(With all this being inspired by a post that now seems to reside somewhere in the otherworld …)

There’s also the idea that Christianity is a (I would uphold forced and, hence, improper) hybridization of Jesus’s life and teachings, of some philosophical notions of the absolute (despite the differences between Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, they both affirm such), and, last but not least, of polytheistic paganism's Jungian-like wisdom (if one can call it such). To which I say, “but of course”.

The Easter bunny and egg has nothing to do with Jesus and everything to do with the Pagan notion of spring being a time of fertility and of vegetative rebirth after the relative “death” of winter – with a lot of symbolism to all this now largely forgotten. This being forcibly tied into the mythos of the resurrection. Likewise, there’s no historical record to indicate that Jesus was birthed in December (and, best I recall, some evidence of it having been spring), but this time of year is the time of the Pagan revered winter solstice, a time which within many a pagan folklore/mythos signifies, symbolizes, the (re-)birth - or else the (re-)expansion - of light that counteracts an expanding darkness. This being tied into the notion of Jesus as the light bringer. To not even start with Christian notion of Santa Clause and the Christmas tree. :wink:

The construction crew began work decades after Jesus. At the moment I can't cite a number. — BC

To be precise, it began three centuries after Jesus, in the exact year of 325 CE. This is the year of The First Council of Nicaea, where the doctrine of the Trinity was compromised between and constructed by different factions into its initial manifestation - this with the oversight of the Roman Emperor Constantine. Before this council convened, there was no Trinity and, hence, no Christianity - a religion pivoted on the reality of the Trinity.

Well, unless one wants to claim that anyone who in any way believes in Jesus and/or his teachings is a Christian. In which case, many a modern voodoo practitioner is a bona fide Christian (this to pick on voodooism as one religious example, among others, wherein the divinity of Jesus is often upheld by those who are almost universally considered to be non-Christians).

Yea, I know, The many sects of pre-Council-of-Nicaea believers in Jesus are popularly called "Christians" on the internet and in history books. Doesn't change the fact that none of them had any inkling of, much less believed in, the Trinity.

I agree that the past is fixed, and the future is not, but this creates enormous, seemingly unsurmountable problems for understanding the nature of the present. The first question is, what happens at the present, which could cause such a change? The unfixed future must consist of possibilities, and the past must consist of the results of some sort of selection process. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would address this by incorporating the both conscious and unconscious, intention-driven free will of all co-occurring minds in the cosmos. Not that easy to explain though in forum format.

Let me say then, that it is a limitation you impose. The problem with this limitation, limiting your understanding of time to conscious experience, is that if you adhere to it strictly, you get a solipsist position. — Metaphysician Undercover

First off, what I expressed was about “prioritizing” and not “limiting” one’s understanding of time. Makes a world of difference.

Second off, I think it should have been lucidly clear from my previous posts that I was addressing conscious experience in general: the conscious experience of all co-occurring minds in the cosmos that are so endowed. Such as via my addressing the present duration during conversations between two or more minds necessarily resulting in a simultaneity of the present relative to all minds concerned. Each of these (need I say, “separate”?) consciousnesses will then hold their own conscious experience to be epistemically primary as I previously described. Not because I so declare or impose but because that’s the way consciousness works: Even though it’s not infallible, can you think of a more robust certainty then that of “I am”? Yet this in no way then logically translates into the ontological primacy of one’s own consciousness over everything else. Self requires world in order to be in the first place. More specifically, it requires a world in which one is not the sole self.

But I’m not here to debate this.

If you are a consequentialist, you must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences - not just good consequences - or you do not have good intentions. I have formulated an argument that supports this:

[...]

So, it seems that not only is consequentialism incredibly demanding, but it is also an exercise in self-deprecation if you are not some sort of selfless, Jesus-like figure incapable of a cheat day. — ToothyMaw

I find the OP to be fraught with unaddressed issues.

For any of the premises given: Good from the vantage of whom? Me? You and me together? The totality of all individuals that constitute the click or nation or culture we pertain to? The entire human species? All life in the cosmos? In some unrealizable idealization of what should be, all of these will converge into the same all the time; akin to a kind of perfected deontology. In the reality we all know, this convergence will rarely if ever happen – with a great deal of conflict between these different vantages of what is good occurring to varying extents most all of the time.

For one example, to typical hardcore capitalist(s), the dedication of one’s entire life to volunteer work (etc.) is clearly bad, for there’s no material profit to be gained by it, and maximized material profit is what the hardcore capitalist considers good. So why presume that the intention of so volunteering is a good intention? (Even those who are not hardcore capitalists still need to make enough profit to put food on the table for themselves and loved ones.)

This is not to say that the constituent minds of all these different, often competing, vantages do not all share the goal of actualizing what is good for themselves. But the issue is far more complex than the OP presents it to be. To include epistemic uncertainty during times of choice making in terms of which alternative possibility is in fact the best option for satisfying the distal goal pursued.

I’ll offer that what makes a good intention good is its ability to adequately satisfy a want when engaged in – this in the long term to the best of one’s forethought, if not also in the short term.

Different wants, different good intentions (here meaning, intentions that best satisfy the given want(s)). A carnivore’s want to catch the herbivore will thereby hold a best intention (among alternative possible intentions) that is thereby good which is directly contradictory to the best intention, which is thereby good, of the herbivore whose want is to not be caught (this to not get into possible details concerning human conflicts).

Only if there occurs a universal underlying want that is the same for all (e.g., for both carnivore and herbivore) will there then be such a thing as a universal good which the constituent minds of all previously mentioned vantages could in theory intend to actualize – this as best as each can within its own contexts even when there occur conflicts between more proximate good intentions (e.g., between what is good for the predator and what is good for the prey). Long story short, it will only be in this situation that there can potentially occur a consequence, or outcome, whose potential actualization would satisfy the wants of all. Such that an honest variant of what is themed "the greater good" is aligned with, at the very least, the long term personal good of all involved. More concretely, such that the good of established cultural mores (including the morals which the culture upholds) is itself aligned to this given universal outcome just mentioned, i.e. to the universal good (as an example of what this could consist of, to the ideal outcome of absolute fairness and hence of absolute equality of value) ... thereby making adherence to these cultural morals a more impartial good and deviation from them a more impartial bad.

Notwithstanding, whether or not one upholds the possibility of such a universal good, the same seems to nevertheless hold as regards the OP: If one’s personal wants shall include the want of not self-flagellating, then any self-flagellation (allegorical or physical) will clearly be a bad relative to one's own judgement, a bad outcome which can thereby only result from (freely chosen, rather than coerced) bad intentions.

That's a fair criticism to my response, although I wonder if it may be taking us off the track of the preceding discussion.

I think it's very difficult to say what other animals may or may not "think" or what "concepts" they might use. I use scare quotes because the words "think" and "concepts" typically apply to our human thinking and concepts, with which we are familiar, but I don't know if other animals have the same sort of thing or something completely different, especially when you are proposing that they may have non-linguistic thoughts and concepts. Therefore, I am reluctant to apply what we have, and apply those terms that usually mean human cognition and human concepts, to other animals. — Luke

I can very much respect this. Just so its said, the way I look at this subject is that, just as we can infer that lesser animals have minds, with some lesser animals giving all indications of themselves having a theory of mind, so too can we infer that lesser animals can in some ways hold non-linguistic concepts. But your are quite right in saying that further discussing this would take the thread off its current course.

