What do you mean by an 'ontological context'? What am I not realizing?

ONce more, I stress that you and others blankly stating that something is false does not constitute counter-evidence. You're not gods - thank god - and so what you think doesn't determine what's true. You need to address a premise and show how its negation is implied by premises that are more powerfully self-evident than mine.

We've all, in various guises, been told we don't understand the terminology, the opinion of other moral philosophers, or sometimes even just logic itself. On no occasion have you provided a shred of evidence to support your assertion that you have the 'right' interpretation in these disputed cases, and you've repeatedly failed to respond substantively to any of my counter-arguments (the moral realism of your premise, the epistemic peer argument with regards to disputed reasoning, the selective use of appeals to authority) and yet here you are talking about my approach instead. Hardly leading by example in the "address the argument not the person" stakes are you? — Isaac

Yes, that is my position and I think it is well supported.

I keep telling you that I am a moral realist. I am unclear how you think you're making a 'counter-argument' by pointing out that I am a moral realist. And you confused believing that moral values are categorical with being a moral realist. So I think I have excellent evidence that you don't now what you're talking about.

As for evidence in support of my position - well, here it is again:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me, but someone else entirely
7. If moral values are made of your valuings, then if you value something necessarily it will be morally valuable
8. If you value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
9. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me, and not you, but someone else entirely.

Now, note that at no point in that argument have I expressed the truth of moral realism. The above argument simply demonstrates what it would take for moral value to be a reality. It does not say that it is.

But I did say that moral values exist - I am a moral realist - and that it follows from this that the subject in question exists.

For convenience then:

10. If some things are morally valuable, then the subject described in 9 exists
11. Some things are morally valuable.
12 Therefore the subject described in 9 exists.

So, there exists a subject - a person, a mind, a subject-of-experience - whose values constitute moral values. He/she is not me, not you, but he/she exists.

Now, the argument is valid whether you like it or not. And so you must deny a premise - but note, simply denying one does not constitute a refutation. I know many of you think that if you think something it must be true. But that isn't actually true. And so just thinking that one of my premises is false is not sufficient to show it to be. You need to argue that one is false, or even that a reasonable doubt can be had about one, by showing how its negation is implied by premises more prima facie plausible than mine.

None of you have done that, or even seriously attempted to, so far as I can tell.

The argument is more interesting than me.

"What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?" — Terrapin Station

I don't understand the question

To be valuing something is to be adopting some kind of positive attitude towards it.

So, when you say "ice cream is good' that is not a value, that is a judgement. You are judging that ice cream has value. Either that it is valuable to you, or that it has moral value.

To be valuing ice cream is to be adopting a pro-attitude towards it. It may be more complex than that, but it is that whatever else it is.

Perhaps it will help to imagine someone who believes nothing is right or wrong, good or bad. Well, that person can and will still value things. They do not believe in morality - so they do not make any moral judgements (or don't if they are consistent and sincere). But they may still value ice cream.

What moral values are is what the argument tells you. We know that some things are morally valuable, for our reason - and the reason of most others - says so. And even if we disagree about which particular things are the morally valuable ones, we agree that some things are morally valuable.

What is moral value, though? We don't just stipulate, we investigate.

Are moral values my values? I mean, I know I value things. I am a valuer, among other things. Valuing is something I do. But are moral values my valuings? That is, is something - anything - morally valuable just if it becomes the object of one of my pro-attitudes? Any of my pro-attitudes?

No and no. That is clear to my reason and clear to yours too, surely?

So premise 2 - the one that says "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable" - is self-evidently true.

Premise 1 simply expresses a conceptual truth that cannot be denied, namely that if moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

The conclusion that follows from these is that moral values and my values are not synonymous.

But as I know that moral values must be the valuings of someone - for how can something be valuable if it is not the object of a valuing attitude? - then I can conclude that moral values, though not constituted by my values, are nevertheless constituted by someone's values.

I am not sure I understand your question. None of our values - that is no valuing of ours, no valuing activity that we may be engaged in - are moral values. That's what the argument established. What we sometimes call 'a person's moral values' are just what we think that person takes to be morally valuable.

