Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions, — Seppo

You beat me to the post.

Again, it seems odd that this relatively simple stuff can be so misunderstood.

Yeah... you may have noticed that I have a hard time walking away from conversations, even when they aren't productive. Time to sign off now though, I have episodes of Breaking Bad to watch. :grin:

Enjoy.

Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions, then having a truth-value is not where they can differ, because having a truth-value is what propositions do. — Seppo

That would depend on how they differ. You cannot just assume that they are the same in the respect of being the same.

If hinge propositions don't have a truth-value, then they are not propositions. — Seppo

Ya, that's my point. You've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post as if you didn't read what I said, so this may be a lost cause. Did you read the article? Hinge propositions are not propositions, but rules of grammar.

Hinge propositions not being propositions is self-contradictory. — Seppo

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions". Apparently you have no interest in discussing whether or not hinge propositions are propositions, or in discussing Wittgenstein's work.

Hinge propositions are set apart from other propositions not in virtue of lacking a truth-value, but in their inability to be justified, — Seppo

You keep repeating this without any apparent regard for Wittgenstein's work, but based solely on the designation of "hinge proposition".

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value.
— Luke

That's not valid reasoning, and it's not cogent. — Banno

It is valid reasoning. Seppo's argument is:

All propositions (in general) are bearers of truth-value
Hinge propositions are propositions (in general)
Therefore, hinge propositions are bearers of truth-value

If hinge propositions are different from propositions (in general), then hinge propositions are not propositions (in general). I'm not sure about you, but Seppo has acknowledged a difference between hinge propositions and propositions (in general).

If hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are in some respects the same, then it needs to be explained in what respects they are the same, without assuming that they must be the same because they are both propositions (in general). They are not both propositions (in general).

If hinge propositions were sufficiently different to other propositions so as not to be truth bearing, they would arguably no longer be propositions. — Banno

Yeah, as I said in my last post, and according to the article I linked to in my last post, hinge propositions are not propositions.

I'm not sure one can have a rule that is not a proposition. — Banno

This is a very anti-Wittgensteinian sentiment imo.

A rule presumably says how things should be, and how they should be is a possible state of affairs, and hence a proposition. — Banno

What "possible state of affairs" or "[way] things should be" is given by a rule of grammar, logic, or chess?

As Moyal-Sharrock (again) notes:

When we learn rules, we do not learn content, but a technique, a skill, a mastery – how to proceed. To follow a rule is not to make a judgement, but to make a move. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein's Hinge Certainty

If hinge propositions are different from propositions (in general), then hinge propositions are not propositions (in general). — Luke

Ah, I see. You are using an odd version of "different" - hence you have confused yourself.

Siamese are different from other cats, lets' say.

You want to conclude that Siamese are therefore not cats.

But I give in. Correcting your simple errors is both arduous and thankless.

For what it is worth, there may be a point in Moyal-Sharrock, but I see nothing to indicate you have understood it.

Where's @Sam26?

Siamese are different from other cats, lets' say.

You want to conclude that Siamese are therefore not cats. — Banno

It remains to be demonstrated that hinge propositions are of the same type as propositions in general.

Where's Sam26? — Banno

Yeah, where is he? He was also arguing that hinge propositions do not have a truth-value.

:roll:


It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general.

It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general. — Banno

More like: It remains to be demonstrated that koala bears are of the same type as bears in general.

The argument being offered is akin to: All bears hibernate in the winter, therefore koala bears must hibernate in the winter. Otherwise, they wouldn't be called bears. ...Solid argument.

Yeah, where is he? He was also arguing that hinge propositions do not have a truth-value. — Luke

He was also arguing that propositions in general cannot be true unless they're known.

Sorry, I haven't been feeling well, so it's difficult to post.

I'm just going to do a general post because I just don't have the energy to respond to all of you.

Much of the problem probably stems from the different ways we view beliefs. My contention is that beliefs can function quite apart from language (Wittgenstein's showing), i.e., we can observe beliefs in non-linguistic actions (even in animals). And, epistemological language-games (knowing, justification and truth), in terms of hinge's or bedrock beliefs, come later as language develops.

If we think of very primitive language-games (for e.g. W.'s example at the beginning of the PI), I think it follows, again, necessarily, that epistemology, and all the concepts involved (even truth), will not, and cannot obtain, until the conceptual framework develops. So, bedrock or hinge beliefs at their core, i.e., because of how they come about as part of the framework or backdrop of reality, have a status that excludes them from all epistemological talk (including truth - OC 204, 205, 206).

