanding.

So your argument here is, "I believe X is true and I have strong justification to believe it, therefore it is true [or, therefore I know it]." But why do you think those two conditions are sufficient?

Those conditions obviously fail to generate knowledge in certain circumstances. And this idea of "strong" or "adequate" justification is not even in keeping with that broad sort of Gettier epistemology. It looks like a subset, something like probabilistic internalism. — Leontiskos

I agree that "Strong" justification, per se, is not sufficient for knowledge. But if one believes that knowledge is possible, one would then have to agree that there are SOME justifications are sufficient for knowledge. Does "my name is Fred" qualify for knowledge? It doesn't really matter, because I was simply trying to illustrate the relation between knowledge and belief.

But again, rather than falling into the rabbit hole of contemporary epistemology, my claim is that the traditional epistemic opinion is that knowledge is possible - that I can know and know that I know certain things. I don't see how you would be able to accept such a view.

I do believe knowledge is possible (analytic truths, for example), but I also believe it is rare - because Gettier conditions are nearly always present. If one chooses to define knowledge more loosely, with somewhat less deference to Gettier conditions, then he would consider knowledge to be more common. But whether or not the term (knowledge) can be applied to some specific belief seems to me to be of no practical significance.

What is of practical siginficance (IMO) is the importance of making an effort to seek truth through good epistemological practices. What I've been arguing is that inference to best explanation (IBE) is usually the best we can do. I doubt that any IBEs can constitute knowledge, but that doesn't mean we should treat all inferences as equally credible. Conspiracy theorists draw inferences from data, but they tend to cherry pick data to fit a prior prejudice, while ignoring or rationalizing data that is inconsistent with the theory. They are not applying good epistemological practices.

No, your source did not say that knowledge is belief. Go back and have another look. — Leontiskos

Yes, it did. Let me be clear: the sources did not say (nor did I claim) that all beliefs are knowledge. Rather, both sources are saying that knowledge constitutes a a subset of ones beliefs. I'll also clarify that we're discussing propositional beliefs/knowledge.

I gather that you use the terms differently, but I've consistently been discussing what the standard philosophical terms are. If you are unable or unwilling to understand this, then there's no point continuing the discussion.

When we are talking about knowledge we are not really dealing with beliefs. — Leontiskos

I don't think so, because it is a statement of knowledge, and knowledge is not belief. — Leontiskos

You're wrong - in terms of standard philosophical discourse. I provided the definition from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy that categorically states that knowledge is belief (belief that is adequately justified and true). Here's another source:

Ever since Plato’s Theaetetus, epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of propositional knowledge. These components will yield an analysis of propositional knowledge. An influential traditional view, inspired by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge hasthree individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This tripartite definition has come to be called “the standard analysis.”

-- Moser, Paul K.. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford Handbooks) (pp. 15-16). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If you think there are truths then can you give an example of a truth? — Leontiskos

I'll give two examples:
I. :My name is Fred.

I believe this to be true, and I have strong justification to believe it (it's the name on my birth certificate, the name my friends and family have always called me, and the first name on a variety of legal documents). My justification is sufficient to categorize this belief as knowledge - so I can also say I know this to be true. A TRUTH is nothing more than a true statement (or proposition), so I can confidently say "My name is Fred" is a truth.

Now let's suppose you believe me - that my name really is Fred. Your justification is weak, compared to mine (you're just taking the word of a strange guy on a public internet forum), so you cannot claim this to be knowledge on your part. In spite of the fact that you can't know this to be true, you do believe this to be the case and this also means you regard "My name is Fred" to be a truth.

II. Consider Goldbach's conjecture:
Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers

This statement has not been proven, and it hasn't been disproven. This implies that one of the following is a true statement:
G1. Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers
G2. There is at least one even number greater that 2 that is NOT the sum of two prime numbers

No one can claim to KNOW G1 or G2, because there's no proof of either. But one of them has to be true in spite of this - and therefore one of them is a TRUTH. My point is that something can be true, even if no one can actually know it.

For me, telepathy means there is an energy that is different from our other forms of communication, which are all physical. — Athena

If telepathy is real, why wouldn't it be physical, given that both sender and receiver are physical? To assume there's something nonphysical means the brain can have a causal relation to the nonphysical. More assumptions = weaker justification.

