You are confusing hedonic with eudaimonic happiness. — Bob Ross

When I quote you, then immediately respond relative to that quote, then you respond to my response with something suggesting my confusion, I wonder if you’ve missed the point of my response.

Different renditions of happiness aside, we are Western moderns after all, I shall consider it proved that worthiness of happiness and happiness itself, are very far from….

….interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

….and sufficiently so, that it serves as the form of a rule rather than an example of an exception to it.

So if I have given the inkling of a rule, is it something you understand well enough to form an opinion? Or, tell me how it shouldn’t be a rule in the first place?

…..worthiness of happiness and being happy are interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

So I’m driving along, in this cool-as-hell ‘67 Cobra, hair flyin’, head-bangin’ to some classic Foghat turned up to 11….happy as a pig in an overturned hotel restaurant dumpster.

The car isn’t mine, I stole it.

And with that…..(Sigh)
————-

You are welcome to your philosophical inclinations, as anyone is, but obviously they are very far from mine. Not that that’s a problem for either of us, only that there’s little chance of meeting in the middle.

But that’s what ‘redness’ means: it’s the property of being red. — Bob Ross

So a property of a property? Red is a property of a thing and redness is a property of red? Usually, a property facilitates establishment of consistent identity of an appearance, so that it can be said of any thing perceived as having that property, it is a particular thing. Must we then concede red is only so, inasmuch as it has this property of redness, all the while the thing we actually perceive as being red, retains its identity without regard to its redness?

That may be fine, but the problem lies in the negation, in that we can still say of a red thing it is that thing even if it has relative redness, but we cannot say of a thing it is that thing if it isn’t red.

Sure, a property is attributed to things by subjects; and so it is an estimation, to your point, of the quality which the thing has….. — Bob Ross

Property attributed by subjects to things, yes. The quality a thing has because of it, no. Property relates to the identity the thing has, whereas quality is an estimation of the property itself. This reflects the error of calling redness a property of red, when it is actually the quality of it, leaving red itself alone, to be the property of the thing.

I am not following the relevance. When analyzing redness, we would analyze redness — Bob Ross

The relevance follows from, originally, the concept under discussion was “good”, but has since been replaced by “red”, which doesn’t matter much, in that adding “-ness” to either one has the same implication. The real point resides in this: when analyzing redness we are analyzing red, not redness.

By extension, then, when analyzing goodness we are analyzing good, not goodness. And the comment addressing biology as the inappropriate science for analyzing good, resides in the “-ness” qualifier, which implies relative degrees, and herein lies the authority of metaphysics proper, insofar as for any relative degree there must be an extreme, which is EXACTLY what we’re looking for, in the negative sense…..good in and of itself, not good for this or that, but just plain ol’ good. Period. Full stop. Bare-bones, pure conception representing a fundamental condition upon which a proper moral philosophy follows.
————-

I would rather see us giving them the tools to ‘ethicize’ then tell them our own ethical theories. — Bob Ross

We’re already in possession of the tools for “ethicizing”. They are codes of conduct, administrative rules, edicts and assorted jurisprudence generally, in the pursuit of what is right. None of which has anything to do with what is good.

…..the question asked is “how do I determine what is good?”? — Bob Ross

Which is the whole point…..that is the wrong question to ask. It is good to “ethicize” in accordance with assorted jurisprudence, which reflects one’s treatment of his fellow man, which one can accomplish for no other reason than that’s what everyone else is doing.

When asked what good is, as indicated above, good in and of itself, not good for this or that end, not good in reflection of treatment of fellow men, we may come closer to what makes us tick as subjects rather than what makes us tick as herds. Which reduces to….a reflection on how man treats himself in accordance to his own personal code, for which he and he alone is the law-giver.
————-

I don’t disagree that eudaimonic happiness is the chief good for any living being — Bob Ross

Hmmm….for any living being? What happened to tools for “ethicizing”? Are ants being ethical for not crowding each other out of the way when entering the hole to the lair? I’ve seen one guy punch other guy in the face for trying to get through the same door at the same time.

