I don't know where you are trying to go with any of this. — Fooloso4

You said "We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain."

How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour?

Do you acknowledge that your numbered sections 2 and 5 contradict each other? — Luke

2) PI 246 Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

We both agree that 2) is the interlocutor

You believe that 5) is Wittgenstein. I am unsure.

As I wrote in my last post:

If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's

I don't understand what you mean by "a private language, ie. "myself"". — Luke

I agree when you say: "Wittgenstein repeatedly attacks the idea that a private language is possible"

I agree when you say "He (Wittgenstein) says "It can't be said of me at all.........that I know I am in pain" It is senseless to say "I know I am in pain""

Wittgenstein agrees in PI 304 that we can have private inchoate feelings, ie, sensations, but argues that no one else can ever know what these private feelings are. He is not just saying that a private language understood only by the speaker is impossible, but that the very existence of a private language is impossible. These private inchoate feelings can only be given form within a community of other minds using a language game, thereby breaking the problem of solipsism. Within the language game, when I say "I am in pain", I am not taking about my private personal experience, but rather talking about the concept of pain that exists in the minds of the community of which I am part.

In a private language, to say "I am in pain" requires no justification, other than "I know I am in pain because I am in pain", in which event the word "know" has no function.

However, in the language game, to say "I am in pain" does require a justification. For example, "I know I am in pain because I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress". In the language game, the word "know" does have a definite function.

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain".

But the only situation where to say "I know I am in pain" requires no justification is in a private language, but as Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the possibility of a private language, 5) cannot be Wittgenstein's position but that of an interlocutor.

We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein discusses pain-behaviour in PI 244, 282, 302, 304 and 393.

How can the word "pain" refer to a sensation pain.

We know a rock is not in pain because it expresses no pain behaviour, whereas we know a living human being can be in pain because it expresses pain-behaviour. Yet how do we know that a rock, even though not expressing pain-behaviour, is actually in pain, and how do we know that a child, expressing pain-behaviour, is not actually in pain. Does an actor on the stage need the private sensation of fear and loathing to be able to express the sensations of fear and loathing.

What is the function of language and words such as "pain". Perhaps not to convey thoughts about things such as houses, pains, good and evil, but rather, taking the case of pain, as a replacement for pain-behaviour, where the word "pain" replaces the pain-behaviour of crying rather than describing any unknown cause of the pain-behaviour.

How do you know someone is in pain, when all you know is pain-behaviour. When you say that you know someone is in pain, isn't all you saying that you know that they are expressing pain-behaviour. The word "pain" in the language game is replacing the observed pain-behaviour rather than describing an unknown something.

Is this not the same situation as for the direct Realist, who would say that if one observes something green in colour, then in the world is also something green in colour. The Direct Realist conflates effect with cause, equating what has been observed with an unknown cause of that observation. The Direct Realist would equate pain-behaviour, replaced in the language game by the word "pain", with the unknown something that is assumed to have caused such pain-behaviour, whether a beetle or a pain.

As Wittgenstein says, the beetle in the box is not a something but it is not a nothing either, meaning that even though everyone's beetle may be different, it is not a nothing.

As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. — Fooloso4

As the pain you are referring to cannot be the beetle in the box, as the something in the box drops out of consideration in the language game, the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language.

PI 293 - If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. — Fooloso4

Yes, if the something is "the distance from the Earth to the Moon", then this is something that I may know or may not know.

If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain. — Fooloso4

"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game, and there is no guarantee that I am using all my words correctly. For example, within the language game it makes sense to say "I do not know if I am in pain" if this means "I do not not know if I am in pain, it may be extreme soreness or just discomfort"

It makes sense to say in the language game "I do not know if I am in pain" if there is any doubt about my understanding of the word "pain".

It is more likely that the second sentence is not the interlocutor's...5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — Luke

It seems to me that there can be no definitive reading of Wittgenstein because of inherent ambiguities with his text

I am partly repeating myself, but I think PI 246 does illustrate why many people dislike Wittgenstein, mainly because of the ambiguities in the text. PI 246 does illustrate that there cannot be one definitive reading of Wittgenstein, although his text is invaluable as a foundation for one's own ideas. Reading in context cannot solve the problem, only exacerbate the problem by increasing the number of ambiguities.

1) In what sense are my sensations private?

Ignoring the given text, what would be a sensible topic? For example, I have private sensations such as pain and hunger, and the question is, can anyone else ever know my private sensations. On the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 1) is Wittgenstein.

2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
3) In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.

Ignoring which is the interlocutor and which is Wittgenstein, what do we already know from our personal experience. We know that it is common in everyday conversation to say "I know you are in pain over the death of your relative" rather than the less personal "I surmise you are in pain over the death of your relative". Therefore, 3) agrees with what we already know regardless of the given text. If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

It is not immediately obvious whether Wittgenstein is referring to 2) or 3).

If he is referring to 2), then he would be saying "Only I know that I am pain, whilst others surmise it with less certainty than I know it myself ". But this clearly does not make sense as a sentence. Therefore 4) cannot be referring to 2).

Therefore he must be referring to 3). What he is saying in everyday language is that I can say "I know I am in pain" and someone else can say of me "I know he is in pain", but I know I am in pain with certainty and they know I am in pain with less certainty. IE, in everyday language, in the language game, the word know can be used to imply certainty, such as "I know it is raining", or to imply some uncertainty, such as "I know it will rain".

As 4) is a sensible thing to say, and assuming that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 4) is Wittgenstein.

5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Ignoring the text, what would be a sensible topic? As regards my private language, the word "know" in the phrase "I know I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose, and therefore would only make sense if said as a joke. As regards the language game, to say "I know I am in pain" would make sense, and therefore wouldn't be considered as being used as a joke.

Therefore if 5) refers to a private language, then it would be a sensible thing to say, and assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, then 5) would be Wittgenstein. But if 5) refers to the language game, then it wouldn't be a sensible thing to say, and assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, then 5) would be the interlocutor

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's

6) Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

Ignoring the text, in everyday conversation it would be a sensible thing to say that if someone saw my crying, and had never experienced pain themselves, then they couldn't learn the sensation of pain just from observing someone else's pain-behaviour. On the other hand, if I feel a pain and then cry, I am not learning the sensation of pain from my crying.

Assuming Wittgenstein to be a sensible person, as 6) is a sensible thing to say, 6) must be Wittgenstein.