I would say, that traditionally the background is of entities. The entity is what is static, and changes occur to it. This is the traditional logic of predication, the subject accepts changing predications. The static aspect is representative of what does not change as time passes, what is continuous, and this is matter in ancient philosophy, and matter is the background. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm in general agreement. There was, however, the ancient philosophy of Heraclitus.

What makes a thing a thing, is temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

True. I didn't want to define it by temporality, though, since it's temporality that we're trying to understand.

If you define the past as absolutely fixed, and the future as absolutely unfixed, then we run into the same problem that I was showing with Luke's arguments when past and future are mutually exclusive contraries. There cannot be any overlap of past and future. Then, the nature of "the present" becomes extremely problematic. Since the present has to be a process (it cannot be a dimensionless point when a predicate changes to is contrary because this requires a duration of becoming), this time, "the present" must be completely distinct from past and future. But then we need to account for the process whereby the past becomes the present, and the present the future, and I think we'd have to posit some other form of time for this. It may become an infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear about what I meant, I qualiified the perfect fixedness of the past with "for all intended purposes". Meaning that the past is not, as I interpret it, absolutely fixed.

That said, I do hold that the future, not having yet been experienced as a present duration by any mind, is distinct from and in a sense contrary to the past, which was once experienced as a present duration by all minds concerned - such that, generally speaking, interacting minds will not agree on what the future will be but will agree on what the past was. Making the details of the past equally real to all, but not the details of the future.

But I'm having trouble understanding how the past could ever become the present, or how the present could become the future. To my mind, the newer portions of the present duration perpetually incorporate the most proximal aspects of the future; likewise, the older portions of the present duration perpetually transmute into the past. Yet the present duration always remains the present duration: that duration of befores and afters which we experience with physiological phenomena. (I should here add, during waking states of being.)

I think that these points of distinction are imposed pragmatically, depending on the purpose. For example, you intentionally qualified "past" with what is consciously remembered as past. That is just for the purpose of having a clear division. If we allow all past, then we have to deal with things like "sensory memory", which I brought up earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

I prioritize the conscious experience of the present duration (or "moment" in the sense of a short duration) because I take the conscious experience to be the sole source of all epistemological givens of which we can be aware: including, for example, all knowledge regarding the unconscious operations of our minds, hence including our knowledge of sensory memory. And this ontological source for all givens we can be aware of, which is our consciousness, I take to hold regardless of purpose.

So I so far don't find this epistemological prioritization to be a matter of confirmation bias.

Here is where the problems present themselves. When you say "focus on", I consider this to be conscious effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not typically. Our vision, as one example, always holds a focal point (more technically, a "focal zone"), i.e. some given area of vision upon which we visually focus, which is itself surrounded by peripheral vision we don't focus on, itself surrounded by non-vision. Maybe obviously, without any sharp distinction between these three zones of visual awareness, so to speak. And all this occurs, typically, in manners fully devoid of conscious effort. When we're very attentive visually, this focal point becomes smaller bringing more details into visual focus; when we "zone out" this focal point can become so disperse so as to virtually blend everything into our peripheral vision; nevertheless, most of the time, our visual focal point, or that which we visually focus on, will occur without any conscious effort. The same, I believe, can be generally held for all other senses (with tactile perception potentially holding two or more focal points as the same time) as well as for our overall awareness in general. But getting into all this would be quite a chore. So I'll just let it be for now.

Nevertheless, you bring up good points. My tentative, overall understanding of what you've written is that it addresses the issue of time by prioritizing physical matter over conscious experience. (I say "physical matter" so as differentiate it from the Aristotelian notions of, for example, individual ideas being the constituent matter - or material substrate - of a paradigm (with neither ideas nor paradigms being physical matter)).

If so, our metaphysical outlooks will then get in the way of our agreeing upon the nature of time.

But if I'm not misinterpreting you with the just mentioned, I'd be interested to know how you would address time in regard to prime matter? This given that prime matter, from which all matter as individual units develops, is understood to be completely undifferentiated in all ways.

And thank you for the criticisms.

I have to report that there is as a matter of fact a state of absorption sometimes called 'flow', which I have experienced, mainly playing music, but even occasionally in writing, and sometimes walking in the countryside. In such a state, there is no separation for the moment between self and world; the music is playing the fingers and the rhythm is breathing the time, I mean timing the breath: even as an audience one can become lost in music. — unenlightened

Good subject and nicely made point. I would quibble on “no separation for the moment between self and world” being, as I currently interpret the expression, a poetic truth. In other words, the sharp distinction between self and world – often, as thought the two were in some ways antagonists – vanishes in moments of flow. True. Yet it's a poetic truth in that there is yet technical distinctions between observer and observed – between the experiencer of flow and the immediate world that this experiencer perceives which is (or at least seems to be) fully unified with oneself in terms of one’s intentions and resulting activities. Such that what one does one then does in manners fully unperturbed by aspects of what one would in other situations recognize as one’s unconscious (e.g., in slips of the tongue) or factors external to one’s total self of body and mind. Hence, my quibble is that technically, because there is yet a distinction between that (be it deemed entity, process, both, or neither) which perceives and that which is perceived by it – granted, this being a distinction one gives no importance to in such moments – there will then yet be a duality between I-ness and non-I-ness, regardless of the extent to which this duality is momentarily reduced or otherwise harmonized.

My poetic metaphorical language attempts to convey something that is probably familiar to most, so one does not need to rely on the authority of another. Bliss, because the habitual tension and anxiety of holding out against the world is gone for a while. — unenlightened

Agreed. In keeping with what I take to a possible interpretation of Eastern philosophies, such moments of flow as you’ve described can be deemed examples of moments in which one (maybe unintentionally) approaches – but does not yet obtain – the actualization of Moksha/Nirvana (in absolute form).

My only critique would be that, on my own view, it is not our focus that causes something to become a thing or entity within our cognition; instead, it is the nature of language that requires these "units" or concepts. — Luke

Again, I don't see the problem as one of cognition, but as one of language. It is the constant, stable, static meanings/uses of words such as "present" which allow us to talk about it, but which does not capture the ongoing change that we perceive. You cannot step into the same river twice. The meaning of the word "river" stays the same, but the actual river is ever changing. — Luke

I think I understand what you mean. All, or at least nearly all, concepts we entertain are language dependent. The concept of “animal” is specified by the word, as one example, and this is an inter-agential construct: both as word and as the concept the word specifies. And our conceptual cognition makes use of language to manipulate concepts, sometimes to extremely abstract extents.

With this I fully agree. The impact language has upon our cognition is overwhelming.

Yet, I’m thinking that maybe there’s a difference in the way we understand “cognition” within the contexts I previous addressed. I intended it as the noun form of “to cognize”, with the latter here intending “to hold an awareness of” among with the term’s other meanings. So interpreted, conscious perception is then a form of cognition, for we cognize (gain awareness of) physical objects via our perception of them.

I don’t find it credible that perception will of itself be fully contingent on language; though, of course, the language-specified concepts we hold will significantly influence that which we consciously perceive. If we in no way hold the concept of “a house” we will not be able to perceive a house when looking at something that is otherwise known as a house; we would perceive shapes and colors (etc.) that stand apart from their background but would not recognize these to be houses. I fully grant this. But consider that objects which we commonly perceive with lesser animals are nevertheless perceived as background-independent objects by all organisms concerned. Both a human and a dog, for example, will perceptually recognize a fleshy bone, and will deal with it accordingly to their own benefit. This though lesser animals are languageless creatures.