Only certain forms of living beings are conditioned by happiness on the one hand, and it isn’t the chief good on the other. The chief good is worthiness for being happy, which reduces to a principle..….that by which his worthiness of being happy, directly relates to the good of his will.

So in this roundabout way, arises the premise: there is no other good, as such, in and of itself….hence undefinable….as a good will. That which doesn't do for the good of something else, but does because it is good to do. And that by which “living well” does not necessarily comport with being happy.
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I apologize Mww, I forgot to respond to this one. — Bob Ross

No need; I get that a lot.

….we mustn't engage in some sort of "leveling of history"….. — J

Well said.

Shoulders of giants all the way down.

just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’. — Bob Ross

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red. It may be that a thing has a certain redness, indicating some relative quality of a certain property. But this latter use requires an object to which the property belongs, whereas the concept, in and of itself, does not. We perceive that a thing is red; we appreciate how or what kind of red it is, its redness.
————-

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason
—Mww

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’….. — Bob Ross

Attribution requires a conscious subject, the conscious subject requires functional intelligence, functional intelligence requires reason. You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

Ideal of is not attribution to; your misunderstanding is not my contradiction. I may have, and you may show that, I’ve contradicted myself; just not with that.
—————-

…..all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.

Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.
—Mww

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori? — Bob Ross

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Moral philosophy, then, while it may contain transcendental ideas, re: freedom, the c.i., and so on, isn’t itself a transcendental doctrine, for its end just is experience, in the form of acts conforming to it.
————-

…..are given to Nature.
— Mww

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct? — Bob Ross

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?
————-

How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me). — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s the common position of the pure realist, insofar as he’s already determined reality without understanding it. And there’s your proverbial cart before the horse. In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself.

Common, in that the comfort of certain knowledge as an end diminishes the theoretical means by which it obtains.
————-

I would say biology. — Bob Ross

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What an odd lot we are: we know how biology gives us brains but we don’t know how brains give us reason; we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains.

I dare you to call THAT a false dichotomy!!!
—————-

This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness. — Bob Ross

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition. It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does. And even if that general gravitation isn’t happiness, it is something, otherwise there is no fundamental underlying condition which serves as a rule for describing humanity proper. Nothing is lost by initiating a rational moral philosophy, which may even attempt to define good as the OP inquires, with happiness as a fundamental condition.

Goodness is just the property of being good. — Bob Ross

I reject that good has properties, like most balls have a round property and gasoline has a fluid property. Good is an ideal of pure practical reason, that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
————-

we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism — Bob Ross

Don’t have to, there are plenty of other kinds. But if that happens, then Kant yes; idealism, yes; transcendental philosophy…..no. Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

how can we know what is in-itself good? — Bob Ross

Because the subject in his moral philosophy uses a different aspect of his understanding, judgement and reason for his moral determinations, than are used for his knowledge claims. An in-itself from the strictly moral perspective or domain, is such insofar as it is a construct completely internal to the subject himself, and its relative goodness is known with apodeitic certainty because it is measured against how good the subject feels about it, rather than whether or not he contradicts himself.

The understanding is prudential rather than cognitive; the judgement is aesthetic rather than discursive, and pure reason is practical rather than transcendental.

From the human point of view, a pure dualist intelligence is necessary to appreciate that…..
…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.
————-

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. — Bob Ross

Maybe not so much as what is a car, but we certainly do have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise. As well, with this, for you, it is impossible to explain those fundamental conditions by which we can all have the same sense of what a car is, but we do not all have the same sense of what good is.
————-

….since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality — Bob Ross

There ya go. Others may differ, of course.

Tictoktictok???

As my ol’ buddy Billy Gibbons might say to Bob….got (you) under presssssuuurre….

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting. At least, with respect to what I asked about, you haven’t shown that by which you understand what good is, yet you’ve presupposed goodness as a qualitative judgement of it.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.

