I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever. — Banno

Aristotle thought you could directly see ideas. Trees and cups are part idea and part physical. That framework, that we're all in the mind of God, is the original basis of direct realism. Indirect realism came from the beginnings of the materialistic age. It's ironic that for some, the backgrounds have come to be switched around.

You are not seperate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

I appreciate the attempt to streamline the issue here, but that just doesn't make any sense.

I appreciate the attempt to streamline the issue here, but that just doesn't make any sense. — frank

:smile:

So it seems.

It's a rejection of the homunculus. Indirect realism has you sitting inside your head, seeing and touching what is constructed by your nerves. It separates the observer not just from the thing observed, but from the observation.

Take a look at Michael's diagram:

It's the "mental image" that is seen. The observer is somehow distinct from the "mental image".

But doesn't it strike you as odd that the "mental image" is not part of the mind doing the observation?

Isn't the "mental image" mental?

Building that mental image, that model, that representation, is something mind, and presumably, brain, does.

So seeing the screen this text is on is constructing a mental model of the screen.

That's different to the indirect realist view, that you do not see the screen but instead see the "mental image" of the screen.

Does that help?

But doesn't it strike you as odd that the "mental image" is not part of the mind doing the observation? — Banno

This comes down to the nature of the self. I think what you're trying to do is eliminate the self along with the homunculus. Is that true?

This comes down to the nature of the self. — frank

In a way, yes, since it is oneself that does the perceiving. Is the "self" seeing the tree or the representation of the tree? I say one sees the tree, by representing it. Although I also have sympathies for disjunctivism.

I'm not seeking to eliminate the self. I do have a preference for externalism and extended mind views, that the content of mind is stuff that is in a way external to the mind. That you believe Canberra is in Australia is in some sense about stuff outside the mind.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/#ContExte

So does the view I'm trying to express still make no sense?

A good spinach salad tastes better using chopsticks. Couldn't be more physically direct contact. Could be less links in the chain.

Light directly enters the eye and interacts with biological machinery beginning at the back of the eye and spreading out into the brain. Numerous biological structures are involved. I do not know the names of them all, nor do I need to. There are, and that's what matters. That's all physical interaction. How much more direct can anything be?

I understand the idea of seeing the tree by way of a representation, but like Michael, I would say that's indirect realism. I don't think it matters what we call it as long as we both know what we're talking about. It was this that made no sense to me:

You are not separate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room?

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank

I almost quoted that paragraph, crossed that part out, and agreed. That part caused me pause as well.

I took it to mean that when you are interacting with the room then that is what you are. I don't want to speak for @Banno, but I have no problem with that ever-changing notion of the self—why should we think there is an unchanging self over and above that?

Not sure why you have posted this. Is it by way of agreeing wiht what I have said?

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank

Well, where are those representations? If you are interacting with them, then presumably they can be distinguished from you... hence you see them, and we havn't an explanation of what seeing consist in at all.

As contrasted with interacting with the room by constructing those representations. I dunno. Seems a simple enough point.

Well, where are those representations? If you are interacting with them, then presumably they can be distinguished from you... hence you see them, and we havn't an explanation of what seeing consist in at all. — Banno

I would propose that instead of trying to explain sight, let's first do a quick analysis of what we do with the concept of self:

You saw a cow.
You tasted a sesame seed.
You heard a song.

The "you" in these sentences refers to a single entity who experiences a sequence of things. The self stays the same, and the things change, going by like a stream. This means the logic of these sentences rules out the self being equivalent to the things. It appears that if we do that, the self will be a fragmented, schizoid stream. If you choose to allow the self to fragment in that way, a pretty large chunk of your own speech will become nonsense.

Now lets look at what we know about what's happening when you see a cow. Our best guess, as set out by scientists, is that the brain is creating an experience of a visual field. We know your brain has to be creating this because your eyes are constantly shifting direction and focus. Somehow you put all that data together into a seamless, unified image. I would say you experience the image. It's a visual experience. Where is the experience? I don't think that question has an answer. Where is the image? I don't think that question has an answer either. I think it's an element of neural algorithms, or something like that. Could we say that you are the experience? As I mentioned before, that will slice and dice your capacity to speak coherently. Is that what you wanted to do though?

I would propose that instead of trying to explain sight, let's first do a quick analysis of what we do with the concept of self: — frank

Not sure that's a good plan. I don't see that self will be any simpler than sight - that seems very unlikely.

