Yes, but I think he is also challenging traditional assumptions about man and reason. — Fooloso4

Ok, I'll do some more reading.

Ok, I'll do some more reading. — frank

Yes, there is always more reading to do.

language is not a game consisting of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order.

Where? — Banno

It looks as if I made an assumption that has turned out incorrect.

I took the passage from www.newworldencyclopedia.org: "Thus, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of the term or concept is highly contextualized; two different contexts, be it a theory or a culture, can be incommensurable although they may present a loose similarity." New World Encyclopedia is an offshoot of Wikipedia for teachers and students.

The first statement
I think that the first part of what I wrote is correct: "Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised.............."

Context is defined as the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood.

In para 21, Wittgenstein wrote "Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the tone's being the same—for an order and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face—the difference being only in the application."

In para 43, "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

IE, meaning is in use, and use is in a context.

The second statement
However - I am having difficulty justifying the word "incommensurable" within the quote.

The definition of incommensurable is - i) not able to be judged by the same standards - ii) having no common standard of measurement. For example, the beliefs of the atheist and the theist are incommensurable.

Starting with para 21, the term "five-slabs" could be being used either as a report or a statement.
Even if there are no clues in the speaker's tone of voice, the difference is only within the application. As in para 43: "the meaning of a word is its use in language". For example, if used on site, five-slabs would be a statement, whereas if used in the office it would be a report.

As regards the word incommensurability, this means that there are different standards for judging the meaning of five-slabs - one on site and one in the office. However, for Wittgenstein, there is only one standard for knowing the meaning of five-slabs, and therefore the word incommensurable is not appropriate. Perhaps a better word than "incommensurability" would have been "different".

Then how does Wittgenstein explain how one knows the correct meaning of five-slabs ?
In para 68 - "For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a
game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No."
In para 138 - "But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp
it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"
In para 220 - "Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly one can often say in mathematics: let the proof teach you what was being proved.)"
In para 692 - "But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone"
On page 218 - he writes - "How do I find the 'right' word? How do I choose among words?........But I do not always have to make judgments, give explanations; often I might only say: "It simply isn't right yet". I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: "That's it!"

Wittgenstein seems to be using the transcendental argument, in that we don't judge the meaning of a word, the use of the word teaches us the meaning. But this seems chicken and egg - in that how can I use a word if I don't know its meaning.

Conclusion
In summary, the term "incommensurabity" seems wrong, whereas "different" may have been better.

OK - you worried my because I have been on the lookout for anything Witti wrote concerning the commensurability of language games.

In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order. — RussellA

I don't deny that there are rules in language, that's what formal logic is all about. The thing is that it's not an essential aspect of language, because communication with langue existed before there was such rules, and rules emerged from language use. It's that backward order, that some sort of rules are foundational which leaves us looking for things like hinge propositions.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

See, this is that backward idea, that there is some sort of logical form at the foundation of language or knowledge. In reality language came into existence and evolved according to human necessity. To have a logical form and therefore rules, is one need which was developed, but it's not the most basic need driving the evolution of language. So looking for some sort of logical form, as hinge propositions, at the base is a misguided endeavour.

That's why it's much more commonplace, and philosophically acceptable, to ground meaning with intention, rather than some imaginary hinge propositions. But since one's words are not always true to one's intentions, there are no statements which are free from the doubt of skepticism.

If language games were real, then in a religious language game "God exists" would be a hinge proposition. But it's ridiculous to say that it's unreasonable to doubt this, either inside or outside the religious circle, because it's something held on faith. And it's very reasonable to doubt one's faith. The idea of hinge propositions as something foundational which we do not doubt, completely distracts us from the reality that faith is the foundation, and we ought to doubt it as much as possible. It is only by doubting our faith that it is reaffirmed and strengthened, or exposed as misplaced.

Where? — Banno

Your post gets to the core of my continuing problem with Wittgenstein's language game, illustrated by the fact that whilst we both understand the phrase "where?" and how it is used within its context, I understood the phrase as a statement, whereas I believe you understood the phrase as a question.

