Or, perhaps you are wrong!

Deleted. I decided that there is no benefit in responding to your churlishness.

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." — Sam26

There is not a single agreed upon sense or meaning or assumptions that define the term 'epistemic', but I do not think we can deny that epistemology deals with the problem of knowledge. Clearly from beginning to end Wittgenstein was concerned with the problem of knowledge. It is one thing to claim that his epistemology in OC differs from more traditional views, but quite another to deny that it is epistemology. Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock have edited a book titled "Hinge Epistemology"

Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system — Sam26

In OC Wittgenstein identifies one hinge proposition: 12x12=144. This propositions is true. 12x12 = any other number is false. If one doubts it, it can quickly and easily be demonstrated. If this cannot be proven then there can be no mathematical proofs.

My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. — Sam26

Within the game, according to the rules, it is true that some things are allowed and others not.

One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. — Sam26

It is justified within the system.

Do you mean the question of whether Peter wrote First or Second Peter and your answer that if he did then we have a direct account from someone who lived with Jesus for years, etc? If he did then the rest follows, but we do not know if he did.If we cannot answer the question then we do not know if what is said in those writings is what Jesus or Peter said. We do not know what Jesus said or taught.

Most scholars today conclude that Peter the Apostle was the author of neither of the two epistles that are attributed to him.

(Wikipedia, "Authorship of the Petrine epistles", with note to twelve different scholars).

At best, suggestive, but certainly not reliable evidence of what Jesus and/or Peter or his other disciples believed and taught.

Made is X is a somewhat meaningless term since parts and materials may come from elsewhere. According to Forbes there are no American made vehicles that are completely American made,

I was half joking, but not really surprised.

What is the big issue regarding Chinese products? — javi2541997

It is largely a matter of politics. Both parties claim unfair trade practices. This is questionable because US companies including auto manufactures are subsidized.

At a rally in March Trump threatened that there would be a bloodbath if he was not elected because he would impose a 100% tariff. In a fact sheet from the White House in May Biden announced that he was imposing a 100% tariff on electric vehicles in addition to other tariffs.

Made in China. Imported to the US.

There is a difference between being unable to distinguish between what he actually said and what has been attributed to him and the claim that a message has or has not been transmitted faithfully.

I would not be surprised if this escalates. Eating people is next.

I too think it matters, but the question is how much it matters to the voters. Certainly it will to may, but will it be enough in those states that matter most? I would like to think so, but a lot of people have and will overlook everything else if they believe they will benefit with Trump and/or be hurt by Harris. How they might calculate that, if they do calculate it, or go with what their gut tells them, remains a mystery.

Up until last night I worried about coyotes eating my dog. Now it seems I have worry about illegal immigrants eating my dog. Or is it all immigrants? Or just those from "shithole countries"?

These are not statements that apply to angles or even Zeus. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When was John written? Does it reflect the beliefs found in the synoptic gospels? We cannot say what Jesus would have said, but can this be squared with Jesus recitation of the Shema and calling it the first of our commandments? (Mark 12:29)

1 Timothy 3:16) — Count Timothy von Icarus

The authorship is in dispute. I think the emphasis on false doctrines and trustworthy saying is significant . It seems likely that whenever it was written there were different teachings vying for authenticity. Is the fact this this one made the canonical cut and others did not indicative of more than the preferences of the collectors?

What does it mean to manifest? This too is open to dispute. To manifest is to show, appear, or be seen. This is not the same as for God to be in the flesh.

It is readily apparent that the "Son" is not one son among many in John. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. John appropriates the passage from Psalms for for own ends. It is readily apparent that in Psalms there is not just one son. This raises the question of authority. Is Psalms authoritative or John? It seems far more likely that Jesus would come down on the side of Psalms.

There is a distinction between the sheep and the Good Shepherd — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is also the distinction between father and son in this passage.

The Septuagint was motivated by the fact that they increasingly only wrote and read Greek. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is true, but:

There exists a consensus among scholars that the language of Jesus and his disciples was Aramaic.

