:yikes: :cool:I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink: — NKBJ
I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.
The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy. — NKBJ
My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken. — javra
My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken. — javra
Perhaps it's in the possibility that the choice can reconfigure the causal chain, in effect resetting its succession to a new origin. — Merkwurdichliebe
Even if the choice has no causal relation to the state of affairs, it marks a resolution for the deciding agent so that the landscape of possibility becomes altered. — Merkwurdichliebe
I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused. — NKBJ
Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs? — Merkwurdichliebe
So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile. — javra
Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s). — javra
hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. — javra
But those choices aren't "free" or untethered to determined causes. — NKBJ
I suppose one could psychologise at this point as to why such a negation is so important. A terror of responsibility perhaps? . . . It seems like a refusal to live, almost — unenlightened
I'm just amusing myself at their expense, while I wait for that justification. — unenlightened
Freewill is usually contrasted with determinism which is the belief that the any state of affairs is causally specified by what comes before it. — TheMadFool
He is addressing what you are talking about, i thought you might be interested. — Merkwurdichliebe
But the opposite of that wouldn't be decisions that are not influenced by anything. The opposite would simply be some departure from strict causality. — Terrapin Station
I was just giving you a chance to build your position — Merkwurdichliebe
I'm not interested in typing some long, very generalized thing. I think it's rather a problem on this board that people tend to do that. There's usually no focus. People ramble on, bringing up 15-20 different topics in a long post and not really addressing any of them. I just wanted to simply correct a conceptual misunderstanding. If you disagree or don't understand what I said that's fine, but ask specific questions, keep things focused, etc. — Terrapin Station
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