If the same phrase fulfils several language games, which language game should be used

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein argues that I should know even without clues external to the text, such as tone of voice or expression of face (para 21 of Philosophical Investigations)

It is not as if I can guess, as Wittgenstein makes clear that whilst a beginner may guess (para 156), or someone coming into a strange country (para 32), one cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that (para 340)

Wittgenstein discusses ambiguity of perception as regards the duck-rabbit (page 194). He writes that when shown a picture he reports his perception that he unambiguously sees a rabbit. Yet on another occasion he may well have unambiguously seen a duck. I cannot find in PI any mechanism whereby if the same perception can be explained by more than one language game, then which language game should be used.

I find Wittgenstein's transcendental argument unpersuasive, in that as the meaning of a word is its use in the language (para 43, para 220), in order to discover the meaning of a word I must first use it in language, but I cannot use it unless I know its meaning.

Wittgenstein also offers no explanation of the process whereby one finds the right word not by judgement but through inspiration: "At last a word comes: That's it!" (page 218)

IE, similar to Grayling's problem in Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty, where the foundationalism of Wittgenstein's language game is undermined by the relativism between alternate language games.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein argues that I should know even without clues external to the text, such as tone of voice or expression of face (para 21 of Philosophical Investigations) — RussellA

That's a very odd way of reading §21. Indeed the point of §21 has usually been taken as the exact opposite: that the very same phrases have differing uses that can be recognised by context. He's simply pointing out that there is a difference between the force of the locution and the force of the illocution; that for example a question can be an assertion, as in a rhetorical question.

If language games were real — Metaphysician Undercover

As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language.

I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether.

Wittgenstein's "language game"

Whereas Bertrand Russell dismissed ordinary language as being of little philosophical significance and too confused to be able to solve metaphysical and epistemological problems, Wittgenstein proposed that philosophy was in trouble because it tried to use words in too abstract a manner. IE, outside the common usage of ordinary language within a community of language users.

The truth or falsity of the whole and its parts

If I make the statement "the apple is on the table", and there isn't an apple on the table, then the statement is false. But because the whole statement is false, it does not follow that the individual parts of the statement are false. IE, because "the apple is on the table" is false it does not logically follow that "the apple" is false

If the statement "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth" does not correspond with the world, then the statement is false. However, even if the statement is false, it does not logically follow that the "hinge proposition" "the sun revolves around the earth" is false.

If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts.

Do relationships of parts ontologically exist in the world or the mind

Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them.

Given a statement, the meaning of the whole is a function of how the parts are combined. The parts may be combined in different ways. This means that dependent on how the parts of a statement are combined, the meaning of the whole changes. This raises the question - do these possible combinations exist independent of the observer, or only in the mind of the observer. The Platonist would say that they exist as universals in a transcendent world of pure forms. The mereological nihilist would say that relations between part and whole don't exist in the world. The conceptualist would say that these relations only exist in the mind, either as mental representations or as abstract objects.

Do different language games originate in the world or in the mind

If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.

The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer.

Summary

IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language.

Sure, the rules of language are stated post hoc.

In order for a rule to be made explicit, it must first be. That is, they cannot be explicated unless there is something to be explicated. Hence, there are rules for language use.

The rules of language are not binding in the way the rules of physics are; they are normative.

The rules of language can be usefully broken, and this is itself worthy of discussion - see "A nice derangement of epitaphs"

There is more to the way words are connected than the logical operators. These do not for instance describe the difference between statements, questions and commands, let alone rhetorical questions, metaphors, and so on. Logic is insufficient to set out the rules of language.

We can more or less circumscribe certain activities in order to understand what is happening; that is, we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole. We can look at the sorts of utterances that might occur during some activity. Importantly, such activities do not consist only of language, but involve interaction with stuff in the world. Such examples of language use might be found by observation, or set up by fiat.