(Language of Jesus)

and provides references. In addition to the question of language there is the question of culture. An audience not familiar with Jewish Law and teachings may not hear a term such as 'son' in the way it is used in the Hebrew Bible even if they are reading in Greek translation.

,,, that Paul was a gentle, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I did not say that Paul was a gentile, but that he spoke to a gentile audience. Paul himself, as you probably know, confirms this.

Nor is it in any sense definitive that none of the epistles attributed to Jesus disciples were written by them. I have no idea where you are getting this certitude. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My certitude is not so great that it will hold in the face of evidence to the contrary. Do you have such evidence? Which Gospel or which part of the Gospel? Do you reject the source theory such as Q source?

Well no, this is also overreaching. You keep using the lack of definitive evidence as an excuse to make definitive claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If we cannot distinguish between what Jesus actually said and what is attributed to him that is because of the stories and claims that stands between them. Or do you have a way of making that distinction?

St. Paul states in unambiguous terms that Christ existed from before the foundations of the cosmos — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be more precise, he is the image of the invisible God, first-born of all creation. This is hardly unambiguous. As the image of God he is not God. If he is first-born he is not the creator. Through him and in him differs from 1 Corinthians 8:6 where a distinction is made between God from whom all things came and Christ through whom all things came. The NIV translation has "firstborn over all creation". Young's Literal Translation has of all creation. RSV also has of all creation. If he is "of creation" he is created. If he is "over all creation" he is still firstborn, that is, created.

The Gospel of John is markedly different from the synoptic gospels and the writings of Paul. Nowhere in those gospels does Jesus call himself God. In addition, John begins:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

How is it that the word could both be with God and be God?

With "in the beginning" what John says would have sounded familiar to Jesus and his disciples, but in the Genesis account God the creator stands apart from His creation. If John was aware of this difference he presents a brilliant rhetorical piece of writing. The word of God as opposed to the Word shifts the voice of authority.

In John Jesus defends himself by saying:

Is it not written in your Law, "I have said you are ‘gods’’
(10:34-36)

He is most likely referring to Psalms 82:6-7:

‘I said, ‘You are ‘gods’; you are all sons of the Most High.’ But you will die like mere mortals; you will fall like every other ruler.’

John leaves out the second part. If Jesus understood himself to be a son of God in this sense then he is not the one unique Son". And, of course, those who die like mere mortals are mere mortals. Jesus goes on to say, according to John, that he does the work of his father. (10:37-38) Does he do the work of his father or is he his father?

He goes on:

"I and the father are one"
(10:30)

this expression of unity can be taken to mean united together or one and the same. But the latter is at the expense of ignoring the distinctions between him and the father that he repeatedly makes. It is only when his words are heard with foreign ears that his words come to take on a very different meaning. A pagan meaning where the distinction between man and God is obliterated.

As for the "Greek authors," the entire New Testament is in Greek. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. That is the point. They are not Jesus' Jewish disciples. If any of them were Jewish they still spoke to a gentile audience with gentile ears, that is, with gentile and/or pagan beliefs and understanding.

But per his own reckoning, not one single word written by a Disciple has come down to us. But no one wants to buy a book that says "it's impossible to know," — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you agree that it is impossible to know? If so, then it is true that whatever might have been written or told by a disciple has not come down to us because we cannot know that this or that was said or written by one of his disciples.

We do not know what Jesus said or taught. Between Jesus and the Gospels stand many voices. The voice of Paul stands out not only in his own writings but that of other Gospels. But Paul never saw or heard Jesus speak. He relies first and foremost on his own vision. A pious view of this is that he was witnessing the indwelling of spirit. That he was inspired. One problem with this is that the Church Fathers sought to destroy the writings of others with similar experiences. There were other voices that were silenced by the Church Fathers. Voices that if they were heard might give us a very different understanding of Christianity. We might ask: by what authority did they take this upon themselves?