The self stays the same... — frank

Well, no, it doesn't. It is in a state of flux.

For the rest, the experience is of a cow, not of a "visual field" or of an "image" of a cow.

I would say you experience the image. — frank

That's not right. Rather, constructing the "image" is your experiencing the cow.

I don't understand why this seems so difficult to comprehend.

I don't understand why this seems so difficult to comprehend. — Banno

:grin: It's just one of those things.

So

...constructing the "image" is your experiencing the cow. — Banno

Does that make sense to you? You experience the cow by your neural nets building some sort of model or image or representation of the cow. Add to that the smell, the feel of the hide, and so on.

Does that make sense to you? You experience the cow by your neural nets building some sort of model or image or representation of the cow. Add to that the smell, the feel of the hide, and so on. — Banno

Yes. That makes sense.

So a further point, about language use, perhaps: Is it clearer, better, to say that you see the cow, or that you see the model or image or representation of the cow that your neural network constructs?

By way of argument in favour of the former, we sometimes might claim that you and I are to be said to be looking at the very same cow. It seems difficult to say this if what you see is the product of your neural net, and what I see is the product of my neural net. You see the product of your neural net, I see the product of my neural net, and hence we do not see the same cow.

That is, saying that what you see is the model or image or representation of the cow, and not the cow, makes other things we commonly do, oddly complicated.

Is it clearer, better, to say that you see the cow, or that you see the model or image or representation of the cow that your neural network constructs? — Banno

I've been a visual artist for a long time. I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at, but this is something new artists struggle with. The mind strongly insists it knows what things look like and it will override attempts to draw what's actually in the visual field. I've known about this since childhood, so it's obvious to me that a person can voluntarily shift focus depending on what their concerns are. If it's an incoming car, I probably won't dwell long on how the car is foreshortened in space as it approaches me.

By way of argument in favour of the former, we sometimes might claim that you and I are to be said to be looking at the very same cow. It seems difficult to say this if what you see is the product of your neural net, and what I see is the product of my neural net. You see the product of your neural net, I see the product of my neural net, and hence we do not see the same cow. — Banno

We say we see the same cow, yes. Our experiences are different though.

That is, saying that what you see is the model or image or representation of the cow, and not the cow, makes other things we commonly do, oddly complicated. — Banno

It depends on the situation and what point you're trying to convey.

I've been a visual artist for a long time. I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at, but this is something new artists struggle with. The mind strongly insists it knows what things look like and it will override attempts to draw what's actually in the visual field. I've known about this since childhood, so it's obvious to me that a person can voluntarily shift focus depending on what their concerns are. If it's an incoming car, I probably won't dwell long on how the car is foreshortened in space as it approaches me. — frank

Cool. So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on?

I'm not seeing what we are to do with this. Is the claim that the colour, shade, shape and so on are the mental model, and that you have learned to see it? I don't think that quite right. Interesting, though.

Our experiences are different though. — frank

Sure. But not so different that we always say we are seeing different cows... At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow...

That might be enough.

No single thread runs through the whole rope - that sort of thing.

So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on? — Banno

Yes. Anyone who learns to draw has to learn this. This is what the mind wants to do:



What's happening is that the mind has a hoard of stock images. When you go to draw something, the power of these images appears. Egyptians didn't know how to override that. That's why their figures are basically fleshy stickmen.

The next development was perspective. This was huge from the Renaissance onward. In the 20th Century, artists decided that perspective is also a stock idea rather than how visual experience really works. Cubism was one sprout from that soil.

So I'm just explaining that people focus on the nature of experience quite a bit. A lot of art is really about that rather than the object of perception: the cow.

At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow... — Banno

True.

I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at — frank

Most people have 2 "local" visual fields, one from the left eye and one from the right eye. These 2 local visual fields overlap, but there are parts of each eye's local visual field which can't be seen by the other eye.

The brain combines the 2 local visual fields to create a "global" visual field.

There is a "blind spot" in each local visual field where the optic nerve enters the eye. When creating the global visual field the brain combines the 2 local visual fields in such a way that the blind spots are hidden. People are normally unaware of the blind spots, but they can be experienced under certain circumstances.

Your brain "tricks" you in a number of ways. Most people say that they can experience color over the whole global visual field. But the periphery of each local visual field only contains "rod" cells, which can only detect black and white. The "cone" cells which detect color are not found in the periphery.