These examples allow us to look at and understand something about the rules that are being use.

Wittgenstein called such examples "language games" with an eye towards three aspects: They involve not just language, but interaction with the things around us; they involve behaviour that can be set out in terms of rules; they are related to each other in ways he spoke of as a family resemblance.

Hence to claim that language games are not real is to misunderstand what they are.

As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language. — RussellA

Are you distinguishing between ordinary language (whatever that means), and language games? How would you distinguish between ordinary language and non-ordinary? If all language is in some sense "ordinary", and language games are in some way different from this, then doesn't this just indicate what I said, that language games are not real?

I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether. — RussellA

I don't see how you escape from the reality that all language is ordinary, to get yourself into this unreal type of language which you call a language game, and is supposed to be some sort of language that is not ordinary.

If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts. — RussellA

I think this is an oversimplification, to say that falsity consists of a false relation between parts. How does correspondence fit into this?

Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them. — RussellA

I don't see this as a matter of relationships between parts. I think of it as each person sees one thing, but they each see that one thing in a different way. Since they are each seeing one thing, and not composing something out of parts, there is no issue of seeing relationships between parts in a different way. If it is composed of parts, they might be seeing the exact same relationships, but seeing a different whole.

If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.

The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer. — RussellA

It appears to me, like "language games" is a faulty analogy here, inapplicable. You do realize that a statement has an author, or do you not? So the relations between parts must exist independently of the observer, because they were put there by the author. Otherwise the observer could not read what was written by the author. Isn't the goal of the observer to determine what was intended by the author? Why would the observer look to possible language games, rather than seeking the intent of the author?

Summary

IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language. — RussellA

Didn't you start off by making a separation between ordinary language and language games? So if hinge propositions are a part of language games, and language games are different from ordinary language, how can hinge propositions give valuable insight about ordinary language?

We can more or less circumscribe certain activities in order to understand what is happening; that is, we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole. We can look at the sorts of utterances that might occur during some activity. Importantly, such activities do not consist only of language, but involve interaction with stuff in the world. Such examples of language use might be found by observation, or set up by fiat. — Banno

The problem with this perspective, is that as RussellA has pointed out above, meaning is attributed to the whole. And since this is the case, the meaning which any part has is somewhat dependent on the interpretation of the whole. So if we set out parts of our language use, as you describe, without setting out the whole, we will not get a true determination of meaning, just like we cannot get a true determination of the meaning of a word without considering the rest of the statement..

These examples allow us to look at and understand something about the rules that are being use.

Wittgenstein called such examples "language games" with an eye towards three aspects: They involve not just language, but interaction with the things around us; they involve behaviour that can be set out in terms of rules; they are related to each other in ways he spoke of as a family resemblance.

Hence to claim that language games are not real is to misunderstand what they are. — Banno

According to what I just said then, referring to distinct language games, as parts of language as a whole, cannot adequately provide us with the meaning in language. This becomes more evident when you consider what Wittgenstein says about family resemblances. The same word has different meanings which you might speak of as attributable to different language games. However, the different meanings, or supposedly different games, are actually similar, related as members of a family. So the supposed language games cannot be separated as distinct games, because they are all tied together as a family, and one doesn't ever really exist independently of the others.

This is why equivocation is extremely difficult to identify and even harder to avoid. Each word is associated with a whole group of different uses, and despite efforts to assign a very unique and particular meaning to a word for a specific purpose, the associated similar meanings cannot be exclude from the mind because all these associations occur in habitual ways. So we never isolate one so-called language game from another, and the meaning of the word remains a sort of vague conglomeration of multiple supposed games, until the word is finally assigned meaning according to the context of the particular whole, the statement in which it is actually being used.

That is why language games are not real. There is no such thing as an overall game which refers to all of language, and distinct language games cannot be isolated, therefore there is no place in reality for language games. It's just a faulty model.