Which immediately requires you to separate the empirical contingency of the one from the a priori necessity of the other.

Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

What might your primary consideration be, for separating what good is, from what is good?

I think 'ignore' would be more appropriate…. — Wayfarer

I think ‘finds fault’. Which is rather easy to do, when either the original is merely re-arranged, or, conditions are attached that were excluded as irrelevant in the original.

Doncha just love it, when you invent something, and some guy comes along later and tells everybody you invented it wrong?

He can’t. He just doesn’t know it, never stopped to think about it.

Dunno about Moore. The title asks for something to be said about good, not about what is good, not how it is good, not goodness.

Good doesn’t have a definition, but if you think you can build your own set of rules, you must already have an idea of what good will be.

I suspect, when you go about building a set of rules, you’ll find you’re only discovering them.

Where should you begin, then?

Stop asking where to begin.

“How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent?

It is a map of the territory. We use math, e.g., to model laws which do not pertain to way we cognize (e.g., law of gravity). You would have to deny this. — "Bob

I think the math used to establish the laws that represent perceived natural relations….is exactly how we cognize empirical events. It is now called mapping the territory, which is merely embellishment of what was once just plain ol’ understanding, but it’s only euphemistic language for a representational system of cognition.

Not sure what I'm denying here. Which of the map/territory relation is transcending the other?

The brain seems to be the external representation of whatever ‘thing’ is doing the cognizing. That seems pretty clear (to me). — Bob Ross

It shouldn’t, in that no representation is external. As well, the brain doesn’t cognize, I do. The brain does absolutely nothing but employ natural conditions in accordance with natural law, which somehow manifests as me cognizing that the brain does absolutely nothing but…...

Brain is a thing in the same manner as a dump truck is a thing. Dump trucks as things do not cognize, therefore brains as things in the same manner, do not cognize.

“Dump truck” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing, “brain” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing. Intuitive things, re: phenomena, irrespective of their individual form, have no power of their own for cognition, therefore brains do not cognize.

you were denying this before. So to clarify: you do, in fact, believe that the brain is the ontological grounding for reason? — Bob Ross

No, I wasn’t. To clarify, even if I cannot deny or affirm that it is, if I cannot know how it is, I don’t care that it is. That is to say, even if I think it inconceivable that it isn’t, is not in itself tacit authorization that it is. This is expandable to, even if it is absurd to suppose the brain isn’t the ontological origin of reason, unless I know how such is the case with apodeitic certainty…..it is a waste of my time to give a damn.

This doesn’t negate the fact that the brain is ontologically what facilitates that reasoning. — Bob Ross

It also doesn’t affirm that it does.

That A and !A cannot both be true presupposes that A = A. — Bob Ross

I don’t know what !A represents. If it is not-A, then A and not-A can both be true, when not-A is B. The presupposition is invalid. If !A cannot be re-written as not-A, then never mind.

if LNC only applies to our understanding of reality, then it plainly follows that it is at least logically and actually possible for an object in reality, independently of our understanding of it, to both be and not be identical to itself. — Bob Ross

Account for this is already given, at least in Enlightenment metaphysics and probably elsewhere, the end being it makes no difference at all, insofar as anything independent of our understanding, which is….theoretically….predicated on the laws of logic generally and the LNC in particular, cannot be said to abide by the same laws.

In addition, to be logically possible does not imply the empirical proofs by which the truth of the logic is determined and from which the actual is given or not. Not to mention, “actually possible” is superfluous, insofar as actually possible just is conceptually equivalent to possibility itself. It is enough to say a thing is logically possible without the additional qualification that it is also actually possible.

So what??? Why would we even consider any methodology relevant, if it isn’t ours? If it isn’t the one we’re convinced we have and thereby the one we unconditionally use?