Again, the justification for "I know the key is on the table" cannot be "The key is on the table"; that's just a repetition of the claim. — Banno

I agree. But that is not what I said.

Previously you said:

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

If you still hold to this claim then it is not enough to say a propositional justification is and must be possible. If you cannot provide propositional justification then why should we assume that there is one? Why isn't showing the key on the table sufficient to conclude that I knew where the key is?

There is a difference between knowing the key is on the desk and being certain that the key is on the desk. — Banno

Again:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

It will not do here to simple repeat your claim — Banno

Right. The justification is showing that the key is on the table. Showing that the key on the table - pointing to it, picking it up - is not a propositional justification. What would stand as a propositional justification?

If you say "I know the key is on the desk" and ↪frank asks how you know, asks for a justification for your claim, do you think Frank will find "Because I will find it there when I go in" satisfactory? — Banno

No. That would not be an adequate justification. That is my point. The justification would be to go to the desk and find it. To show it to him.

"I left it there and no one has been in the room" is a justification for your claim. And a proposition. — Banno

It is an attempt to justify my knowing that that is where it is. But it will not suffice. It might, after all, not be there. It is not justified by a proposition. Do you have a proposition that will justify it?

But
12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew". — Banno

Right. Taking a seat or shutting the door is not a state of mind. If I was wrong and there is not a chair or a door I could not take the chair that is not over there or shut the door that is not there.

Frank is righ; there is a chair over there if it can be moved, sat on, sold at auction and so on. — Banno

You are confirming my point! Where is the propositional justification?

So much for ignoring me. That did not last long. But perhaps someone else can sort out what you are either unwilling or unable to do. Perhaps someone else can sort out the different contexts so that your various claims either hold together or at least do not contradict each other.

In Judaism the messiah is not God.
— BitconnectCarlos

That's right, and therefore claiming to be the messiah is not blasphemy. — Leontiskos

and yet:

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy. — Leontiskos

Leontiskos is pretending to ignore me, so maybe someone else can sort this out. The claim to divinity might mean that to be divine is not to be God, but when he says:

The Nicene Creed affirms exactly what Lionino says, namely that Jesus is the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father. — Leontiskos

and:

If you are saying that Christians never affirmed that Jesus is God, they only believed it, I would say that this is both anachronistic and incorrect. — Leontiskos

one might then think that not all Christains believe that God and Jesus are consubstantial, but nope:

When I talk about what a religious group believes, such as Catholicism or Mormonism, I am talking about what the bona fide representatives and scholars of that group believe (i.e. the leaders and their aids). — Leontiskos

Asked twice be two different members, first:

Why don't you tell me what you think they said constitutes the essence of Christianity? — flannel jesus

He answers by saying what it is not. We might all agree that Christianity is a meatball but this tells us nothing about what it is.

And then:

All right, tell us what a Christian is. — tim wood

he says:

Christians believe in God. They do not worship a "God the Father" who has a human past. — Leontiskos

This is a bit better, but it goes too far in the opposite direction. According to this Jews are Christians.

Where are we? The messiah is not God. But if the messiah is not God then either Jesus is not the Messiah or Jesus is not God. If Jesus is not the Messiah then Jesus is not the anointed one. Jesus would not be Christ.

Can anyone make sense of this contradictory mess?

Yes. But he's just very confident about the chair. There isn't any sort of justification for some metaphysical position. — frank

I agree.

Amy Jill-Levinson — BitconnectCarlos

I take it you mean Amy-Jill Levine. Her scholarship is solid. I read "The Historical Jesus in Context" and some interviews somewhere. Being raised in a Jewish household she was unencumbered by belief in Christian dogma. She did not have to struggle with the belief that Jesus is God.

Once a Jew believes Jesus is divine is he essentially becomes a Christian. — BitconnectCarlos

The term 'divine' is problematic. For example:

Psalm 82:1

God has taken his place in the divine council; in the midst of the gods he holds judgment.

Whatever these divine beings or gods are, they are distinct from God, the creator of the universe. Distinct from "God the Father".