"language games" — Banno

language games — Metaphysician Undercover

I am going out on a limb here, but hopefully sensibly reasoned.

I cannot know the meaning of a word through its use in language
Wittgenstein wrote in para 43 of Philosophical Investigations "the meaning of a word is in its use in language" and para 220 "Let the use of words teach you their meaning". If this were true, we would have known the meaning of the Ancient Egyptian in the Rosetta Stone by solely reading the text. It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". It is also clear that it would be difficult to learn the meaning of a complex abstract word, such as Zeitgeist, through direct observation of pictures in the world.
IE, we can only learn the meaning of a new word as long as the words we use, needed in order to learn the new word, must sooner or later be simple concrete words whose meaning is clear to us by observation of pictures in the world.

Banno - we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole
As Wittgenstein wrote in para 21, language games is not just language - "Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different." There is a difference in meaning between a part of a proposition and a simple. For example, if I say "the sun is warm" in a particular tone of voice, then there are three simples - "the sun" + a particular tone of voice + "is warm".
IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples.

Banno - "beliefs range over propositions"
There is the whole and the parts, and in mereology the parts are "simples". Consider the statement "I believe that the sun is warm", where "the sun is warm" is a proposition. I cannot have a belief in a simple, such as "the sun". Only a combination of simples has meaning. I can only have belief in a combination of simples, such as "the sun is warm", where one simple has a relation with another simple. For example, pre-langauge, a sentient being when looking at a yellow circle in the sky, the circle, being a simple held no meaning. There was only meaning to the sentient being in the combination of simples, in the combination of the simples "circle" and "warmth". With-language, there is the additional meaning, in that the simples "circle" is combined with the linguistic simples, the word "sun".
IE, within a proposition there cannot be belief in a simple but in the set of simples within the proposition

It is true that simples can be split into further simples
As a simple, "the sun" has no meaning. But the sun can be split into the further simples - the star - around which - the earth - orbits. Each of these can be split into further simples, until, in my opinion, we arrive at Kant's a priori pure intuitions.
IE, it remains true that a "simple" has no meaning.

Banno - words are connected using more than logical operators
Pre-language, there is the relation between the simples circle and warmth, where the connection is not that of a logical operator but that of empirical observation. With-language, where the circle is named "the sun", the connection between the empirical observation of a circle and the word "the sun" is not that of a logical operator, but as the word is learnt in a social environment, is also that of empirical observation.
IE, words are connected by correspondence with empirical observations.

metaphysician - relations between parts must exist independently of the observer
If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion.
IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer.

Summary
1) The meaning of a proposition such as "the sun is warm" is not in any of its simples - "the sun", "warm", but the combination of its simples.
2) These simples are themselves sets of other simples, in that the simple "sun" is the set of the simples "the star", "around which", "the earth" and "orbits".
3) Eventually we arrive at foundational simples, which I describe as Kant's a priori pure intuitions, such as time, space, causation, etc.
4) As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, A239: "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves".
5) IE, those things we observe in the world are only combinations of things for which we have prior knowledge.
6) IE, the meaning of a word is not in its use in language, but in that set of a priori pure intuitions from which it is composed.

It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". — RussellA

This would only be the case if the word is being used to refer to a particular thing. We could see that "dog" was the name of that particular thing. But since 'dog" is used to refer to numerous things, as it indicates a species of animals, then we cannot understand the meaning of the word in this way.

Actually "dog" is a complex abstract word, because it is debatable whether wolfs and coyotes and other doglike creatures are varieties of dogs.

IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples. — RussellA

I'm sorry RusselA, but I really cannot understand your description of wholes and parts, and your use of "simple". It is completely foreign to me and is not at all consistent with how I would normally use these words. You'd have to lay out a whole structure, and answer many questions from me, to make this at all intelligible to me.