I infer from this that very rudimentary, likely unthought of, concepts can be held in the complete absence of language: For, just as a wild dog will likely not be able to perceive, and hence recognize, houses (or, even more so, spaceships) due to not having any conceptual understanding of what these background-independent shapes and colors are, so too, I argue, would a dog not be able to perceive and thereby recognize a bone were it have no conceptual understanding of what bones are. In much simpler lesser animals, such as insects, one can then well assume that physical objects are perceived via species-specific rudimentary concepts that are fully inherited genetically. Again, this in the utter absence of language. I’m, for example, guesstimating that a spider doesn’t in any way learn what a fly is via some trial and error in the process of growing to maturity. This as a dog can be said to do in gaining cognizance of what a bone is – and thereby being able to perceive bones.

If one deems the just mentioned to hold, then: To perceive X is to necessarily discern, or cognize, a unit – this, for lack of better words, within one’s focal point of conscious awareness. And language will not be essential to this process of perceiving. So, for one example: some more developed lesser animals (greater apes for instance) could then perceive, and thereby recognize, rivers as individual units (rather than processes) despite having no language by which to refer to the concept of "river".

(BTW, this is to say that lesser animals will necessarily experience units (to which processes, such as running, can then apply). But it takes a human to infer that all of physical reality is in flux.)

Don’t know if you’d find general agreement in this, but, if not, I’d like to better understand why not.

p.s. Thanks for the critique.

Good luck getting MU to agree that we can ever distinguish memories from anticipations, or the past from the present from the future. — Luke

:grin: Fingers crossed, there might not be significant differences between the given description and what MU experiences. But whatever differences there might be, I'm sure he'll inform me of them.

I’ve been keeping up with part of the interchange between you two. I want to present the following overall thesis regarding the past, present, and future for critique, this since I currently suppose it to be in partial agreement with both of your views. Thanks in advance for any criticisms.

---------

By “entity” I here mean “an individual unit”. By “process” I here mean “continual change”. So understood, an entity is not a process, for in being an individual unit it is not continual change – and vice versa. Of note, an entity thus understood will not need to be in any way physical.

There exists a process/entity duality (which in some ways is akin to the wave/particle duality of QM) in the operations of cognition. For one example, our cognition naturally, innately, perceives physical objects, or entities, set against a background – objects that we can cognize as sometimes engaging in processes (e.g., the rock (entity) is rolling (process) down the hill (entity)).

All these experiences then result in our cognizing that everything physical is in an underlying state of flux, i.e. is process, or becoming. Yet the moment we focus on something it becomes a thing, or entity, within our cognition; and this applies to both perceived givens and concepts. For example, the concept of “running (as process)” itself becomes an entity (an individual unit) - linguistically, a noun – in the form of a specific type of process that we then can cognitively manipulate as concept.

As a generalization, then, when we don’t focus on X we know, hence cognize, X to be process - but when we focus on X it then is cognized as entity.

For cognition to in any way work, it is then absurd – or at the very least direly hypocritical – to deny either process-hood to physical reality or entity-hood to physical reality.

Applying this to past, present, and future:

-----------

In what follows, memory will be addressed as strictly signifying conscious memory – and not any form of unconscious memory which can be inferred to be required for our consciously perceiving, or consciously conceptualizing, givens.

Our experiential present (be it specious or not) consists of a duration replete with befores and afters. To account for this:

What we in any way physiologically perceive via all physiological sense will hold a certain quality as phenomena – a quality of phenomena that is by us readily distinguishable from phenomena we, for example, either recall or else perceptually imagine to occur in the future. In experience, this physiological quality of phenomena lasts for a short but immeasurable duration, a duration that is yet distinct from the phenomena of things we consciously recall and from the imagined phenomena we anticipate. This duration in which physiological phenomena are actual (visual, auditory, etc.) relative to us is then what we intuitively deem our experienced present.

For the sake of argument, presume that this experienced present is for the average human an average duration of approximately half a second to one and a half seconds.

Next, consider a conversation. We actively converse (hence listen and speak) with the other in the present. This extended present we experience can then include our replying after the other’s comment or the other replying after our comment. Generalizing from this and other possible examples: wherever there is any type of direct interaction between human minds, there will be a shared experiential present common to all minds involved – and, hence, a simultaneity of the present relative to these causally interacting minds.

Notwithstanding, relative to all minds involved, everything that is consciously known about the past will be contained within the duration of the experiential present. As will be everything that is consciously anticipated about the future.

Unlike the future, though, our recollections of past present-durations wherein we in any way interacted with other minds will always reference events commonly stored (here overlooking mistakes of memory and such) within the memory of all minds concerned. Hence, the past will be fixed relative to all minds that once partook of it when it was a (commonly shared) present duration. In contrast, the future – not having yet been presently experienced – will not be.

As an aside, I’m one to believe that such musings could (together with other principles) be applied so as to formulate a theory of presentism wherein the past is for all intended purposes perfectly fixed and the future is indeterminate – a theory of presentism that parallels the theory of relativity’s stipulation that simultaneity is always observer-dependent. But I’m here presenting all this simply to provide better general background for the current purposes, this in terms of defining the present in respect to the past and future. (In other words, though I’m aware these given premises could be further enquired into, I’m only here presenting them for the purpose of the current issue.)

We then know from experience that there is no measurable distinction between the future and the experienced present, with the latter always changing to incorporate what in the past was strict future. The same lack of measurable distinction holds between the experienced present and the past. So we know all this to be process, for it's all continuous change. Notwithstanding, we also know that the experienced present is always qualitatively distinct from all past we can recall (be it the past of two seconds ago or that of two years ago, etc.). Likewise with future present-durations which we can in part predict and thereby anticipate.

So, when we don’t focus on the past, present, and future we know that these are all aspects of an inseparable process. Yet when we focus on them, each becomes an individual unit distinct from the others.

Furthermore, when we focus on the past, present, or future, we then cognize each of these to be composed of befores and afters. For example, I am in this current duration of the experienced present writing this word before this one. Upon closer experiential examination, all these befores and afters too are perfectly devoid of measurable distinctions. Yet, when we conceptualize these processes of lived experience – such as by consciously or unconsciously ascribing causality – each before and each after will then be cognized as a distinct unit.

Then, to represent these experientially cognized units we will typically utilize definite quantity, i.e. numbers, and can furthermore represent them geometrically via points – such as a point on a line that measurably distinguishes what was before and what was after the given depicted point on some visual record of our past.

The mathematization of duration, hence of time, can of course be of vast pragmatic benefit (the theory of relativity as example; the use of seconds, minutes, hours, etc. as a more immediate example). Nevertheless, a) any such will be an abstracted representation of our lived experiences as previously addressed and b) any such will conflict with our lived experiences for the reason’s previously provided.

Where would you find disagreement?

And this flows with Gadamer's "Fusion of Horizons," theory very well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Just checked it out. It strikes me as a very formal way of addressing what is traditionally meant by the non-euphemistic use of the term "intercourse". In other words, that course, or path, that so becomes on account of interactions and which all interlocutors pursue. We don't hear "verbal intercourse" too often, but that's what all communications consist of. As I see it at least.

I actually think there is a ton of good work that can be done by mining the insights of continental philosophy and other humanities and attempting to put them into a framework that will play nicely with the sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For lack of better current analogy, I find a tightrope in the empirical sciences between raw data empirically obtained and the (inferential) theories that accounts for the data. That said, for me at least, at the end of the day the empirical sciences are about validating falsifiable inferences via empirical observations. I often like to simplify the matter into the humorous story of: "Hey, I see X. Do you see X as well? Yea?, then lets see if others also see X. If we all see X, then X must be real to the best understanding of reality we currently posses. Given all the Xs we currently know of, whats the best way to inferential account for all of them? OK, that theory works better than the others. We will hold onto it until the new Xs we discover can no longer be explained by the theory. So our theories regarding what is real can drastically change over time; but the X's we've all observed and can still observe at will shall remain staple aspects of what we deem real."