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. — Bob Ross

I’m not interested in what is not; I wouldn’t say reason is not grounded in the brain. I work with what I know, and how reason is a product of the brain, while being a deduction logically consistent with experience, cannot itself be an experience. And if I cannot learn the operational parameters of a physical thing with sufficient certainty using my internal non-physical means, I am entitled to dismiss it, at least temporarily, along with its other, related originating notions, re: soul, mind, deity, spirit, and assorted abstracted whatnots, in conjunction with what I may or may not eventually come to know.

In which case, then…..

“….. the proud name of an ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding…”

….which is to say, whatever the brain is doing is not contained in my internal analysis of my own intelligence. I already opined as much, in that the human subject in general does not think in terms of natural law.

And is found here the inconsistency regarding the notion and subsequent application of transcendent law, that which even if the idea of which is thought without self-contradiction, can give no weight to the possibility of empirical knowledge, the attempt in doing so is where the contradiction arises. It follows that I am not, or, have no legitimate reason to be, properly interested in such laws, insofar as they do not and cannot support the method by which my knowledge is deemed possible.
—————

“There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.
— Mww

These are transcendent, no? — Bob Ross

How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent? Observation of natural relations is certainly within the purview of universality and necessity, that is to say, in order for there to even be natural relations given by observation they must be given universally and necessarily….

(you can’t look outside here today and see rain falling then look outside there tomorrow and see rain rising)

…..and while universality and necessity are pure a priori transcendental deductions of pure reason which are the form of principles in general by which laws as such are determinable, they are not from that called transcendent.

Are they transcendent with respect to the possibility of experiencing a priori deductions, is a nonsense question, insofar as experience is only of synthesized representations of real physical things by means of intuition, which conceptions themselves never are. From which follows such conceptions while certainly not experiences, are not because they do not arise from intuition, rather than because they are transcendent.
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Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is.
—Mww

The law of non-contradiction, which you noted here…. — Bob Ross

A = A and its negation A /= ~A is the law of identity. The LNC, on the other hand, states that simultaneously A =/ B. I disagree one presupposes the other, but grant that either one presupposes their respective content, re: A and B, or any other general conception represented by A or B.

The law of non-contradiction (…) doesn’t just pertain to just how we cognize objects. Otherwise, you are admitting the actual possibility of an object that exists in reality which is not identical to itself….or/and identical and not identical to itself…etc. — Bob Ross

So if I claim the LNC just does pertain to how we cognize objects, I have no need of admitting any such possibility? Parsimony suggests and experience confirms I don’t hold with that admission. The root caveat being, of course, how we cognize objects consistently with respect to time and, by association, change.

Now I readily admit the possibility of underlaying causality for our intellectual manifestations. But I won’t admit transcendent law as being contained in that causality, for it is the case I cannot be made conscious of how such law would be possible, hence I cannot be conscious of them as having the authority necessary to overthrow, insofar as they must contradict the very rules to which I’ve already granted sufficient functional integrity.
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From this armchair, you’re foisting on me, not an emperor in new clothes whose authority I might accept insofar as I don’t care what this guy is wearing, but rather, an entirely new emperor, whose authority I wouldn’t even begin to accept until I can comprehend his methods.

That being given, rather than…..

the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason. — Bob Ross

….I’d posit that the brain is the organ necessary for all human intellectual functionality, but it is in no way clear how it is responsible for all by which its subjective condition occurs. Furthermore, it may just be that it never can be clear just how that organ is responsible for anything at all, that isn’t strictly contained in the same empirical domain as physical object itself.

I see my mistake. A creature IN-capable of thought (…) doesn’t have any, making his incapacity for comparing them with anything, moot.

You are hardly one to be imprecise. That being given, it just seemed to me, in-capable would have lent more consistency to the overall point being made in that particular entry.

If I’m mistaken, that’s on me.

The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing. — frank

Ooooo….I like that.