Perhaps there was a telepathic event as the man was dying, that planted the words in your mind. Or perhaps you received it telepathically from his wife's subsconscious, stimulated by her mental state. These seems more plausible to me than your receiving this cryptic message from him, after his brain ceased functioning.

You seem to be suggesting that our memories could be copied to another form and re-attached to our souls after death.

Sure, this is logically possible, but it's an ad hoc hypothesis that lacks supporting evidence. If this is something that occurs, I wonder why the deity bothers at all with brain-storage of memories, and why she fails to help out dementia patients with access to this resource.

The medical evidence demonstrates that memories are "stored" (in some sense) in the brain. Disease and physical trauma can result in memory loss. So even if a "soul" lives on, if the individual's memories are absent, it seems irrelevant to me. I regard myself as the person who was shaped by my experiences, including the memories that were formed along the way.

Meat is murder, but it's also rather tasty. Ultimately, I think that's why it's going to continue to be consumed.

I agree that the question of an afterlife is more relevant than the existence of a God.

The thought of an afterlife is certainly appealing, but wishful thinking seems to me a poor guide to truth. And AFAIK, there's no evidence of it (unless you buy into claims about houses being haunted). Still, believing in an afterlife is not usually harmful (unless it leads one to risk or forgeit his life, or that of others), and it could be emotionally beneficial.

whether or not one believes in God does affect one's approach and interpretation of all that happens in life. — Jack Cummins

Consider 2 scenarios:
1) deism is true: a "God" created the universe, but is indifferent to everything that occurs in it. There is no afterlife.
2) naturalism is true: there is no being that intentionally created the universe.

Would you approach life differently in scenario 1 vs scenario 2?

That couldn't be more wrong. Surely you know of the many controversies over the interpretation of quantum physics. The question of whether the objects of analysis really exist, or in what sense they exist, is central to that. — Wayfarer

There are a variety of interpretations of QM, and it seems unlikely that it will ever be possible to verify which one is correct. That seems a background curiosity, and gives a good reason to be agnostic as to which interpretation is correct. However, it does not provide a reason to deny that the "objects of analysis" exist. These objects are (obviously) analyzable- which seems sufficient reason to regard them as real. If some interpretation of QM entails these things as being nonexistent, that seems more of a reason to deny the interpretation, than a reason to deny the existence of these analyzable objects.

At worst, this interpretation establishes that it is possible the object doesn't exist. But that possibility still seems no more than an idiosyncratic curiosity - not a fact that further scientific investigation should feel obligated to take into account.

Perhaps such idiosyncratic interpretations of QM might lead some brilliant scientist to develop a new paradigm on this basis. If that paradigm is more successful at making predictions, then it could become relevant. But unless/until that occurs, it seems a dead-end.

the set of all things that have this property. — litewave

a set is a single thing too and its elements can be said to participate in or share the character of this thing. — litewave

the set of not only its presently existing instances but also of its past and future instances and of all its possible instances (existing in possible worlds) — litewave

Can we agree that only one possible world actually exists (the actual world)?

In that case, your set includes "things" that do not exist, never have existed, and never will exist (they are non-actual possibilities). Let's focus on this subset of your big set. Does it have any members? Are the members things? If so, what is a thing?

The shift in language from “prostitute” to “sex worker” reflects a deeper societal change in how we view autonomy, dignity, and labor. Referring to it as “sex work” acknowledges that it is, indeed, work -often under complex and challenging circumstances. — PatriciaCollins

The term also normalizes/de-stygamtizes it. Somewhat. That is both good and bad. It's good we're finally accepting that the sex trade will always be with us, that the sex workers are people too, and deserving of the respect every human deserves.

That said, I am firmly in the camp that going to OnlyFans instead of getting a skilled job is absolutely a cop-out and not something we can sufficiently compare as "work". — AmadeusD

Yes. This is the problem, and it does not seem like a long-term career. It would be good for sex-workers to recognize the relatively short term nature of the career and plan accordingly. I suspect that's rarely done, although I did read about a nursing student who was using sex-work to fund her education. Good for her!

Why does it matter if a "God" exists?

A religious person would point to the promise of eternal life. That requires a God of religion: one requiring worship and perhaps a moral life, and providing a life after death. The problem is that this package is rather implausible.