All that to say, I agree with what you've expressed. Bearing in mind that such very approach can be reduced to the humanities in so far as it is itself a philosophical understanding of how to best understand out commonly shared world. Hence, the philosophy of (the empirical) sciences. (As an aside, I'm very grateful for having taken such courses as part of my biological evolution studies in university days, offered by some fairly hardcore biological scientists. I developed better Cog. Sci. experiments because of it, for starters.)

I think information theory and complexity studies in particular give us the language to begin a translation process. E.g., I'm also working on trying to put Hegel's theory of institution/state development, laid out in the Philosophy of Right, into the terms of the empirical sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is awesome! I'd like to have access to your work someday, this when you're ready to share it.

(And of course, part of the reason for the gulf is the "linguistic turn" leading continental philosophers to begin making up slew of new compound words and phrases, so as to avoid "cultural taint," but IMO this has mostly had the effect of making them unintelligible to people outside a small niche). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I get that and I agree. The irony being that in my own work I haven't been able to find an alternative to using novel words for what I find to be novel ways of conceptualizing things. But yea, if one can avoid it, it's best to avoid so doing.

Again, in my understanding of Taoism, the Tao and the multiplicity of the world are recognized as continually cycling, returning. Neither causes the other. — T Clark

I acknowledge your interpretation of the Tao. Thank you for it. I'll point out that there are multiple interpretations of the Tao.

For instance:

A central tenet in most varieties of religious Taoism is that the Tao is ever-present, but must be manifested, cultivated, and/or perfected in order to be realized. It is the source of the Universe, and the seed of its primordial purity resides in all things. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tao#Diversity_of_views

Here the Tao (from which yin and yang emanate and, thereby, from which the multiplicity of the world emanates) "is to be manifested, cultivated, and/or perfected". The "primordial purity" of the Tao is then a priori to (thought not necessarily an efficient cause of) the mutiplicity of the world which the Tao's yin and yang brings about. Realizing this primordial purity via cultivation of the Tao, then, would in this case be a telos and, thereby, a teleological determinant of being by other words.

But again, there are multiple interpretations of the Tao.

Interesting thread. Is consciousness cognition? Or is cognition something one might be conscious of. Or can both be true at once, such that consciousness is recursively defined as consciousness of consciousness? — unenlightened

Aye, though question - with the meaning intended to these quoted words being crucial to any proper answer. All the same, I so far see both as true at once but in different ways. We can cognize that which is in some way other than us (as that which cognizes): these can include percepts as well as concepts.

Yet at the same time we can be cognizant of ourselves as that which cognizes other. Here, the innumerable examples can includes one's own state of being as that which cognizes other as taking the form of being either happy or sad, of being either confident or unsure, of being either interested or bored, and so forth. The latter does not in any way stand apart from us as that which cognizes other (not in lived experience, not unless this lived experience is turned into concepts of self that one then analyzes). So, as to, for example, being certain as that which cognizes X, the experienced certainty and the "cognizer" which so experiences one's own certainty will in that one instant or more be in a perfectly non-dual relation to each other; will in that instant be the same exact thing or process (or both, or neither).

Tying this with the thread's main theme, were a literally egoless consciousness possible to actualize in principle, such would then be perfectly devoid of otherness - but there is no cogent reason to then affirm that it would also be devoid of its "auto"-awareness regarding its own, here unperturbed, state of being. I interpret this to then be in-line with the often told description of Moksha or Nirvana as being pure bliss.

I really don't know if that's true of The Embodied Mind book, in particular. That book, as mentioned, draws mainly from phenomenology and also Buddhist psychology, which is not physicalist in orientation. — Wayfarer

Ah, in terms of that one particular book, I have not yet read it, and I too am uncertain. In fact, rather, given its primary interests, like I believe you are, I’m fairly confident that nothing within this particular book contradicts the ontological tenets which would allow for Moksha to occur in principle. As I previously suggested, it is possible to maintain an embodied understanding of consciousness from within an idealist worldview wherein an ontically real soteriological end occurs (the Real, as some would call it). As such, one could then maintain an embodied cognition approach that is utterly neutral to ontological commitments. And my current hunch is that this applies to Varela et al.’s The Embodied Mind.

One idea is that the brain simulates or recreates sensory and motor experiences when engaging in cognitive tasks. For instance, when understanding language, we may simulate the associated sensorimotor experiences (gestures etc) to comprehend the meaning better. It is combined with the enactivism that emphasizes the active role of the agent in shaping cognition. Cognition is viewed as emerging from the dynamic interaction between the agent and its environment, which is not, as physicalism presumes, a pre-given, independently existing domain of objects, but is more like the Husserlian 'meaning-world' or 'lebesnwelt', a world of meanings rather than objects. Obviously its main focus is not on eschatology or other such religious concerns, but I wouldn't describe it as physicalist in orientation either. — Wayfarer

Well said. However, I was addressing embodied cognition as they are TMK currently known within popular philosophical debate. Which, whether pro or contra these stances, seems to me to most always take for granted that cognition can only occur within a physical body (that interacts with other). I’m addressing the (it seems to me) implicitly given difference between “the occurrence of cognition can be thus embodied in a physical body” and “the occurrence of cognition must be thus embodied in a physical body”. When the latter “must” is implicitly employed, then all soteriological ends become logically nullified.

That said, in having thought about it some more, maybe this is me reading too much into the current literature I’ve been exposed to? I can’t conclusively evidence what I currently believe to be true regarding the mainstream philosophical understanding of embodied cognition. Yet, I so far have not encountered evidence to contradict that this is the typical way in which embodied cognition is currently understood.

I don't consider myself learned in any depth in Eastern philosophy, but I think the response of one who was adept in those traditions would be to reject the claim that Mokṣa is a notion or a concept in the first place. — Wayfarer

Yes, I can understand that, yet this at the same time reminds me of the saying “the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao”: To speak of X is to necessarily have a conceptual understanding of X. A conceptual understanding will itself be other relative to that which understands it, and thereby necessitate a duality between I-ness (the personal act of understanding) and non-I-ness (that which is understood in conceptual form). So the Moksha which is addressed in speech cannot be the eternally real state of Moksha which, necessarily, is nonconceptual (hence, devoid of any duality between a conceiver and that conceived).

From my reading there is a distinction made between “having gained an awareness/understanding of Moksha (as ultimate reality and soteriological end) – else, an awareness of Nirvana” and “having actualized the state of being which is Moksha – else, Nirvana – wherein all ego vanishes; i.e., having actualized the soteriological end itself). In Buddhist terms, the first is “Nirvana-with-remainder” and the second is “Nirvana-without-remainder”.

So then, even the Buddha while alive had then only obtained "Nirvana with remainder" and not "Nirvana without remainder". As such the soteriological end of "Nirvana without remainder" was yet other in respect to the living Buddha. As such, the latter could then have only been a concept, or idea, that represented the nonconceptual actuality which is specified by "Nirvana without remainder".