….in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it…. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws? If so, I can get on board with it, in a rather loose conceptual assignment anyway. Understanding certainly is very far from experience, but I’d not so much say understanding is transcended by it.
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The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.
————-

there are natural laws — Bob Ross

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

The most fundamental would be logical laws — Bob Ross

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself? — Bob Ross

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is. I cannot say that about any thing as it were in itself, which is merely the glorified rendition of the ding an sich we’ve all come to know and love. From a distance.

How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?

any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. — J

….because for that knowledge, we must have recourse to empirical science. But then, how does one experiment for that which isn’t to be found? Which gets us to : we automatically become dualists…..
———-

…..we automatically become dualists of some kind. — frank

….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.

Why…. — frank

Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
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…thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." — J

Agreed. Thinking is something I do, and it does tell me something. It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? If I am that which thinks, I am conscious of that already. Even if it is that determines what it is to think, I still haven’t said what I am, other than I am a necessary condition for that which thinks, which is highly circular or abysmally tautological.

Hence….psychologists. (Sigh)

Why does there have to be a seat of consciousness? — frank

There doesn’t have to be; consciousness is not a physical necessity. But, the metaphysical argument, is that it is necessary in order for there to be represented, not so much that which comprehends the relations “thoughts, feelings, sights and sounds” have with respect to their causes, but moreso that upon which the comprehension is bestowed.

Agreed. That consciousness of mine that proves that I am, insofar as its negation is a contradiction, says nothing at all about what I am.

we ought to do what is good just because it is good. — Janus

Agreed, of course, but we are still left with determining what thing to do, sufficiently reflecting that good already decided.

Other creatures capable of thought….. — creativesoul

IN-capable?

Shouldn’t the discussion bear on the OP? Maybe present some theory-specific examples of transcendent laws?

Even if we’re limited to their necessity, but without examples, then we’re just doing noumenal imaginings, which have nothing to do with the possibility of consciousness of reality.
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Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—Mww

What do you mean? We’ve already determined that the brain is responsible for cognizing reality into the ‘experience’ that you have. — Bob Ross

Nahhh…you may have stipulated something like that as part of your thesis, but I never agreed with it. Cognizing reality into experience is a metaphysical process, using conceptions thought, relating them to things perceived. The brain, on the other hand, even if it is the mechanism by which metaphysical processes are possible, has no part to play in the tenets of such process.

Humans do not think in terms of natural law. The certain number of phosphate ions required, at a certain activation potential, as neurotransmitters across certain cleft divisions, in some certain network or another, never registers in the cognition, “black”-“‘57”-“DeSoto”.

What’s the difference between the two in your view? — Bob Ross

Experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions; consciousness is a natural human condition, represented as the totality of representations. Sometimes called a faculty, but it doesn’t have faculty-like function, so….not so much in T.I..

transcendent is that which is beyond our experience — Bob Ross

That definition works well enough.

…..constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

….describes empirical cognitions…..

…..the preconditions for constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

…..describes transcendental cognitions, which covers not only experience but possible experience.
—————-

….the brain is the representation of what is ontologically “responsible” for reason. — Bob Ross

This is a kind of categorical error, in that when talking of the brain, the discourse is scientific, in which representation has no place, but when talking of representation, the discourse is philosophical, in which the brain has no place.

Nothing untoward with the fact the brain is necessary for every facet of human intelligence, but there remains whether or not it is sufficient for it. Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—————-

Immanent has to do with empirical cognitions, hence experience; transcendental has to do with a priori cognitions, hence possible experience. Transcendent, then, has do to with neither the one nor the other, hence no experience whatsoever.

I'm more wondering what we can derive from it…. — Moliere

Derived from “I think”, one relatively well-known philosopher suggests….

“….The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. (…) All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think,” in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. (…)

It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (…), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results. (…)

The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious.…”

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was (…) that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of (…) apperception. To the former of these two principles are subject all the various representations of intuition, in so far as they are given to us; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception “I think” and therefore could not be connected in one self-consciousness.
(CPR B132-137)

….and even if the cogito is represented as this kind of something from which can be derived that it does this other something, one could still be left to wonder what the “I” itself really is.