For instance, I see no reason why a part is necessarily a simple, because even parts are composed of parts. So when you speak of the parts in meaning, like "sun", even this word, to be intelligible must be understood through composite parts of meaning. And since any aspect of meaning which appears to be a simple, really is not a simple, it really does not make sense to speak about meaning in these terms. I don't see what a "simple" could actually be. If to understand a simple requires understanding others, then how is it in anyway a simple? In conclusion, I don't know if you're trying to support the idea of "simples", or to dismiss it as inadequate.

If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion. — RussellA

Yes, I believe that all things have an ontological status. That is what makes a thing a thing, and by the law of identity a thing has an identity proper to itself regardless of how we as human beings might attempt to identify it.

The issue of the relationship between two things is different though. This is because relationships are understood by us through abstract concepts, which are generalizations based in quantitative assessments, applicable in numerous different situations. If a relationship between two things could be understood in terms other than generalizations, such as mathematical quantities, and scientific laws, then there might be relations which are purely unique, and distinct, just like things are distinct and unique. But this is not how we understand relations, so relations, as we understand them, do not have the same ontological existence that things have.

What I think, is that things have ontological existence. But since the relations between things is perspective dependent (dependent on the frame of reference in relativity theory), what is referred to by "relation" does not have ontological existence. But we might assume that since things have ontological existence, there must be some sort of ontological relation between them, and this would be to an extent true, but the word "relation" is not adequate here because it implies that our human abstractions of relations which are extremely deficient, are what is ontological.

IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer. — RussellA

Yes, I can see that. The ontological thing, which is the picture, could be said to be both a duck and a rabbit. By the law of identity, the true identity is within the thing itself, and is unrelated to what one might call it. As human beings we might say that there is both a duck there and a rabbit there, and there is a relation between these two. But any determination of such a relationship is somewhat arbitrary and simply dependent on one's perspective. The true identity is within the thing itself.

However, since the thing was created with intention, as one united whole, with a split personality, and this was the intent behind its creation, the issue is even more complex.

An neat summary. I'd recommend you keep reading about philosophy of language and especialy Wittgenstein, who's ideas you are beginning to understand.

It's worth noting that, despite not knowing the whole of language, folk do make use of it most effectively.

Also, that language is constructed from simples is the very notion perfected by Wittgesnten in the Tractatus, and rejected in the Investigations. It' called Logical Atomism. You might enjoy investigating it further.

As for Kant, there are those here who would defend him. I think philosophy, physics and psychology have made considerable progress since his time.



Cheers.

Sure, the rules of language are stated post hoc.

In order for a rule to be made explicit, it must first be. That is, they cannot be explicated unless there is something to be explicated. Hence, there are rules for language use.

The rules of language are not binding in the way the rules of physics are; they are normative. — Banno

:up:

Whether Banno's statement is acceptable or not depends on one's ontology. If rules are imaginary things, and imaginary things do not exist, then it makes no sense to say that rules must exist before being made explicit. This is like saying that God must exist in order for us to talk about Him. And if rules are not imaginary things, then what existence do they have other than as written statements? In this case being explicit is the existence of the rule. I don't see any other options for how a rule might exist, other than within the imaginations of human beings, or in the words written in the physical medium. Neither one implies that a rule exists before being made explicit. Do you know of any ontology which would support Banno's claim? Platonism and natural laws perhaps?

The 'rules' are just structures in the way we talk. Before we develop a complex tradition of studying the ways we talk (like trying to clarify what 'truth' means) we have already been using words like 'truth' successfully enough in ordinary contexts. This is the post hoc.

You mention 'imaginary things' which takes for granted what might be called a vague ontology. You also use the word 'exist.' It's not as if these words have clear, uncontested referents. Nor does 'referent' have some clear, uncontested referent. We simply charge ahead, shooting our ambiguous mouths off, taking a certain intelligibility utterly for granted. We can focus a critical 'eye' on some words only by using other words uncritically. This is why it's a matter of making explicit what's mostly automatic and unnoticed (inexplicit).