All epistemological talk (as arguments against my position), even truth, is always after the fact, we tend to bring it into the conversation as though its always been there. Even in young children, who learn what it means to know only later in their language talk, have these primitive beliefs long before they develop the concepts involved in epistemology.

Now some of you might argue that it doesn't matter that the concepts of justification and truth come later, that doesn't, in itself, negate the truth of these bedrock beliefs. If this, however, was true, then it would seem to follow that it wouldn't negate our use of justification either, or it wouldn't negate Moore's use of the concept know within the the context Moore is using the word.

One of the key features W. points out about Moorean propositions is that when seen against their negation (e.g. "I don't know this is a hand.") it's not clear what their sense is (OC 4). After all if we're not sure of the very backdrop of reality, then how can you be sure of the very words used to talk about such things (W.). It also seems clear to me that truth (as an epistemological function) has the same problem, viz., if Moore had said, as he held up his hand, "It's true that I have a hand," it would have the identical problem that Moore's use of know has, especially since knowing entails truth. Again, consider the negation, "It's not true that I have hands," this proposition also lacks sense in the same way.

One last point, W. pointed out through examples that Moore's use of "I know..." can have a sense in other settings or language-games, but this use is different from the use as a hinge, which is the use Moore is being criticized for. The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false. However, in other settings or language-game, they can be true or false. I think to fail to acknowledge this is to fail to understand W. point about hinges, or as I like to refer to them, bedrock beliefs.

Me too as it happens. No problem.

Take care and get well.

That would depend on how they differ. You cannot just assume that they are the same in the respect of being the same. — Luke

Having a truth-value is an essential, characteristic trait of propositions. Just as having three sides is an essential, characteristic trait of triangles. Different types of triangles can and do differ from one another... just not in having three sides, since if they don't have three sides they aren't a triangle. And in exactly the same fashion, different types of propositions- hinge propositions, for instance- may differ from one another in various ways, but not in having a truth-value or not. If hinge propositions lack a truth-value, then they are not propositions, just as a triangle that didn't have three sides wouldn't be a triangle.

This is why this is frustrating, neither I nor anyone else should have to explicitly make such an argument.

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions". — Luke

Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions". So, they have a truth-value. Because having a truth-value is to propositions what having three sides is to triangles.

So this is what this conversation is amounting to, me having to explicitly draw out tautologies and argue for trivialities, and re-iterate things you ignored or forgot. Not a very rewarding discussion from my perspective.

Apparently you have no interest in discussing whether or not hinge propositions are propositions, or in discussing Wittgenstein's work. — Luke

:yikes: Yikes, man, just yikes.

It remains to be demonstrated that siamese cats are of the same type as cats in general. — Banno

its sad that this isn't even an exaggeration or caricature...

The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false. — Sam26

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning. When a baby takes its first steps it is either true or false that the floor or ground will support their weight, but such a consideration does not come into play.

200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for
or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true? The student learning their times tables might even doubt it. They may ask you to justify it. And you can via demonstration. But, of course, not all mathematical propositions can be required to be justified in order to justify 12x12=144.

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning. When a baby takes its first steps it is either true or false that the floor or ground will support their weight, but such a consideration does not come into play. — Fooloso4

:up: Exactly, good analogy. Its absurd to think that there is no fact of the matter as to whether there is a hand here, or whether I've spent my life in close proximity to Earth. Of course there is some fact of the matter, and therefore a truth-value to the proposition that "here is a hand" or "I've spent my life in close proximity to the Earth"- either this is a hand, or it isn't, and either I have spent my life in close proximity to the Earth, or I haven't. One or the other is, necessarily, true, and the other false.

What distinguishes these propositions, and our beliefs in these propositions, is that they are taken to be true, rather than evaluated to be true, and that they are not doubted, rather than somehow being immune to doubt in and of themselves.

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true? — Fooloso4

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting. Can they function as truths, yes, in certain settings/contexts language-games they can. You're failing to see the dual function of these bedrock statements.

he does refer to them as "propositions — Seppo

The fact that something can be stated as a proposition does not mean that all hinges are propositional, or should be analyzed in terms of propositions.