By contrast, the traditional arguments for God's existence only (provisionally) establish a creator and ontological ground of reality (i.e. deism). So what if such a being exists? The only reason I can imagine is that it statisfies a curiosity about the nature of existence. But does it? Should it?

At best, these arguments only define a coherent metaphysical framework. Being coherent means its possibly true. But the frameworks that entail a God necessarily depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Why should this satisfy anyone's curiosity?

There are metaphysical frameworks that don't include a God. Similarly, they depend on metaphysical assumptions - so they can't be established as true either. But...

No metaphysical theory can be tested, verified, or falsified. Still, we can compare different theories in terms of explanatory power and parsimony. A deistic theory can answer all questions (magic can explain ANYthing), but it loses parsimony by assuming something as complex as a deity just happens to exist without cause or explanation. To me, this seems sufficient reason to assume a deity does not exist. One can still explore metaphyical systems to satisfy curiosity, but the theistic ones seem rather far-fetched.

That said, in my experience debating these issues with theists- they tend to embrace the deistic arguments because it helps to rationalize what they already believe, or want to believe.

if you are saying that everything is believed and nothing is known, then I don't find that to be epistemologically precise. — Leontiskos

My semantics is standard in epistemology Here's what the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy says:

Starting from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, knowledge has been thought to consist in three necessary conditions: belief, truth, and justification. Traditionally, the focus is on the nature of justification...In 1963 Gettier showed that these three conditions do not really explain what knowledge is. For I may hold a justified belief which is true but which I believe to be true only as a matter of luck. Such a belief cannot count as knowledge. Epistemology since then has been debating whether the original conditions need to be modified, or whether further conditions must be introduced.

So if you KNOW X, this means you BELIEVE X, X is true, you are justified in believing X, and your justification is not a product of luck.

You said, "I know X is not a statement of belief". Well, it IS a statement of belief in standard philosophical discourse. I realize that in colloquial speech, some people consider belief and knowing to be something distinct, but that actually muddies the water.

You're also drawing a distinction with "certainty" and "certitude" but this also seems colloquial. We're still dealing with beliefs, even if there is no logical possibility that the belief is false.

the way we linguistically distinguish facts from opinions highlights the way that facts are not subjective in the way that opinions are subjective, and that they exist all the same. That is: there really are facts (truths), and they really are something different than opinions. If everything returns to attitude, then it seems that there is nothing other than opinion. — Leontiskos

Our colloquial way of speaking is vague, and implies distinctions that are not real. An opinion is a belief. Colloquially, if we say "that's my opinion" - we may be qualifying the nature of the belief, but it's a vague qualification. A person might say this when he knows the basis for his opinion is weak, but another person might formulate an opinion only after a good deal of analysis. In either case, they're stating a belief.

A TRUTH is a statement that corresponds to some aspect of reality. Of course there are truths. Truth is what we all want to have in our possession. The issue is: how do we assess whether of not some statement is true? A justification is a reason to believe the statement is true. Some justifications are better than others. If it's derived from deductive reasoning, you're on very solid ground (although you're still dependent on the premises being true). The point I've been making is that we rarely use deduction; more often we use abduction - it's an imperfect guide to truth, but it's usually the best we can do. But it's better than choosing beliefs randomly, or jumping to conclusions without considering all the facts.

In the context of this discussion on continuity of the self? Nothing. What I mean is: the most defensible position on the self is that consciousness is just a momentary phenomenon that comes packaged with the illusion of continuity. — Mijin

I agree.

What do you regard as the necessary and sufficient conditions (or properties) for being you? I suggest that this is a central issue in the transporter scenario.

Are you a physicalist, with respect to the mind?
If not strictly a physicalist, do you agree that at least some physical components are necessary to being you?

My position: I'm a physicalist, so I believe I consist of my component, physical parts. These parts change over time, but there is a causal chain that accounts for these changes. As such, at any point of time - I consist of exactly the physical parts that comprise my body at that time (100% are necessary and sufficient for being me at that time). This accounts for the perdurance of my identity over time. AFAIK, no other theory if identity makes as much sense under physicalism. So, if you are a physicalist then I think you should embrace perdurantism (although I'm open to hearing alternative points of view and reconcidering).