On the normative aspect, I'd look at which side of the road people drive on in this or that nation. Which side is contingent, but it's an important norm. With language it's not just a matter of being inoffensive but of being understood at all. Green ideas sleep furiously.

As far as W's ontology goes, I'd say some kind of social ontology. Not Platonism and not anything that starts with a ghost in the machine (reification of 'I' usage.)

To be a self, according to Hegel, involves self-consciousness. And this is not something that an individual can possess independently of others. Instead, self-consciousness depends on our having a sense of ourselves as individuals as distinct from others, which in turn depends on our interacting with other people (i.e., recognizing other people and being recognized by them)
...
Hegel’s universal spirit is sometimes used as an example of “ontological holism”—i.e., the claim that social entities are fundamental, independent, or autonomous entities, as opposed to being derived from individuals or non-social entities (Taylor 1975, Rosen 1984).
...
As an alternative to ‘compact’ or ‘agreement,’ the legal theorist Samuel Pufendorf, in De Officio Hominis et Civis of 1673, uses the term ‘convention’ as the basis for law and language. He argues that conventions do not need be explicitly formed or agreed to. Instead, we can have tacit conventions—i.e., conventions that we may not even be aware we have. — Blue Book thread

The details are endlessly debatable, but the gist is naked ('nothing is hidden'), if we are willing to let go of certain prejudices (misleading inherited metaphors for cognition.)

:up:

'A rectangular whittling silver lovely little French old knife' does sound weird. Interesting (but unsurprising?) that it's opinion(value) first.

Great example!

The 'rules' are just structures in the way we talk. Before we develop a complex tradition of studying the ways we talk (like trying to clarify what 'truth' means) we have already been using words like 'truth' successfully enough in ordinary contexts. This is the post hoc.

You mention 'imaginary things' which takes for granted what might be called a vague ontology. You also use the word 'exist.' It's not as if these words have clear, uncontested referents. Nor does 'referent' have some clear, uncontested referent. We simply charge ahead, shooting our ambiguous mouths off, taking a certain intelligibility utterly for granted. We can focus a critical 'eye' on some words only by using other words uncritically. This is why it's a matter of making explicit what's mostly automatic and unnoticed (inexplicit). — j0e

Great stuff. Well said.

Great stuff. Well said. — Luke

Thank you.

Well, I really don't see how there could be such a thing as a normative rule which is not explicit. That seems to be a self-contradicting idea. It's easy for people like you and Luke to insist that there must be such things, but if you think about it, it really doesn't make any sense. How are you supposed to know what to do without being told what to do? If you simply observe others doing something, and decide to behave in a similar way because it appears to be advantageous, this ought not be described as a normative rule.

Take your example of driving on the right or left. Suppose no one tells you which side of the road to drive on. You observe, and decide that you'd better drive on a certain side of the road if you want to avoid a crash and stay alive. How is that a normative rule? You have simply chosen not to go against the flow, decided that it is in your best interest to do things in a way which is consistent with others. I would not call this a "normative rule", because I think what makes a rule a rule, is to be explicitly stated.

To me, it seems ridiculous to conclude that any time a group of things are behaving in a similar way they are following a normative rule. Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. Such a conclusion leads one to believe that molecules, atoms, and fundamental particles are following normative rules, and panpsychism in general. Denying this, as I do, allows us to see that consistency in behaviour which is common in inanimate particles, and also common in human beings, is not properly described as following a normative rule.

So I think it is fundamentally wrong to conclude that when people are acting in a way which is consistent with the way others act, that this is a matter of following a normative rule. That is an oversimplification which upon analysis turns out to be false, or else gives "normative rule" a very odd sense which is not at all conducive to good philosophical inquiry. So this idea is simply misleading. When you see a swarm of insects, or a flock of birds headed south, would you say that these creatures are following normative rules? Herd mentality ought not be described as following normative rules.

How are you supposed to know what to do without being told what to do? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm confident that you mostly learned language just by hanging around. Pronouncing words correctly is not even explicitly taught.