But that means I want to conceive it [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination. (OC 475)

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting. — Sam26

If mathematical propositions were neither true nor false then my bank account might be in big trouble, but then again, it might be a windfall when I deposit $100 and my balance goes from $200 to $2,000,000.

The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC.

The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC. — Sam26

You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly.

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly. — Fooloso4

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops. It has nothing to do with truth or falsity. Sure, in some language-games I can say that it's true that 1+1=2 or that it's true that bishops move diagonally, or that it's true that a given statement, which at times doesn't have a truth value (Moorean propositions), can at other times have a truth value. When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill, like learning any language, i.e., we apply the grammatical rules that others use, and we learn to use them in ways that accord with particular language-games.

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity. What are the truths that language sits on? There are no prior linguistic truths, no more than there is something prior to the rule that bishops move diagonally. In a sense it's just an arbitrary grammatical move that we choose to use as part of the language-game of mathematics. It's a useful tool like any of our concepts.

You're right, there is a sense where they are incontestable, but that's not because they are true, it's because we choose to act with these propositions in ways that are incontestable - not because there is some intrinsic sense of truth. They have a bedrock function that's completely devoid of truth. They are arational beliefs, so they function apart from ratiocination in their bedrock role.

For myself I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions, which is why they're referred to in a number of ways (bedrock propositions, basic beliefs, foundational beliefs, hinge certainties, etc). For me, and I believe for W. they are just very basic certainties or beliefs that lack a truth value or justification.

Wittgenstein never called them "hinge propositions".
— Luke
Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions". So, they have a truth-value. Because having a truth-value is to propositions what having three sides is to triangles. — Seppo

Moyal-Sharrock does not use the phrase "hinge proposition".

He talks of "hinges", and there is some small merit in the account he gives. @Luke is too gormless to articulate it, but it is there.

I disagree with it. I suggest that an analogy for this thread would be an argument between builders as to whether the hinge is part of the door or part of the wall. Of course, it is part of both - that's it's purpose. Is a hinge an "animal" thing or is it propositional? It's were these two come together.

So a hinge is propositional in that it is true; and "animal" in that it is part of the background against which language can occur.

For myself I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions, — Sam26

Then best to stop referring to them as such. Better to call them just "hinges". Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional.

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops. — Sam26

Those who know how to calculate have learned that it is true that 1+1=2. Those who know how to play chess have learned that it is true that bishops can only move diagonally.

Suppose you grew up in an isolated area where the few people who are around add 1+1=3. In your defense you might point out that this is how everyone calculates. It does not follow that if you live here 1+1=3 and if you live somewhere else 1+1=0.

It does not follow that if you have one stone in one hand and one in the other that you have three stones. You have this one in this hand and that one in the other, where is the third? If you claim that 1+1=1 then if you this one in this hand and that one in the other, do you hide one in order to get 1 from 1+1?

The baker's apprentice does not learn that 6+6=13 but that with a baker's dozen you get one free.

When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill — Sam26

Part of that skill is learning 1+1 equals some number other than 2 false.

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity. — Sam26

654. "The multiplication '12x12', when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result '144'." Nobody will contest this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the mathematical proposition?

It does not.

Then best to stop referring to them as such. Better to call them just "hinges". Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional. — Banno

I've referred to them in multiple ways, especially as bedrock beliefs.

For me, the language-game of certainty is wider in its scope. In particular, one's certainty expressed in acts apart from language. When I sweep the floor my actions show my certainty (the certainty of the existence of a broom and floor for e.g.), apart from any expression of that certainty. Language is something I add on to that basic certainty, it's a further linguistic action.

The fact that something can be stated as a proposition does not mean that all hinges are propositional, or should be analyzed in terms of propositions. — Fooloso4

Sure, in most contexts, its not necessarily the most helpful way to analyze them, and I think Banno was right when he remarked that the phrase "hinge proposition" was unfortunate in some ways. But in this context, its being asked/disputed whether they are truth-apt, and so the fact that hinge propositions are propositions, and that W refers to them as propositions, is directly relevant and hard to omit.

(and again, its just absurd on its face that they are not truth-apt, as if there is no truth-value to the proposition "here is a hand"- of course there is a truth-value, and its truth or falsity depends on whether there is a hand there or not... but as hinges, they are taken to be true, not evaluated or justified in the usual manner that we evaluate propositions and form our beliefs, in order that we can evaluate, justify, doubt, believe, etc other propositions/propositions in general)