This appears to me to be no different than contrasting the reality of a physical rock and the concept, or idea, of a rock; only that when it comes to Moksha and Nirvana, the ontic reality addressed, instead of being physical, is among other things beyond space (e.g. any sort of distance between I-ness and other - including that applicable to what some term "cognitive spaces") and time (e.g. any before and after - including that applicable to, for one example, thoughts). So, if a soteriological end is ontically real (rather than being only conceptually real), than among the differences between its reality and that of a physical rock is that the former cannot be perceived to be real - but can only be understood to be real, this to varying extents.

[...] Therefore existence is estrangement." Hence the theme of 'union' or 'returning' which is universal in all of the perennial traditions, but again, something that escapes easy (or any!) conceptualisation. — Wayfarer

I'm in agreement. Of note, the themes of "union" and "returning" can only be coherently aligned to this state of perfectly nondual being, in one way or another, itself being a soteriological end As such, the state of perfectly nondual being is then a teleological determinant, or teleological cause, but cannot - at least by this - be interpreted as an efficient cause of where we are. In other words, this state of being is an ultimate end, and not an ultimate beginning.

There are millenia of debates about whether this entails some sense of continuity life to life, or whether union with or return to the One amounts to complete cessation of any sense of oneself. — Wayfarer

Depending on what one means by "life", I don't yet understand why the two could not both be true - were the soteriological end to be real. (Not life in the sense of biology but life in the sense of "He's dead inside" or "He's never been more alive" - such that, in this latter sense of the term, the One would be both the cessation of any sense of oneness (what is to be expected of an absolutely infinite being) as well as a state of absolute, or perfectly complete or whole, or even a state of perfectly wholesome life. The Good in Platonic terms).

For instance, Howard Pattee in discussing origin-of-life, observes that: 'Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object. Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'. (Notice the resonance with embodied cognition, not a coincidence.) But you also find explicit awareness of the 'self-other' duality in non-dualist philosophy, where it is understood as the root of the anxiety that pervades individual existence. Of course, the contexts of the two discussions are worlds apart, but I feel that they're both touching on the same deep issue. — Wayfarer

I fully agree. In my view, any cogent biosemiotics will hold the duality between I-ness / self and non-I-ness / other as the most essential epistemic cut imaginable. With all other epistemic cuts being extrapolated from the reality of this one.

Maybe this is neither here nor there for this discussion, but as to Umwelts, I find it beneficial to distinguish between intra-real Umwelts (those each individual forms for themselves), inter-real Umwelts (those shared by two or more agents; e.g., a cultural worldview or, more biologically speaking, the genetically inherited aspects of cognition pertaining to an individual species (e.g., grass is green to us humans but not some other species of animal), and the equi-real Umwelt, which can only be singular (that Umwelt which is equally applicable to all coexistent agents in the cosmos). The equi-reality I here address becomes very difficult to explain in a constructionist-like manner - it certainly wouldn't be constructed by individuals but, instead, here laconically expressed, in large part by the unconscious processes of all coexisting beings which, as construct, then affects all agents in equal manners. All the same, devoid of the concept of equi-reality (a reality that is equally applicable to all and which is thereby in this sense objective) I would have very little understanding of how the following works as regards the total world (the same which the empirical sciences study):

The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image'.

First off, thanks for starting the thread.

For clarity, this portion of what the OP quotes has the following link in the original:

Although debatable, these interpretations for example corroborate the construal of Nirvana as “transcendent consciousness” or, else worded, as a transcendent awareness devoid of I-ness – one that can hence be inferred as being beyond time, space, and the co-occurrence of observer, observing, and observed. — javra

First, with respect to enactivism and the whole 'embodied cognition' school. Let's not forget that [...] — Wayfarer

I’ve read Thompson’s Mind in Life with considerable interest. I’m of course also familiar with Varela’s and Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis. And, while I’m not steeped in the details, I am likewise aware of the Mind & Life Institute. So I know that Buddhism inspired considerable aspects of at least certain enactivits’ positions in respect to cognition.

Enactivism and the closely related embodied cognition are vast topics in their own right. And they can be expressed as having presented somewhat of a shock to mainstream materialism. As for myself, I respect much, but not all, that I’ve read regarding these two positions. Notwithstanding, the pivotal metaphysical divide I presented in the OP so far appears to me to remain.

Both enactivism and embodied cognition as these are currently known – neither of which is on its own a comprehensive metaphysical ontology – will tend to hold views that more or less correspond to the central tenets of physicalism. For one example, here, the cessation of the living body is inferred to signify the (permanent) cessation of its respective cognition - such that it ends in absolute nonbeing, or nihility. Hence, for example, the reincarnation of awareness is implicitly deemed to be untrue on grounds that each unique mind is bound to its respectively unique body.

In contrast, in the worldview of idealism, the possibility of personal consciousness that transcends into a literally egoless awareness remains viable. And, for this to occur, there logically must then be a continuation of being subsequent to the death of one's body. Not only this, but there then must logically be a continuation of being after one's literal death of ego wherein I-ness completely vanishes.

To be clear, my own view is that one can, at least in principle, have an objective-world-realism explained by an idealist metaphysics which, thereby, supports enactivism and embodied cognition for corporeal beings such as ourselves while, simultaneously, allowing for soteriological ends.

However, were one to start with the affirmation that consciousness can in principle only be embodied and, thus, in a dualistic relation to other, then the soteriological ends of Hinduist Moksha and Buddhist Nirvana (together with the metaphysics on which these concepts are founded) so far seem to me to become logically negated.

(I have more to say on the other points you've raised but will be away for a couple of hours.) — Wayfarer

There’s of course no rush. I look forward to your views.

Because I don’t want to start a new thread on this topic, I’m presenting this as a tangential to the thread’s theme. Hopefully @Count Timothy von Icarus doesn’t object.

[Moderator note: @javra - the remainder of this comment has been copied to a separate discussion as while it's a very interesting question and worth pursuing, it is very much outside the scope of this original post's intent in my view.]

While the so called “scandal of deduction” is not something I personally find great interest in (primarily due to what I take to be the exceeding ambiguity, and possible equivocations, to what is meant by the term “information”), I can certainly respect your argument and agree with its conclusion. To paraphrase my understanding of it: The understanding of conclusions obtained from valid (or sound) deductions will always be novel to anyone who has not previously held an understanding of that concluded but who does hold awareness of the premises – and so will thereby bring about new information to such persons.

I here however primarily want to champion this following affirmation, which some might not deem intuitive:

When we understand messages we “bring information to the table.” The initial signals we receive are combined with a fantastic amount of information stored in the brain [I'd prefer to say, "in the unconscious mind ... which holds the cellular processes of the brain as it constituent makeup (as does consciousness)"] before we become consciously aware of a meaning. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Every understanding (else here expressed, “meaning”) – this as one example of what we can intend to consciously convey – which we seek to express to others via perceptual means (these most often being visual, auditory, or tactile signs among humans) shall always be understood by others via that body of ready established understandings which each individual other for the most part unconsciously holds in a ready established manner. This will of course apply just as much to all understandings others intend to express to us.

It can thereby be safely inferred that, most of the time, the meaning we are consciously aware of and intend to convey to others via signs will end up in the other’s mind being a hybridization of a) the meaning we hold in mind that we intend to convey and b) the ready established, largely unconscious, body of meaning which the other is endowed with. And, so, in most cases it will not be understood by the other in an identical way to our own conscious understanding. Less often, we can feel, or intuit, that the other fully “gets us” – such that what they hold in mind is felt to be indiscernible from what we hold in mind – and we can corroborate this feeling by further interactions with the said other. Nevertheless, in all such instantiations, the meaning which is conveyed shall always be in large part dependent – not on the perceptual phenomena employed, but, instead – on the ready present, largely unconscious, body of meaning the other is endowed with.