Talk of gods is a holdover from polytheism. The commandment that you shall have no other god before me is not a claim of monotheism but of henotheism - this god and no others is to be your God. Monotheism is a later development, one that can be found in Isaiah but not earlier. By the time of Jesus there is only one God.

The question then is whether the term 'divine' as it is used by Paul when preaching to the Gentiles and by the Greek speaking authors of the Gospels are claiming that Jesus is God or a god or rather of God. In the case of Paul it might mean that he has renounced his Judaism or, as seems far more likely, since the end is near and he wants to save as many souls as possible, he is no longer concerned with such theological distinctions. In the case of the gentile authors, however, it seems likely that the distinctions between men and gods was not so clear cut.

when I read the Jesus of the Gospels I mostly see him arguing Jewish Scripture, interpretation of the law (halaka), using Jewish methods of argumentation, Jewish parables, referencing Jewish liturgy etc. — BitconnectCarlos

I agree. I think this is why the disciples were against Paul preaching to the Gentiles. His use of the distinction between the Law as written and as it is in one's heart was his own blasphemous invention.

They don't have to be uttered. — frank

Yes, but the point is, they can be expressed.

I think what Witt is saying there is that he demonstrates confidence in the existence of a certain chair by his behavior. Isn't that what you see there? — frank

He does say:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain ...

he goes on to say:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

The justification is that you found the key on the table. Everything that follows the word "that" is a proposition. — frank

Finding the key on the table is not a proposition. Saying I found the key on the table is.

This sounds like you're misunderstanding what a proposition is. — frank

Perhaps. What is it about a proposition that I misunderstood?

If A justifies B, presumably the truth of A justifies B. I don't know what could count as a justification that could not be put into propositional form and take a truth value. — Banno

If I say "the key is on the desk" what proposition justifies it? I might say that I left it there I might add that no one has been in the room. That keys do not just disappear. In the end the only thing that justifies it is not a proposition but finding the key on the table.

When Wittgenstein says:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

It is not only that propositional justification is not necessary but that a proposition cannot serve as justification.

I can't see how any of the multiple quotes count against the contention that Wittgenstein held the proper use of "know" to involve justified true belief. — Banno

Must the justification for a belief that is true be in the form of a proposition?

When you claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy, that means that all breakings of the Law are blasphemy. — Leontiskos

Complete nonsense! It seems more than a bit desperate. There are a great many laws in Judaism. Only a few of them are punishable by death. This like arguing that since breaking some laws in US jurisprudence are punishable by death that means that all breaking of the law is punishable by death.

You are now on my ignore list. — Leontiskos

Thank you!

This is simply playing with an equivocal usage of "divine." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you have it backwards. It is not playing with an equivocal usage. The term itself is equivocal.

Jacob wrestled with a divine being. (Genesis 32:24-30) The being is called a man, but:

Jacob called the place Peniel, saying, “It is because I saw God face to face, and yet my life was spared.

(30)

This being is often regarded as an angel. Man, God , Angel? Divine or of the divine? Is what is of the divine in some sense also divine?

One thing that should be noted is that unlike in Christianity Judaism is not bound by official doctrines.

With regard to the nature of Jesus, a distinction is made during the conflict addressed at the Council of Nicaea between apotheosis and divine ousia.

I think it quite easy for pagan followers of Jesus to regard Jesus as a god. After all, Caesar and humans are called both divine and gods.

I take your point that some Jews either modified or rejected the Jewish teaching but, according to Mark 12:29 he recited the Shema:

Hear, O Israel; The Lord our God, the Lord is one.

and called it:

The first of our commandments.

Paul, however, who preached to the gentiles said:

yet for us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things came and through whom we live.

(1 Corinthians 8:6)

Two points here: He distinguishes between God from whom all things came, and Christ through whom all things came. Jesus is not God. He is not the creator. The one Lord is not the one God.