I think you are still running roughshod over the difference. There is a difference between believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true, and this is tracked by the fact that people are saying different things when they say, "I believe it is true," and, "It is true." Similarly, when you say, "That's what it means to be certain," what you are saying is, "That's what it means [for someone] to be certain." But again, "certain" is not always predicated of persons. It is very often predicated of propositions. — Leontiskos

I think you're discussing the semantics of everyday language - many people say "I believe X" to convey a degree of uncertainty. There could be an implied "but I could be wrong". Some people also say they "know" something to be true, conveying absolute certainty, not the philosophical sense of knowledge. Everyday language is imprecise. In a conversation, one might need to clarify.

I'm using the terms more precisely- using definitions that dovetail epistemology (dealing with beliefs and their justification) and psychology (what a belief IS to a person).

For example, from the Grammarist entry, "It’s a near certainty that the 17-member nation eurozone won’t survive in its current form." This is not a predication about an attitude or a subjective state.

It's a statement of belief* by whoever formulated it and becomes a belief* of any person who reads it and accepts it. If no one had ever formulated it, then it wouldn't be a belief* held by anyone.

* a subjective state of an individual.

Perhaps you're thinking, "it would be true even if no one had formulated it". But what exactly would you be referring to as the "it" that is true? The statement? Does the statement exist independently of human minds? Do all possible statements have some sort of independent existence? In my opinion, statements only exist in minds.

Do you stand by your decision to label beliefs that are not provably true IBEs? — Leontiskos

No, not all unproveable truths. I was being careless in my wording. More precisely: most of our rational, acquired beliefs are IBEs. (My objective had only been to contrast this with the notion that our beliefs are somehow proven deductively; in most cases - IBEs are the best we can do, and that's perfectly fine).

The more central question can be restated with your claim, "Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined." The "nearly" makes me think that some beliefs are not underdetermined, but I'm not sure if you really hold that. — Leontiskos

I do hold that we have some beliefs that are not underdetermined. The belief that the object before me is a tree or not a tree is not underdetermined. Properly basic beliefs (e.g. there is a world external to ourselves) aren't underdetermined, because they aren't determined through reasoning at all- so the term seems inapplicable (however, arguably- they are determined by the environment that produced us. This aspect is what makes them properly basic - a variation of Alvan Plantinga's reformed epistemology).

In English "certitude" connotes subjectivity, whereas "certain" and "certainty" need not. When I said, "premises which are foundational and certain," I was using 'certain' in this objective sense, which is quite common. For example, you ↪claimed that some beliefs follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts. I might ask, "But do they really follow necessarily?" You might answer, "They certainly do." Your answer would not mean, "I have a high degree of certainty or a high degree of certitude that they do follow necessarily." It would mean, "They objectively follow necessarily." — Leontiskos

I understand the semantic distinction, but are the attitudes actually distinct? (Remember that I suggested certainty is an attitude). Some may insist there is a parallel distinction of attitude, but I'm not convinced.

This is associated with my view toward "Bayesian epistemology": which depends on assigning an epistemic probability to every belief. It is a practical impossibility to do this consistently. We can only apply some subjective coarse grained level of certainty (which may vary from one day to the next). So it seems to me that our epistemic judgements aren't sufficiently fine-grained to truly have an attitude distinction that matches the semantic one. Example: I'm certain the sun will come up tomorrow, despite there being a nonzero probability the sun will go nova.

Well the same problem crops up here. What is certain and a feeling of certainty are not the same thing, just as justification and a feeling of justification are not the same thing. One's being justified and one's deeming themselves justified are two different things. — Leontiskos

This seems similar to someone believing a proposition to be true vs the proposition actually being true. All we can ever do is to make a judgement: there is no oracle to inform us that our judgement is correct. One or more people may examine the reasoning and concur, but this only elevates a subjective judgement to an intersubjective one. Similar with the feeling of certainty: it's subjective, and so is the analysis that leads to the feeling. When we're certain of something, we believe we've arrived at objective truth - that's what it means to be certain.