To me, it seems ridiculous to conclude that any time a group of things are behaving in a similar way they are following a normative rule. Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a group of just any kind of things, but a group of human beings or (I just discovered, checking on a suspicion) some animals.

Social norms, or mores, are the unwritten rules of behavior that are considered acceptable in a group or society. Norms function to provide order and predictability in society.
[/qoute]
https://examples.yourdictionary.com/social-norm-examples.html
— link

A paper in PNAS this week explored differences in social behavior between four different populations of chimpanzees, finding that the groups had very different norms when it came to hanging out together and grooming one another. They point out that this means studying one population of chimps might not always be enough for accurate claims about the species as a whole. — link

https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/11/chimps-have-different-cultural-norms-about-friendliness-too/

Even chimps seem to have varying local norms. Nice!

Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that works. When children misbehave they are corrected by parents and peers. We don't get a manual of everything to do or not do. Some things are made explicit, of course, but generally only when they need to be, when a child misbehaves or the situation is complex (websites tell US visitors to Sweden, for example, which differences to prepare for to avoid being rude.)

Moreover norms change. People see other people mocked or insulted for online speech (to name an example) and update their sense of what's acceptable. Such norms aren't exactly articulated. It requires skill to stay on the right side of the line. Comedians work right on the edge, and we love or hate them for it.

Such a conclusion leads one to believe that molecules, atoms, and fundamental particles are following normative rules, and panpsychism in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

It would (slightly) violate the norms of intelligibility to use 'norms' for fundamental particulars. A panpsychist might make a case, but that would be an attempt to get us to think in uncommon ways. Some attempts like that do succeed. I don't believe that rivers always had mouths.

When you see a swarm of insects, or a flock of birds headed south, would you say that these creatures are following normative rules? Herd mentality ought not be described as following normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the contrary, 'herd mentality' is a good phrase for the kind of linguistic norms I have in mind, if one ignores its connotation.

If you simply observe others doing something, and decide to behave in a similar way because it appears to be advantageous, this ought not be described as a normative rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

The individual's decision is not the rule. I can decide to drive wearing a blindfold, but this violates the rule or norm that I drive carefully whether I like or recognize that norm or not. It's not up to the individual, excepting that individuals contribute in their small way to maintaining or shifting norms.

wholes and parts — Metaphysician Undercover

metaphysician - names
I agree. When we observe, for example, a post-box, we can know two different things at the same time. We know that we are observing a particular red (700nm), and we also know that we are observing an abstract "redness" (620nm to 750nm).

metaphysician - use of "simple"
I am trying to use the word "simple" as used in mereology, where a "simple" is any thing that has no proper parts.

metaphysician - all things have an ontological status - the true identity is within the thing itself - what is referred to by "relation" does not have an ontological existence

If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated.

If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.

If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".

However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.

As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts

IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind.

I'm confident that you mostly learned language just by hanging around. Pronouncing words correctly is not even explicitly taught. — j0e

Right, that's my point. We learn how to talk simply by hanging around, not by learning rules.

. When children misbehave they are corrected by parents and peers. — j0e

Yes, when children misbehave the rule is made explicit. Prior to it being made explicit, the children do not know the rule, and cannot follow it, hence they are prone to what the adults call misbehaving.

It would (slightly) violate the norms of intelligibility to use 'norms' for fundamental particulars. — j0e

But how would you differentiate between these two? People behave in ways similar to each other, without following explicit rules. Fundamental particles behave in ways similar to each other without following explicit rules. On what basis do you claim that the people are following normative rules, and the particles are not, when there is no physical evidence of any such rules in both cases, only common behaviour in both cases?

So I think it is you who is violating the norms of intelligibility, with your case of special pleading, to say that some things which behave in common ways are following normative rules, while other things are not, when there is no evidence of any such rules in both cases.