The blood vessels in the eye lie near the retina, but between the retina and the lens. This means that shadows of the blood vessels fall on the retina. But your brain "tricks" you and you are normally not aware of them. They can be seen under certain circumstances.

Here's the point, again; one does not see the representation; seeing is constructing the representation. — Banno

I see colours and feel pain. Colours and pain are mental phenomena. I see things when I dream and hear things when I hallucinate.

You're reading something into the grammar of "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

You mean like direct realism = the apple is distal object is numerically identical to the apple percept? — fdrake

I'll copy from What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

There's a distinction between a distal object being a constituent of experience and being a cause of experience. Indirect realists accept that distal objects are a cause of experience but deny that they are a constituent of experience.

Colours and pain are mental phenomena. — Michael

If colours are no more than mental phenomena, how is it that we agree that clear skys are blue? How is it that we agree that an ache is not a sting?

They are also linguistic, and physical.

If colours are no more than mental phenomena, how is it that we agree that clear skys are blue? How is it that we agree that an ache is not a sting?

They are also linguistic, and physical. — Banno

I'll repeat myself from an earlier comment:

This is equivocation. There is "colour" as an object's surface disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light and there is "colour" as the mental phenomenon that differs between those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision (and that occurs when we dream and hallucinate).

Despite sharing the same label these are distinct things – albeit causally covariant given causal determinism.

Those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision will agree that some object reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, but they will see it to have a different colour appearance.

All assertion and no argument. I'll wait until you present an argument to address—responding to mere assertions being a waste of time. — Janus

The argument was in that comment:

Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects (and their properties) do not exist within experience.

The first premise is supported by neuroscience. The second premise is true by definition. The conclusion follows.

This is equivocation. There is "colour" as an object's surface disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light and there is "colour" as the mental phenomenon that differs between those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision (and that occurs when we dream and hallucinate). — Michael

There's also the colour red. Folk knew about it well before they knew about wavelengths and three channel colour vision.

If there is a equivocation here, it is being forced on us. But in any case, it seems we now agree that colours are not just mental phenomena.

If there is a equivocation here, it is being forced on us. But in any case, it seems we now agree that colours are not just mental phenomena. — Banno

When I say "I see colours and colours are mental phenomena" I am referring to the mental phenomena, not whatever else the term "colour" might be used to refer to.

So to repeat:

I see colours and feel pain. Colours and pain are mental phenomena. I see things when I dream and hear things when I hallucinate.

You're reading something into the grammar of "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

There's also the colour red. Folk knew about it well before they knew about wavelengths and three channel colour vision. — Banno

What is the substance of this? If we're not talking about wavelengths and we're not talking about mental percepts then what do we mean by "is red"? All we seem to be agreeing on is that most English speakers use the predicate "is red" to describe the apple.

That linguistic issue has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. You can't see the forest for the giant red herring you've fished out.

To help you out, lets's consider us all to be deaf, illiterate mutes. We still see colours, and the colours we see have nothing to do with language.

I started writing the following, decided it was too pedantic, and didn't post, but in light of others discussing it...

The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

How about, "The model emerges in the process of you interacting with the room."?

That issue of language has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

:rofl: I think it is exactly the problem. We do not disagree on anything to do with the physiology or physics hereabouts. Where we disagree is as to the language of perception.

I say we see the cow. You say we see only the mental cow.

I don't see our approaches as meshing.

"The model emerges in the process of you interacting with the room. — wonderer1

Something like that. This is where @Isaac would chime in. :worry:

This discussion will again get nowhere. not with comments such as

When I say "I see colours and colours are mental phenomena" I am referring to the mental phenomena, not whatever else the term "colour" might be used to refer to. — Michael

Well, yes; if by "colour: you mean only mental phenomena, then colours are only mental phenomena, and you have thereby invented your own little language game that you can go play in the corner by yourself.

Enjoy.

I think it is exactly the problem. We do not disagree on anything to do with the physiology or physics hereabouts. Where we disagree is as to the language of perception.

I say we see the cow. You say we see only the mental cow.

I don't see our approaches as meshing. — Banno

This is precisely the point I have been making since the start. The philosophical dispute between direct (naive) and indirect (non-naive) realists concerns the physics and physiology of perception. Indirect realists are right and direct realists are wrong.

Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists enter the fray, read something into the sentence "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there, and so start an irrelevant and nonsense argument about grammar.