You’ve exemplified rocks. One can just as validly exemplify lesser animals. A typical dog, for example, can understand a very limited quantity of meanings which we convey by signs. But express the phrase “biological evolution” or that of “calculus” to a dog and the dog will hold no comprehension of the meaning one here would be intending to convey by these linguistic signs. The same dog might get you when you utter “good dog”, but the dog’s understanding of what this meaning is, for example, in reference to will be fully dependent on the dog’s largely unconscious body or ready present understandings.

Which is to only further endorse parts of the OP such as the following:

The information that signals are combined with in the brain varies by person and it varies according to the amount of cognitive resources that we are able to dedicate to understanding the message. "Understanding," is itself an active process that requires myriad additional communications between parts of the mind and the introduction of vast quantities of information not in the original signal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

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At any rate, nice OP!

And a "bit" is a binary digit, expressed as a mathematical ratio*2. Which, incidentally is the root of "Reason" and "Rational". :nerd: — Gnomon

Not sure how you intend the sentence I just quoted. But I want to clarify:

As the Latin root of modern English “reason” and “rational”, “ratio” is the noun form of the Latin terms “reor” and/or “ratus”. These latter two Latin terms have multiple definitions (from "having judged" to "to consider" and a lot more aside), but all these definitions make indispensable use of discernment – by which I here mean a cognized distinction between some X and some Y that are bound by some relation (e.g., an object and its background), this regardless of whether one focuses on X, Y, or the relation between.

As such, the Latin term “ratio” does not pivot on maths and computations – it certainly doesn’t equate to mathematical ratios in the modern sense of "ratio". Instead, this Latin term's meaning pivots on something far closer to discernment and, thereby, all that can result from and is implied by faculties of discernment (to include judgments, awareness of purpose(s), plans, and mathematical properties and relations, among many other possibilities).

In any case all of this is kind of a red herring given the subject of discussion was concerning self-contradictory argumentation. — Janus

OK. Point taken. To then better address the issue you’re pursuing:

While I stand by the belief that the LNC is sound, it of itself is in no way prescriptive. If indeed sound, it is strictly descriptive of what is. So I so far don’t find that one can obtain an ought from the LNC.

That said, I’ll present the outline of an argument for why self-contradicting arguments are bad. First some simplistically expressed premises:

• Premise 1: The objective world is singular (hence, we don’t inhabit a world wherein two or more objective realities co-occur, if this is even possible to contemplate).
• Premise 2: This singular actuality, or reality, of the objective world we all partake of is itself coherently structured so as to comprise a unified whole. (This postulate can become complicated by the possibility of ontic randomness in part occurring in the world. But, even so, this random aspect of the cosmos would nevertheless here be an integral component of the unified whole which will interact with non-random aspects of the world so as to, again, result in a coherently structured, singular, objective reality.)
• Premise 3: The word “truth” references “conformity to that which is actual, i.e. real”.

I get that these premises can be debated and that they might be too simplistic in present format, but in here tentatively granting them all the same, the following then results. Truths will in such world never contradict; this because the singular and universal actuality, or reality, which truths conform to is itself coherently structured, hence consistent, hence noncontradictory. By comparison, an untruth will always be that which does not conform to what is actual and, because of this, two or more disparate untruths will always contradict each other – as well as contradicting that which with is actual.

Here, an expressed contradiction in one's reasoning will signify either that all but one of the contradicting parts do not conform to what is actual or that all the contradictory parts do not so conform. In short, a contradiction will here always entail a lack of conformity with what is actual.

Conversely, an argument that is devoid of self-contradiction then givens no indication of being untrue.

Further granting that what is sought is conformity with what is actual (that we seek what is true), then self-contradictions shall in this case always be bad due to always entailing untruths.

That said, there are other goals that individuals can pursue, some of which will find untruths and the resulting contradictions quite useful so as best fulfill said goals. As one example, we can tell untruths to a murderer so as safeguard a loved one. As a more unpleasant example, we would not be able to understand the psychology to Orwell’s 1984 (complete with the Ministry of Truth’s dictums of “War is Peace”, “Freedom is Slavery”, and “Ignorance is Strength”), nor find the story-line believable, were untruths to not be beneficial in sustaining autocratic power within everyday life.

This is a rough outline of a general perspective I hold. In summation, contradictions always evidence untruths. But whether untruths are good or bad will be fully dependent on the ends which one seeks to fulfill. (That said, none of the contradictions here expressed which result from untruths will themselves be the logical contradiction which the LNC states cannot occur - in so far as hypocrisy and doublethink can occur despite the LNC nevertheless holding.)

In short, I don't agree with Einstein's assessment because if it is true that light really is both a wave and a particle, then the difficulty is not that that is a contradiction, but that due to our lack of some relevant understanding it is merely the case that it might appear to be a contradiction. — Janus

Remember, these are models of the quantum realm, models that have a very high degree of predictive value, but models just the same. In Einstein's quote, he doesn't say that reality is contradictory but that we have contradictory pictures of reality. This makes a world of difference in what is affirmed by him.

I will just point out that a photon being a wave and a particle is not logically equivalent to a photon both being and not being a particle, because it being a wave does not logically rule out its also being a particle. — Janus

TMK, a particle is localized thing with volume, density, and mass. Whereas a wave function is not. So a wave function is not a particle. And hence the term "wave-particle duality". Am I missing out on something?

To corroborate my current understanding:

As Albert Einstein wrote:[1]

It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave%E2%80%93particle_duality

edit: I get that a photon is considered massless. But wave-particle duality applies to mass endowed particles just as well. It even applies to some small molecules.

To say that something could be simultaneously wave and particle does not constitute a logical contradiction as far as I can tell. We might think there is an incompatibility between the two states, but maybe our understanding or imagination is just not up to the task, If it is a fact that something can be both wave and particle, then it is a fact, pure and simple. — Janus

This, I think, will depend on what significance one imports into the terms "particle" and "wave". If the LNC does hold, however, then one can not have a photon be both a particle (A) and not a particle (~A) at the same time and in the same respect.

For example, it might be that the unobserved photon is neither spatially localized (particle) nor disperse fluctuations (wave) but something else that can account for both observations.

That said, as to our imagination likely not being up to par, as I tried to previously express, I agree.

Indeed. I think reasoning serves a purpose. — Srap Tasmaner

I should add: so do I (multiple possible purposes). But we will likely disagree on the details. It was good debating with you.

:up:

Are you even sure you know what you're claiming? — Srap Tasmaner

We don't seem to share the same wants when it comes to philosophy. I'm interested to ground my beliefs on what is. If I can't currently fully explain all that is, that's OK by me - so long as my beliefs regarding what is are sound. I dislike forsaking truths because they don't fit in with the explanatory model I so far have. What I'm claiming, in short, is that the LNC appears to be sound. The possible implications of this take a very distant second place for me.

What's the model of rationality we should aspire to? Flip-flopping and hypocrisy are fine so long as you don't contradict yourself? We're supposed not to contradict ourselves because it's a bad thing to do. — Srap Tasmaner

This is entirely an issue of ethics (and value-theory): what ought we do. As I think you're by now very aware of, arguments are sometimes engaged in with the outlook of "winning at all costs" - such that snide remarks and innuendos intended to humiliate the "opponent" are given in arguments by those who uphold the just mentioned ought. Whether this is rational or not fully depends on the goal one has in mind: e.g., to win and subjugate at all costs or, as corny as this might sound, to better discover truths and only then their likely relations. If one intends the former, then its rational to belittle and dehumanize the other. If one intends the latter, then it is not. But, again, this is an issue of what one ought do and, hence, one of ethics.

p.s. the same then goes for whether contradicting ourselves in rational discourse is good or bad: it depends on one's overall goal in so engaging in discourse.