Seeing as in the visual sense? Or seeing as something the mind does, as in "I see your point." — frank

Both and more. Some things I posted in prior discussions. This in no way meant to be comprehensive:

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an aspect”.

114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience.
— Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment



111. Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

He goes on to say at 116:

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. - So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

The idea of seeing something according to an interpretation blurs the line between seeing and thinking. "Now I see it" can mean, "Now I understand". Seeing is not limited to passive reception, it involves both perception and conception.

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

The focus on propositions can occlude the importance of seeing for both the early and latter Wittgenstein. Seeing connections involves making connections and seeing things in light of this perspective.

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value)

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

what do you think is being overlooked about Wittgenstein's thoughts? Nothing? — frank

The central importance of seeing.

Good example.

I asked you to defend it and you gave a non sequitur argument. Now you are finally admitting, albeit quietly, that you were wrong: — Leontiskos

You have a noxious habit when you are unable to understand the scope of an is of accusing me of a a non sequitur argument. The Law includes Torah, Mishnah, and Talmud. To break the Law is not limited to infractions. The accusation of blasphemy is not limited a claim of divinity as you eventually go on to admit:

Jesus gets accused of blasphemy for doing things like ... teaching and reinterpreting the Law "with authority," — Leontiskos

To say that Gentiles need not follow the written Law, is a grievous example of breaking the Law.

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy. — Leontiskos

Evidence?

The historicity of the gospel narratives has been questioned by scholars, who suggest that the evangelists' accounts reflect the later antagonism that arose between the Church and the Synagogue.

(Wikipedia, Sanhedrin trial of Jesus)

I pointed to the problem of historical veracity in an earlier post.

So we agree: your earlier claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy is false. — Leontiskos

Absolutely not!

People who steal, that is a desecration of God's name.

(On the Other Hand: Ten Minutes of Torah - What Is Blasphemy, Anyway?)

Now there might be so disagreement between rabbis, but interpretation and disputes over interpretation are part of the Law. So, both the violation of at least some of the Laws as well as rejection of the Law fall under the accusation of blasphemy.

What is your conclusion here supposed to be? That Jesus is claiming that anyone who is human can forgive sins? Do you even believe yourself when you make these sorts of points? — Leontiskos

You ask what my conclusion is then put words in my mouth, as if this is my conclusion. Another example of arguing in bad faith. If you had waited form my answer I would have told you that it not just anyone. Once again, Jesus, according to the Gospels is not just any man.

The appropriation of Daniel works against you.As pointed out above: The Aramaic phrase bar enash means human being. The is no decisive evidence in Daniel that Jesus is this man . Whoever the man is, he was given authority, glory and sovereign power by the Ancient of Days. So again, not just any man, but a man none the less.

No, just in general. Is there something you think is being lost? — frank

In a remark to Drury Wittgenstein says :

Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things that look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: ‘I’ll show you differences.’

Connections often obscure differences. When differences are taken into account the problem of what this guy is saying and what it means is compounded by what that guy is saying and what it means.

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost.
— Fooloso4

Do you think that's happening here? If so, what's getting lost? I'm asking. — frank

Do you mean by referencing Hume? No, not as it stands.

And does he maintain this position despite his later arguments? That's kinda the point. — Banno

Yes. There is a direct through line with propositional analysis on one side and in the Tractatus' showing/seeing on the other, plus form of life in PI, plus doing/acting ("In the beginning was the deed.") in OC.

How is "look closer" propositional justification?
— Fooloso4
It's not. Again, that's the point. — Banno

I don't think that is the point. Looking/seeing stands over/against/ beside propositional justification. A few of many examples:

PI 66. ... look and see whether there is anything common to all ... [emphasis in the original]

To repeat: don’t think, but look!

And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small.

PI 122 A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation [übersichtliche Darstellung] produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous [durchsichtig] view of the foundations of possible buildings. (CV, p. 7)

(I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)

(Zettel 461)

hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

And yet, in 3 and 7 he gives examples of things he knows without giving propositional justification.