"..I guessed that this meant that some of our beliefs are provably true, and are not IBEs. If that guess is correct, then apparently you must hold that some foundations are certain. If that guess is wrong, then it would seem that you hold that all beliefs are (unprovable) IBEs. Do you disagree with any of that?"
I don't think ALL beliefs are IBEs:
-We have some basic, intrinsic beliefs, that aren't inferred. Example: the instinctual belief in a world external to ourselves.
We also accept some things uncritically (no one's perf ect).

Re: certainty- that's an attitude, and it may or may not be justified. Justification doesn't require deductive proof. Consider your example "this entity before me is either a tree or it is not a tree." Solipsism is logically possible, so that there actually isn't something before you. We can justifiably feel certain despite the logical possibility we're wrong.

Arguments for a more widespread skepticism or relativism I am familiar with tend to instead rely on a more global underdetermination of things like all rules/rule-following, all causal/inductive reasoning, or the underdetermination of any sort of solid concept/meaning that would constitute the possession of knowledge, which is a step up (or down) from simple scientific underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think we should keep the underlying logical limitations in the background of our minds, but we shouldn't let this undermine practical critical thinking for making judgements and arguments. As one example: a lot of people embrace some conspiracy theory because it explains some facts, and defend their judgement on the basis that it's not provably false. It's a distortion of inference to best explanation. This is a tangent from the theme of your thread, but it's an issue I consider extremely important.

So would you say that some of our beliefs are provably true? — Leontiskos

Good question. We have beliefs that follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts, so they're provable in that sense. It seems inescapable that we depend on some foundational beliefs. So nothing can be proven without some sort of epistemological foundation. What are your thoughts?

God can be known through the application of reason to empirically demonstrable aspects of the ordinary and natural world, — Bob Ross

Is this a premise?

Your OP seems focused on morality. Are you defining God as nothing more than the foundation of objective moral values? That may be all you need, and it lightens your burden of proof.

I would basically argue that some theory which is believed to be underdetermined is not believed. So if I think there are only two theories to account for a body of evidence and that both are exactly 50% likely to be true, then I psychologically cannot believe one over the other.

So I think we would need to get more precise on what we mean by "underdetermined. — Leontiskos

Agreed that we need to establish what "undetermined" means, when were talking about beliefs. I've been treating "underdetermined" as any belief that is not provably true (i.e. determined=necessarily true). Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined. I also agree that we ought not to believe something that has a 50% chance of being false.

Most of our beliefs are not provably true, so I have labelled them IBEs. I don't see how else one could claim to have a warrant to believe it. So if you say your belief in X is "more than an IBE" - is it really, if it's not provably true? Or is it still an IBE, but with strong support?

.

This is a really interesting objection. Is an IBE underdetermined? Remember that the conclusion is not, "X is the explanation," but rather, "X is the best explanation." I actually don't see why underdetermination would need to attend IBEs. — Leontiskos

I see your point, that by labelling X and IBE, underdetermination may not apply. Labeling it the explanation would be underdetermined.

But I suggest that in the real world, we operate on beliefs, which are often formed by inferring to the best explanation from the facts at hand (background beliefs will unavoidably affect the analysis). We make errors, of course, but a proper objective is to minimize these errors (more on this, below).

I think it depends on how far underdetermination is allowed to roll. If you pair these arguments, their reach is far greater than scientific theories. The term is most associated with the underdetermination of scientific theories, but as noted in the OP is has been used for substantially broader effect.

If some of these arguments go through, then the "best" explanation is not "the most likely to be true (as in, corresponding to reality)," but rather "the explanation I most prefer," or "the explanation society most prefers, given its customs." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Forgive me if I misunderstand, but this sounds a bit fatalistic, to me - in that it seems to imply the quest for truth is irrelevant or hopeless. I suggest that we have a deontological duty to minimize false beliefs and maximize true beliefs. To do otherwise is irrational, and this includes embracing an explanation simply because he prefers it (there are exceptional cases where this might be appropriate, but I'll leave that aside).

Even if we were perfect at this, the resulting beliefs would still be "underdetermined", but ideally they will be our best explanation for the set of information we have. There will necessarily be subjectivity to it (we each make a judgement, and it will be based on our background beliefs - many formed the same way, others the product of learning). This is a proper objective for critical thinking.

If we accept abductive reasoning (inference to best explanation on available evidence - IBE) as leading to rational beliefs, is there really a problem? Such beliefs will, of course, be undertermined but that just means they don't comprise knowledge (in the strict sense).