I think you are an arrogant one, I really do. But to be honest i couldn't care less what you think of me - as should be obvious - and i am surprised you, like others, keep feeling the need to tell me. I am just trying to listen to reason not strike a pose. So again, address my argument not me.

You're just ignorant and don't understand the difference between moral realism and the claim that moral norms are categorical. — Bartricks
How do you know this? I've asked you several times now to justify your claims of intellectual superiority, — Isaac

Ah, because I said that most moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical and you sought to refute me by, bizzarely, providing me with data showing that most moral philosophers are moral realists. That, to my mind, demonstrated that you did not know the difference between believing that moral values and norms are categorical and being a moral realist. For you seemed to think that the fact only slightly more than 50% of contemporary moral philosophers are moral realists demonstrated that it was false of me to say that the overwhelming majority of moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical.

I am a moral realist, yes. That, I think, has never seriously been in doubt. Your point?

For I said that most moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical. I did not say that most moral philosophers are moral realists (although they are that too - even the contemporary ones).

I have to be honest, I was initially impressed by all those symbols and I thought I was done and dusted, for they were all Greek to me. And so I replied as best I could, fearing that I would face a tirade of more symbols. Perhaps I still will, though I warn you in advance that I don't understand them at all. Not even a tiny bit. But what of the argument? You are clearly more educated than me in these matters. But isn't it true that if gold and water are the same, then if I have some gold necessarily I have some water? And so isn't it also true that if moral values and my values are the same, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable? And isn't it also true that if I actually have some gold I do not necessarily have some water? And isn't it also true that if I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable? And isn't it true that I can validly conclude on that basis that therefore water and gold are not the same, and that my values and moral values are not the same? That seems true when expressed in English, but is it true when expressed in the strange symbol language you were using earlier?

No, those aren't beliefs. You can call them beliefs, but that won't make them beliefs. Beliefs have to be believed. And only minds - subjects of experience - can believe things.

For example, imagine that your dog wags its tail and knocks a bottle of ink all over a piece of paper and, by pure chance, the ink streaks form a pattern that says "it is sunday". Is that a belief? No. Is that even an expression of a belief? No. It is an 'apparent' expression of a belief, not the real thing.

I think anyone who denies that has lost their reason. I mean, whose belief would it be? that paper's? The dog's tail?

Nobody, apart from someone in the grips of a theory, would think that the lucky pattern expressed a belief.

So your view is plain and simply false.

I am not playing (you are, as ever, extremely bad at drawing conclusions). But as you are, I am not responding to you any more. And as you've given me your assessment of me, irrelevantly, let me say - equally irrelevantly - that I think the 'J' in your name is surplus to requirements.

Something is made morally valuable by her valuing it, for what it is for something to be valuable is for her to be valuing it. Crickey.

She knows more than other sentient beings because she knows more than them - indeed, she is the source of all knowledge given that to have knowledge is to have a belief that she endorses

Ah, sorry - that was a typo on my part. The first premise, using your ice cream example, would be this:

1. If my values are moral values, then if I value eating ice cream then necessarily it is morally valuable for me to eat ice cream.

That one is clearly true.

I have answered your question. A question I have answered numerous times before and that you could have read the argument and seen the answer to.

Reason, the source of moral values, the valuer whose valuings constitute moral values is a subject of experiences, a.k.a. an experiencer.

I think by this time even my cat - ignorant fool that she is - has understood me. My cat, who spends most of her date licking her own anus - she, now, understands me. She too, incidentally, is a subject of experiences. Her values - which are sick - are not moral values. But she's a subject of experiences. As am I. As are you. As is the one whose values are moral values.

Are you saying that Reason is a sentient, sapient being? — Janus

Sentient - yes. Sapient - no. She could be - but no, I don't think she is, because I think this argument is going to be sound no matter which human it names:

1. If moral values are made of Bartrick's valuings, then if Bartricks values something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If Bartricks values something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. .Therefore, moral values are not make of Bartrick's valuings.

I have answered numerous times.

So, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? — Janus

Yes.