By the way, I agree that whether Wittgenstein dislikes Hume is bedsides the point.

The point about texts as a whole is a general point regarding interpretation. For example, if an author says one thing and then another that seems to contract it, we need to pay attention and see it the seeming contradiction can be reconciled.

Trouble is, this text is not a whole. It is an incomplete process, a work in progress. Sam26 and I have pointed this out repeatedly. — Banno

And as I responded: where does this leave the reader? And:

The act of thinking, both for the writer and the interpretive reader, takes place without sight of the finish line. There may, in fact, be no finish line.

and:

It is within the space and tension of interpretive uncertainty that we engage the text, whether it is a completed whole or not.

If he says "x" and then a few pages later seems to contradict this, you might try to explain this away by claiming that the text is incomplete, but this seems to me to be a way a trying to avoid the problem.

No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno

How is "look closer" propositional justification? It is not about the proposition of looking closer but the act of looking closer.

Notice that (7) does not include the word "Know"? — Banno

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there ...

Neither of these count against what I have said. — Banno

I will respond one more time then drop it.

What you said is:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

How does using "know' only in situations where there is a explicit justification that can be given in the form of a proposition fit these cases?

The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. Taking a chair or shutting the door points to the fact that in doing these things we show that we do not doubt their existence. No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door.

I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. — frank

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost. If there is something unique about it that should not become part of a homogeneous whole.

I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, — frank

Well, its not individual words, its a matter of interpreting the text as a whole This is not the only approach. Is not yours. I have no problem with that and have read some interesting books and articles that take this approach.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. — Banno

How else might your claim that:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

be understood? I admit that I might have misunderstood you but you have not given any indication of how this is to be understood if not in a straight forward way.

In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7.

You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. — Banno

I don't think it counts against what you said. I think that it avoids the issue raised by 3 and 7. Unlike 10, they are examples where the term 'know' is used but no explicit propositional justification is present or needed.

Also:

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre").

Here is your argument:

Speaking against the Law is blasphemy.
Therefore, To break the Law is blasphemy. — Leontiskos

I have given textual evidence that speaking against the Law is regarded by the accusers as blasphemy. Have you forgotten your claim that:

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy. — Leontiskos

or are you just trying to bury it?

As to the second point. What I said was:

the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. To break the Law is blasphemy. — Fooloso4

It is not simply a matter of breaking the Law, as it every offense however minor would be a blasphemous offense. What is at issue destroying or abolishing the Law. (Matthew 5:17)

When you say:

Jesus gets accused of blasphemy for doing things like ... reinterpreting the Law "with authority," or forgiving sins.These are all the unique prerogatives of God ... — Leontiskos

you are making my point for me.

...the Jewish mind is characterized by a verse like John 11:51. — Leontiskos

Was the author of this a Jew? A rabbi? An expert on "the Jewish mind"? A proper characterization is captured in the oft told joking expression: two Jews and three opinions.

The subtlety ... What is blasphemous for others is not blasphemous for him./quote]

This is about as subtle as getting hit in the head with a sledge hammer. That any man "has God's prerogatives" would be regarded as blasphemous by the Jewish leaders. But even if the Christians believed this, it does not mean that Jesus or his Jewish disciples believed he was not a human being.
— Leontiskos

"I, in my uniqueness as the Son of man,* can forgive sins, and to prove it I will cure this paralytic." — Leontiskos

Again, you make my point. A son of man is a human being.

In the notes to the New International Version of Daniel 7 it says:

The Aramaic phrase bar enash means human being.

Young's Literal Translation has son of man. Other sources confirm that bar enash means human being .

This not to contest what you said. My preference when interpreting a text is not to bring other texts into it. It adds another layer of questions. I don't know how Moore might have responded, or what Wittgenstein thought of Hume's contention if he was aware of it. It just makes it cleaner.

From a chapter on Hume and Wittgenstein in "Impressions of Empiricism" Oswald Hanfling says:

Wittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of’.

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