That it is, is given; what it is, may be better left unasked.

Wouldn’t you say that is Kant’s standard distinction? — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t, myself, no. In Kant, transcendent is juxtapositional to immanent, with respect to experience, whereas transcendental merely indicates the mode in which reason constructs and employs pure a priori cognitions, which, of course, have nothing to do with experience as such, but only with those conditions by which it is possible. It’s complement is reason cognizing in its empirical mode, the difference being the conceptions of the former mode represent ideas, but in the latter the conceptions represent things or possible things.

So it is that in Kant, transcendent relates to experience, not consciousness. Besides, and I’m surprised you’d do such a thing….you can’t use the word being defined, in the definition of it. I get nothing of any value from transcendent being defined as that which transcends.
————-

On related definitions being inconsistent with each other, I just mean the conceptions in one represent a thing under these conditions, but the same conceptions are said to represent a different thing under those conditions.

For instance, when you say, “that by which the brain cognizes reality is transcendental”, is the inconsistency wherein it is reason alone that cognizes anything at all transcendentally, the brain being merely some unknown material something necessary for our intelligence in general.
————-

Not that I don’t admire your proclivity for stepping outside the lines. It’s just that you’re asking me to upset some rather well stabilized applecarts, but without commensurate benefit.

He does seem to base his philosophical mindset on Kant, however over-extended it seems to be, from a purist’s perspective anyway.

Yeah, that, and I think he wants to use Kantian methods to justify them, which is fine, as long as they work. Which is possible iff the relevant definitions are inconsistent with each other.

And there hasn’t yet been mention in the thesis, of principles, under which the transcendent laws would have to be subsumed.

Guess we’ll find out….

HA!! I know…sorry. You beat me by a full 17 minutes.

Define transcendent. In what sense are you using it in this discussion? What would be its complement?

And transcendent cannot be defined as that by which the brain cognizes reality into a coherent whole, without sufficient justification that pure transcendental reason hasn’t already provided the ground for exactly that.

I think, again, depending on definitions….and indeed metaphysical predispositions….. that while a transcendental argument cannot suffice for establishing that transcendent laws precondition human consciousness of reality, it is far more relevant to consider quid juris with respect to them. To establish that, re: by what right or warrant does reason determine that such transcendent laws are justifiable to begin with, historically anyway, requires a “transcendental deduction”, in which, not arguing that conceptions belong quid facti to a cognition, as expressed in general by ’s “…. (as apodictically demonstrated by one’s own consciousness)….”, but rather, by what right do they belong.

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to assume that reality itself has no necessary conformity of behavior (of relations)…. — Bob Ross

…..these laws are, can only be conditionally mapped, or modeled, by a priori modes of cognizing reality (with mathematical equations and rules of logic being the most fundamental of them all)…. — Bob Ross

How can non-relational transcendent laws ever be determinable by a method necessarily predicated on relations? If the method is relational, mustn’t the model constructed by that method, be relational?

What’s the difference, in this thesis, between consciousness, and consciousness (of reality)? Do transcendent laws only precondition the latter, and if so, why not the former as well?

The ground of a transcendental argument presupposes a given. Depending on the choice of definitions, to construct an a priori judgement in the form of a transcendental argument, but with transcendent conceptions, is always invalid, insofar as no transcendent conceptions are given, re: that, the negation of which, is impossible.

Dunno why I need a law that preconditions the possibility of my consciousness of reality.

Doncha just love it when a plan comes together?

It's odd to call Kant's critique a "Copernican Revolution" though because he put humanity right back at the centre of things. — Janus

I think the point was relocation of center. One de-centered Earth in favor of the Sun, the other de-centered various forms of ens realissimum in favor of a certain form of thinking subject.

As for the plate and congruent macro-conditions, as long as my food stays where my fork can get to it, I’m good, as I’m relatively sure the plate-in-itself will be just as good…..whatever it may be.

Perspective, yes indeed.