You: what do you mean by 'yes'. Do you mean 'turnip'? Answer my fucking question!!!.

Me: no, I mean 'yes'.

You: I don't see how you could mean anything other than turnip. Do you mean turnip? Answer my fucking question and don't be rude to me, you fucking fuckstick. Why are you so rude to me.

Me: I did answer. I said 'no, I mean yes'.

You: you mean no means yes - you total fuckstain What does that even mean!!! Grrr. I am so righteously indignant.

Again, you are saying that Reason is a subject and hence in light of the above we can conclude that for you Reason must be a subject that experiences? "LIke me. Like you" — Janus

Yes.

You: Answer the fucking question.

Yes.

The answer to your question is 'yes'. Y. E. S. Yessy yessy yes yes.

I don't know what you mean by an 'objective belief'. I am not following you.

I have defined 'subjective' as meaning 'made of a subject's mental states'. All beliefs are going to be subjective according to this definition, because beliefs are always the beliefs of some subject or other.

But anyway, my argument is not about beliefs. It is about moral values. And I am arguing that moral values are subjective because moral values must be a subject's values, as only a subject can value something. But as moral values are clearly not made of my values - my mental states - (for I cannot make something morally valuable just by valuing it - I mean, sometimes that may make something morally valuable but it won't necessarily do so) , or yours (for I take it you'd agree that the same holds true for you), then moral values must be the values of some other subject.

Some seem to think I need to say more about this subject, but I don't - the above reasoning, so far as I can tell, establishes that moral values are the values of a subject.

I do not see how what you're saying challenges this conclusion.

No, I can't do that. Not sophisticated enough - sorry.

If water and gold are one and the same, then if I have some gold I necessarily have some water, do I not?

And yet if I have some gold, I do not necessarily have any water, do I? (I may have some water as well, but I won't have water just in virtue of having some gold)

And so I can now conclude that water and gold are not one and the same.

If moral values and my values are one and the same, then if I value X, X is necessarily morally valuable. I mean, how could it not be if my values and moral values are one and the same?

And yet if I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable. It may be morally valuable too. But it won't be morally valuable just in virtue of the fact I am valuing it.

And so I can now conclude that moral values and my values are not one and the same.

But you're not challenging anything I've argued.

I know more than you do about how value works. See my argument for details (although take a course in logic first or it won't make sense)

I think it is quite clear what I am arguing here - i am defending, indeed demonstrating, that subjectivism about moral values is true. How far the subjectivity should extend is another matter and far from clarifying it wounder distract. Of course most of those who are taking issue with me would, I am quite sure, prefer it if I argued differently - that is, fallaciously - or just contented them with labels. The tribal tendencies of those who eschew reason being strong and well represented here.

Buddy Rich.

i'm not. Dingo Jones is. I am cool as a cucumber. I just think most people couldn't care less where an argument leads if it leads to a view they don't like and I think those people need to be "taken outside and shown how it is", to quote bundy rich.
But anyway, it's the argument that is important not the arguer. And it's a good argument

are you seriously saying I haven't presented arguments? Blimey - do you even know what one is? I have presented arguments - good ones. Sound ones. The problem is that none of you can say anything that challenges them and that makes you all cwoss.

of course it matters. Nothing incoherent about my premises.

Some typos there due to my phone presumpively but wrongly predicting my words

I assume your working definition of a troll is 'someone I don't agree with or understand yet who argues in accordance with the canons of reason and who does mean but very accurate parodies of my questions so as to reveal their confused and tortorous nature'

well you're not coping well are you. Go write my name on a pillow or something and hit it a few times and then see if you can raise a reasonable objection to my argument rather than swear and stomp.

yes, the subject - the one whose values are moral values - is an experiencer. A subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. And what - what - is your objection?

And what problem is the euthyphro raising for me? The original does not address my view. So you have to tailor it to address my view. And then all I am going to say is "something is valuable because reason values it" and wait to hear why that's something I shouldn't say.

Here's a quote from Bertrand Russell that I quite like - it's about why we shouldn't trust Xenephon's version of Socrates' Apology.

"“A stupid man's report of what a clever man says can never be accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand.”

