I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever. — Banno
You are not seperate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno
:smile:I appreciate the attempt to streamline the issue here, but that just doesn't make any sense. — frank
In a way, yes, since it is oneself that does the perceiving. Is the "self" seeing the tree or the representation of the tree? I say one sees the tree, by representing it. Although I also have sympathies for disjunctivism.This comes down to the nature of the self. — frank
You are not separate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno
It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank
It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank
Well, where are those representations? If you are interacting with them, then presumably they can be distinguished from you... hence you see them, and we havn't an explanation of what seeing consist in at all. — Banno
Not sure that's a good plan. I don't see that self will be any simpler than sight - that seems very unlikely.I would propose that instead of trying to explain sight, let's first do a quick analysis of what we do with the concept of self: — frank
Well, no, it doesn't. It is in a state of flux.The self stays the same... — frank
That's not right. Rather, constructing the "image" is your experiencing the cow.I would say you experience the image. — frank
Is it clearer, better, to say that you see the cow, or that you see the model or image or representation of the cow that your neural network constructs? — Banno
By way of argument in favour of the former, we sometimes might claim that you and I are to be said to be looking at the very same cow. It seems difficult to say this if what you see is the product of your neural net, and what I see is the product of my neural net. You see the product of your neural net, I see the product of my neural net, and hence we do not see the same cow. — Banno
That is, saying that what you see is the model or image or representation of the cow, and not the cow, makes other things we commonly do, oddly complicated. — Banno
Cool. So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on?I've been a visual artist for a long time. I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at, but this is something new artists struggle with. The mind strongly insists it knows what things look like and it will override attempts to draw what's actually in the visual field. I've known about this since childhood, so it's obvious to me that a person can voluntarily shift focus depending on what their concerns are. If it's an incoming car, I probably won't dwell long on how the car is foreshortened in space as it approaches me. — frank
Sure. But not so different that we always say we are seeing different cows... At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow...Our experiences are different though. — frank
So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on? — Banno
At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow... — Banno
I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at — frank
Here's the point, again; one does not see the representation; seeing is constructing the representation. — Banno
You mean like direct realism = the apple is distal object is numerically identical to the apple percept? — fdrake
The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).
...
... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.
If colours are no more than mental phenomena, how is it that we agree that clear skys are blue? How is it that we agree that an ache is not a sting?
They are also linguistic, and physical. — Banno
This is equivocation. There is "colour" as an object's surface disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light and there is "colour" as the mental phenomenon that differs between those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision (and that occurs when we dream and hallucinate).
Despite sharing the same label these are distinct things – albeit causally covariant given causal determinism.
Those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision will agree that some object reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, but they will see it to have a different colour appearance.
All assertion and no argument. I'll wait until you present an argument to address—responding to mere assertions being a waste of time. — Janus
This is equivocation. There is "colour" as an object's surface disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light and there is "colour" as the mental phenomenon that differs between those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision (and that occurs when we dream and hallucinate). — Michael
If there is a equivocation here, it is being forced on us. But in any case, it seems we now agree that colours are not just mental phenomena. — Banno
There's also the colour red. Folk knew about it well before they knew about wavelengths and three channel colour vision. — Banno
:rofl: I think it is exactly the problem. We do not disagree on anything to do with the physiology or physics hereabouts. Where we disagree is as to the language of perception.That issue of language has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
Something like that. This is where @Isaac would chime in. :worry:"The model emerges in the process of you interacting with the room. — wonderer1
Well, yes; if by "colour: you mean only mental phenomena, then colours are only mental phenomena, and you have thereby invented your own little language game that you can go play in the corner by yourself.When I say "I see colours and colours are mental phenomena" I am referring to the mental phenomena, not whatever else the term "colour" might be used to refer to. — Michael
I think it is exactly the problem. We do not disagree on anything to do with the physiology or physics hereabouts. Where we disagree is as to the language of perception.
I say we see the cow. You say we see only the mental cow.
I don't see our approaches as meshing. — Banno
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