On the contrary, 'herd mentality' is a good phrase for the kind of linguistic norms I have in mind, if one ignores its connotation. — j0e

Yes, and this makes good evidence that these norms do not exist as any sort of rules

If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated. — RussellA

This presents an ontological problem. If the thing is a whole, then it is fundamentally a unity. We use the concept of spatial separation to refer to a measurable distance between distinct unities, separate wholes. If we assume spatial separation within the supposed thing, then we deny the unity which is required to make it a thing, a whole.

So in reality, the opposite of what you say is what is true. If a thing has true ontological status, then it is impossible that the parts are spatially separated because this would deny the unity of the thing, making it just a group of things (its parts) instead.

This is the issue of divisibility. We say that a thing is divisible. But divisible means possible to be divided, it does not mean actually divided. If we actually divide the thing, to produce the required spatial separation between its parts, then the thing loses its ontological status as the thing it was, because it has been divided. So the relationship between parts and whole is actually very complex, because a thing cannot be at the same time, a whole, as the unity required to make it a thing, and also a group of parts, even though we commonly say that a thing is composed of parts. It's contradictory to give the thing existence as a whole, and the parts existence as individual things, at the same time.

Take the solar system for an example. Let's assume that it is a whole, a unity. The inclination is to say that each planet is a distinct part, with spatial separation. In reality though the planets are all within the electromagnetic and gravitational fields of the sun, and there is no real spatial separation between them, as the fields occupy the entire area. So representing each planet as a separate part with space between them, is not a true representation.

If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.

If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".

However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.

As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts

IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind. — RussellA

Now you are talking about concepts here? I agree that they only exist in minds, and as such the type of existence they have is completely different from things. That's why I had a hard time understanding you when you were talking about wholes and parts, and simples, in the context of meaning. These ideas, wholes and parts are applied to the divisibility of things, but I do not see how a concept is divisible.

Descartes last book was Passions of the Mind. Underlying all the talk of morals, he seemed concerned whether he WANTED his theory of innate ideas to be right and that this was the cause of his previous conclusions. Now Kant's last major work was Conflict of the Faculties, in which he too seems concerned that his previous conclusions were motivated by desire and now found himself trapped in contradictions. Wittgenstein, now we can say, tried to overturn his previous philosophy by coming up with a new system, for which he should be praised. It is questionable though if he anything meaningful to say about philosophy apart from the conviction that philosophy leads to no truths. I for one don't read much at all from Wittgenstein because he doesn't try to draw conclusions and find a final Ethos

I should clarify that Wittgenstein makes a lot of sense to a lot of people. Descartes thought he found the one and only set of moral hierarchies and Kant thought he found the only arrangement of categories that made sense. They were polar opposites though, one believing in innate ideas which lead to analytic posterior truth and the other rejected innate ideas and argued that they were synthetic a priori ideas disguised as knowledge. All three of these philosophers seem kind of anal to me so I prefer pure German and Italian idealism

We learn how to talk simply by hanging around, not by learning rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

es, and this makes good evidence that these norms do not exist as any sort of rules — Metaphysician Undercover

'Rules' is just a metaphor to be interpreted in context. In general the 'rules' are not explicit.(We may agree more than you think.) I see meaning out there in the interactive hustle & bustle and not in here, directly present to an infinitely intimate mind-eye. It's patterns in our doings, including our mouth-doings. Patterns, rules, games. I say don't cut your fingers on the envelope.

All three of these philosophers seem kind of anal to me so I prefer pure German and Italian idealism — Gregory

That's a fun sentence.

Wittgenstein was a positivist, who were people who restricted reason in some type of attempt to find absolute knowledge by finding "all the angles". I think Descartes was a Platonist with more math skills than philosophical ability, but Kant on the other hand started positivism. He is the only one of them I like. He makes a lot of sense in some ways. Wittgenstein will put his arguments in weird arrangments to make them appear more profound than they perhaps are, which is a trick started by, yes, Kant when he put mathematics under the category of Aesthetics in the critique of pure reason