7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

Ignoring the given text, as regards my private language, as with the word "know", the word "doubt" in the phrase "I doubt that I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose. If I am in pain, there is no doubt in my mind that I am in pain. However in the language game, as another person can only judge my private sensations from my outward pain-behaviour, it makes sense that they should doubt whether I am in pain or not.

The problem within 7) is that Wittgenstein seems to be mixing up references on the one hand to a private language, ie, "myself", and on the other hand to other people and the language game, ie "other people".

Overall however, accepting that Wittgenstein is mixing up his references, 7) seems to be Wittgenstein.

How can Wittgenstein in PI 246 use examples from a private language whilst arguing that private languages are unintelligible?

My problem with PI 246 is that part refers to a private language and part refers to a public language game, yet in PI 244 to 271 Wittgenstein attacks the idea of any private language as unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener.

For example, item 7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

The phrase "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain"
makes sense within a language game, involving not only me but other people.

But the phrase "but not to say it about myself" initially seems to be within a private language, but as Wittgenstein says that private languages are unintelligible, this infers that even to say "I am in pain" is within the language game.

Then if all our talk about our own pain is within the language game, then it is more than acceptable to say "I know I am in pain".

Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"? — Fooloso4

In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". Adding the word "know" would be redundant.

However Wittgenstein in PI 244 to 271 attacks the idea of any private language. He argued that any such private language would be unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener.

Wittgenstein in PI 293 uses the beetle in the box analogy to show that words such as "pain" in the language game are disconnected from whatever unknown thing there is in the mind of the individual, whether a sensation of pain or anything else, as such an unknown thing has no place in the language game at all.

Therefore in the language game of everyday conversation, it does make sense to say "I don't know if I'm answering the question", "I don't know if I'm in Nevada" or "I don't know if I'm correct".

It also depends on how the word accurately describes one's sensations, such as "I don't know if I'm in pain or just discomfort", "I don't know if I'm in pain or emotionally tormented", "I don't know if I'm in pain or extremely sore".

Or perhaps the speaker doesn't have a complete understanding of the meaning of the words, such as a speaker of a foreign language. Perhaps a Spaniard who doesn't know how to translate the word "dolor", or a German who wants the nearest equivalent to "schmerzen".

There are many occasions within the language game when it makes sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain".

Wittgenstein indicates that it does not make any sense to say "I know I am in pain". — Luke

Wittgenstein attacks the idea of a private language
Wittgenstein in PI 246 includes the idea that to say "I know I am in pain" may only be said as a joke:
PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

In which situation is Wittgenstein thinking about whereby to say "I know I am in pain" would be nonsense?

If I said either "I am in pain" or "I know I am in pain", either I am having a conversation with myself or a conversation with others.

If I am having a conversation with myself, the statement "I am in pain" is sufficient, as no justification is possible nor needed. Any justification would be self-referential, along the lines "I know I am in pain because I know I am pain". In this situation, when conversing with myself, to say "I know I am in pain" would be nonsense.

Referring to SEP Private Language, Wittgenstein in PI 244 to 271 attacks the idea of any private language, as any such private language would be unintelligible not only to the originator but also to any listener. Therefore the only situation where "I know I am in pain" may be said as a joke is in a private language, which Wittgenstein attacks as unintelligible.

One therefore concludes that the sentence in PI 246 has been spoken by the interlocutor, not Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's Language Game
However, if I am having a conversation with others, then to say "I know I am pain" is no longer nonsensical, but an accepted and reasonable normal part of language. It is normal to say "I know I am in Paris", "I know it is time to leave" or "I know governments are necessary".

As one can say in normal language both "I am in Paris" and "I know I am in Paris", it is surely acceptable to say both "I am in pain" and "I know I am in pain".

Within the language game, the word "pain" refers to a general concept contained within the language game rather than any particular sensation within a person.

In PI 293. Wittgenstein discusses a beetle in a box, where the beetle has no place in the language game at all and drops out of consideration as irrelevant. The particular private sensation of pain is the beetle in the box, and as such cannot be talked about. Within the language game the word "pain" is a concept, something general rather than particular, and refers to a general concept rather than a particular sensation .

"I am in Paris" is a belief. Whether true or not depends on whether one is in Paris.

"I know I am in Paris" is a belief that in order to be true needs to be followed by a justification that one is in Paris, such as "because I can see the Eiffel Tower".

"I am in pain" is a belief. Whether true or not depends on whether one is using the word "pain" correctly.

"I know I am in pain" is a belief that in order to be true needs to be followed by a justification that one is using the word "pain" correctly, such as "because others say they are in pain when in the same situation as I am"

The above are justified beliefs. Knowledge requires them to be true. What makes propositions such as "I know I am in Paris"or "I know I am in pain" true? They cannot be made true by facts in the world, such as I am truly in Paris or I am truly in pain, as within Wittgenstein's language game, the object, the beetle in the box, drops out of consideration and cannot be talked about.

Wittgenstein's Hinge Propositions
This takes us into On Certainty, notes on knowledge, doubt, scepticism and certainty.

Referring to Wikipedia Here is one Hand, the book's starting position is GE Moore's A Proof of the External World. Wittgenstein asks how Moore knows he is holding up a hand, as any knowledge claim can be doubted.

Moore argued against scepticism in favour of common sense by making the following argument: i) here is one hand, ii) and here is another, iii) there are at least two external objects in the world, iv) therefore, an external world exists.

Wittgenstein says that propositions such as "here is a hand" should not be thought of as empirical statements open to doubt, but rather as a "hinge proposition" that cannot be doubted. Hinge propositions are part of the framework of a logical language, on which other propositions are built. The proposition "here is a hand" is establishing how "hand" is to be used within a coherent language game, not making an empirical claim about the existence of a hand in the world.

Hinge propositions are the foundation of a language game, thereby creating a coherent whole that cannot be doubted. The truth of a proposition within the language game comes from such hinge propositions, not facts in the world, not whether or not I am truly in Paris or truly in pain.

Knowledge is justified true belief. Moore believes that the external world exists. He justifies his belief by pointing out that at least two objects exist in the world and founded on the hinge proposition that here is a hand that exists in the world. Moore can then say that "I know the world exists because here is a hand" rather than make the unjustified statement that "the world exists".

Wittgenstein in PI 244 writes about words as replacing rather than describing pain-behaviour
A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

Summary
Similarly, I believe that pain exists. I justify my belief by pointing out that I cry when suffering from pain and founded on the hinge proposition that one cries when suffering pain. I can then say that "I know I am in pain because I cry when suffering" rather than the unjustified "I am in pain".