OK. That said, it certainly doesn't look like that to me.

I thought you were going to finish that paragraph with A at 0.7 and ~A at 0.7, which should also be impossible but is known to happen, at least when considering the implications of people's beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. Its called hypocrisy or doublethink. But no one actively holds two (or more) contradictory beliefs at the same instant. Instead, one flip-flops between them while upholding both as true.

As to doubting: One can choose to doubt anything, including what is is. But doubt, of itself, does not affirm, i.e. posit, anything.

And then what is it the LNC actually applies to? Is it the non-verbal intellections of God? — Srap Tasmaner

While I don't share many another's phobias of the possibility of divinity, the basic answer is no more or no less then laws of nature, such as that of gravity. Which is to say, who the heck can conclusively answer this & by no means necessarily. It could be as much an uncreated "just is" aspect of reality as matter is to the materialist.

es, yes, we all know you can make this sound more precise, — Srap Tasmaner

TMK, it’s the way the LNC has always been worded and understood since the time of Aristotle.

Anyway - as an aside that I find interesting - wanted to point out that, as per Leibniz, the law of non-contradiction can be deemed entailed by the law of identity. As one example, one can word the law of identity this way:

At any given time t, A can only be equivalent to A, this in all conceivable ways. (otherwise, A would not be equivalent to A)

And then the LNC can be worded this way: at any given time t, A cannot be ~A in all conceivable ways. (which is the same as saying: A and ~A cannot both occur at the same time (i.e., simultaneously) and in exactly the same respect).

Hence, if this holds, then to deem the law of non-contradiction inapplicable will then be to then deem the law of identity inapplicable; for, if the LNC is violated, then so too is the law of identity. ... Unless one engages in dialetheism.

BTW, a belief that A which is held with a probability of .90 is not contradicted by a belief that ~A held with a probability of .10. Each proposition entails the other, for they address the same thing. The LNC however does affirm that it is not possible to hold a belief that A with .90 probability while at the same time holding a belief that A with .10 probability.

↪Srap Tasmaner
Whitman is a poet, not an rational arguer, and in any case would you say he does actually contradict himself there? — Janus

In case anyone’s interested, in the name of philosophical accuracy, the law of non-contradiction states that A and ~A cannot both be at the same time and in the same respect. If both A and ~A are at different times or at the same time but in different respects, then the law of non-contradiction is not broken or violated.

Whitman’s contradictions do not (or at the very least cannot be proven to be of the type that would) violate the law of non-contradiction. Just as saying “Yes and no (i.e., not yes)” or “they’re the same but different (i.e., not the same)” doesn’t violate this law, since all such non-technical contradictions implicitly affirm either that A and ~A occur at different times or that A and ~A simultaneously occur in different respects.

Apropos, the law of non-contradiction as intended by Aristotle can well be interpreted as applying to everything, and not just thoughts and propositions and percepts: at the very least, all macroscopic objective objects abide by it. (And, if we wouldn't take this for granted, I imagine we'd be direly grateful for such a world, here including our own body parts.) On the other hand, if it weren’t for this law, or universal principle, then there’d be no biggie to comprehending particle-wave duality in QM. But no one can intuit that X is both a particle and not a particle at the same time and in the same way. Hence the incomprehensibility of much of QM as its currently interpreted.

The collection {things I like} is made up of anything I deem to be a member of it. It's nothing more than those things, it's not those things + the collection of those things. The collection {my body} is similarly made up of those components I deem to be part of it. It's not a thing in addition to that collection. — Isaac

Someone with alien hand syndrome might not deem his hand (or other body part) to be an aspect of himself. For this and other reasons, I still find you explanation of what the "I" references to be uninformative.

The point is that you are conflating the already given with the constructed. — Isaac

Experience, including that which is empirical, is directly present to conscious awareness. That experience can be constructed can only be inferential. Inferred from experiential evidence. But, as is already known, we don't share a common outlook.

We tell ourselves a story about the causes of what just happened based primarily on interocepted states. Sometimes a story involving 'willing' will be most useful. Other times a story involving 'involuntary' will. Both are constructions, when looked at at this level of analysis. — Isaac

Thank you for the explanation. I myself don't find it convincing. While it might work well enough on a philosophy forum, such outlook would likely be quickly deleterious in many a real-life context. And it does not explain many a medical condition, such as that of alien hand syndrome. But again, we hold different outlooks.

As was addressing, that no one can empirically observe the mind's eye so far seems to be well enough substantiated. If anyone believes they've come upon evidence to the contrary, I'll likely take a look. Otherwise, due to time constraints, I'll at this point likely be leaving the debate in others' hands.

Why? I'm not seeing any incoherence. — Isaac

There's a few aspects, but I'll start with this:

'I' refers to me, my body, whatever I deem to be part of that unit. — Isaac

This statement claims that "I" refers to both a body and to a unit of that body, this at the same time and in the same respect - thereby making a whole equivalent to a part of that whole. If you uphold this logical contradiction, it is incoherent. If you don't than your quoted statement is erroneous or, at best, very misleading; in which case, please clarify it.

As I said to you (part of the "word-salad" you decided was beyond you to understand), you are not here dealing with your experiences. The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your mind works is not direct evidence. — Isaac

As to the first sentence, it reads as though making the claim that I have no experiences which I can then address. Which is sheer fallacy. I do have experiences, and it is these that I'm addressing. As to the second sentence, it is equivocating the way my total mind works with the way my conscious experience works. Where it to instead read, "The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your conscious experience unfolds is not direct evidence" it would be nonsensical.

No I take 'willing' to be a post hoc construction of the working memory after the event of imagining the table. — Isaac

OK. Interesting hypothesis. How then do you distinguish behaviors - such as that of imagining a table - that are voluntary (which means consciously willed) from those that are involuntary (which means not consciously willed).

Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table. — Isaac

Different in this respect:

the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra

To which you've already replied:

Yes. — Isaac

I asked so as to confirm that this same understanding is there in your proposed expression of, "Things I imagine," but it doesn't appear to be.

So you deem the "I" addressed to be identical to you as body. And yet, the imagined table is only an aspect of your bodily processes, specifically of certain aspects of your CNS - the very same CNS from which this "I" results (at least as its typically understood; such that the I is one of many functioning process of the body - along with a multitude of unconscious processes of mind - but is not the body itself). But then in deeming this "I" identical to you as body there is grave incoherence in terms of what is being referenced in the expression, "Things I imagine".

Given this incoherence, again, in which way then do you deem what you refer to as "I" to be in any way different from the imagined table? (To emphasize: Both are functions of your body, which according to you is equivalent to the you which can imagine tables and the like. But then, again, how would this "I" be in any way different from the table it imagines?)

Clarification would be useful to further discussions.

one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra

I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps — Isaac

OK, so when one intends to imagine a table, you take it that one consciously holds awareness of all the table's imagined properties instantaneously to so intending, aka willing. My experiences affirm that when I want to imagine a table and proceed to do so, my unconsciousness fills in a lot of blanks so as to form a coherent image (also called "picture" in common English usage) of the table - such that my willing to imagine precedes the visual representation which I then apprehend as an imagined given, or thing. It's also not hard for me to suppose that one could want to imagine X but be unable to form a mental image of X. Worse things can happen in psychological processes. But, maybe, all this doesn't matter too much to the discussion.