Epistemology should be of practical use in the world, and in the real world we are nearly always deriving conclusions from limited information. IBEs are the practical ideal.

most people intuit some form of soul, which is totally unsupportable and is probably the only way to maintain identity obtains for a 'self'. — AmadeusD

I agree with you, although the religious connotations of "soul" leads philosophers to shy away from using that word. There's a good article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that discusses various approaches to defining "transworld identities", which seems to cover all the relevant ground. Terms that are used (instead of soul): "bare identity", "thisness", "haeccity". The section on haeccity seems the most relevant.

There has idealism and materialism, as well.ad theism.and idealism. What if all such ideas and models are inadequate? Panpsychism may not be complete but it may further ongoing partiality in models of understanding..Just as consciousness itself is evolving, the human models and descriptions of it, are evolving too. — Jack Cummins

What do you mean by "adequate"? Logically possible? Absence of explanatory gaps? Having rational justification to accept?

I just finished reading Michael Tye's book, "Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness".

Tye labels himself a physicalist/representalist, but proposes there to be some aspect of consciousness present in all things (he labels this "consciousness*").
Full consciousness (without the "*") requires a physical structure - like the brain. Consciousness* is unmeasurable/undetectable, but it's presence is sine qua non for consciousness in humans and some other animals.

I'm pretty skeptical, but for those inclined toward panpsychism, it's at least a relatively minimal form of it. I could rationalize it based on the fact that we're all composed of quanta of the same quantum fields- so there is a direct relation between any 2 objects that exist.

if a one particle difference is all it takes to remove identity, then identity is lost every moment anyway — flannel jesus

Strict identity IS lost with every breath. So this approach uses perdurance to account for individual identity over time.

and we'll never know for sure. Theres no experiment to perform to ever know if it's a numerically identical person or just qualitatively (nearly) identical. — Mijin

There is no objectively correct answer. Any answer depends on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individual identity. I gave you an answer in terms of strict identity - consistent with identity of indiscernibles. Perdurance theory needs to be added to make sense of individual identity across time.

The other extreme is haeccity- which treats identity as a primitive - thus allowing for 100% of your parts to differ while retaining that identity.

Between the extremes are essentialists. One version entails identity being associated with set of necessary and sufficient properties. I've never encountered anyone who could define what these are.

Why? Do the particles contain some essence of you? — Mijin

I don't believe in essence. Either both of them are the identity of the pre-transportee, or neither is. The former implies both copies will perpetually share the same identity - which seems absurd. So IMO, both copies are new identities - each containing memories of the same past life.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world. — RussellA

What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular.

it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality — Mijin

Any analysis would depend on one's attitude toward essentialism: is there an individual essence? If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end.

The nature of the transport also seems important. Are the actual particles being moved from place to place, or are a different set of particles being assembled into the same form at the receiving end? If the latter, then arguably - the receiving end is a duplicate, not the "same" individual.

If there's an essence, is it material or immaterial (like a soul)? If it's a soul, it's questionable whether or not the soul is transported.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts. — RussellA

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective?

Your choice of tense suggests that at said earlier time, 'the universe' (and not just the subset of the universe events where the time coordinate is some low value) 'was' devoid of life, that the universe changes over time — noAxioms

The universe does change over time, from the perspective of any intra-universe reference frame. If anything exists outside the universe, it would "see" our universe as a static entity.

I said I give little weight to intuitions since the purpose of intuition isn't truth, but rather pragmatism. Hence I question all intuitions and don't necessarily reject all of them (most though). — noAxioms

That doesn't answer my question. You had a belief about the external world, and now you don't. I can understand questioning it, given that it is possibly false, but most of our beliefs are possibly false and (I assume) you nevertheless continue to believe most of them.

Regarding this particular intuition: IF there is an external world, and this world produced living organisms, those living organisms would necessarily need to successfully interact with that external world. This would necessarily lead to the organisms distinguishing between what is external and what is internal. The evolutionary development of consciousness would maintain the distinction, through natural, innate intuitions. This doesn't prove there is an external world, but it provides an explanation for why we believe it to be the case. Contrast this with the alternative: there's no reason to believe there is NOT an external world - it's merely a logical possibility.