Within Wittgenstein's Language Game, it makes sense to say "I know I am in pain".

I would consider "Yes, but all the same..." to be a reaction or response to Wittgenstein's unbolded remarks that immediately precede it, which I believe are made in a different voice — Luke

I'm not saying I'm necessarily right, but it does force one to be very careful when reading Wittgenstein.

My reading of PI 246, where Wittgenstein is unbolded and the interlocutor is bolded

1) In what sense are my sensations private?
2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
3) In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.
4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I
5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
6) Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
7) The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

I agree that 2) is the interlocutor and 3) is Wittgenstein. I agree that 4) is a disagreement with what came before it. However, both 2) and 3) came before it.

Reading whereby 4) disagrees with 2) rather than 3)
Then 3) is also Wittgenstein, where he is saying that the idea that another person can only surmise that I am pain is wrong. In fact, they don't surmise it but know it, although with less certainty than myself. This agrees with the normal use of the word "to know", when we say "I know you are suffering at the moment", accepting that one cannot know another person's suffering with the intensity that one knows one's own.

This all hangs on your assumption that he is linking certainty with knowing in PI 246. — Luke

Whether Wittgenstein is linking certainty with knowing depends on whether 4) is that of the interlocutor or Wittgenstein.

If my reading is correct, then Wittgenstein is linking certainty with knowing.

A lot to think about.

It's unclear what distinction you think there should be between sensation and concept, or how you think this distinction would help — Luke

A "cube" is an example of a concept. Wittgenstein is saying that we know and understand the word "cube" not from the sensation of seeing a picture of it but rather from how the word is used.
PI 139 When someone says the word "cube" to me, for example, I know what it means.

Wittgenstein is asking how we know the role of the King in a game of chess. In broader terms, how do we know the rules of the language-game. He says that it is not by definition, which leads to the problem of circularity, but rather from observing how other people use the King when playing chess. We learn concepts from how the concept is used over a period of time, rather than from any momentary definition or particular sensation.
PI 31In this case we shall say: the words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is, if he has already played other games, or has watched other people playing 'and understood'—and similar things.

For Wittgenstein, sensations are particular and immediate events, such as a smell, a touch, a pain.
PI 24 Think how many different kinds of thing are called "description": description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood.

There are two aspects to the word "pain". The general universal concept, as with any concept, such as house, love, government, trees and the particular momentary sensation, such as a biting pain, an acrid smell, a bitter taste. Both aspects of the word must be taken into account to avoid ambiguity in any paragraph.

I imagine that only a very small percentage of discussion (or language use) is about our knowledge of concepts — Luke

I agree that in normal conversation we don't talk about the meaning of the concepts we use, but rather just use them. That being said, as a concept is an abstract idea, I would have said that every word we use in the language-game is a concept. The language game is a game of concepts.

However, in Wittgenstein's terms, our knowledge of the concepts we use in the language game doesn't come from discussing them in a definitional sense, but rather from using them. It is true that definitions are invaluable in helping us gain knowledge of the concepts we use, but only in structuring the relationship between concepts, not in explaining the meaning of an individual concept.

We may not specifically discuss our knowledge of concepts, but concepts are the foundation of any discussion we have.

If 246 seems contradictory, it may be because Wittgenstein speaks in more than one voice — Luke

I agree that his sentence "Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it." is that of the interlocutor.

However, I am not so sure that his sentence"Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!" is that of the interlocutor or his own position.

For example, Wittgenstein writes that he has sensations
PI 246 Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them

He also writes that he doesn't doubt his sensations
PI 246 - The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

He also links indubitability with certainty.
From the SEP article on Certainty: Ludwig Wittgenstein also seems to connect certainty with indubitability.
From OC 115: If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

In PI 246 he is linking certainty with knowing.
Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

As the trail leads from his having sensation that he doesn't doubt, to linking indubitability with certainty and then linking certainty with knowing, this suggests that this statement is his own position rather than that of an interlocutor.

He says that others (often) know when he is in pain. He does not say that he (also) knows when he is in pain. As he states later in the passage, it can't be said of him at all that he knows he is in pain. — Luke

If I said "I don't know I am in pain", this means that I don't know the meaning of the concept "pain", and therefore don't know whether my sensation is that of pain or not, For example, my sensation could be that of hunger.

Therefore, to say "I know I am in pain" means that I do know the meaning of the concept "pain", and therefore do know that my sensation is that of pain.

To say "I am in pain" means that I do know the meaning of the concept "pain", and therefore do know that my sensation is that of pain.

The statements "I know I am in pain" and "I am in pain" have an identical meaning, ie, as I know the meaning of the concept "pain", I know that my sensation is that of pain.

Therefore, it is allowable within the language game to say "I know I am in pain", as it has the same meaning as "I am in pain".

I don’t believe redundancy is the reason why “it can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.” What sort of joke would it be to redundantly say “I know I’m in pain”? — Luke

PI 246 is contradictory in that it doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept

In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense

Wittgenstein is saying that it is said that only I know that I am in pain, whereas others can only surmise it. But he is surely saying that this is wrong because others also know that I am in pain.

If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

Wittgenstein is saying that others know I am in pain, but not with the same certainty that I know when I am in pain. The problem arises that Wittgenstein is not distinguishing between knowing a concept and knowing a sensation.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Wittgenstein is saying that when others say "he knows he is in pain", this is grammatically incorrect and means no more that "he is in pain". It is possible that someone could use a grammatically incorrect phrase as a joke.

However, in order to say "I am in pain", this presupposes that not only "I am having the sensation of pain" but also "I know the concept of pain". For example, if I didn't know the concept of pain, I wouldn't be able to distinguish between "I am in pain" and "I am hungry". Therefore the proposition "I am in pain" is shorthand for "I am having the sensation of pain and I know the concept of pain".

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

The key word is "only". It is true that other people cannot learn of another's sensations purely from that person's behaviour if they didn't have their own sensations that produced the same behaviour in themselves.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself

Wittgenstein is saying that although it makes sense for others to doubt that I am in pain, it makes no sense for me to doubt that I am in pain.

PI 246 is contradictory in that Wittgenstein doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept. On the one hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a concept: If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself and on the other hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a sensation: It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Wittgenstein rejects the idea that we can know our private sensations. — Luke

PI 246 can be considered as having five separate parts.

Part one
In what sense are my sensations private?

He asks the question

Part two
Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

It is true that it is often said that only I know I am in pain and other people can only surmise it.

But clearly this is in a sense wrong, otherwise it would be socially acceptable to kick dogs, for example, which is obviously not the case. So we do clearly know when other people are in pain, not just that we surmise it .

It comes down to the exact meaning of "know". This often depends on context. In one sense we do know when a loved one is in pain, but in another sense we cannot really know the pain of another person.

The word "know" has different levels of certainty. I know with certainty my own pain, and even though I know others feel pain, I can only know with less certainty their pain.

Part three
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

The word "know" seems to be redundant in the two propositions "I know I am in pain" and "I am in pain". Does that mean we can reject the idea that we can know our private sensations.

From PI 293, the thing in the box that has no place in the language-game is the sensation of pain. When he writes "I know what the word "pain" means", he is referring to the word "pain" as a concept in the language-game.

However, in order to say "I am in pain", I must already know the concept "pain". Therefore saying "I am in pain" is shorthand for saying that not only do I know the concept "pain" but also I know that my sensation has the name "pain".

If I know that my private sensation has a name, then it follows that I must also know that I am having a private sensation.

But if I know that I am having a private sensation, then I must know the private sensation that I am having.

IE, I can know a private sensation.

Part four
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

He is saying that other people cannot learn his private sensations from his external behaviour as well as saying that I don't learn my sensations, I just have them.

Part five
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself

He is saying it makes sense to say that he has no doubt that he is in pain, whereas other people may doubt that he is in pain.

I don’t believe that the quote supports your reading. — Luke

In PI 246, Wittgenstein writes that he knows his private sensations with certainty, whereas other people only know his private sensations with less certainty.

He writes that he doesn't doubt that he is in pain, whereas other people may doubt that he is in pain.

Wittgenstein is introducing the concepts of doubt and certainty, which led to his book On Certainty. As AC Grayling said, a book of "serious philosophy".

Consider On Certainty (OC) 504, "Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contracts me. For to say one knows one has pain means nothing. " — Richard B

It is true that in a sense to say one has the sensation of green means nothing, as the sensation of green is a private subjective experience and cannot be described in words. For example, how could you describe the colour violet to a person who cannot experience colours. When we do use the word "green" in language, this is a label and not a description.

As Wittgenstein writes in PI 15
The word "to signify" is perhaps used in the most straightforward way when the object signified is marked with the sign. Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks. When A shews his assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has that mark on it. It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

and also in PI 26
One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. . To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing.

Or, OC 548, "A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour." Again, the emphasis here is language use, not recognition of color sensations. — Richard B

Words labelling inner private sensations are only possible if there is some outward sign of such inner private sensation. As Wittgenstein writes in PI 257:
"What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

Even when there is an outward sign of an inner experience, such an outward sign does not describe the inner experience but only shows that there has been one. As Wittgenstein writes in PI 244:
"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

Language labels inner experiences, not describe them.

Consider OC 505, "It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something." Notice he is not saying it is by the favor of our awareness of private sensations that one knows something. This is evidence he would not support Indirect Realism. — Richard B

Indirect Realism is a direct knowledge of the mind and an indirect knowledge of the world.

Wittgenstein in PI 246 writes that we know our private sensations:
In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

It is true that he writes in OC 505 that "It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something", but what does he mean by this. It could mean that we know the private sensation of pain because a heavy object has fallen on our foot.

Taking the example of the Earth as something that exists in nature, throughout On Certainty, Wittgenstein writes about the belief in the existence of the Earth not from direct knowledge but from a coherent set of evidence that points to its existence.

He writes in OC 291 about his belief that the earth is round
We know that the earth is round. We have definitively ascertained that it is round.
We shall stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing nature changes. "How do you know that?" - I believe it.

He writes in OC 231 that his beliefs in the earth are supported by evidence
If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not

He writes in OC 165 that a belief in the earth has been learnt
One child might say to another: "I know that the earth is already hundred of years old" and that would mean: I have learnt it.

As Wittgenstein writes that we directly know our sensations and only indirectly believe in the world, this is the position of an Indirect Realist.

I will leave this discussion with one more quote from Wittgenstein from "Culture and Value" which suggest the importance of what can and cannot be said, "Couldn't one actually say equally well that the essence of colour guarantees its existence? — Richard B

Although the private sensation of green cannot be said, the word "green" can be said within the language game. For Wittgenstein, we first know the private sensation green and then use the word "green" as a label for these private sensations, not as descriptions of them.

This is clarified by the Beetle in the Box analogy in PI 293
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

But it’s no problem if you make the quotations obvious in future. — Jamal

As I accepted, point taken, and I will be more careful in the future.

I hope this doesn’t mean you’re just going to plagiarize more skilfully. :wink: — Jamal

Plagiarising is serious.

For example, www.scribbr.com writes:
The consequences of plagiarism vary depending on the type of plagiarism and the context in which it occurs. For example, submitting a whole paper by someone else will have the most severe consequences, while accidental citation errors are considered less serious.
If you’re a student, then you might fail the course, be suspended or expelled, or be obligated to attend a workshop on plagiarism. It depends on whether it’s your first offence or you’ve done it before.
As an academic or professional, plagiarizing seriously damages your reputation. You might also lose your research funding or your job, and you could even face legal consequences for copyright infringement.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines plagiarising as: to steal and pass off (the ideas or words of another) as one's own : use (another's production) without crediting the source.

I may use established sources to back up my ideas, to clarify my own ideas, to give me ideas or provide me with sentences I think especially well written, but that is not the same as copying the ideas of established sources. For example, for many years I have held the belief that names are labels not descriptions, and used Wittgenstein's quote in PI 26, where he says - One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. . To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. - to support my belief, not as a replacement for it.

I never plagiarise. All the ideas in my posts are my own, even if they are my ideas about other people's ideas, and am more than willing to justify any post I have ever written. :wink:

What it means is a device that can detect light with a wavelength of 550 nm light, and humans collectively has established that light of such a wavelength is called "green", and the device can be programmed to report out the name of the color. — Richard B

The Indirect Realist would argue that what we perceive through our senses is only a representation of what exists in the world, in that even though we perceive a green object, the object in the world does not of necessity have a colour. Therefore, the Indirect Realist would say: What it means is a device that can detect light with a wavelength of 550 nm light, and humans collectively has established that light of such a wavelength is called "green", and the device can be programmed to report out the name of the colour.

The Direct Realist would argue that what we perceive through our senses is not a representation of what exists in the world, but gives us direct knowledge of what exists in the world, in that if we perceive a green object then a green object exists in the world. Therefore the Direct Realist would say: What it means is a device that can detect light with a wavelength of 550 nm light, and humans collectively has established that light of such a wavelength is "green", and the device can be programmed to report out the name of the colour.

The difference between the Indirect and Direct Realist is that for the Indirect Realist the object in the world is named green but for the Direct Realist the object in the world is green.

The principle can be extended. For an Indirect Realist, an object in the world can be named "apple", "table", "chair", etc, whereas for the Direct Realist, an object in the world is an "apple", ""table", "chair" , etc

Therefore, for an Indirect Realist, the name of an object is a label for the object and does not describe the object in the world, whereas for a Direct Realist, the name of an object describes the object in the world.

In today's terms, Wittgenstein's approach in PI is that of an Indirect Realist rather than a Direct Realist, whereby a name is a label for an object in the world than rather than a description of it.

Wittgenstein in PI 26 wrote that naming is like attaching a label to a thing
One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. . To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing.

He also indicated in PI 244 that a name is in a sense an object in its own right and may replace another object but does not describe it
On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

I would say Wittgenstein is not supporting either Indirect or Direct Realism since both are philosophical theories in which language goes on a holiday. — Richard B

Yes, Wittgenstein doesn't write in support of either. Only today can we take his writings as being in support for one or the other.

As he wrote in 1917 "And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be unutterably contained in what has been uttered!”

Please make it clear when you are quoting from a book. — Jamal

Point taken. I will be more careful in the future. I'm pleased that someone is actually reading my posts.

Science discovers that the green light has a wavelength of 550nm — Richard B

This sentence may be used to illustrate Wittgenstein's importance to language and philosophy.

The link between linguistic grammatical form and philosophical substantive content

Many philosophers believe that the first task is finding a theory of meaning in language. Given such a theory, they can then turn to the problems of philosophy. However, for Wittgenstein, whose first interest is in philosophy, it is this interest in philosophy that makes him then interested in language, but concludes that there is no theory of meaning in language that will enable the solving of philosophical problems. It is incorrect to say that Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher in the sense that JL Austin is.

Wittgenstein urges throughout his later work that mistaking a grammatical claim for a philosophical one is a common source of philosophical confusion, Wittgenstein says that the philosophical problems that concern him are not empirical problems, but are problems solved by looking into and recognizing the workings of our language.

Wittgenstein often insists that he is not presenting a philosophical argument. In PI 109 he writes "We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place", whereby such descriptions get that purpose from philosophical problems.

For Wittgenstein, a standing source of philosophical confusion is the tendency to transpose a remark concerning the grammar of an expression into a substantive claim about the things referred to in the expression. For example, from PI 246 is the sentence “Only I can know that I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it”. This is clearly false, as that on many occasions we can know full well that someone else is in pain, there is no surmising about it. The grammatical difference between the first person "I have a pain" and the third person "he has a pain" wrongly becomes a substantive philosophical problem

For Wittgenstein the first step is to acknowledge the confusion between statements of grammatical fact and the use of them in the search for substantive philosophical meaning.

Science discovers that the green light has a wavelength of 550nm — Richard B

I agree. But to avoid any ambiguity, does the sentence mean i) what appears green to us science has discovered has a wavelength of 550nm or ii) science has discovered that a wavelength of 550nm is green independent of any observer ?

2. If you have no problems with a device that detects color by utilizing scientific theories of light and not positing the device having private color sensations, why not humans that have evolved biological apparatuses to do the same without private color sensations? — Richard B

By the sentence "a device that detects colour", do you mean i) a device that is able to directly detect the colour green independent of any observer or ii) a device that is able to detect the wavelength 550nm, and has been programmed by a human that a wavelength of 550nm is named green ?

I like to be optimistic and believe we are seeing the same thing — Richard B

I am sure we do. I agree that because humans have similar biologies we judge colour the same, and I am sure that your subjective green is the same as my subjective green. I believe this, but I don't know it, as I cannot see into another person's mind

However, even though I believe that we see the same thing, in that we both see the same green plant, our seeing the same thing can be explained by both Direct Realism, looking through a clear window, and Indirect Realism, looking through a TV screen.

It then comes down to arguments for and against Indirect and Direct Realism.

Colour can only exist in a world outside the mind as a Platonic Form

A group of humans look at several objects and come to a communal agreement that there is a certain similarity in the objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm, there is a certain similarity in the objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm, and the objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm are somehow different to the objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm. In the English speaking world it is agreed that the objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm are named "green" and the objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm are named "yellow". In France, they would be named "verte" and "jaune".

However, if it weren't for science, the human would be unaware that they only perceive colour because information has travelled from the object to the eye in the form of a wavelength.

Where does colour exist, in the mind or in the world. Do we perceive an object as green because the object is green or is this an illusion.

The colour green includes the wavelengths 495 to 570nm. The wavelengths 570 to 590nm are not green.

But what has science discovered in the world outside the mind that relates the wavelength 500nm to 550nm but not to 580nm.

We know that in the mind the wavelength 500nm is related to 550nm but not to 580nm because the mind can distinguish green from yellow.

If green exists in the world independent of the mind, then what exactly has science discovered in such a world that relates 500nm to 550nm but not to 580nm ?

we always have Monty Python — Richard B

Even Monty Python get Wittgenstein sent off from playing the game.

As Wittgenstein wrote in PI 244, pain is different to pain-behaviour

How should "colour" be defined
The Merriam Webster dictionary defines colour as a phenomenon of light (such as red, brown, pink, or grey) or visual perception that enables one to differentiate otherwise identical objects. However this is ambiguous, and does not address the problem as to exactly how does colour enable one to distinguish between otherwise identical objects.

It depends how you are defining the word colour. If you are defining colour as a name, such as "green", as names have been created in the human mind, names cannot exist independently of any human. But if you are defining colour as a wavelength, such that the colour green is the wavelength 495 to 570nm, then in this sense colours can exist independently of any human.

As defining colour as a wavelength introduces the confusion of over-determination, whereby two very different concepts are given the same name, the definition of colour should be limited to that of a name. In this case, colours can only exist in the mind.

1. Scientists are not naming the color green "550 nm — Richard B

I agree that the colour green has not been named 550nm, but rather the wavelength of 550nm has been named green.

A group of humans look at several objects and come to a communal agreement that there is a certain similarity in the objects emitting wavelength of 495 to 570nm, there is a certain similarity in the objects emitting wavelength of 570 to 590nm, and the objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm are somehow different to the objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm. In the English speaking world it is agreed that the objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm are named "green" and the objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm are named "yellow". In France, they would be named "verte" and "jaune".

2. We need the device to detect the color of an object that is independent of a human but will detect and report the color as humans do. — Richard B

The device detects the wavelength emitted from an object that is independent of a human, but no device can detect the colour of an object independent of a human.

The community has agreed that objects emitting wavelengths of 495 to 570nm are named "green" and objects emitting wavelengths of 570 to 590nm are named "yellow". These humans can then make a device that distinguishes the wavelengths emitted by different objects. The human designer of the device then programs into the device that if the device records a wavelength of 495 to 570nm, then the device gives the output "green".

3. I am not sending a color that exists in my mind in the mail. — Richard B

I agree, you are sending a physical object through the mail that emits a particular wavelength, not a colour that exists in your mind.

4. The human brain is like the device that detects color. — Richard B

The human brain is different to a device. The human brain directly perceives colour and only indirectly knows about wavelength. The device directly detects a wavelength but only indirectly gives this wavelength the name of a colour.

I agree that the human brain has evolved to sense and discriminate different colours. However, if it weren't for science the human would be unaware that they only perceive colour because information has travelled from the object to the eye in the form of a wavelength. Humans know colour directly, and only know about wavelength indirectly.

On the other hand, a human-made device is only able to discriminate between different wavelengths. These wavelengths can then be named by a human programmer in order to give the output "green" when input the wavelength 550nm. A device can directly detect an input wavelength but only has indirect information about its colour.

5. If colors exist in the mind, why did scientist study light and color that is independent of the human? — Richard B

Colour can refer to two different things. In sense one, it can refer to the private subjective feeling within the mind that cannot be described, as explained by Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box analogy. In sense two, it can refer to the public name "green", "yellow" etc as used in the language game, the physical object, the physical name "green" that you see on the screen in front of you.

In sense one, colour only exists in the mind and not the world. In sense two, wavelengths only exist in the world and not the mind. Sense one and two are linked because the reason that we perceive colour in our mind is due to the fact that wavelengths exist in the world.

Scientists can measure physical things that exist in the world, such as wavelengths and language expressed either verbally or in writing. After all, the word "green" you see on your screen is a physical object that exists in the world. Scientists can measure pain-behaviour, which are physical events in the world, but not the pain itself that caused the pain-behaviour.

Wittgenstein writes in PI 244
A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

But as a story of entertaining fiction, I do get a good laugh. — Richard B

If philosophy was meant to be fun, it would be being promoted at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival. :smile:

We have devices that detect colors on a variety objects that will agree with human judgement. These devices are not detecting color in the minds of humans but on objects — Richard B

We have devices that can detect the wavelength of 550nm emitted by a variety of objects. The device doesn't know the name of the wavelength of 550nm prior to it being named green by a human.

Additionally, if you use the device on the human brain you will be getting the color of the brain not what the brain is sensing. — Richard B

Similarly, a device such as a MRI scanner can be used on the human brain. The MRI scanner doesn't know the colours on its screen prior to their being named by a human. Such devices are only capable of recording the external appearance of the physical brain. They are not capable of recording human thoughts and feelings internal to the physical brain.

Green things. — unenlightened

If the argument is that because we see green things then in the world exist green things,
then it would also follow that if we see a stick bent in water then in the world exist sticks bent in water.

Not so. The colour green is the propensity of an object to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm approx. — unenlightened

Yes, some objects in the world have the propensity to preferentially reflect light of wavelength 550nm.

Humans have defined the wavelength of 550nm as green. Then where does green exist? Although a wavelength of 550nm can exist in the world, green can only exist as part of a human definition, and human definitions can only exist in the mind, not the world.

The wavelength of 550nm could equally well have been defined as violet. There is nothing in the world outside the mind that is able to determine whether a wavelength of 550nm is green or violet. Only in the human mind can it be determined that a wavelength of 550nm is green and not violet.

As the colour of the wavelength 550nm can only be determined by the mind, the colour green can only exist in the mind.

I passed it by, because you have just explained perfectly precisely how an observer sees a past event, which any astronomer can confirm as perfectly normal and universal.. — unenlightened

Exactly, the fact that the event is in the past means that the the observer cannot see the event directly, only indirectly, which is the position of Indirect Realism. Another argument against Direct Realism.

The eye detects light and distinguishes the wavelength and this is how the information is 'conveyed'. — unenlightened

Exactly, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". The colour green exists in the mind, not the world, which is the position of Indirect Realism. Yet another argument against Direct Realism.

We use the same word for the radiation and its source; perhaps that observation might help folk see the light? — unenlightened

Yes, that is the problem. If a wavelength of 550nm enters the eye originating from an object in the world, in common language we say "I see a green object".

As you said yourself "There is no such thing as green light because light is not visible; there are green sources of light and green reflectors of light."

This is the problem with Direct Realism, which believes that the world we see around us is the real world itself, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

This is why I wrote "The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?"

Another problem for the Direct Realist is, if it is true that the object has an the intrinsic colour of green, how does the information that the object is green get to the observer, if the means of getting the information to the observer, the wavelength of 550nm, carries no information about colour.

No one sees light, it is not visible. — unenlightened

The general opinion is that humans can see light, for example:

Wikipedia: "Light or visible light is electromagnetic radiation that can be perceived by the human eye."
National Geographic Society: "Visible light waves are the only wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum that humans can see"
BBC: "Everything we can see is because of how our eyes detect the light around us."
NASA: "All electromagnetic radiation is light, but we can only see a small portion of this radiation—the portion we call visible light."

In the meantime, I will stick with the runner beans that are green, and maintain that they and their greenness are in the garden and not in my eyes which are greyish blue, nor in my mind which is quite clear — unenlightened

The observer sees green light (ignoring for the sake of argument that this wavelength after entering the eye becomes an electrical signal that travels up the optic nerve to the brain).

This green light has been caused by something in the world. The light left the object before being seen by the observer.



The observer directly sees the green light as it enters the eye, and not the green light as it was emitted from the object, as the light emitted from the object was emitted at a time prior to entering the eye. An observer cannot directly see an event that happened in the past, only an event in the present.

As many causes of green light are possible, and as the observer has no direct knowledge of the cause of the green light, the observer's belief that the cause were runner beans can only be indirectly inferred from the other senses, such as touch, smell and taste.

We understand reality by using multiple measurements to abstract out the same pattern. This is known as Construct Validation in psychology. This raises the question as to how we know when a concept is real, how do we know the nature of reality. To establish something as real, we need a set of qualitatively different measurements which converge, which is what the senses do. The senses provide five qualitatively distinct reports, and if they converge one presumes that this constitutes reality. This convergence of the senses is how we define reality.

That the cause of the green light were runner beans cannot be directly known by sight alone. All that is possible is a justified belief from the rational combination of different senses that the cause of one's seeing green light were green runner beans.

The problem is that the light emitted from the object happened at a time before entering the eye, and the philosophical question for the Direct Realist is how is it possible for an observer to directly see a past event?

I use my eyes, personally. The runner beans I can see through the window here are green with orange-red flowers. The runner beans are in the garden. What I cannot see, because my eyes do not point the right way, is into my mind. So I confess I do not know how my mind distinguishes things. I distinguish colours using my eyes, though; I'm fairly sure of that. — unenlightened

In perceiving runner beans, the Direct Realist would say that what we see exists in the world, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence. The Indirect Realist would say that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, where our ideas of the world are interpretations of sensory input derived from a real external world.

Science tells us that a wavelength of 550nm travels from the runner beans to our eyes, where an electromagnetic wave is an oscillation of electric and magnetic fields and its wavelength is the distance between two adjacent crests.

How can a wavelength of 550nm have an intrinsic colour, and if wavelengths have an intrinsic colour, what would be the intrinsic colour of a radio wave having a wavelength of 3 metres ?

I'm also pretty sure I do not look at my sensations to see what colour they are, because I would need special eyes in my my mind that I do not think I have. And even supposing I did, they would surely require eyes in the mind's eye to examine the sensations produced, and those eyes would also need eyes to look at their sensations etc, ad infinitum. — unenlightened

I agree, which is my argument that it is more the case that "I am sensations" rather than "I have sensations".

From Wikipedia Homunculus Argument

If there is a homunculus looking at sensations, these sensations must be in the homuncules' head. But how does the homunculus see sensations inside its own head. It can only be if there is a second homunculus within the first homuncules head looking at the sensations within the first homuncules head. But then we have the same problem, how does the second homuncules see sensations inside its own head.

A dualist might argue that the homunculus inside the brain is an immaterial one, such as the Cartesian soul. A non-dualist might argue that a life form is indivisible from its environment, such that the mind is not separate from its sensations, but rather the mind is the set of its sensations.

A dualist would need to explain how a mind separate to the body can affect the body.

I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. The sensation of green is no more green than the sensation of big is big, or the sensation of having made a mistake is a mistake. — unenlightened

The sensation of green is a different thing to the sensation of big, so the expressions "the sensation of green is green" and "the sensation of big is big" cannot be equated. We directly sense the colour "green", but we don't directly sense the adjective "big". Whereas "green " is a direct sensation, "big" is not a direct sensation.

In the mind are sensations. The question is, how does the mind relate to its sensations. Either the mind is separate to its sensations, such that "I have sensations" or the mind is its sensations, such that "I am my sensations".

You say "I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour.", then how do you explain the relationship between the mind and its sensations.

I am a good deal more than the set of my sensations. — unenlightened

It may well be that you are a Substance Dualist, having the belief that the mind and body are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances. If so, what kind of substance do you think the mind is, and how does it causally affect the body, a different substance altogether.

But do you see the difficulty of your diagram, that recreates colours 'in the mind'; it would require someone to be looking at the mind, to see what colour things were in there. That is the recursion we really need to avoid — unenlightened

Yes, that someone is the person having the mind in the first place.

And the way to do it is to leave colours where they are, in leaves and flowers and stuff, and let all the 'mind-stuff' including sensations be colourless and featureless electrochemical shenanigans, or moving spirit, or some such. — unenlightened

If a sensation is colourless, then how do we know that objects in the world, such as leaves and flowers, have colours at all.

I prefer to say that sensations are not the kind of thing that has colour. — unenlightened

It is normal to say "I have the sensation of green", as it is normal to say "I have a book"

But "I have a book" means that "I" and the "book" are independent of each other, in that the "book" exists independently of "me".

Grammatically, as "I" and the "book" are independent of each other, then it would follow that "I" and "the sensation of green" are independent of each other.

Yet this cannot be the case, as "I" am no more than the set of my sensations. My sensations are what comprise "me".

It would follow that it would be more correct to say that "I am the sensation of green".

This avoids the infinite regression problem which would happen if "I" am separate from my sensations, yet my sensations exist within "me".

But if I were to ask you what colour the sensation of colour was, you might wonder what I meant — unenlightened

A large object is large. A circular object is circular. A green sensation is green.

As being circular is not independent of a circular object, being green is not independent of a green sensation.

Therefore, the sensation of green is green.

It seems to me that the sensation of colour has no colour; it takes place in the dark. — unenlightened

In my dreams, which take place in the dark, I can have the sensation of colour.

Whether in a dream or waking, if there is nothing to sense then there cannot be a sensation, ie, a sensation cannot be of nothing.

As a sensation cannot be of nothing, the sensation cannot be independent of what is being sensed, ie, the sensation is what is being sensed.

Therefore, if what is being sensed is colour, as the sensation is what is being sensed, then the sensation itself is colour.

In fact he does not even support indirect realism, consider PI 304, “The conclusion was only that nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.” An indirect realist would not say this. They would say that there are “somethings” and these somethings are private sensations and we have much to say. — Richard B

Wittgenstein is not saying that there is a "nothing". He is saying that there is a "something", but within the language game, this "something" drops out of consideration.

As regards "object and designation", the object is the intentional content, the private subjective feeling, such as pain and the designation is the public name used in a language game, such as the word "pain"

Wittgenstein in PI 304 writes that the sensation of pain is a definite "something" and attacks those who say that the sensation of pain is a "nothing". He writes that it is only within the context of a language game that this "something", this pain, drops out of consideration.

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!"

Wittgenstein PI 304 continues that within the language game, as this "something", the object of pain, drops out of consideration, then "nothing" would serve just as well. This is obviously nonsense, because if there was "nothing" in the first place, then there wouldn't be anything to drop out of consideration. If there was "nothing" in the mind, there would be no language. In fact, there would be no humans as we know them.

"The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."

Wittgenstein continues in PI 304 that language doesn't function by directly linking object with designation, by directly linking the private sensation of pain with the public name of "pain", which happens to be the Direct Realist's position.

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please."

Wittgenstein writes in PI 293 that language functions by publicly naming things in the world, and it may well be the case that everyone has a different private subjective feeling, a different "beetle" in their box.

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box."

I agree that Wittgenstein studiously avoids taking any philosophical position, however, his Beetle in the Box analogy is a good argument against Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism.

but what can true color even mean here ? — plaque flag

Where does colour exist
I agree. It comes down to a matter of opinion.

The Direct Realist would say that as we directly see the world around us, things in the world, such as colours, are perceived immediately rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

The Indirect Realist would say that our conscious experience is not directly of the world itself, but is an internal representation of an external world. This external world is real and is the cause of our sensations, but as an effect does not need to be the same as the cause, what we sense is an effect that does not of necessity need to be of the same kind as its cause in the world.

The Direct Realist would therefore say that if we see a red object, then in the world there exists also a red object. The Indirect Realist would say that if we see a red object, all we can say is that our sensation has been caused by something in the world. But as an effect is not of necessity the same as its cause, then the cause in the world must remain unknown. In Kant's terms, a thing in itself.

As an Indirect Realist, I cannot know that colours don't exist in the world but my belief is that they don't.

Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box supports Indirect Realism
Wittgenstein's support for the Beetle in the Box analogy indicatives his support for Indirect rather than Direct Realism.

Wittgenstein in PI 293 wrote about an unknown beetle:
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.

If Direct Realism was correct, given a beetle in the external world, I would directly perceive this beetle. Other people would also directly perceive the same beetle. As everyone looking at the beetle would have the same intentional content, everyone would know everyone else's intentional content. Everyone would know that their private perception was the same as everyone else's, contradicting Wittgenstein's private language argument, and contradicting PI para 272 where he wrote that nobody knows another person's sensations:
The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.

Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box is an argument against Direct Realism.

For simplicity sake let us assume we are in a world with just two colors, red and blue. In my tribe, we learned when we see a red object we call it “red” and when we see a blue object, we call it “blue”. One day we travel to an island and we meet another tribe that surprisingly has a very similar language like ours with the exception that when they see a red object they call it “blue” and when they see a blue object they call it “red”. — Richard B

In the world are two objects. One has been named "red" and the other has been named "blue". No-one knows the true colours of these two objects. However, let them be green and orange for the sake of argument.


For Tribe A to see a red object does not mean that the object they are seeing is red, it just means that they see the colour red when looking at the object named "red",

Similarly, for Tribe A to see a blue object does not mean that the object they are seeing is blue, it just means that they see the colour blue when looking at the object named "blue".

Similarly for Tribe B.

As you say, these two Tribes can still carry on a sensible conversation, because the objects have been named, regardless of any private subjective experiences. This is Wittgenstein's "Beetle in the Box".

I think she can — plaque flag

If Mary can talk about not only the concept of colour but also what it feels like to perceive colour, then, in your own words, how would you describe your perception of the colour violet to a person who cannot see colours.

The nearsighted person sees the same ball as the colorblind person with 20/20 vision. And this is the same ball that the blind person can talk about. — plaque flag

I agree that Mary can talk about the concept of colour, ie "colour is the visual perception based on the electromagnetic spectrum. Though colour is not an inherent property of matter, colour perception is related to an object's light absorption, reflection, emission spectra and interference"

But can Mary talk about what it feels like to perceive colour ?

You talk of wavelengths a moment ago, and I presume you rely on the public inferential aspect of the concept. But it's hard to imagine how you could have a private sense of wavelengths without being immersed in a culture that uses this meaningful token in inferences (explanations.) — plaque flag

True. On the one hand, how can I have the private sense of things by description, such as democracy, the 1969 Moon landing, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Machu Picchu, wavelengths, atoms, Julius Caesar, etc. Such description can only be through language, and language requires being part of a society that uses language.

But on the other hand, I can have the private sense of things by acquaintance, such as feeling pain, smelling a rose, tasting coffee, hearing laughter and seeing a colour. Such acquaintance is independent of language, and doesn't require being part of a social group.

How is it possible to understand a wavelength when I only know it through description as "the distance between successive crests of a wave, especially points in a sound wave or electromagnetic wave."

Any whole that is only known by description can only become understandable if the parts are known by acquaintance.

First, as I already know by acquaintance the following parts - the distance between two things, the crest of a wave, a point and a sound - I can remove them from the description, leaving the unknown terms successive, especially and electromagnetic.

Successive is defined as following one another. Especially is defined as singling out one thing over all others. Electromagnetic is defined as relating electric currents and magnetic fields.

Second, as I already know by acquaintance the following parts - one thing following another, one thing taking prominence over another thing, the pain from touching a cattle electric fence and the movement of a compass needle in a magnetic field - I can remove them from the description.

In such as fashion, a whole only known by description may be reduced to component parts known by acquaintance. This allows me the private sense of wavelength, independent of language, and independent of any language-using society.

We learn what “red” is by being expose to red objects and judging similarly. What goes on inside is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept “red”. Private experiences of “blue” and “red”? No. — Richard B

I agree. But I think it is important to distinguish words in inverted colours such as "red" from those not in inverted commas, such as red. Otherwise it will be difficult to distinguish between what exists in language and what exists outside of language, whether in thought or the world.

For example, going back to Davidsons theory of meaning, whereby “‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true if and only if snow is white.”. "Schneee ist weiss" is within the object language, and snow is white is within the metalanguage, such that if and only if snow is white then the proposition "snow is white" is true.

Could it be that I have no experience of what we would call “color” but some other experience of a “private” kind? But what could that be and could it ever be communicated? — Richard B

I agree. When you see a "red" object your private subjective experience may be of the colour blue. But it is impossible for anyone other than yourself to know. But the fact that it is impossible to communicate to another person your private subjective experience, does not mean that you haven't had a private subjective experience.

This idea of “private meaning” is tempting but ultimately vacuous compared to where that idea of “meaning” has its life, among a group of language users talking about a shared reality. — Richard B

If you had no "private meaning", if you never had any private subjective experiences, if you never felt pain, saw a colour, smelt a rose, tasted coffee or heard laughter, then one could say that this would be a vacuous life.