I have told you what a subject is. But you insist you don't know and that I haven't told you.

I have told you that the arguments I have made are deductively valid. But you don't seem to realise this and don't seem to realize that this means you have to deny a premise.

I have told you that my argument does not conclude with 'God'. Yet you insist that the subject has to be God.

And so on and so on.

And don't start talking to me about the Euthyphro dialogue. You haven't read it, have you? I think I'm the only one here who actually has.

What you've done is done some googling on it and read some bonkers Wikipedia page or whatever - something written either by you or someone else on here.

Okay for the umpteenth time - the subject is....wait for it......a subject. A subject of experiences. You know, what you are. What I am. Like, the most familiar thing in the world.

One of those. A person. A someone. A subject of consciousness. Someone it is something like to be. And so on.

And what's interesting about them - the one described in the conclusion of my argument - what marks them out as distinct from you and I, is not their subjectivity, but the fact their values constitute moral values and their prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions.

I don't think you're going to get this at this point if you haven't already. You're locked into your own view and unless I express your incoherent view you're not going to understand mine.

No, you just don't know what you think you know.

You can be a moral realist and deny the categoricity of moral norms and values.

You can be a moral nihilist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms (most do, in fact)

You can be a moral realist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms.

You're just ignorant and don't understand the difference between moral realism and the claim that moral norms are categorical.

And as for empirical data - go and read some moral philosophers writing about morality.

IN other words, I refer you to moral philosophy.

You're confusing the expression of a belief with the belief itself.

If I write on a piece of paper that "I believe it is Sunday" I have not created a belief made of paper.

Read my definition - the one operative here. Beliefs are subjective, becusae beliefs are mental states and mental states are states of a subject.

Again, you're not addressing anything I've argued. I don't deny the existence of beliefs, or that knowledge involves having justified ones (though, like I say, I think I would deny that). Indeed, 'justifications' are what you have if - and only if - Reason, the subject whose values constitute moral values, endorses what you believe.

But, like I say, I don't see how what you're saying is connecting with anything I am saying.

You haven't read Joyce. Or you read him in Albanian or something.

Joyce believes that it is the mark of a moral imperative that it is categorical. Like Kant. And like, you know, the vast bulk of moral philosophers, now and throughout history. And like, well, most who have a moral sensibility.

I agree. But Joyce is not a moral realist becusae he thinks that categorical reasons - that is, categorical imperatives of reason - either don't, or can't exist (it isn't clear which of those views he holds).

I am a moral realist.

Anyway, this is tedious as the issue is not what this or that philosopher thinks about this or that, the issue is whether moral imperatives actually are categorical. And they are. And if they are, then that demonstrates that they are not imperatives that we are issuing to ourselves and others. And likewise for moral values.

I mean, that's by no means the only way to show this, it is just the way I have been adopting given there is such widespread agreement on the categoricity of moral values and norms.

How on earth can you think that?? Missed completely. I mean, hurled the hammer through the window.

Er, no I haven't. The original argument refers to any of your valuings. If it works with any of your valuings, then it is also going to work with a subset of them - yes?

Staring with #1, I value eating ice cream (in moderation) - but I think we would all agree that eating ice cream is not morally valuable. What am I missing here? — EricH

That's not the first premise. The first premise expresses the thesis of individual subjectivism.

So, using your ice cream example, the first premise would say

1. If I value eating ice cream, then necessarily eating ice cream is morally valuable

the second premise then asserts something that is self-evidently true to the reason of most people:

2. If I value eating ice cream, then eating ice cream is not necessarily morally valuable

It might be morally valuable - we can no doubt dream up circumstances under which it would be - but it is not 'necessarily' morally valuable (yet it would be if moral value was made of your valuings).

the conclusion then follows as a matter of logic. Just as most people can see, with their reason, that 2 is true, they can see as well that this argument form is valid:

1. if P then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

the argument therefore establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that moral value is not composed of your valuings.

Perhaps that is already obvious to you - it is to me - but it is not to some people and they need to be shown it in no uncertain terms (normally, in my experience, about 7 times before it sinks in).