I'll check in latter on, probably sometime tomorrow.

'Things I imagine' — Isaac

Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines?

If so, how is this "I" aware of what it willfully imagines?

(In philosophical speculations, one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed; the two processes - that of willing X and that of having visual awareness of X - are not logically entailed, as far as I can currently discern. But we could debate this if you'd like.)

The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture. — Isaac

So far your reply doesn't make sense to me. Maybe you could help me make sense of it.

When I engage in the process of imagination I can imagine various things - granted, this as thought I were looking at them (maybe this is a personal quirk though). But, importantly here, the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other?

And no, the conversation is not over. — Isaac

OK. I'd like an answer to the following so as to gauge were we currently stand:

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal? — javra

If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look. — wonderer1

I'm quite familiar with such articles - and fully acknowledge their worth. You however appear to not have understood what I expressed.

Hm, because taking text out of context is supposed to be ... ?

As far as this conversation being over, as you wish.

My apologies, but for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory. We appear to disagree on the referents which words address - this if we even agree that the words expressed, such that of "a mind's eye", reference anything at all. You, for example, maybe for this reason have not replied to the questions I've asked.

If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration. — wonderer1

Firstly, I/we don't visually experience that which we imagine via our physiological eyes (e.g., one can so imagine just fine if not better with both eyes closed).

Secondly, as I previously commented in my last post: because we are here strictly addressing first-person awareness, the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced (this by first-person awareness).

And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac

Where did I claim it isn't?

I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra

One does not 'see' percepts though. A percept is the result of seeing, you don't then 'see' it, otherwise what results form that process? Another percept? A percept of a percept? — Isaac

I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully.

I'm struggling to think of an example where I obtain knowledge directly from my senses without any inference. Perhaps you could provide one? — Isaac

I already have: knowledge of the keyboard I am typing on. Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be)

Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra

What difference would that make, even if I were to agree? — Isaac

Example: To infer X from empirically observed A, B, and C is not to empirically observe X.

The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye

Its not a made up term.

You're trying to establish it's a real thing (but not material), I'm trying to establish the opposite (not real, but if it were anything it would be in the brain). — Isaac

You're again bringing metaphysics into this. I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience.

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal?

we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra

We're not. You've declared the mind's eye to be the sort of thing that cannot be empirically observed. That's not a discussion it's a lecture. — Isaac

No. It is, again, a falsifiable proposition which - because I both believe it to be true and to be sufficiently justified - I then assert as a (fallible) knowledge claim. As per the initial post to which you responded with illustration of the brain, this proposition remains substantiated till falsified.

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra

No, you don't. You see several perspectives, you see aspects of the table that are behind and shaded, aspects that are out of focus, or moving. Part of the process of 'seeing' involves inferring these details. — Isaac

Those aren't different points of views - aka perspectives - but different aspects of what is seen from a singular point of view (i.e., perspective). And, again, they are not conscious inferences. We are not here addressing the unconscious mind but only the conscious mind - this since we are addressing the first-person awareness of an imagined table.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra

What? You say it's singular, so therefore you know it's singular? That doesn't make any sense, and I know it doesn't make any sense because I just said it doesn't — Isaac

You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience.

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra

Of course you aren't. There's no such thing. A 'cognitive perspective' can't 'see' anything — Isaac

I'll reword this if it helps: a cognitive first-person point of view (in contrast to, for one example, a camera's point of view) - to be clear, this where "cognitive" addresses all conscious aspects of an intellect, as in "cognitive science". Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything?

[Edit: given that there are unconscious agencies of one’s mind capable of perceiving that which one consciously doesn’t (e.g., such as is inferred to occur in subliminal processing of stimuli), these unconscious agencies can easily be further inferred to hold unconscious first-person awareness of stimuli. Hence, for clarity, from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is – as expressed in the above paragraph – here meant to strictly address one’s own conscious faculties of mind). Yes, language can sometimes be unclear in expressing that which one intends to convey by it’s use. Still, hopefully this will better clarify the above paragraph.]

I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra

Yes, and we're all waiting for an actual argument to back up that claim that isn't self-referential. — Isaac

You have this backwards. The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) and reasoning (such as that provided in my last post regarding constituent parts and the whole which you have so far not addressed).

Can you think of any knowledge you have at all that isn't inferred from evidence? — Isaac

Certainly. That I am right now looking at the keyboard I'm typing on is knowledge that is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. For instance, I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. And other such examples of non-inferential knowledge could be provided.

Why is being inferred from evidence suddenly being treated with such suspicion? — Isaac

Our empirical precepts are not conscious inferences. Inferences are one aspect of reasoning-based knowledge (deduction, etc.). On the other hand, empirical data - i.e., data obtained via the physiological senses - are one aspect of experience-based knowledge (the experience of one's own confidence being non-empirical in the modern sense of the term). Yes, the two are intimately intertwined. But they are nevertheless utterly different.

It's not about suspicion for inferences. Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers.

If you think the images I've shown you are not 'the mind's eye' then you'll have to come up with a better counter argument than "that's not what I was expecting it to look like" — Isaac

This illustrates your utter misconception of my position; simply: one cannot see the minds eye because it has no look whatsoever. See below.

your proposition attempts to rule our physicalist/naturalist interpretations. It doesn't merely rule-in dualism. We're not here arguing if dualism is a possible way to think about consciousness. You're arguing that physicalism isn't. To make that you have to show that this view is incoherent, not that it doesn't match the way you like to think about things. — Isaac

This, again, is completely mistaken. I made no metaphysical claims. We are not discussing metaphysics here. Instead, we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. A mere epistemological claim as to what is the fact of the matter.

Your counter regarding p-zombies to me misses the logical implications by focusing on ontological commitments. Nevertheless, I fully grant that the issue can easily become confusing. So, I’ll offer a different, but much less concise, way of addressing why I’m not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations:

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). This, to me, is an experiential fact of the matter. To clarify, I know this to be the case experimentally in non-inferential manners; and - as with my visual percept of the keyboard I am now typing on - this experiential knowledge is steadfast. I'm not claiming this knowledge is infallible, but I am claiming that I can be in no way uncertain about this experiential knowledge regardless of inference I might entertain or be informed about - this on account of it being precisely what I experience.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. Whether it’s a singular entity, process, both, or neither is here fully irrelevant to the actuality of the experience (and could only be an inference extrapolated from the experience's occurrence).

In contrast, the illustrations you've presented all depict multiple brain processes that are located in different portions of one brain (over a dozen different locations in each illustration last I looked). We can of course infer that these visualized brain processes depict aspects of the physiological brain which in whole constitute that process of me seeing an imagined table. Nevertheless:

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination via its non-physiological sight (by which I simply mean, sight which does not occur via the use of one's physiological sensory organs). Of course the person whose brain is illustrated likely imagined something different, but I'm addressing a table to keep things simple.

Just as strictly observing the empirical constituents of a rock cannot be equivalent to seeing the rock itself, so too with brain and awareness: to empirically observe the brain processes on which first-person awareness is dependent cannot be equivalent to empirically observing first-person awareness itself. The multiple constituents of a whole are not equivalent to the singular whole which is addressed.

In other words, I am not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations. At best, all I am seeing is a multiplicity of certain disparate constituent aspects of it.

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Again, I'm not claiming that the mind's eye has a certain look that hasn't yet been evidenced. I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle.